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
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HUMAN DESTINY.

A DISCUSSION.

**DO REASON AND THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THE UTTER EXTINCTION
OF AN UNREGENERATE PORTION OF HUMAN BEINGS,
INSTEAD OF THE FINAL SALVATION OF ALL?**


AFFIRMATIVE.

BY REV. C. F. HUDSON.

NEGATIVE.

BY REV. S. COBB.

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PREFACE.

THIS Discussion is given to the public in book form, in compliance with the call of many friends, from various parts of the country. It originally appeared in the *Christian Freeman and Family Visiter*, and the manner of its origin will appear from the following editorial note and preliminary correspondence.

ANOTHER DISCUSSION.

ANNIHILATIONISM IN THE FIELD.

WE have repeatedly received requests from different parts of the country, to embrace the earliest opportunity to take up, in our columns, and thoroughly review, the annihilation theory, or that of the final and literal destruction of the unregenerate, to the extinction of their existence. We had intended to do so after closing the discussion with Dr. Adams, and to do it mainly in the form of a review of the large work published more than a year ago, by Rev. C. F. Hudson, entitled "Debt and Grace." That work is devoted, in part, to the refutation of the doctrine of endless punishment, which is done with masterly power; and, in part, to the advocacy of this other theory, which is becoming popular in the West,* and into which many "Orthodox" professors in all parts of the country are sliding, as a poor relief from that of endless torments. We promised

* I think it prevails much more at the East than at the West.—C. F. H.

a review of Mr. Hudson's theory, put forth in his book, when we received a copy of it from the author, but other labors have crowded it over.

And now, it is happily opportune that the author of that able work should propose to us a discussion, in our columns, of this important subject. The following preliminary correspondence will explain all : —

REV. MR. HUDSON TO THE EDITOR.

Boston, Jan. 18, 1859.

REV. S. COBB, *Editor of the Christian Freeman*: Dear Sir, — In your notice of my book, about a year ago, you remarked that you might at some time give a "faithful review" of the theory it advocates. I have not seen your paper regularly since that time; but on inquiry I do not hear of such a review as your remark foretokened. I will now say that I have desired, for a reason which I will give hereafter, to give the public of Boston and vicinity some statements of my doctrine; and to do this in a newspaper discussion, as most likely to meet those I wish to reach. Another paper is open to me, but I would prefer yours. If you will entertain any proposal of the kind, either directly or after concluding your reply to Dr. Adams, I will consider or offer such terms of arrangement as may be convenient.

Yours, very respectfully, C. F. HUDSON.

THE EDITOR TO MR. HUDSON.

Christian Freeman Office, Jan. 19, 1859.

REV. C. F. HUDSON: Dear Sir, — Your note of yesterday is received. Soon after I received your book, I announced my intention of giving its affirmative principles a "faithful review," at some future time. Having closed reviews of other important works then in hand, I took up Miss Beecher's "Common Sense," etc.; and then the subject of Spiritualism; and then preliminary arrangements were entered into for the discussion, now in progress, with Dr. Adams; so that I have not even taken time to read your book in course, designing to read it carefully when I should take it in hand, with reference to the purposed review. Yet I have not for a moment relinquished my design to read it in the manner and for the purpose mentioned.

But with regard to the discussion which you suggest, to occupy the

columns of the *Christian Freeman*, I doubt not that a satisfactory arrangement to that end may be made between us. With regard to time, however, my reply to Dr. Adams will run through two months yet: and I shall want a little time further to get it out in book form, and a little respite, probably, extending to the commencement of my new volume, the first of May. In the mean time, you will inform me of your purpose and plan (for I have nothing to propose), let me know your aim, and the method which lies in your mind, and if it shall be such as, in my view, promises good to the public, I shall enter most cordially into the arrangement.

Yours, most truly,

S. COBB.

MR. HUDSON TO THE EDITOR.

Boston, Jan. 20, 1859.

REV. S. COBB: *Dear Sir*,—Yours of yesterday is received. I regret if my first note seemed to imply any need of explanation of delay in the proposed review. I am sufficiently aware of the endless and ever changing duties of an editor, to understand how a strong purpose of the kind might be not only postponed, but fairly forgotten.

The delay until May 1st, might be inconvenient for me, because I may not then be in this neighborhood, or in the vicinity of any good library. If I am then here, I shall be pleased if arrangements may be made. But, meanwhile, *another* arrangement might be made, which I would like quite as well if it would suit you. For reasons which would appear in the sequel, I care more to combat the notion of endless misery, than that of the final happiness of all, though I deem both views equally erroneous. The former, however, creates a panic which crushes reason, and perpetuates itself by making calm consideration impossible. The latter, I think, easily admits corrective influences, especially when it shall be viewed in proper relations of contrast. I think much of its power has come out of its just quarrel with the "orthodox" view.

If, now, you know or can find any one who will maintain the "orthodox" view against my own, I will agree to meet him in your paper, if that would suit you, and we could arrange preliminaries. Your own view would still remain to be considered. This would, indeed, be a triangular discussion; but Christianity has got itself into a triangle; and the debate, if novel, would be no more so than the fact.

If this strikes your mind favorably, the terms of the second part of

the discussion could be fixed at your pleasure. Two ways would be open. Either I could introduce the new discussion, or, you might introduce your view as a reply to my own, and allow a rejoinder.

My "aim" would be mainly to make known the principal reasons and methods of argument that support my view, as they are now little understood. I have thought of doing this in a pamphlet, and shall do so if there is no discussion. I may add that the circumstance which first suggested a discussion was the materialism that encumbered the late discussion in this city.*

Yours, very respectfully,

C. F. HUDSON.

THE EDITOR TO MR. HUDSON.

Christian Freeman Office, Jan. 28, 1859.

REV. MR. HUDSON: *Dear Sir,*—Your note of the 20th instant was duly received. With regard to the proposition for a discussion in my columns between yourself and some one believing in endless punishment, it does not strike my mind favorably, for the reason, among others, that the great argument for endless punishment from one of its most able advocates, has just been presented to my readers, and I am occupying considerable space in replying to it. But a friendly discussion of your own theory between yourself and me may conveniently obtain. I do not see that the probability of your absence from this city the latter part of the spring, and early summer, presents any serious difficulty. The plan of the discussion may be matured; you may have your main work in perfect readiness, and left with me; I will send the papers to you wherever you may be, which shall contain your statement of principles and argument, and my replies; and you can send by mail such brief rejoinder as you may deem expedient. Why not?

I suppose you will furnish me with a complete statement of your theory, so far at least as it may differ from Universalism, embracing, perhaps, some succinct statement of your reasons for renouncing endless punishment, which I may publish in one or more numbers, and proceed to review. Please give me a definite statement of your plan.

In respect to the *time of beginning*, I shall not probably get through with Dr. Adams until about the last of March. My new volume commences the first of May. That will leave me but the month of

* Reference is here made to the oral debate between Rev. Mr. Grant, Destructionist, and Rev. Dr. Litch, of Philadelphia, Presbyterian.—S. C.

Appl for respite, and for various necessary preparations for the new volume. Furthermore, as there will be additions of new subscribers to commence with the new volume, for this reason, and the convenience to those who bind their files to have the entire discussion in one volume, the right time to commence will be the first of May.

Yours, most truly,

S. COBB.

MR. HUDSON TO THE EDITOR.

Boston, Jan. 31, 1859.

REV. SYLVANUS COBB: *Dear Sir,*—Yours of the 28th instant is received. You may consider the discussion as a thing agreed on, and to be begun at the time you name.

I may furnish you, in a day or two, a succinct statement on the points you named; i.e., reasons for renouncing the so-called orthodox view, and the heads of my present faith. These are of course given at large in my book, except the relations I hold to your view, which are slightly indicated.

I can now state, however, that my plan of argument would be briefly this: I should begin with naming the prominent occasions of the Universalist faith, as they discover themselves to my mind. This on the principle indicated by Coleridge,—we must recognize the features of truth in a system, ere we can meet its supposed errors.

Next, I should raise the question, Are there radically bad men?—giving my reasons for thinking there are.

Thirdly, Do the Scriptures teach the immortality of mankind as a race, or of the good—or those who shall become good—as a class? This I should consider the main question.

As supplementary to the last, would follow some historical argument, mainly as comment on the expression: “Life and Immortality brought to light.”

Then would come the rational argument; or, Is the view I offer consistent with a just philosophy, and with the sentiments of humanity? This would include a metaphysical argument.

I might add a theological argument; or endeavor to show that the main tenor of the gospel and the import of the term “salvation,” is better observed by my view than by yours.

Yours, very respectfully,

C. F. HUDSON.

So, then, this discussion is to take place, to commence some time in May. We do not know whether or not we shall com-

mence our reply in the same number which shall contain Mr. Hudson's first article. It will depend on whether there shall be a completeness in it of itself, or whether there shall appear to be such a relation in it to something to follow, that we shall judge it expedient to wait that we may see the whole in all its bearings.

And now with regard to the *status* of the man whom we introduce to our readers in the capacity of a discussionist. We would not dishonor our *Family Visitor*, nor misuse our patrons, by admitting as a disputant a weak-minded, illiterate, and discourteous opponent. Mr. Hudson is a gentleman of the first order of talent, education, and social and Christian refinement. He was graduated at Western Reserve College, Ohio, studied Theology at Lane Seminary, under Drs. Beecher and Stowe, labored some time in the orthodox ministry; embraced his present sentiment about six years ago, has since devoted a portion of the time as a teacher in an institution of learning, and much of his time to researches in ecclesiastical history, and to book-making. The following editorial notices of his large book before mentioned, mostly from his theological opponents, will afford our readers an idea of his standing in the world of mind:—

"We have here a work surpassing in elaborateness and completeness the most of modern theological productions. . . . The author is mild and candid in the statement of his views, correct in his representations of others, and exceedingly full and impartial in his exhibition of the various phases of belief and conjecture that have prevailed, both among philosophers and Christian writers, from the Fathers down to the present time."—*Zion's Herald*.

"We have read it with deep interest, and not without profit."—*Congregationalist*.

"His work shows very careful and extensive research, and on many collateral points his suggestions will be found instructive and important. . . . The aim of the book is, by showing the limitation of evil, to vindicate the goodness of God. There is scarcely one of the numerous positions of the writer for which he does not find collateral support in passages from the writings of distinguished Christian authors of past centuries."—*New-York Evangelist*.

"As a history of religious opinions, their relations and influence, it

is a *thesaurus*. It has more real argument in it than almost any other 12mo volume of less than 500 pages we have ever seen. . . . It is impossible not to respect his candor and acknowledge his ability. He is not to be answered by a paragraph, nor disposed of by a sneer."—*Free-Will Baptist Quarterly*.

"Moving straight in among some of the most perplexed, solemn, and profound questions of theological concern in our day, — especially those of Retribution, Human Nature, Divine Justice, and Love, — with a bold heart, a firm step, and a learned head, the author will not fail to get a hearing. He has suffered cheerfully, both for his orthodoxy and his liberality. Whatever sectarians and idlers may do, thinkers and scholars will attend to him with respect."—*Huntington's Monthly Religious Magazine*.

"The following is from one of the best-informed theologians of America: — 'It is a work with which no one who feels an interest in the subject can afford to dispense, whatever may be his views. The matter of fact and argument condensed in it would be expanded by many writers into half a dozen volumes. . . . I am persuaded that there is no single work which gives so good an historical view of the various forms of opinion in relation to the matters discussed. . . . It is not merely a work of learning; it is full of thought.' "—*Christian Register*.

"A most extraordinary book — on the score of argumentative ability, among the greatest contributions that have been made to theological literature in America for many years."—*Universalist Quarterly*.*

These are samples of the commendations of Mr. Hudson's

* The book is entitled, "Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of a Future Life." Pp. viii. and 472, 12mo. Price, \$1.25. Published by Messrs. J. P. Jewett & Co., Boston.

The Rev. Convers Francis, D.D., Professor in Cambridge Divinity School, says of it: — "The most complimentary notices have certainly done it no more than justice — hardly that. The more I have read it, the more I have admired the very thorough and painstaking research, the profound scholarship, and the able, fair reasoning, which pervade the whole work. I really think it is a book of higher theological character than we have had among us for a long time. The ability, the sound learning, and the extent of research by which it is characterized, will entitle it to rank among the works of permanent and settled value in theology."

talents and acquirements, which we might proceed to copy at great length. A few days since we saw an original letter addressed to him from Edward White, of London, who stands at the head of this denomination in England, conceding to him priority of rank in their religious body, for ability and effective labor in their cause.

And now it is with unfeigned pleasure that we introduce into our columns an opponent who is our superior in talent and education, for our combined efforts will conduce the more efficiently to the development of truth.

We presume there will be no occasion for making this discussion a very protracted one, as the essential points will be few, and we can conceive of no necessity for extensively discussing but few passages of Scripture—leading passages, which shall be samples of the classes relied upon. The numbers will also be made shorter than we have made them in our discussion with Dr. Adams, that the other varieties on the inside of our paper may not be crowded out.

If the result of this discussion shall be the enlargement of the faith of some, so that what John Foster calls a “prodigious relief” shall become a “joy *unspeakable and full of glory*,” we shall feel abundantly compensated for our labor.

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The preceding references to the Negative are convenient and proper. The plan might have included the Rejoinder and Review.]

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DISCUSSION OF HUMAN DESTINY.

DISCUSSION OF HUMAN DESTINY.

QUESTION.

Do reason and the Scriptures teach the utter extinction of an unregenerate portion of human beings, instead of the final salvation of all?

AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENT.

BY C. F. HUDSON

INTRODUCTION.

FOR several generations past the great controversy in the Christian Church has turned on the question of a supposed eternal misery of the wicked, and a supposed eternal evil in the universe of God. Two parties have been arrayed against each other, separated by a twice infinite difference of opinion, inasmuch as endless bliss and endless woe are each infinitely removed, and in opposite directions, from man's original nothingness. Each party has also maintained, consistently with its confidence in the safety of truth, or at least in the hurtfulness of error, that its opinion is most conducive to the present and future welfare of man. And when we look to the lives of those who have held the opposing opinions with any devoutness, it can not be denied that they have exhibited real, though sometimes different, graces and virtues.

Paradoxical though it may seem, their twice infinite difference has turned on one point of agreement. They have held alike and in common the actual immortality of all human souls. The paradox vanishes at a single thought, and appears as an

essential and explanatory fact. For only as immortal beings can sinful men be eternally blessed or endlessly wretched.

But this common opinion of a general immortality is lately, more than for several centuries past, challenged and denied. It is claimed, by respectable and growing numbers, that man's immortality is not absolute, but dependent on personal goodness and virtue of character. The language of Paul, "to those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor, and immortality, eternal life," is taken by these persons in a literal sense, which precludes the endless life of those who obey not the gospel of Christ. This third opinion, commonly known as that of the final annihilation of the wicked, is now giving a triangular character to the Eschatology of the day. In its recent history it is not old enough to have *produced* much character of any kind, and will be judged somewhat by the existing character of those who embrace it. I think it suffers no disparagement by their general morals. And two hundred years ago, when it had lived long enough to allow some estimate of its proper fruits, we are told it was "matter of public notoriety that in respect to morals no sect had approached more nearly to the simplicity and strictness of the early Christians" than those who held this view.

It has fallen to my lot to offer this view instead of that of eternal suffering, in my book on "The Doctrine of a Future Life." There has been a little criticism on the part of my orthodox friends, as if I had more ably combated their view than defended my own. And I have met a few who told me they would sooner accept the Universalist faith than mine. The former fact I think is due to the aggressive character of my book; the latter, to the modern novelty of my opinion. But in view of both facts I am happy in my present opportunity to treat the question anew; to show — if my pen and the truth will allow it — that the Universalist view is untenable, and to say some things that more directly concern the view I hold.

But before I proceed to the argument I should meet certain prejudices of various kinds that may beset me.

1. I shall not by the phrase "Universalist faith" imply the opinion that all men, without respect to present character, enter immediately after death into a state of unsullied happiness. This notion has been ably opposed by those called Restorationists, and it is fast declining. Yet I find the term *Restorationist* inconvenient, because it implies the opinion that there is a fall in the history of the human race from which man is restored; and this opinion is disowned by many who believe that condition is ever the inseparable consequence of acquired character, that salvation is never forfeited or lost, and that Restoration is strictly impossible. By the term Universalist, then, I mean simply one who holds that all men will be at last both holy and happy.

2. I shall disclaim all opinion of a special or violent interposition on the part of God, in the final perishing of the wicked. My view is that the unrepenting sinner *destroys himself*; and though this self-destruction may not be complete in the death of the body, but in a second instalment of death, I shall still regard it not as miracle, but the natural process of the life divorced from an unloved God, languishing back to naught.

This view also cuts off a frequent objection that final punishment is "vindictive," and that God is wrathful in a bad sense of the word. It also allows the opinion that physical death is not a crisis in the history of one's being, and that one who has not deliberately rejected God and virtue before the dying breath, may embrace God and virtue thereafter. Thus I hold, and have long held, the salvability of the heathen. The doctrine of an intermediate state without change, and of an appointed limit of probation on either side of the interval between death and resurrection, may still be true.

3. I speak of "persistently wicked" men. I do not *assume* that there are such, that being part of the argument. Nor do I design to limit the power of God in this regard, but only to show that the soul may be so contaminated with sin that reformation would involve reconstruction, at the hazard of personal identity; or, that after a great sin the power of faith in God's forgiveness, or the possibility of happiness along with a faithful memory, may be gone.

Having premised these things, I am prepared to state my general argument, as follows:—

I. What are the prominent occasions of the Universalist faith?

II. Are there radically bad men? Or, is there a “good in all,” which may justly be called a redeeming virtue in the worst, and a nucleus of their reformation and salvation?

III. Do the Scriptures teach the immortality of man as a race, or of the good—or those who shall become good—as a class?

IV. Is the immortality of the good as a class supported by the history, especially of early Christian doctrine?

V. Does this doctrine accord with a just philosophy, and with the sentiments of humanity?

By way of apology I will offer but a single word. The compliments that have been bestowed upon my book may raise undue expectations of my present argument. Suffice it to say, the book was the fruit of long meditation, and of several years' study; my present effort must be begun and ended in not many days. And I am not as familiar with Universalist as with orthodox opinions and history. The main advantage, if any, which I shall have over the opponent of my opponent in their late discussion, will be that of my position. I have not to maintain any tenet of eternal woe. For this advantage partly do I write, and on it partly shall I rely. In one view it is a disadvantage. My change from the orthodox view was a great emancipation, and he who has changed once may change again. Who knows that one will abide in the half-way house, and will not some day rejoice in another great emancipation? We shall see. Meanwhile, I shall deem the present essay as an introduction to the great subject, on which I may possibly, years hence, gratify the wish of friends at both ends of the street by writing more fully.

CHAPTER I.

WHAT ARE THE PROMINENT OCCASIONS OF THE UNIVERSALIST FAITH?

HERE is a delicate point of argument; for the causes of human opinion bear some analogy to the motives of human conduct, of which we ought not hastily to judge. I think, however, the argument is a legitimate one; for every cause enters into and qualifies its effect. Nothing is thoroughly known until it is traced to its source. Moreover, in every important and extensively prevalent opinion, however erroneous, there is some element of truth whence its power is derived. And we shall labor at great disadvantage if we do not thankfully recognize all that is good, even relatively, in whatever we oppose. I think the remark of Coleridge a just one, that "unless you understand a man's ignorance, you may be sure you are ignorant of his understanding." I shall waste my words if I do not know the paths by which my gentlemanly opponent and those on his side have come to their opinions. Only thus should any one pretend to offer himself as a guide into the right way.

1. One most obvious cause of Universalism is the reaction from the doctrine of eternal misery. It is easy to utter those two fearful words without thinking what they mean. It is almost as easy to forbear thinking upon them out of a suspicion that they mean more than can be true. But to ponder them, and *then* believe them, is hard indeed, and requires a high opinion or a deep sense of human guilt and ill desert. I have met with ministers who confessed they did not dare to think of the eternity of misery, for fear they should doubt the fact. And it has been said very plausibly, if not very truly in the choice between the two more prevalent beliefs: "We are all

Universalists when we lose our friends." And I can easily understand those who say they did not really believe in endless woe, even when they thought they did.

In this view I would say that the Universalist faith is relatively true. But it will be a part of my historical argument to show that this reaction did not begin—as there was no occasion for it—until the latter half of the second century, when Platonic views of the immortality of the soul had begun to be received into the faith of Christians.

2. Certain views of the sovereignty and supremacy of God have in various ways promoted the Universalist faith. Men would fain comprehend all things in the world, including those which seem evil and wrong, under one system and plan of God. This desire seeks to get rid of the perplexity and mystery of sin. It is of two kinds,—intellectual and moral; the first often attended with a deadness of the moral sense, and the second growing out of a tenderness and acuteness of the moral sense. A word respecting each of these.

(1.) I frequently meet persons who say there can be nothing in the universe opposed to the will of God, for the very idea of God makes Him the absolute sovereign, disposing and ordaining all events. In accordance with this view they excuse any apparent wrong in themselves as the necessary imperfection of finite and infant being. And as they grow consistently cold and philosophic, they extend the same charity to their neighbors. "Whatever is, is right," is their motto. And though earth is so full of apparently needless suffering, and of such exquisite counterfeits—if not realities—of guilt, these people persuade themselves that the Infinite Being can not have allowed any thing which He would disapprove or dislike, and that all men, with greater or less completeness of moral mechanism, are gliding on toward the same final happiness.

This philosophy is doubtless a reaction, in part, from the higher forms of Calvinism. When the scripture texts that asserted the unity and sovereignty of God against the Persian Dualism and the Greek and Roman Polytheism, were taken as charging God with all that men ever did, and when God was

said to condemn some *for the sake* of glorifying others, so that he must appear to do evil that good might come, it is no wonder that all evil was denied, though at the hazard of denying with it all moral good, and of locking up the universe in necessity and fate.

This doctrine of necessity I name as a cause of Universalism, not because all Universalists hold it, but because I meet it more frequently now in their books and on their lips than elsewhere. I rarely meet one who makes a thorough and outspoken denial of man's free agency, who is not a Universalist. And I so often meet Universalists who scout the notion of free will and moral responsibility, that the two beliefs have become somewhat associated in my mind. Many of the persons I speak of are not members of Universalist churches; but some of them are such, and they find support in respectable books of Universalist literature.

(2.) But a sensitively acute moral sense, no less than a cold philosophy, may stagger at the mystery of sin and deny its existence. For sin, as I take it, when reduced to its proper elements, is no mere misfortune or indiscretion; but it is doing wrong in the face of conviction both of duty and of interest, and with the certain prospect of bitter regret, availing or unavailing. Thus sin, as sin, is purely monstrous,—excuseless and reasonless, a disjoining of the will from its just moral relations, threatening havoc around if not ruin within. But this anomaly is so horrible and horrifying that, like calamitous tidings, men dread to believe it true. They sometimes turn away from it, shocked and confounded, wishing not to look at it, or to think of it, again; but hoping that the apparent mystery of human guilt may be resolved into some better mystery of divine goodness and omnipotent love.

Whether the mystery can be thus solved is a question to be considered in the next chapter. I need only to remark here that Olshausen, alluding to the Universalist view, has well said: "Although this may often be owing to a sickly and torpid state of the moral feelings, yet it is without doubt deeply rooted in noble minds; it is the longing of the soul after complete har-

mony in the universe.”* But I think such a harmony does not preclude the notion of temporary and even self-ruinous perversion of finite free agency. God may still be divinely sovereign and good. “The highest power only becomes the more perfect, from the fact that instead of acting with all-subduing violence, it operates in a determinate mode, as a spirit of holiness and love. This higher power may safely leave man free, for the very reason that it is omnipotent; for it is the character of strength not to fear freedom; and it is precisely because Omnipotence governs the world, that no infringement of universal order is to be apprehended from the personal self-subsistence [or perverse action] of finite spirits.”†

3. I query whether Universalists do not usually hold an opinion of the “highest good” from which I should dissent, but which has contributed to their faith. The natural and just revulsion from the thought of eternal misery has given prominence to the question of happiness or misery; and it were no wonder if this question should displace that which is most important,—What is the *highest kind* of happiness or welfare? Is it not virtue? Is it not better to be *worthy* than to be *fortunate*? My noble opponent, and multitudes of Universalists with him, will at once say, “Yes, virtue by all means, and let the happiness take care of itself. First pure, then peaceable. Seek *first* the kingdom of God, and his righteousness.” And the moral philosophy prevalent among Universalists,—that blessing can not be sundered from goodness, that suffering is inseparable from guilt, and that the only forgiveness is the putting away of sin,—this philosophy has opposed the happiness-worship of which I speak. Still I doubt if many have not *become* Universalists out of a primary love of enjoyment—here or hereafter—to which moral worth is secondary. The same may be true of other religionists—this is religionism as distinct from genuine godliness, and it is an exceedingly subtle mischief in human nature. But is it not fostered more by the

* Comm. on Matt. xii. 31, 32.

† Bockshammer, *Freedom of the Will*, p. 104. Kaufmann's Trans.

hope of a final happiness, in spite of any guilty abatement or postponement of that happiness, than by the doctrine that makes godliness the condition of the gain or total loss of the happiness?

I have watched the progress of phrenology, and have read some phrenological books. I am sure that multitudes of them make virtue the means and happiness the end, as if virtue were not intrinsically good. Many of them manifestly use words of moral and religious import in a merely physical sense, as Epicurus doubtless did when he wrote a book about holiness. In fact, much of the phrenological philosophy is strictly Epicurean, making pleasure the highest good, and prudence the highest virtue. Of the phrenologists the great majority I think are Universalists; — many because they have found in their science special and striking proofs of the goodness of God in the economy of Pain — of which hereafter. But many of them are Universalists on the happiness principle. These are no disparagement to those who are nobler minded; but the fact is proper to be named among the causes of the faith.

4. Important among these causes are various modern reforms, such as those of criminal codes, of prison discipline, and of the treatment of the insane, and efforts in behalf of the intemperate, of abandoned females, and of vagrant children. All these reforms have grown out of a kindlier feeling of humanity, and they have all encouraged a higher faith in the salvability of those who seemed beyond hope. Many who had been given up as lost have been recovered back to the paths of virtue. These reforms are an honor to our age, and no lover of his kind should discourage the last effort to save the fallen. They are our brothers and our sisters all. But the question still remains whether the cases of reformation form so large an induction as to warrant the inference of a general salvation in the holiness and blessedness of God's kingdom. This question I reserve for the next chapter, where I shall examine the doctrine of the "good in all," which is one form of the Universalist faith.

5. Philanthropic effort in behalf of the slave is another occasion of this faith. "God hath made of one blood all nations of men." There is a human brotherhood, and a divine Fatherhood; and he is false to humanity and piety who does not recognize and live out this truth. But whether the fact warrants the faith in question is to be considered.

6. Modern Spiritualism has doubtless promoted the belief of the final salvation of all. I would not by any means confound the two doctrines; for the majority of Universalists may think no more of the supposed revelations of Spiritualism than I do. And I shall have no occasion to discuss their merits. I simply name the fact that nearly all Spiritualists are Universalists, and may refer to the opinions of some Spiritualists when I come to the scripture doctrine of immortality.

7. I think that Universalists have thought less than others of the infinitude of blessing implied in eternal life, and have thus been more ready to regard eternal life as the destiny of all. I think this is the *fact* because I have frequently heard Universalists speak of it as unjust if the sufferings of this life are not to be compensated with endless joy; or, as if the eternal life of some instead of all would be an unequal partiality in God. The *reasons* for the fact are various.

(1.) Universalists have not been compelled to ponder and weigh an infinite boon in order to justify a supposed exposure to an infinite woe. This is an orthodox habit of mind, which is exceedingly interesting, and which is one of the more common methods of vindicating the divine justice. God is so good as to offer immortal glory to man, once and again. If man declines—refuses—rejects—scorns the offer, does he not deserve the pains of hell? How shall we escape endless pangs, if we neglect so great salvation? Such is the argument; and it is so plausible that I have heard of one Universalist preacher who in a pardonable vexation with the people for not welcoming his faith said that if there was not a hell there ought to be one. The orthodox reasoning on this subject is indeed a monstrous perversion, which, pressed to its consequences, involves the notion that, from the beginning and for

ever, infinite evil has as good a right of possession and may claim as fair a chance in the universe as infinite good.

But, notwithstanding this fearful corollary, the orthodox man, compelled to offset an infinite good against an infinite evil, has got some benefit of the process. With this doctrine of election, or selection, he has thought *intensively*, has intently considered the "powers of the world to come," has reckoned the "unsearchable riches" until he has felt that they were past computation, and has contemplated the "far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" until not only the heaviest temporal calamities have seemed a "light affliction," but even the hazards of deathless pain, however imminent, have seemed of little account.

The method of the Universalist, on the other hand, has been the *extensive*. He has enlarged the range of the eternal life, making it comprehend the entire host of the human race, and the whole range of God's intelligent creatures. The orthodox estimates have been those of *magnitude*; the Universalist, those of *multitude*. And I believe that many Universalists have sought to enlarge the bounds of the eternal weal (they can not make them wider than I shall) *because* they have less fathomed its depths.

I think the early Christians had an advantage here. With no eternal evil to fear for any, but deeming themselves called by God's free gift, freely received, to be "heirs of glory," joint heirs with Christ of all that eternity can yield, they gained some sense of what is "Length, and Breadth, and Depth, and Height," in the computations of the celestial kingdom. Hence we cease to wonder that when fiery trials came, and not the strong men only, but delicate women and children of tender age were killed all day long, counted out like sheep for the butcher, — they thought they more than conquered, in the name of the Prince of Life who had loved them unto death. The early Christian martyrdoms served as a precedent for the courage of the later martyrs, burdened with the tenet of eternal woe. Let that burden be removed, and the "great salvation" be great not as from an infinite evil, but as for an

eternal and ever augmenting good,—and when poor, weak men, born of yesterday, shall begin to reckon the magnitude of the salvation, modesty may inspire some doubt whether all are thus saved. To be indeed “children of the Most High,” “sons of God,” “kings and priests” unto the Lord of all, *may* be so high an honor that an “election,” or selection, shall not be a very unworthy doctrine.

(2.) The slight estimate of which I speak is in part due to a reaction from a false heavenly mindedness. There are many professing Christians who seem to do christian duties *because* they lead on to eternal glory. This is what Coleridge has well styled “the-other-worldliness,”—trying to be godly, not because it is right, but because it will pay well. This is a gross perversion, the over-working and abuse of considerations that should be properly used, for cherishing of gratitude and for comfort in tribulation. It is the counterfeit doing harm to the genuine. And this spurious piety is specially mischievous when it assumes that the degree of future glory is never affected by one’s attainments in virtue, but that the best and the worst of the saved will be at once and equally blessed when they pass the pearly gates—a doctrine which the parable of the laborers in the vineyard was never designed to teach. This selfish and miraculous theory of future glory is justly repudiated by many Universalists, who find the law and the measure of happiness in virtue itself. Science and philosophy are discovering to men close and natural connections between well-doing and well-being. A very important gospel this—or, rather, a very important law of all gospel. But it may go too far with its doctrine of natural processes, sinking the supernatural in these, and losing itself in the finite, which is its proper sphere. And it will be well if in the rigor of moral law men do not forget the miracle of infinite love that has offered immortal life to those who had incurred some sort of death.

(3.) The light estimate of eternity is also due, in part, to the secular prosperity of this age, and to the unwonted preaching of the gospel in its secular bearings. The gospel easily catches

the spirit of the times ; and in this age of social wealth, with its new social interests and pressing problems, the attention of Christians is a little turned away from heaven to earth. In the gospel for the times many things are said that are immensely true and important. There is a gospel for the drunkard, for the harlot, for the pauper, and for the slave ; and woe be to us if we preach not all these gospels. Yet they are all worthless and false, and they will surely degenerate into mere temporalities, if they are not leavened and permeated with the old gospel of salvation from sin and death, for a life that runs parallel with the eternal being of God. . We have need to remember what Archbishop Leighton once said, when reproached for not preaching up the times. He hoped that while so many were preaching up the times, he might be excused if one humble servant of Jesus Christ should preach up Heaven and Eternity.

CHAPTER II.

ARE THERE RADICALLY BAD MEN?

By radically bad men I do not mean persons who are born of badness and unto badness, as if character were a thing of parentage or race. But, are there human beings in whom evil feelings, purposes, and habits so predominate that they mark and determine the character? And I use the popular phrase "bad men," rather than the scriptural phrase "the wicked," because I think the former best represents the latter in its original and proper sense. But scriptural expressions are apt to be used in a technical and conventional sense; "the righteous" and "the wicked" may come to signify men who are such according to an arbitrary and false standard. This is a great evil, and it needs to be corrected by substituting for the technical phrases such homely but hearty Saxon words as scarcely need defining.

And by the question, Are there radically bad men?—I do not mean to intimate that there are no traces of good nature even in the worst men. The real question will be, Is the "good in all," upon which the Universalist so much relies, a genuine goodness, a real virtue, a moral principle? Is it an element so substantial, and a germ so vital, that it must, by a natural law of character, grow and develop into a prevailing goodness and a final salvation? If this question is answered in the negative, then the question remains, Will God, by methods higher than the native elements of character, secure in all men a final holiness and blessedness? This question will be considered in the closing chapter.

Here, at the outset, I should discard a host of rash and conventional judgments that are wont to be pronounced upon human character. Men are too often judged good or bad ac-

ording to outward appearance. This is the way of men as compared with the judgment of Him who looketh upon the heart. Precisely this is meant by the "respect of persons" which the Scriptures so much rebuke. Human nature, fallen desperately in love with happiness, is apt to think that those who are "well off" must be good people, and that those who are badly off must be bad folks. This was the great mistake of Job's friends, and it has been made thousands of times since his day. God is no such "respector of persons," or of outward advantages; but in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness, in whatever condition, is accepted of him.

This principle cuts off all hasty condemnation of the heathen in the mass, as if they must inevitably perish. If they cherish true goodness and virtue, neither their ignorance nor their unscriptural methods of worship will exclude them from God's kingdom. But as ignorance is a very great evil, and the gospel is worth preaching to everybody, the question remains, Whether a heathen, with his false views of God, may not lose confidence in the supremacy of goodness, take the side of an evil divinity because the evil divinity is supposed to be the more powerful, and thus debauch the conscience and allow vice to become a settled policy and ruling principle of the character? How else shall we understand Paul's account, in which, after giving a long catalogue of heathen sins, he says: "Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them?"

In judging of character I also throw out of account all considerations of natural temper or disposition, amiable or otherwise. The brutes, in their measure, may have these as well as men. We are responsible, not for the nature we are born with, but for the use we make of native temper and capacity, in repressing the evil and cherishing the good. I also throw out of the account the manifold differences of education and custom, whereby the same act which expresses ill-feeling and hate in one man may express goodness and love in another man. All this, I presume, is so well understood between him-

self and my opponent, that it needs only to be named, and not argued.

The whole subject of human character is a vast one, and it is all involved in the question if there be radically bad men. I can only pretend to make a few points of the general argument; suggestions only, where demonstration—in a matter so prejudiced by manifold dispute—would require a volume.

1. The first point to be insisted on is the essential and responsible freedom of the human will. I believe—it is almost a proverb—that the common consciousness of man asserts his freedom. Without this there could be no merit, either good or ill. Without this, whatever right or wrong there might be in the nature of things, neither could exist in actions or in men. There could be neither praise nor blame, there could be no character worthy of the name. Without freedom, the native dispositions and original feelings of men might be more complex than those of the brute, and more interesting for study; they might be more agreeable or disagreeable, more fortunate or unfortunate; still they would be the inevitable result of forces within the man and of circumstances without him, for which he would be as blameless and as thankless as the revolutions of the windmill.

But this practical consciousness of freedom—which excuses or condemns ourselves if it be real, and makes God an impostor if it be unreal—has been often denied for the sake of a theory. I believe it has often been denied by men troubled with a sense of guilt, of which they wished to be rid. Still more unfortunately has it been denied by divines, to save their views of a divine sovereignty and efficiency, or to save a false theory respecting God's foreknowledge. Supposing that God could foreknow only as a natural philosopher does, or as an astronomer predicts an eclipse,—by calculations of cause and effect—they have ignored all actions that could not be determined by such calculation. The same class of divines have also been prejudiced by a false theory of freedom; one which divorced the will utterly from *moral* considerations, and reduced it to a sheer caprice. At an earlier date—in the Reformation—

the notion of free will was supposed to make man independent of the gratuitous help of God. This explains that remarkable book of Luther, *On the Bondage of the Will* (*De Servo Arbitrio*). The other causes culminated in the no less remarkable and more famous work of Edwards on the *Freedom of the Will*.

Those who have opposed the Calvinistic scheme have often said that Universalism is its legitimate fruit. I think, for the theoretic denial of free will I have just named, that this is true. The Calvinists, by a happy inconsistency, have maintained a deep sense of the evil and wickedness of sin. But when they had, by a method

“More honored in the breach than in th’ observance,”

made the Author of man’s nature and surroundings responsible for all men’s doings, it was natural that men should infer that God’s fairness required the salvation of one as well as another. The principle, or rather the lack of principle, by which God elected one man, appeared equally good for the election of all men. Hence we need not wonder that the Universalism of eighty years ago was offered as a “Calvinism Improved” — a title given by Dr. Joseph Huntington to his Universalist book. Here another cause of Universalism is worthy of note. The Old-School doctrine of the *nature* of the Atonement made it a legal satisfaction for the sins of the saved. The New-School doctrine of the *extent* of the Atonement makes it sufficient for all men. Combine the two, and all are saved at a stroke of logic. Some of the Universalists have employed this logic, and the result of their reasoning abides, though the old and false view of the Atonement is discarded. But the Calvinistic views of the human will, I think, prevail now more among Universalists than among the Orthodox. I may have misjudged the literature of Universalism on this point, and if so I shall thankfully stand corrected. But such is my strong impression.

Now I admit that the freedom of the human will, as uncon-

trolled by any necessitating power of motives, makes the actions of men no more traceable by any philosophy of cause and effect. We shall then have what Dr. Bushnell calls the "supernatural" in the will itself. And when the will does not follow the motives or reasons which it *ought* to follow, there is a wild lawlessness that perplexes us, and threatens disorder and ruin, limited only by the power of the perverse free agency. But this lawlessness is precisely what I understand to be the essence of sin. Sin is the transgression of law ; and sin is *guilty*, and not unfortunate merely, just because it is not compelled by motive, or passion, or any cause out of the free will itself. And this, too, is the *mystery* of sin. It is that for which there is no valid reason ; an act which the person knows to be equally wrong and imprudent, and so an act of un-reason ; an act admitting no excuse save those worthless pleas by which the selfish or malicious guilt was first palliated or instigated. Such are the excuses which the stammering tongue fails to utter when one is confronted with the conscience, suppressed for a while, but again accusing. And by this final verdict of the conscience the guilty man is rendered — like him in the parable of the wedding garment — speechless.

This mystery of sin, which seems to be involved in the very idea of moral character, has been recognized by various eminent writers, ever since the time of Plato. I will quote but one, and that one probably a Universalist. I mean Neander, whose labors in Church History have such signal merit because he was not a mere compiler of facts, but a philosopher, profoundly versed in the causes of human action. He says: "According to my conviction, the origin of evil can only be understood as a fact — a fact possible by virtue of the freedom belonging to a human being, but not to be otherwise deduced or explained. It lies in the idea of evil that it is an utterly inexplicable thing, and whoever would explain it nullifies the very idea of it. It is not the limits of our knowledge which make the origin of sin something inexplicable to *us*, but it follows from the essential nature of sin as an act of free will that it must remain to all eternity an inexplicable fact. It can

only be understood empirically by means of the moral self-consciousness." (Planting and Training of the Church, book 6, chap. 1, note.)

I have thought it important thus to insist on the freedom of the will and the reasonless nature of guilt, as showing that man may be *really* guilty and bad. This alone, of course, does not prove any man *radically* bad, since one may, perhaps, repent of little sins, and reform himself into entire goodness. Yet the reasonless *nature* of guilt shows that it may not so be. He who acts foolishly, lawlessly, madly in a small matter, may do the same in things of weightier moment. He that is unjust in that which is least may also be unjust in much. Nay, as physical disorder tends to further and utter derangement, so the human will forsaking the law of reason may gain fresh impulse away from the true good, and end in final and utter abandonment, in the darkness of un-reason which it has freely entered.

I will here remark that while I am glad to hear my Universalist friends speak of charity and forgiveness, and doubt not they cherish a real feeling of good will toward all, yet a very common theory pressed to its consistent results would destroy the very idea of charity and forgiveness. If no man acts against known duty or interest, if all are doing precisely according to their best light and knowledge, then what place for charity or pardon? One who is conscious of having done the best he knew or could, does not ask forgiveness, nor thank one for the offer of it. And if it is further said that men do wrong only under the influence of passion or of strong temptation, the question recurs, Do they act with good conscience? and, Can they not resist and conquer their foes, the evil passions? If they can not, they need no pardon, for they are simply victims. If they can do better, their guilt remains; and while we should forgive until the seventy times seven, it should be with some fear that the actual and, in its measure, reasonless and excuseless guilt may continue and subvert the soul. But let us never speak of forgiveness under a theory that leaves nothing to be forgiven.

2. The nature of genuine moral virtue is such that we should not hastily conclude that all men possess it, even in slight measure. Virtue is something more than prudence, or a regard for one's interest. It is true that duty and interest ever *coincide*; neither can properly interfere with the other. Honesty is ever the best policy. Yet it has been well said that he who is honest from policy is not an honest man. To do a certain act *because* it is prudent and profitable, and to do the same act *because* it is right, generous and noble, are two very different things. Though all that is really virtuous is also really prudent, still here are two kinds of *motive* totally different. The two planes are indeed exactly parallel, and the figures are equal and similar; yet he who moves in one plane may have no sympathy whatever with him that moves in the other. The two persons are of different aims, and may therefore reach different moral results, and destinies.

The nature of virtue as something more than prudence may be observed in various relations, and illustrated in various ways. The man of prudent expediency is apt to be self-seeking and selfish. The man of principle regards what is right—for others no less than for himself. One makes self the centre about which his life revolves; and the other looks to what is just and good for all. One is devoted supremely to his own interests; the other is benevolent, devoted to the welfare of those around. One is seeking to gratify himself; the other is self-sacrificing, self-denying. The friendships of the one class are friendships of convenience,—they love those that love them, as publicans and sinners may do; the other class make all men their neighbors, and give not expecting to receive again. The former are almost sure to fall before temptation, because selfishness is ever short-sighted and blind and weak; the latter endure trial because they are settled in principles of duty, as upon a rock.

Here we may urge that the scripture doctrine of conversion contains an important principle, and that the change from selfishness to benevolence is most radical, and beyond the power of any prudential consideration. "He that saveth his life shall

lose it." "If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his life also, he can not be my disciple." Self-denial, or the foregoing of pleasure and even of the favor of friends and kindred, out of regard for him who was "full of grace and truth," is made the condition of acceptance with God. Such is the high style of virtue which he requires. But self-denial is, in the very idea of it, beyond the power of self-love. No self-seeking can help in this matter of self-forgetting. If this is not the sole work of a higher power, lifting man up and out of his selfishness with his free consent, it is at least the work of a higher nature than any mere regard, however far-seeing, to one's own interest. And this seems to me to cut off one very common argument of the Universalist, i.e., that the vicious and abandoned will and must become virtuous when they find that this is for their interest. I answer, the habit of self-interestedness is just what makes the case of many so helpless and hopeless. They are slaves to self, "lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God." This is their bondage, and they can not be emancipated by any proclamation how they may serve themselves better. Prudential maxims may lengthen their chain, but they can not break it; a wiser policy may let out their tether, and give them a wider range of self-service, but it can not make them truly free. It can not make them unselfish, or give them a generous and hearty interest in the well-being of others, or a self-sacrificing joy in that which is noble and true. Such a freedom comes from the Deliverer, the Jesus who came to save his people from their sins.

But to break away from this self-love requires some struggle and effort, and it may be refused as an intolerable hardship. Here is a most alluring bondage from which we are not sure that all will escape. True it is that when one is devoted from self to the general good, he *has* an interest in that wherein he *takes* an interest, so that "all things are his," and he has gained the true riches, the unsearchable and inexhaustible wealth of God's domain. But no self-love can grasp that priceless pearl. And because the neglected duty of regard for others brings an

accusing conscience, the duty itself may be hated. I can not otherwise explain the dislike which Alcibiades had for Socrates, when he "wished that he were no longer to be seen among men," apparently because, while Socrates was doubtless his true friend and well-wisher, he wished to dissuade him from a low but fond demagogueism, and make him a nobler and truer man. I can not otherwise explain the conduct of the man who ostracized the Athenian whom no man could accuse, because he could not bear to hear him perpetually called "Aristides the Just." I can not otherwise explain the open scoffing at the idea of moral principle, of which we heard a little in political life a few years since, when many whose sincerity was not questioned were reproached as "conscience men." I can not otherwise explain the feeling of the Scribes and Pharisees, of whom Christ said, "Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father;" a signal instance of cherished malignity, which seems to preclude the notion that all sin grows out of ignorance or misconception, or that all will do better when they know better.

For some further suggestions under this and the following heads, I will refer to Dr. Bushnell's argument on "The Fact of Sin," in his work on "Nature and the Supernatural." The most thorough discussion of the whole subject is found, I think, in Müller's "Christian Doctrine of Sin."

3. The extended history of wickedness among men, often in most flagrant forms, gives some reason to fear that there may be radically bad individuals, finally unsaved. I wish here not to be misunderstood. I am not of the croaking school of philosophers, who say deliberately and habitually what David said in haste, that "all men are liars." It is indeed a significant fact that multitudes have doubted whether there be any disinterested benevolence or virtue in the world. The famous maxims of Rochefoucault are based on this denial. And we know how many have re-asserted that of the British statesman: "Every man has his price." Almost in the same tone has Jeremiah said, "The heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately weak" (Heb. *enosh*), i.e., our hopes of

human nature are often woefully disappointed. But, while I doubt the conversion of the world into a church, I am not given to jeremiads. I do not believe that the history of the world has been mainly a catalogue of hatreds, vices, and crimes. I doubt not the vast majority of all men's outward acts have been good rather than bad. It must have been so. Society could not subsist for a single week if it were otherwise. Fallen as mankind are, they are not so lost to self-love that they should destroy themselves in a trice. And — better than this self-love or prudence — there are many natural sentiments of the human heart that produce much agreeable and amiable deportment and feeling. But it still remains true that man shows too bad a history for an unfallen race — a race of which every individual has retained the remnant of saving virtue, as a "good in all." For argument's sake we may regard as hyperbole the strong language in Genesis: "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of his thoughts was only evil, continually." And we may say the same of Paul's account in the first chapter of Romans: "And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, spiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them." But if this be hyperbole, it is not confined to inspired men, writing in the interest of a humbling doctrine of man's nature. A heathen writer of the first century says of Rome: "All is full of criminality and vice; indeed much more of these is committed than could be remedied by force. A monstrous contest of abandoned wickedness is carried on. The lust of sin increases daily, and shame is daily more and more extinguished. Discarding respect for all that is good and sacred,

just rushes on wherever it will. Vice no longer hides itself. It stalks forth before all eyes. So public has abandoned wickedness become and so openly does it flame up in the minds of all, that innocence is not only a rare thing, but has wholly ceased to exist." * Add to this dark picture of an age of corruption and vice the wars of aggression in all ages, and of conquest without even the paltry pretence of "extending the area of freedom"—too often for a French or Napoleonic love of "glory;" add the intrigues, lusts, rapines, and murders of all times, including the finest portions and palmiest days of Christendom; the revival of the slave-trade in the noon of the nineteenth century, uncondemned by the courts of "the land of the free and the home of the brave," and with the augmented horrors of a "middle passage" under the vigilance of a frowning world; add the developments of border-ruffianism, in Congress and out of it, scorning reason and truth to carry a purpose of oppressive and lustful conquest; add the recklessness of a perverse nature that so often utters the maxims: "rule or ruin," and "after us the deluge;" and from such historic data what shall we infer? Shall we say that all this badness is only a lowering of the general tone of morals, which yet spares the inmost integrity of each individual of the race? Shall we say that the evil infests society, and pervades the mass, injuring fatally no single member? The wide differences of character that have been ever observed, oppose this view. The distinctions of good men and bad men have not been regarded as mere differences in degree, but distinctions radical; and though they may have been sometimes made by false tests and standards, yet wherever there has been enough of moral truth for a true and just standard, the same distinctions have been made none the less. Here is a very strong presumption that, as many seem far more bad than good, so as to be commonly reckoned on the whole bad, the badness which is so large in the aggregate may in some individuals be more concentrated, so as radically to affect and determine the character.

* Seneca, *De Irâ*, l. 2 c. 8. Compare Livy's Preface.

4. Various examples, I think, confirm our fears that some men are hopelessly bad. And I shall not seek my examples among the lower classes of men, so often given over as past saving, or as not worth saving, by the *élite* of society. Here is one of the great corruptions that Christ came to rebuke, — the “respect of persons” or of outward appearances and advantages, which often make men really worse instead of better. Akin to this is the common condemnation of men because ignorant, sceptical, or unorthodox. So the Pharisees said: “This people that know not the law are accursed.” And in modern times the term “miscreant” has grown out of the same feeling that no man could be worse than a *misbeliever*; for that is the meaning of the reproachful word. The mission of Christ, who made himself the “friend of publicans and sinners,” was in part to condemn this false and pernicious method of judgment.

Here it may be urged that Christ extended his charity to all classes. “Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,” was his dying prayer. But it may be fairly questioned whether the prime instigators and contrivers of his death were included in this petition of mercy. The account occurs in Luke xxiii: 33, 34: “And when they were come to the place which is called Calvary, there they crucified him, and the malefactors; one on the right hand and the other on the left. Then said Jesus, Father forgive them, for they know not what they do.” This condonation may apply only to the Romans, who were the *instruments* employed by those who plotted his death, and to others who might fairly plead some excuse of ignorance. Luke tells us in the next verse, with two intervening statements, that “the rulers derided him;” and though Christ felt no resentment or revenge, we can not, in a strict interpretation of the passage, make the act of pardon cover the argument of my opponent. Especially is this view discouraged by what Christ had before said to the class in question, “Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father;” and on another occasion, “If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth.” With

which agrees that of John, "There is a sin unto death; I say not that ye shall pray for it."

For examples of apparently bad men, then, I will name:—

(1.) Balaam. This man, who had very important gifts of prophecy, seems after all to have had none of that charity or holy love without which one is nothing. He is preëminently an instance—and as such Bishop Butler has wisely selected him—of the power of man to act wickedly, against the fullest conviction both of duty and of interest. He was well persuaded that Jehovah was the true God, and that one's highest welfare, if not the only salvation, was in his favor. "Surely there is no enchantment against Jacob, neither is there any divination against Israel." (Num. xxiii: 23.) "There shall come a Star out of Jacob, and a Sceptre shall rise out of Israel, and shall smite the corners of Moab, and destroy all the children of Sheth." (xxiv: 17.) "Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his." (xxiii: 10.) Such were his utterances in the rapture of the prophetic spirit. Yet this same man, for filthy lucre's sake, contrived a plan by which he should seduce the Israelites into idolatry with its usual vices, so he might feel warranted in pronouncing upon them the curse which Balak craved. If it be said that he did this in the confidence that nothing could harm the Israelites,—as some have excused the treason of Judas against Jesus,—then we must consider that after the seduction was accomplished and the curse pronounced, and twenty-four thousand of the Israelites had perished, he joined the army of Balak to meet their attack. If he expected Balak would conquer, he accepted the bribe and repeated the guilt which procured it. If he expected the Israelites to conquer, he gave up all hope of dying the death of righteous people, or of interest in their inheritance. In either case, we do not wonder that the Jews regarded him as a thoroughly bad man, and that the early Christians called the sin of simony after his odious name.

(2.) Nero. This emperor of Rome, in the earlier part of his government, was restrained by the counsels of Seneca, and seemed likely to disappoint the gloomy expectations of the

people. But he soon entered upon a career of infamous lust and crime. His mother, wife, and many other relatives, were put to death by him. Seneca was sacrificed to his jealousy. Tacitus remarks that, after the murder of many illustrious personages, he manifested a desire of extirpating virtue itself.

Suetonius asserts positively that the burning of Rome that occurred in his reign was by his command. Tacitus thinks it uncertain whether this was by his order, or by accident; he says, however, that all Nero's efforts failed to quiet the general suspicion that he fired the city, and for this reason he charged the crime upon the Christians. There is no doubt that during the conflagration he sung the Fall of Troy to the music of the lyre, looking upon the scene from a tower.

Niebuhr regards this as simply showing that Nero was mad, though he says that after the murder of Agrippina he "abandoned himself more and more to bloodshed, and delighted in it." Admitting that he was insane, the question still remains whether moral causes did not mainly produce his insanity; for all his derangement was apparently moral rather than mental. And if so, what proof have we that such a morbid condition, such disease of the soul, might not end in its proper death?

I have met another solution of the rational difficulties in the way of Nero's salvation. A Universalist to whom I mentioned his playing while Rome was burning, thought that was rather a hopeful feature of the case. For Shakspeare has said:—

"The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils."

But Nero was evidently no such man, for he could sing. "So much the worse," said I, "for the common opinion is that he played the lyre just because Rome was burning." My friend was not so sure of that, and thought that as we all need charity we should have a little for Nero. This seemed to me like stretching the veil of charity to meet a case and cover a theory—until it was rent. The question remains: Was Nero so unmoved by the calamities of half the people, that he could enjoy

the poetry of their blazing homes? If so, was he radically good or bad?

(3.) *Cæsar Borgia*. Ranke says of this ambitious son of Pope Alexander VI., "He had caused his brother, who stood in his way, to be murdered and thrown into the Tiber. His brother was attacked and stabbed on the steps of the palace by his orders. The wounded man was nursed by his wife and sisters; the sister cooked his food, in order to secure him from poison, and the Pope set a guard before his house to protect his son-in-law from his son—precautions which Cæsar derided. He said, 'What is not done by noon, may be done by evening.' When the prince was recovering from his wounds, Cæsar burst into his chamber, drove out the wife and sister, called an executioner, and ordered the unfortunate prince to be strangled. . . . He killed Peroto, Alexander's favorite, while clinging to his patron and sheltered by the pontifical mantle. The Pope's face was sprinkled with blood. . . . Rome trembled at his name. Cæsar wanted money and had enemies; every night murdered bodies were found in the streets. Men lived in seclusion and silence; there was none who did not fear that his turn would come. Those whom force could not reach were taken off by poison."

There were, if possible, "greater abominations than these." The record of them is cited by Gordon in his lives of the father and the son, in modest Latin which may satiate the curious.

(4.) *Colonel Francis Chartres*. "Of immense wealth and of aristocratic connection, every effort was turned to the gratification of animal passion. Even in his old age, his body burned to a cinder, the fire of passion continued unabated. Utterly impotent in body, he pursued the shadow of the same lusts with the same energy with which he had pursued their substance." He was executed in the year 1730, at the age of seventy, for an attempt at rape. The following epitaph was written by Dr. Arbuthnot:—

"Here continueth to rot the body of Francis Chartres, who,

with an inflexible constancy and inimitable uniformity of life, persisted, in spite of age and infirmities, in the practice of every human vice, excepting prodigality and hypocrisy. His insatiable avarice exempted him from the first, his matchless impudence from the second. . . . He was the only person of his time who could cheat without the mask of honesty, and retain his primeval meanness when possessed of ten thousand a year; and, having deserved the gibbet for what he did, was at last condemned to die for what he could not do."

Along with Chartres I may allude to Count Cenci, so abandoned to lust as to attempt the ravishment of his own daughter. The account of him may be found in a tale recently translated, "Beatrice Cenci." It is doubted by some whether so over true a story should be read.

(5.) Bertrand Barère. This man is known to many of your readers from the account of him by Macaulay. Those who have read that account, I think, will not say that the French Revolution, with its Reign of Terror, made him what he was; but that he more than any other man made them what they were. Let those who have read say whether Macaulay is rash in his opinion "that Barère approached nearer than any person mentioned in history or fiction, whether man or devil, to the idea of consummate and universal depravity. In him the qualities which are proper objects of hatred, and the qualities which are the proper objects of contempt, preserve an exquisite and absolute harmony. In almost every particular sort of wickedness he has had rivals. His sensuality was immoderate; but this was a failing common to him with many great and amiable men. There have been many men as cowardly as he, some as cruel, a few as mean, a few as impudent. There may also have been as great liars, though we never met with them or read of them. But when we put every thing together, sensuality, poltroonery, baseness, effrontery, mendacity, barbarity, the result is something which in a novel we should condemn as caricature, and to which, we venture to say, no parallel can be found in history."

(6.) The perpetrator of the "Three Memorable Murders," of whom De Quincey says:—

"To an epicure in murder, such as Williams, it would be taking away the very sting of the enjoyment, if the poor child should be suffered to drink off the bitter cup of death without fully apprehending the misery of the situation. . . . The logic of the case, in short, all rested on the ultra fiendishness of Williams. . . . Our present murderer is fastidiously finical in his exactions—a sort of martinet in the scenical grouping and draping of the circumstances in his murders. . . . Let the reader who is disposed to regard as exaggerated or romantic the pure fiendishness imputed to Williams, recollect that except for the luxurious purpose of basking and reveling in the anguish of dying despair, he had no motive at all, small or great, for attempting the murder of the young girl. She had seen nothing, heard nothing—was fast asleep, and her door was closed; so that, as a witness against him, he knew that she was as useless as any of the three corpses. And yet he was making preparations for her murder, when the alarm in the street interrupted him." (Note Book, pp. 53, 54.)

The "three corpses" do not mark the three murders, but the third murder.

The reader should also peruse De Quincey's essay on "Murder as one of the Fine Arts," in his volume of "Miscellaneous Essays." I quote De Quincey the more willingly, because, taking the common view of man's immortal nature, he seems to be a Restorationist.

I mention these examples, not because I would assume the divine prerogative of judgment upon the cases; I do no such thing. I do not assert that all or any of these apparently quite bad men are lost. I simply cite the facts of history respecting them, to show what may be true of their radical characters, and to show that in a human, and even a humane, judgment of character, we are not warranted in asserting their final regeneration and salvation as heirs of an "eternal weight of glory."

I need not multiply examples, for the argument does not turn on numbers. If it did, I think almost any one might name instances of apparently utter abandonment, or of persons in whom the religious faculty, once excited, had afterwards apparently died out. I have known such persons; and in each case the apparent death of the spiritual capacity could be directly traced to a deliberate resolve to please one's self out of the way of manifest duty, and that resolution was considered final, and was made in view of all supposable consequences, here or hereafter. Some points here raised will be considered more fully in my closing chapter; but this class of cases gives some support to a strict interpretation of the Parable of the Sower. Such are the seed falling on stony ground, or among thorns; it is as if the soul had but one germ of religious vitality; and when this is quickened and fails to take root, or to become a radical and ruling principle, the proper life of the soul is expired forever.

The Scriptures speak of a sin against the Holy Ghost. Whether that is strictly unpardonable will be considered in the next chapter. But I may here give my view of the nature of it, to meet an argument that will doubtless be offered by my opponent, from the many cases of conversion of very hardened and abandoned men. I think that in all such cases there had been no flagrant sin against conscientious conviction. Either the law or the love of God had never been fully understood. The sense of duty or of mercy in all such cases comes with an original and fresh power, upon a heart before blinded, or upon feelings blunted by bad or even vicious habit, reaching for the first time the inmost core and centre of the nature, and inspiring there a spiritual and immortal life. So it was with Paul — fierce persecutor as he was, he had never disowned the principle of duty, though sadly, and not without fault, mistaken in the details of it. So it was with John Newton — carrying on an active traffic in the persons of his fellow-men, “ignorantly, through unbelief.” My Universalist friends are very familiar with such cases, and I am glad of it. I wish my orthodox

friends knew them as well. They relieve our hopes of the degraded and the outcast, and rightly interpreted, they give fresh zeal to our efforts for fallen humanity. But ten thousand such cases do not relieve one instance of contempt of duty, and of mercy, and of man, and of God, deliberately cherished under the full blaze of the gospel's blessed light; and I do believe there are such instances.

CHAPTER III.

DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THE IMMORTALITY OF MAN AS
A RACE, OR OF THE GOOD — OR THOSE WHO
SHALL BECOME GOOD — AS A CLASS?

§ 1. *Is the proper immortality of man ASSUMED in the Bible?*

HERE, at the outset, we meet the question whether man is *naturally* immortal. We may call this the question of the immortality of the soul; or, if that phrase seems too technical and metaphysical, it is the more general question whether all human beings are destined actually and absolutely to an immortal life, without forfeiture or failure.

The older Universalists, as Winchester and Huntington, holding the old opinion that sin against an infinite God deserves endless woe, regarded eternal life not as of man's nature or desert, but as once forfeited, and now bestowed as an act of grace. They held that all had been liable to "eternal death." And if we take this phrase in its literal sense, as signifying the loss of immortality, we should then have at once a doctrine of conditional immortality, and we should say nothing more about any absolute immortality of the soul or of man.

But modern Universalists, if I am not mistaken, do not allow any notion of forfeiture or of speculative contingency in respect to immortality. They say it would be either unjust to man, or unworthy of God, that He should allow such a being as man, by any possible means or supposition, to fail of the immortality for which he was created. And in this view the word *death*, as used in the Scriptures, can have no reference whatever to the being of the soul, or to the loss of immortality, but it can refer only to the dissolution of the body, or to such a low moral or spiritual state as is, for the time, no better than death itself.

Universalists at this day, I say, will hardly allow the idea of annihilation as a thought to be in anywise entertained. I may be mistaken ; but I think the following criticism of my heterodox book, from my very good friend, the editor of the *Christian Inquirer* (Dec. 19, 1857), is only a strong statement of the real views of Universalists generally. The *Inquirer* says:—

“He admits the possibility of the *annihilation* of the soul of man, which argues a want of appreciation of its exceeding worth, its dignity, and divinity. We can not but feel that any man who esteems the image of God at so light a figure that it could by any possibility of its earthly action, choice, experience, or condition, come within the verge of the shadow of annihilation, is not fitted to write upon the immortality of man. He speaks of what he does not know, and testifies of what he has not seen. The creation points to man as the crown and completion of its long ages of change and refining development, the king and climax of its several departments of vegetable and animal growth. History and revelation confirm all that nature hints of the honor and greatness of the spiritual nature. To believe in the remotest contingency or possibility of the utter extinguishment of these souls, is to throw a disastrous eclipse over all those teachings and hopes they inspire, and destroy all moral perspective. If we admit that one soul will be annihilated, we admit that all souls may be ; we lose the absolute certainty of immortality ; we begin to sink ever so little in a fathomless gulf of soulless and atheistic nonentity.”

Abating the strong statement of the case, the above, I think, expresses the common view and sentiment of your readers. But if so, it cuts off all proof of the *natural* immortality of man, from two of the passages most relied on by Universalists. I refer to Rom. v. 12–21, and 1 Cor. xv. 12–58. For it is manifest that if these passages teach the final salvation and *actual* immortality of all men, they equally teach that man has been subject to utter death, and liable to annihilation—the very thing which is held unjust to man or unworthy of God. Life and death are in these passages put in contrast. The death came by Adam ; the life comes by Christ. If the life

includes immortality, the death implies annihilation; and it follows that man is no more absolutely immortal, or by a strict nature, but by grace; by a regaining of what was lost; by a recovery of what was forfeit; by a redemption — a rescue from the jaws of the very monster which it is supposed has no place nor right in all the universe of God.

The only escape from this view that annihilation has been invited and confronted by man, is in supposing that Róm. v. 12-21, and 1 Cor. xv. 12-58, refer not to life and death of man's being, but either, literally, of man's body, or, metaphorically, of his moral nature. The immortality of the soul is then no longer expressed or directly taught in those passages, but assumed and implied. So much for the present; what the passages do refer to, we will inquire hereafter.

Another important passage relied on to prove the final salvation of all is that in Luke xx. 35-38. And this is also relied on by some as explicitly declaring the immortality of all. The phrase, "Neither can they die any more," is applied to all mankind. But we need only remark that the expression, "they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world," etc., is at least partitive *in form*; the whole passage *taken alone* would not suggest the immortality of all, but of a class only; the proof that it applies to all must be derived from other passages. Hence it is simply accurate to say that the immortality of all men is not here named, or explicitly taught.

Now orthodox writers, in saying that "the immortality of the soul is rather assumed, or taken for granted, than explicitly revealed in the Bible," have been *obviously* consistent because they have *not* applied these three passages to all mankind. A single orthodox writer, maintaining the immortality of the lost, has endeavored to show that the last-named passage applies to all; but his attempt to relieve the silence of the Scriptures on the immortality in question only adds a manifest burden to the orthodox argument; for he would have those elsewhere called the "children of the wicked one" here called the "children of God." (J. H. Hinton, Athanasia, pp. 423-443.) What the passage means is to be seen hereafter.

But it will be found as *really* consistent for the Universalist to say that the immortality of the soul is not explicitly taught, but silently assumed in the Bible. For if he claims that it is taught in Rom. v. 12-21, and 1 Cor. xv. 12-58, his argument, as we have seen, proves more than he admits; it proves too much. Hence I think the Universalist labors under the same general difficulty with the Orthodox, respecting the profound silence of the Scriptures on a very weighty matter,—their utter failure to name the immortality of the soul as such, or the immortality of man as man. And I may therefore here repeat, with some variations, the argument I have published on this subject.

To propose the argument more distinctly I should say that I reserve two or three passages supposed to *imply* the immortality in question, for separate consideration. The point now urged is that man's immortality is nowhere either directly asserted or made the burden of a proposition, nor stated, mentioned, spoken of, or alluded to, in proper terms. As Olshausen says, "the *doctrine* of the immortality of the soul and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible." Such expressions as to live or to exist for ever, to be immortal, the immortal soul, etc., never occur in the Scriptures with plain reference to the nature of man or the destiny of the human family. If such be the doctrine of Scripture, it is not told, but quietly taken for granted and assumed.

For argument's sake I will admit this; and we will compare this supposed implicit doctrine of the Bible with another doctrine doubtless assumed in that volume, and with which the doctrine in question is often associated as one of the main pillars of all religious truth. I mean, of course, the doctrine of God's existence; which I say is assumed or taken for granted because it is never made the burden of a proposition. The doctrine of *one* God is sometimes asserted against that of many gods. And in one instance (Heb. xi. 6), where the nature of faith is the point in question, the existence of God appears in a subordinate statement, by which the doctrine is explicitly assumed; but even this is a single case.

Now I assert that we might expect these two truths to receive similar treatment in the Bible. For the questions of God's existence and of man's immortality are of precisely the same importance to man himself. Not of the same *absolute* importance, to the universe at large; for in that relation the eternal duration of a billion human souls might be only as a drop in the ocean, to the existence of an infinite and eternal God. And therefore, if the universe had been divided into two halves, ruled by two Gods, and if the Bible were a volume of diplomatic documents and messages exchanged between the two deities, *then* we might suppose a bare allusion in it to the existence of the people of this earth, and nothing said whether they would at all live for ever. All nations are as the dust of the balance, compared with the Deity. "He sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers before him." But the Bible is no such book of state papers, or of royal correspondence. It is not a majestic thundering, from deity to deity, uttered from Sinai to Olympus, or from nebula to nebula, in which the children of Adam might be overlooked and forgotten; but it is a special revelation from the Supreme God to the sons of Adam. And it is a revelation for their special instruction and benefit and behoof; and so exclusively for them is it designed, that all the rest of the universe is put by it in the background, and it seems to make the earth the centre of the world, insomuch that its apparent meaning once imprisoned the reformer in astronomy, Galileo; and the star gazers can now tell us more about the universe than the Bible itself does. And this confined and exclusive character of the revelation, with which geologists and astronomers have sometimes quarrelled, is just and proper because the dearest personal interests of man's immortality are as important to him as all worlds beside, and as the being of God himself. Whether God exists at all and whether man lives for ever, are questions of equal moment to man. Hence I say that in the revelation of God's character and of man's destiny, these two doctrines, if equally true, should be treated alike; we should expect to find them on the same footing.

If, then, one of these cardinal truths is stated in the Bible explicitly and directly, we should expect the same of the other. If one is expressed not directly, but explicitly assumed, with frequent mention and allusion, we should expect the same of the other. If one is assumed implicitly and silently, — taken as a doctrine too clear for doubt and scarcely needing to be named, we should expect the same of the other.

But in fact these doctrines receive in the Bible the widest difference of treatment. That of the divine existence, as I have already remarked, is not directly asserted; but it is assumed as too clear for assertion. It is taken as a first truth of the religious consciousness, to prove which would be preposterous. The Bible never goes into debate with the atheist. If one says in his heart, "there is no God," there is no help for him in logic. But while this truth is taken for granted in the Bible, so far from being *tacitly* assumed, it is named and alluded to in various forms of speech, continually. It stands out, in bold relief, on almost every page. In two short books only is it not named, — Esther and the Song of Solomon, — and their inspiration has been questioned on that ground. In every other book this doctrine is the apple of gold in the picture of silver. It is the central truth, that makes the Bible a Discourse of God — the Word of God. It is the *Shekinah* that renders it sacred and "holy." And with manifold names, and expressions of the wisdom, power, and goodness of God, do the Scriptures invite men to the faith, love, and service of Him. If we strike out from the record those passages that tell of His being and His works, we reduce the dimensions of the volume almost by half, we make it a book without sense or meaning, we exchange its radiant light for midnight darkness.

But if we expunge from the same book all those passages in which man's immortality is expressly mentioned or unquestionably assumed, we leave the volume unchanged. It might have been written precisely as it is, and the revelation would have been just as complete as it is, if the sacred writers had agreed to ignore that doctrine now so much on the lips of men, or at

least, to speak about it so obscurely that their words should settle nothing in the case.

Whence this contrast in the scriptural treatment of these ideas? Will it be said that man's immortality is sufficiently clear to man's unaided reason? *But that important truth ought to be exceedingly clear to human reason, which need not be named in a revelation.* And if the more obvious truth is named less frequently *because* more obvious, then man's immortality should be as much clearer than God's existence as a thousand is greater than zero; for this is about the numerical ratio in which the truths are named.

No one will claim that the soul's immortality *is* so clear past all shadow or dream of doubt. But if we suppose, for argument's sake, that it is too clear to need explicit mention in the Bible, we only encounter a new difficulty. The revelation which God should make to man is of necessity given in man's language; not only in a human dialect, but also in the current phrases of human speech, including many proverbial expressions. But if the immortality of men were so clear a doctrine of the human reason, it must be a most cherished sentiment, and must give rise to many familiar expressions—household words of natural theology. In fact, the doctrine has created various forms of expression that reveal the sentiment, wherever it has been believed. These now appear in the daily speech of Christendom, and we shall find them also in the old forms of gentile philosophy. Why, then, are such expressions wholly avoided and unknown in the Bible? Why should the spirit of prophecy, that catches so readily the language of men, have failed to conform to their style of thought in this most important item of their own immortal nature? If man is born an heir of the future eternity, why is he not invited and encouraged to its suitable virtues by some mention of the fact? The gift of immortality is surely preëminently worthy of God's sacred mention to those who think and say so much of their supposed possession of the boon. Why has he not deigned to say a plain word about a nature in man which would be the chief element of the divine image in him?

Such are our difficulties, on the supposition that man's proper immortality is too clear to need mention in a revelation. Turning from the supposition to the facts, we only meet a new difficulty in the anxious doubts of long generations on this very question. Because man was made *for* immortality, we find in his fallen nature, through all history, some sentiment of the birthright he had lost. He finds himself subject to death; but he also finds, or thinks he finds, some remnant within him of that which is too good to die. Is death an eternal sleep? or, "If a man die, shall he live again?" This was the Question of Ages. But when it came to be answered, and "Life and Immortality were brought to light," there was not a word said respecting the immortal nature of which there had been so much talk. He who "had the words of eternal life" never said that all men were to live for ever. He never spoke of the life that he gave as an attribute or quality of some other essential life which men already possessed.

As I have remarked already, the Universalist will not probably claim that Christ *gave* immortality to all men; for this would imply that it had been lost. He will say rather that Christ *revealed* and gave assurance of what was already true. Thus a writer on 2 Tim. i. 10, in the *Universalist Quarterly* (vol. ii. p. 55), says: "Immortality of some beings was brought to light; but not surely the immortality of angels or of beings in another sphere of action. It was the immortality of mankind. But this could not have been disclosed, unless it had been possessed as an inherent attribute of the soul, prior to its disclosure—before the appearing of Christ." But Christ never said that men are immortal. His own words are never such as to describe such an existing fact. And the expression "brought to light" does not require such an interpretation. It may as naturally signify that he pointed out the way of life; or that he showed that there is immortality for man, and how it may be gained. And this accords perfectly with the general tenor of his language. "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." "He that eateth of this bread shall live for ever." "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son,

that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life." "Because I live, ye shall live also." Whether these and similar expressions cover the doctrine of immortality, I shall examine hereafter. But if they do, we see at once that they confirm my interpretation of the phrase in question.

And equally significant, it seems to me, is the silence of *Paul* respecting the immortality of the soul. It may be said that the Jews were too little philosophic, or too full of national conceit and prejudice, to think of such an immortality, good for all nations and all men. But Paul surely suffered no such lack of culture, nor such narrowness. He was the apostle of the Gentiles; and he who could quote the gentile poets, and was even more a logician than a poet, could not have been so grossly ignorant of the Grecian philosophy as to know nothing of its doctrine of immortality. Why did he, then, never speak of the immortality of the soul? Or, if he thought that too abstract and metaphysical a form of thought, why did he not speak of an immortal nature in man? or of man as somehow immortal? Nay, if he thought the Greeks in the truth respecting a universal immortality, but in error respecting the nature or method of it, why did he not take special pains to recognize their half of the truth, and complete the doctrine by showing the connection between its two parts? When some mocked at the mention of the resurrection of the dead, why did he not show that immortality did not at all depend on the resurrection? And when, in that most ample discussion in the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, he made a supposition of no resurrection, why did he say, "Then they which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished"?

The sum is this: The Scriptures, given to reveal God's character and man's duty and destiny, speak of the divine existence many hundred times and in considerable variety of ways; but they speak of man's proper immortality, equally important to himself, never. And though the question had been long agitated among men, and the doctrine was incarnated in men's language, Christ, coming to illustrate the subject, said nothing of the doctrine. And Paul, whose education and mis-

sion pointed him out as the man to name and teach so great a truth, has failed to do it. The question arises whether the supposed taking for granted of man's immortality is not an assumption out of the Bible, and foreign to it.*

I think that my argument from the silence of the Scriptures respecting man's immortality receives additional force from some facts among the Spiritualists. They offer the spiritual manifestations as proving more than almost any thing else the immortality of the soul. Those Spiritualists who reject the Bible will naturally regard its teachings as defective on this subject. But how is it with those who accept the Bible? I can not speak from very general acquaintance or reading; but I have read enough to know that the following incident means something. The first lecturer on Spiritualism whom I have heard, informed us he had been a Methodist preacher. He found himself in trouble because he could not prove the immortality of the soul from the Bible. He told his perplexity to a friend; yet he found no relief, but aggravation of his difficulty, for his friend was in the same predicament. The friend, however, thought that what the Church had always held must be true, and he must preach it indulging no private speculations on the subject. Our lecturer replied that God gave him the faculty of reason, and he did not dare to forego the use of it; he must think for himself. And he thought he could now prove the desired immortality, thus: Matter is eternal. Whatever produces material effects is matter. The spirits do this;

* This argument from the persistent silence of the Scriptures respecting man's immortality I regard as the main argument of my book; and it is so regarded by others. It is passed over in silence by three of my reviewers: D. N. Lord, *Theological and Literary Journal*, April, 1858; Dr. J. Strong, *Methodist Quarterly Review*, July, 1858; and Dr. A. Hovey, *State of the Impenitent Dead*. Another reviewer, Prof. E. P. Barrows, *Bibliotheca Sacra*, July, 1858, entirely misapprehends the argument; he proceeds as if I had in mind only the "immortality of the soul" in the technical or metaphysical sense, though I devote a paragraph (p. 162) to prevent such a misconception. I know the professor too well to suspect him of an intentional *ignoratio elenchi*; but the *ignorantia elenchi* is manifest.

hence they are material and eternal; and the Bible, recognizing their existence, teaches thus the immortality of the soul.

The argument of our lecturer plainly proved a great deal too much,—a past eternal existence, as well as a future immortality, and that of all species of life. It was pretty straight pantheism. Yet I doubt whether the lack of faith among orthodox Christians in a Providence that could give immortal life to the worthy alone, or their reliance on immortality from some “nature of things,” has not helped forward this modern style of pantheism.

§. 2. *Is the immortality of the soul IMPLIED in the Scriptures?*

A truth ^{which} does not lie on the surface of an expression, or in the form of its words, may yet be very clearly contained or implied in it. Is the immortality of man thus taught in the Bible? A very few passages only need here to be considered.

Gen. i. 26, 27: “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . . So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him.”

I think this can prove no more than the creation of man for immortality, of which, nevertheless, he might fail. I think the expression in the Book of Wisdom, ii. 23, denotes just this: “God made man for immortality (*ep’ aphtharsia*), and to the image of his own nature made he him. But by the envy of the Devil death came into the world.” Some editions of the Apocrypha have the word *eternity* instead of *nature*; but this is a false reading of *aīdiotētos* instead of *idiotētos*, which has been remarked by various scholars. And I think the context shows that the prospective immortality was, in the opinion of the Jews, cut off by the entrance of death. This appears more fully from the entire context, which I think signifies the immortality of the righteous alone:—“And they [the wicked] knew not the secrets of God, nor hoped for the reward of righteousness, nor esteemed the honor of holy souls. For God made man for incorruption, and to the image of his own nature made he him. But by the envy of the Devil death came into

the world ; and they follow him that are of his side. But the souls of the just are in the hand of God, and torment may not touch them. In the sight of the unwise they seemed to die, and their exit was reckoned a calamity, and their departure from us utter destruction ; but they are in peace. For though in the sight of men they are punished, their hope is full of immortality."

This passage may be taken as showing how the Jews understood that in Genesis, and my view is supported by an expression in ch. xv. 3 : "The just live for ever (*et in ævum*), and their reward is in the Lord."

And two expressions in the New Testament seem to denote that the divine image in man is a moral likeness. Eph. iv. 24 : "Put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." Col. iii. 10 : "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." From this we should not infer that *actual* holiness was concreated in man ; for character can not be created by another. Rather, I should take it, man was made with a capacity and design for godliness, or godlikeness, and thus for immortality. Now that which is moral is primary and ruling ; that which is physical is subordinate. If the godlikeness fails, the immortality may follow.

Gen. ii. 7 : "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life ; and man became a living soul."

Few of your readers, I presume, need to be told that the Hebrew phrase for "living soul" is in ch. i. 30, applied to the brutes. And in ch. vii. 22, we have a still stronger expression : "All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of lives (*nishmath ruach chayim*) died." In 1 Cor. xv. 45, the phrase is put in a contrast which directly intimates that Adam was not made absolutely immortal : "The first Adam was made a living soul ; the last Adam was made a quickening spirit."

Ecc. iii. 21 : "Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth ?"

This text would be unworthy of attention in this argument

if it were not so often adduced by many orthodox people. I am happily ignorant of the Universalist treatment of it. Suffice it to say, the previous verse,—"All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again,"—and still more the 19th verse, sustain the view which takes it as a challenge; q. d.: "Who knows whether the spirit of man goeth upward?" etc. It is a piece of Solomon's scepticism, which proves Epicureanism and French atheism if it proves any thing. That it should get into a "Scripture Manual" as a proof-text that man will live as long as God does, shows either a sad state of traditional reasoning, or a great meagreness of orthodox argument.

Ecc. xii. 7: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it."

Here the Preacher speaks more as a moralist, and, as the last two verses show, with some sentiment of piety. Yet his whole book yields scarcely a glimpse of immortality. The "judgment" named in verse 14, if after death, proves no eternal life. And the expression "shall return to God who gave it" naturally denotes that the spirit reverts back to the disposal of the power that created it; and it may intimate a return to original nothingness. This view is strongly supported by an expression of Justin Martyr, treating this very question of immortality. He says: "As the personal man does not always exist, and body and soul are not ever conjoined; but, whenever this harmony must be dissolved, the soul leaves the body, and the man is no more; so likewise, whenever it is necessary that the soul should no longer be, the vital spirit leaves it, and the soul is no more, but itself returns again thither whence it was taken." (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 6.)

§ 3. *The General Tenor of Scriptural Language.*

There are two methods of human thought and investigation: synthesis and analysis; the compiling of facts, and the examination of them singly. Neither of these methods is safe or complete without the other. When, therefore, I offer the

general tenor of scriptural language on this subject, I do not ask the reader to deem it worth a straw without some consideration of what the language means. For it is at least conceivable that after a hundred passages have been recited, *sounding* as if they supported one side of a question, they should be one by one transferred to the other side, or removed and thrown out as not referring to the subject, — belonging to neither side.

Before giving my list, therefore, or my enumeration, I remark that it includes most of the passages that *seem* to refer to the future if not the final destiny of man. It also does *not* include the greater number of passages in the Old Testament that probably denote temporal destructions or deliverances of the Jews. I think not more than a tithe of the number I give could be claimed as of special Jewish application; and I willingly pay such a tithe in account with the seed of Abraham, with the single remark that if such Old Testament passages signify nothing beyond the grave, then the Jews knew nothing beyond the grave. But then it becomes a fair question whether the passages do not contain a *principle*, and if the temporal deliverances and destructions were not types of similar results in man's relations to the immortal life. And if it is claimed that many of the passages I count refer to the life or death of the *body* but not of the *soul*, I reply that very few passages will be left to be referred to any immortal life. And the question whether they are to be taken literally or metaphorically, will be duly considered. Also the question whether those which speak of *everlasting* or *eternal life*, or life *eis ton aiōna*, denote the life of the Christian dispensation, *aionian* life in some limited sense, or immortal life in the absolute sense.

A very few passages, obviously not referring to man's final destiny (e.g. Isa. xxxviii. 16), are thrown in as suggesting the literal sense of others which may thus refer. Also two or three asserting God's immortality, because they contain phrases apparently denoting the destiny of good men.

I must ask the indulgence of the reader, or rather his assistance, *referring* as I do to most passages without quoting them. My best apology is that such passages ought to prove nothing

either way if they are not read; and when they are read in their places one has the benefit of the context.

TO LIVE; LIVING.

"This do, and thou shalt live" (Luke x. 28; compare Lev. xviii. 5; Neh. ix. 29; Prov. iv. 4; vii. 2; Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12). "Man doth not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live" (Deut. viii. 3; comp. Matt. iv. 4). "Incline your ear and come unto me; hear, and your soul shall live" (Isa. lv. 3; comp. 1 Sam. i. 26; xvii. 55; xxv. 26; 2 Sam. xi. 11; Ps. lxxix. 32; cxix. 175; Jer. xxxviii. 20).

"He is just; he shall surely live" (Ezek. xviii. 9; comp. ch. iii. 21; xviii. 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32; xx. 11, 13, 21, 25; xxxiii. 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19; xxxvii. 3-14). "The just shall live by faith" (Rom. i. 17; comp. Hab. ii. 4; Gal. iii. 11; Heb. x. 38). See also Ps. lxxii. 15; cxviii. 17; cxix. 144; Prov. ix. 6; xv. 27; Isa. xxvi. 14, 19; xxxviii. 16; Luke, xx. 38; John v. 25; vi. 57 ("He that eateth me, even he shall live by me"); xi. 25; xiv. 19 ("Because I live, ye shall live also"); Rom. vi. 8; viii. 13; 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Gal. ii. 19, 20; 1 Thes. v. 10; 2 Tim. ii. 11; 1 John iv. 9.

"Shall be called holy, every one that is written among the living in Jerusalem" (Isa. iv. 3). See also Ps. xxvii. 13; lii. 5; lvi. 13; lxxix. 28; cxvi. 9; cxlii. 5; Matt. xxii. 32; Mark xii. 27; Luke xx. 38.

TO LIVE FOR EVER, (Gk. *eis ton aiōna*, Heb. *lōlām*.)

"He that eateth of this bread shall live for ever" (John vi. 51, 58). See also Gen. iii. 22; Deut. xxxii. 40 ("I [Jehovah] lift up my hand to heaven, and say, I live for ever"); Ps. xxii. 26; xlix. 9.

LIFE.

"Tree of life" (Gen. ii. 9; iii. 22, 24; Prov. iii. 18; Rev. ii. 7; xxii. 14). "The soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord thy God" (1 Sam. xxv.

29). "Thou wilt show me the path of life" (Ps. xvi. 11; comp. Acts ii. 28). "I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life" (Deut. xxx. 19; comp. v. 15; Jer. xxi. 8. This and the following passages, I offer as typical, and as containing a principle: Deut. xxxii. 47; Ps. xxx. 5; xxxiv. 12; xxxvi. 9; xci. 16; Prov. iii. 2, 22; iv. 22, 23; v. 6; vi. 23; viii. 35; x. 11, 16, 17; xi. 19, 30; xii. 28; xiii. 12, 14; xiv. 27 ("The fear of the Lord is a fountain of life"); xv. 4, 24 ("The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from Sheol beneath"); xix. 23; xxi. 21; Eccl. vii. 12). "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, that leadeth unto life; and few there be that find it" (Matt. vii. 14). "It is better for thee to enter into life," etc. (Matt. xviii. 8, 9; comp. Mark ix. 43-45). "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments" (Matt. xix. 17). "Shall not see life" (John iii. 36). "Resurrection of life" (John v. 29). "Ye will not come unto me, that ye might have life" (John v. 40; comp. x. 10; xx. 31). "I am the bread of life" (John vi. 35; comp. vs. 33, 48, 51, 53, 63; also ch. i. 4; viii. 12; xi. 25; xiv. 6; Acts iii. 15; Col. iii. 4; 1 John i. 1, 2).

"Book of life" (Phil. iv. 3; Rev. iii. 5; xiii. 8; xvii. 8; xx. 12, 15; xxi. 27; xxii. 19). "Water of life" (Rev. xxi. 6; xxii. 1, 17; comp. ch. vii. 17; John iv. 10; vii. 38). "Crown of life" (Jas. i. 12; Rev. ii. 10).

See also Rom. v. 17, 18; vii. 10; viii. 6, 10; 2 Cor. ii. 16 ("Savor of death unto death, and of life unto life"); iii. 6; v. 4 ("Mortality swallowed up of life"); Gal. iii. 21; Eph. iv. 18; Phil. ii. 16; Col. iii. 3; 1 Tim. iv. 8 ("Godliness, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come;" comp. 2 Pet. i. 3); 2 Tim. i. 10; Heb. vii. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 7, 10; 1 John v. 12, 16.

ETERNAL OR EVERLASTING LIFE (*zōē aiōnios*.)

The phrase is found once in the Old Testament (Dan. xii. 2), and forty-four times in the New Testament, the places easily found by the concordance. In most instances the ex-

pression is partitive, or designates a class of men. Whether the phrase implies immortal life will be considered hereafter.

OTHER EXPRESSIONS APPARENTLY DENOTING IMMORTAL LIFE.

"He asked of thee life, and thou gavest it him, even length of days for ever and ever" (Ps. xxi. 4). "Life for evermore" (Ps. cxxxiii. 3). Immortality or incorruption;—*Athanasia* (1 Cor. xv. 53, 54; comp. 1 Tim. vi. 16). *Aphtharsia*, (Rom. ii. 7; 1 Cor. xv. 42, 50, 53, 54; 2 Tim. i. 10. The word also denotes *incorruptness*, as in Eph. vi. 24; Tit. ii. 7.* King James' translation of the word is not bad.) Incorruptible (Rom. i. 23; 1 Cor. ix. 25: xv. 52; 1 Tim. i. 17; 1 Pet. i. 4, 23; iii. 4.)

TO DIE.

"Shalt surely die" (Gen. ii. 17; iii. 4; Ezek. iii. 18; xxxiii. 8, 14). "He that hateth reproof shall die" (Prov. xv. 10; comp. v. 23; x. 21; xix. 16). "The soul that sinneth, it shall die" (i.e. the very person that sins, Ezek. xviii. 4; comp. vs. 18–32). "That a man may eat thereof and not die" (John vi. 50; comp. xi. 26). See also Luke xx. 36; John viii. 21, 24; Rom. viii. 13.

DEATH.

"He that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul; all they that hate me love death." (Prov. viii. 36. This I offer as containing a principle respecting the future life. Comp. x. 2; xi. 19; xii. 28; xiii. 14; xiv. 12; xvi. 25; xviii. 21; Ezek. xviii. 32; xxxiii. 11.) "If a man keep my saying he shall never see death" (John viii. 51; comp. ver. 52). "The wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord" (Rom. vi. 23; comp. vs. 16, 21; ch. v. 12, 14, 21; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 26, 54, 55, 56; also the

* I have since discovered error in this statement respecting *aphtharsia*. See it corrected in my Rejoinder, p. 434.

following passages, from which some may argue the metaphorical sense: vii. 5, 10, 13, 24; viii. 2, 6). See also 2 Cor. ii. 16 ("death unto death"); iii. 7; 2 Tim. i. 10 ("hath abolished death"); Heb. ii. 14, 15; Jas. i. 14; 1 John iii. 14; v. 16, 17; Rev. xxi. 4.

SECOND DEATH.

This phrase is put in contrast with "crown of life," "resurrection," "book of life," "water of life," Rev. ii. 11; xx. 6, 14; xxi. 8. It will be further examined.

TO PERISH; TO BE DESTROYED.

These expressions are the same in the original. I select mostly from the New Testament. "It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish" (Matt. xviii. 14; comp. John iii. 15; x. 28; 1 Cor. viii. 11). "A sweet savor . . . in them that perish . . . of death unto death" (2 Cor. ii. 15, 16; comp. 1 Cor. i. 18; 2 Thes. ii. 10). See also Luke xiii. 3; Acts viii. 20; xiii. 41; Rom. ii. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 18; 2 Pet. iii. 9. "Shall utterly perish in their own corruption" (2 Pet. ii. 12).

"Able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. x. 28; comp. Jas. iv. 12). "Will destroy those husbandmen," etc., (Matt. xxi. 41; Mark xii. 9; Luke xx. 16.) See also Rom. xiv. 20; (2 Pet. ii. 12; 1 John iii. 8; Jude 5. "Every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be utterly destroyed (*exolothrethesetai*) from among the people" (Acts iii. 23; comp. Deut. iv. 26).

PERDITION; DESTRUCTION.

I discard the conventional sense of the word "perdition" which makes it the same with "damnation," remarking that it strictly means *perishing* or *being destroyed*. The question whether these words refer to the body alone, or to the being, is not here decided.

"To them an evidence of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God" (Phil. i. 28; comp. Heb. x. 39; 2 Pet.

iii. 7). "Son of perdition" (John xvii. 12; 2 Thes. ii. 8). "Foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in destruction and perdition" (1 Tim. vi. 9). "The beast . . . that goeth into perdition" (Rev. xvii. 8, 11).

"Broad is the way," etc., (Matt. vii. 13.) "Vessels of wrath, fitted to destruction" (Rom. ix. 22). "Whose end is destruction" (Phil. iii. 19; see context). See also 2 Cor. v. 5; x. 8; xiii. 10; 2 Pet. ii. 1; iii. 16. "Everlasting destruction," (2 Thes. i. 9; comp. 1 Thes. v. 3; Ps. lii. 5; xcii. 7; Isa. x. 25; xiii. 6. Whether this destruction admits a subsequent salvation is to be considered.)

As part of the general tenor of scriptural language I should name the class of

PASSAGES SUPPOSED TO IMPLY A GENERAL SALVATION.

Luke xx. 38; Rom. v. 12-21; and 1 Cor. xv. 12-58, are named above. The others most important are the promises that in Christ should all the nations of the earth be blessed" (Gen. xii. 3; xxii. 18; xxvi. 4; Acts iii. 25; Gal. iii. 8; comp. Ps. lxvii. 2; lxxii. 11, 17; lxxxvi. 9; Isa. ii. 2; Mal. iii. 12; Rev. xv. 4). The mission of Christ to seek and save the lost (Matt. x. 6; xv. 24; xviii. 11; Luke xix. 10). The declaration, "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me" (John xiii. 32). The designation of Christ as the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world" (John i. 29; comp. 1 John ii. 2); as the "bread of God that giveth life unto the world" (John vi. 33; comp. ver. 51); and as the "Savior of the world." (John iv. 42; 1 John iv. 14; comp. 1 Tim. iv. 10; ii. 4). See also Rom. xi. 14. The paternal relation and character of God (Isa. lxiii. 16; lxix. 8; Mal. ii. 10; Matt. vi. 9; Luke xi. 2; Acts xvii. 26, 28; Heb. xii. 9; but see context, and comp. Ps. ciii. 13; Ezek. xviii. 4; Matt. v. 45; John viii. 41-44; Rom. viii. 15). The character of God as loving and merciful (in manifold passages). The restitution of all things (Acts iii. 21). The promises of Christ's universal dominion (Phil. ii. 9-11; Isa. xlv. 23; 1 Cor. xv.

24-28; Rev. v. 13). The destruction of death, Satan, and his works (1 Cor. xv. 26, 55; Gen. iii. 15; Heb. ii. 14; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xx. 14; xxi. 4).

This list I do not offer as complete, so the reader will not be prejudiced by its brevity. Several passages concerning God's long-suffering with and repeated forgiveness of the Jews, in the Old Testament, might be added as containing a principle.

Yet if passages declaring the mercy of God are brought into the list, those touching the divine anger, whatever that means, might be added; and, as apparently asserting a limit to the divine forbearance, such a passage as Heb. iii. 7-iv. 11.

I have tried what I shall be proud if I have accomplished, to give this "general tenor" impartially. I here add that I do not *assume* that any of the passages apply to man's final destiny. I simply insist that in the absence of all statement of man's immortality this general tenor has great force; and the same silence respecting an immortal nature in man may admit the application of the common remark, that the literal or ordinary sense of words is *prima facie* the true sense, overruled only by special considerations. Whether the literal sense shall be applied to physical life and death, or to the question of immortality, is to be considered.

I am very far from asking or expecting that my opponent should examine all these four hundred passages, or even a small fraction of them. If he shows that those which I shall examine do not prove my proposition, I am answered, and that triumphantly, unless I happen to select the weakest passages for proof. For if my chosen texts do not contain my doctrine, there is left an *à priori* presumption against those I do not select. And if I have failed to present fairly the general tenor of the Scriptures, my opponent may do better.

§ 4. *The Exegetical or Analytic Argument.*

So much for the general tenor or tone of scriptural language respecting man's destiny. This is the synthetical argument, valuable in its place, but, as I said, indecisive without that

other element of reasoning, — the inquiry what individual expressions mean.

I will now therefore examine a few of these passages more particularly ; partly to meet certain arguments for their metaphorical sense, and partly to show more directly that they contain the literal sense, and apply to a final destiny.

Gen. ii. 17 : " Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it ; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."

This is claimed, 1st, as applying to temporal or physical death only, not that of the soul ; 2dly, as denoting moral or spiritual death only, and not that of the being.

To the first objection it is sufficient to reply for the present that no plain instruction appears to have been given our first parents of a distinction between body and soul as "body mortal" and "soul immortal." Hence, when they saw the brutes around them dying into nothingness, and heard the sentence, "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return" (Gen. iii. 19), it seems to me they must have had small hope of immortality left, unless by a rescue and redemption. And whether the promised deliverance would accrue to their benefit, or to that of their seed only, they were not told particularly, so far as we are aware. And the expression in Gen. iii. 22, "Lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever," seems a little discouraging in the hour of expulsion from so sweet a paradise. I query whether a Universalist, commissioned to execute the business, using his own words, would have said just so much and then have dropped the subject, to finish his work by guarding the tree of life with forbidding security (ver. 24).

But it is urged, both by the Orthodox and by Universalists, that literal death could not have been intended in the sentence in Gen. ii. 17, because our first parents did not actually die on the day of their sin. It is inferred that the death intended was a moral or spiritual death, commonly called death "in trespasses and sins ;" and to support this view the expressions in Eph. ii. 1, 5 ; Col. ii. 13 ; Matt. viii. 22 ("Let the dead bury

their dead"); 1 Tim. v. 6 ("is dead while he liveth"); Rev. iii. 1 ("Thou hast a name that thou livest, and art dead"), and some others, are frequently cited. And the apparently metaphorical sense of the word in such passages gives a very respectable appearance of argument to show that the threatened penalty of sin is a death which does not kill.

But I think the argument is only apparent. True, as Adam did not die out on the day he sinned, there must be some figure or trope in the sentence; but it may still be a trope that leaves the literal sense intact. There is just such a figure, in frequent use in the Bible and in the common speech of men. Thus, if a person has taken active or subtle poison, by which sooner or later he must die, or has provoked a mortal enemy, or has committed a capital crime, for which he must be detected and sentenced, or is falling from a precipice and must be fatally hurt if not dashed in pieces,—we say "he is a dead man!" And the *time* of his dying, whether instant or after long years, makes no difference in the proper import and truth of the expression. The literal sense, of course, remains. This figure—of the anticipation of the future as if present—is well known among the rhetoricians, who have bestowed upon it the classic name of *prolepsis*. I said it occurs in the Bible. The Egyptians applied it to themselves, when the angel of death had smitten their first-born: "We be all dead men." And so the Israelites, when the troop of Korah was suddenly destroyed: "Behold, we die; we perish; we all perish." And God himself is represented as speaking in the same way to Abimelech: "Behold thou art but a dead man, for the woman which thou hast taken."

And language very similar to that in Gen. ii. 17, occurs in two parallel passages. In Exod. x. 28, Pharaoh says to Moses: "Get thee from me; take heed to thyself, see my face no more; for in that day thou seest my face, thou shalt die." Would any one have questioned the veracity of the king, if his threatening had been incurred, and executed after several days, or even weeks or months? Again in 1 Kings ii. 36, 37, Solomon says to Shimei: "It shall be that on the day that thou goest out, and passest over the brook Kidron, thou shalt know

for certain that thou shalt surely die." Shimei did go, in pursuit of two fugitive servants, (under the law of Congress, we suppose, as Solomon had no statute so convenient, and thus by a long *prolepsis* of three thousand years anticipating the future as already present,) all the way from Jerusalem to Gath, and then from Gath to Achish — several days' journey. Did that make the threatening word of Solomon out of date? His last words tell his evident meaning: "Thy blood shall be upon thine own head."

I take the meaning of Gen. ii. 17, to be, then, that life was *forfeit* by transgression. And this might be the life of the soul no less than of the body; nay, it must appear so if there were no clear intimation that the soul was spared. And the earliest versions and paraphrases, besides able commentators, support the view I have given. The Greek translation of Symmachus (A. D. 200) renders the phrase: "Thou shalt be mortal." The Syriac gives the same sense, which is accepted by Jerome, and by Grotius. The Arabic renders it: "Thou shalt deserve to die." The Targum or paraphrase of Jonathan: "Thou shalt be subject to death," or guilty of death (*reus mortis*); in like manner Isidore of Pelusium, and an eminent Rabbi, Nachmanides. Some of the Hebrews understood it to mean immediate death, averted by repentance. (See Fagius, in Poole's Synopsis.) Other writers say: "The phrase, Thou shalt die, does not signify the fact of dying, but its necessity and desert." (Cornelius à Lapide, et. al., in Poole's Synopsis.) Vatablus interprets: "Thou shalt be subject to death, both of body and soul." And Fagius adds that the Hebrews deny not this twofold death. Others: "Say rather that Adam then began to die; that is, by a lingering death of inward wasting and decay." The above are all, save one, varieties of the same proleptic sense, and all are varieties of the literal sense. They differ in form only, while they agree in substance. The sense I have given is also approved by Anselm among the mediæval Fathers, and by Dr. Knapp and Dr. J. Müller, among modern German divines.

Of the Jewish opinions I may give some glimpses elsewhere. But the following, from a Rabbi of the sixteenth century, Abarbanel, who knew how to talk of the immortality of the soul, is significant. He says: "The wicked in their lifetime are called dead, and their soul is to be destroyed with the ignominy of the body, and will not have immortality or eternity." (Summary of the Faith, c. 24.)

And in one or other of the following passages of the New Testament supposed to sustain the metaphorical sense of death, —Matt. viii. 22; Rom. vi. 11; viii. 11; Eph. ii. 1, 5; Col. ii. 13; 1 Tim. v. 6; Rev. iii. 1,—I find the sense I have given supported by Theodoret, Chrysostom, Augustine, Erasmus, Calvin, Beza, Turretin, Calovius, Pareus, Calixtus, Gomar, Grotius, Vitringa, Bengel, Michaelis, Bretschneider, Wahl, Rückert, Platt, Fritzsche, Käuffer, Thofuck, Meyer, Hammond, Whitby, Clarke, Macknight. In this view, to be "dead in trespasses and sins" will mean, to be subject to death by reason of trespasses and sins. And this agrees naturally with the expressions in Ezek. xviii. 18: "He shall die in his iniquity." And ver. 24: "In his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die." And John viii. 21, 24: "I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins: for if ye believe not that I am he, ye shall die in your sins." And 1 Cor. xv. 17: "If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins." The last expression is used of the Corinthian Christians, who were supposed to be converted, regenerate, and no longer in the *guilt* or *bondage* of sin. Here the only possible sense is, subjection to the *effects* or *penalty* of sin, which is death. Here appears very finely the sense of the Latin word *reus*, and of the old English word *guilty*; i.e., *liable*, but not of course *ill deserving*.

Some of the above writers are Restorationists. The most indeed, are orthodox. But my Universalist friends will hardly quarrel with that fact, since the interpretation, so far as it affects the present question, is as unfriendly to the orthodox view as to the Universalist. It goes to refute the notion of a

metaphorical death that spares the immortal life of the soul. And hence the effort of a late writer against the view I held to show that these passages do signify spiritual death.*

But I am willing, for argument's sake, to give up any support to my view that comes from my interpretation of all these passages. Allow, for a moment, that "death in trespasses and sins" denotes morally or spiritually dead. What is gained, either to the orthodox view or to the Universalist? If this death is like disease, it remains to be shown that it is not mortal—that sin is not to the soul what fatal disease is to the body. The metaphorical sense may thus *include*, rather than *exclude*, the literal sense. So we say of the abandoned inebriate that he has "destroyed" himself. Instead of foolishly arguing that since he is not dead yet, but staggers boisterously about, he will live for ever, and never drop into a drunkard's grave, we say he will certainly die just *because* he has destroyed himself. So a moral and spiritual death may foreshadow and atmosphere a real and final death of the soul. We shall meet this question again. But here it may be remarked that the expression "*dead* in trespasses and sins" supports the notion, if not of radical badness in human nature, at least of radical defect; and thus it supports some of the previous argument against the Universalist view. The word *dead* is a strong word even in a metaphor. The literal sense of Gen. ii. 17, is, I think, pretty fairly sustained. And though the view runs counter to the prevalent notions about the immortality of the soul, the passage applies to the soul as naturally as to the body. And this literal and extended application is proven, I

* Prof. Hovey (State of the Impenitent Dead, § 5) takes no notice of the authorities given in my book for the proleptic sense of Gen. ii. 17. His reader might think that I stand alone in my exegesis. He argues against it on the ground that such a lively figure of speech would not suit the formal announcement of a law and its penalty. It might be so in modern legislation, made into a special branch of government and a special business of a deliberative assembly. But God's personal and earnest words to Adam required no formality. This argument and the other reasons given by Prof. H. are freely submitted to those who read both sides.

think, by a few passages that speak of *life* as a thing to be chosen and gained, and of *death* as to be shunned. I will name two or three passages. One is in

Ezek. xviii. 31, 32: "Make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house of Israel? For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye."

I think the whole chapter and the class of sins which it mentions, do not favor the reference of this passage to "the national life of the Jews as a people. It is remarkable as asserting and insisting on the personal accountability of each man for himself. "The soul that sinneth, it shall die," and not one for another's fault. Does the passage, then, refer to the *prolonging* of life in this world? It does, indeed, unless we suppose the Jews had such hopes of a future life in their own land, by a resurrection, that they might well understand these words as applying thus. I will not positively affirm that they looked so far into the future, in Ezekiel's time; though they did afterwards. If they did then, the passage decidedly favors the future life of the righteous alone. If they understood it only of long life on earth, it has only a typical value in my argument, though that is something.

Luke x. 25, 28: "Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? . . . This do and thou shalt live."

I do not now affirm that eternal or *aionian* life implies immortal life. But the phrase "thou shalt live" naturally suggests the literal sense. If the *aionian* life, or life of the gospel era, was implied, still Christ must mean more than simply that the lawyer would live on and into the gospel age, by keeping the commandments. If the *aionian* life was a spiritual and higher life, still Christ's reply no less favors the idea that such would be the only continuing and immortal life.

John xiv. 19: "Because I live, ye shall live also."

This expression can not easily be referred to a *moral* or *spiritual* life, as distinct from life in the literal sense. All the circumstances, as they appear in the previous context, seem to refer the expression to the future destination of the disciples.

"I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you. Yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more; but ye see me; because I live, ye shall live also." The same literal interpretation is proven by the words of Christ in John vi. 39, 40, 49, 54: "And this is the Father's will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son and believeth on him may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day. . . . Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead. . . . Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day."

Rev. ii. 10, 11: "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the spirit saith unto the churches. He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death."

The phrase "second death," which is here contrasted with "a crown of life," occurs in three other places in this book, where it is put in contrast with "resurrection," "book of life," and "water of life." It was also common among the Jews, and the following examples go to show that it meant extinction of being: "Every idolator, who says that there is another God besides me, I will slay with the second death, from which no man can come to life again." (Pirke R. Elieser, c. 34.) "Let Reuben live, and not die the second death, by which the ungodly die in the world to come." (Targum of Jerusalem, on Deut. xxxiii. 6.) "This hath been decreed by the Lord, that this sin shall not be forgiven them, until they die the second death." (Targum on Isa. xxii. 14.) I take this to be a periphrastic way of saying that the sin should never be forgiven. So Matt. xii. 31: "It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come." David Kimchi, one of the ablest Jewish doctors, says the Targumist means, in the above expression, "the death of the soul in the world to come." Again: "They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the Lord." (Targum on Jer. li. 39.) "They shall

die the second death, so as not to enter into the world to come." (Ib. Jer. li. 57.)

On the phrase "the world to come," I shall speak again. I am aware that Dr. Hammond, who is quoted at length by Mr. Paige in his "Selections," makes some application of the passage in Rev. xx. 6, to the gospel dispensation. He speaks of "the second death, into which they are said to go, that are never to appear in the church again." But this indicates no immortality of the wicked. And the above citations, I think, fully warrant the words of Dr. H. : "Whatsoever be signified by the *world to come* (the *age* of the Messiah, in whatsoever Jewish notion of it), it seems to denote such a death from which there is no release. And according to this notion of it, as it reflects fitly on the *first death* (which is a destruction, but such as is reparable by a *rising* or *resurrection*, but this past hopes, and exclusive of that), so will all the several places in which it is used be clearly interpreted. . . . And though, in these different matters, some difference there must needs be in the significations, yet in all of them the notion of *utter destruction*, final, irreparable excision, may very properly be retained and applied to each of them."

Matt. x. 28 : "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul ; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Compare Luke xii. 5.

I need not here debate the question whether the being here referred to as "able to destroy both soul and body" is God or Satan. It is supposed to be Satan by Maurice in his "Theological Essays," and also by Stier in his "Words of Jesus," in a happy statement of the argument. This view likewise accords with a remarkable passage of Arnobius, in his work "Against the Gentiles," (A.D. 303.) "This is the real death of man which leaves him nothing. What we see is but the separation of soul and body, not his utter destruction. This, I say, is the true death of man, when souls that know not God are consumed by long-continued torment, by a fierce fire into which certain cruel enemies shall cast them, who were unknown before Christ, and detected by himself alone." (l. 2. c. 14.) Arnobius evi-

dently refers to the evil angels, whom, in a collective sense, Dr. Bushnell calls Satan. What Arnobius says of "long-continued torment," or of *infliction* generally, belongs to his age. It concerns the form of thought only, not its substance.

That annihilation is the danger here described is conceded by Dr. Ballou, who says: "We see no allusion, here, to the idea of endless misery, but rather to that of annihilation. It was a *killing* of the soul as well as the body, a destroying of both soul and body; and the literal import at least of both expressions is, that it was a destruction of the one in the same sense as of the other." (Universalist Expositor, vol. iv. p. 168: See Paige, Selections, *in loco*.) And Mr. Balfour: "Men who are able to kill the body could not kill the whole man or person, for this would be to blot the man for ever out of existence. God only was able to do this." "If Gehenna refers to punishment in a future state, the passage in question rather teaches the doctrine of annihilation than endless misery." (First Inquiry, pp. 152, 156. See also Appendix, pp. 354, 355.) These writers think there could be no *actual* danger of annihilation, — or that, if God *can* thus destroy, it does not follow that he *will*, — because those whom Christ addressed were in the divine favor and under the divine protection. Very true; but that does not destroy all practical meaning of the passage. It may still describe a danger from which the disciples were delivered by their faithful allegiance, and would be finally saved by "continuing unto the end;" and a danger to which those are still exposed who do not trust in God because they do not love him.

Again, when one urges that the disciples were in no actual danger of annihilation, I reply, it is equally true that they were in no actual danger of *any other* calamity which *gehenna* may be supposed to mean. But Universalists now contend that "gehenna punishment," in some sense, is or has been actually suffered by ungodly men. And this is to admit that *if* destruction of "both soul and body" means annihilation, that is an actual danger, to be averted only by repentance. Christ never warns against an unreal danger.

Now that the destruction of the *body* here contemplated is literal, is admitted by all. It remains to be shown that the contemplated destruction of the *soul* is not also literal; or that the phrase "destroy both soul and body in gehenna" admits the idea that the soul is indestructible, or never will in fact be destroyed. But the literal sense seems so obvious and inevitable that some Universalists take the word "soul" (*psyche*), not in its modern sense, but in the sense of "life," comparing the passage with Isa. x. 18, and Mal. iv. 1. They take the phrase "soul and body" to be proverbial, and the whole phrase in hand to denote an utter destruction, temporally. But in a Bible that says nothing about an immortal soul, this interpretation is quite formidable. Admitting the phrase to be proverbial, it remains to be shown that the destruction named spares a principle of immortality, of which the Scriptures say nothing. But the passage in Matt. x. 28, is of still further importance, because it contains a much disputed word, *gehenna* (hell). Universalist writers have shown with great learning and ability that *gehenna* can not mean a place of eternal misery. It is taken from the valley of the *son of Hinnom*, or Tophet, and there was no eternal misery there. And because the punishment referred to in the twelve places in the New Testament where the word occurs, could not be executed in that valley, Universalists have also inferred that it might be something different from any punishment accomplished in that valley. Here two questions arise: What was the punishment of the literal Tophet? and, What corresponds to it, in the penalty of *gehenna*?

In Mark ix. 43-48, the word *gehenna* thrice occurs, and as often the phrase, "Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." This brings us at once to Isa. xlvi. 24, the only other place where the phrase is found. "They shall go forth, and shall look upon the *carcasses* of the men that have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh." Here I do not see that it matters whether the *place* described is the valley before Jerusalem, or the scene of

the ruin of Sennacherib's army, or of the destruction of Jerusalem. Allowing all this latitude, the words still denote a proper destruction, the fire devouring what the worm does not consume. The orthodox view of eternal non-destruction as much favors the immortality of "carcasses" as of the lost soul. The *accompaniments* of this scene of death are, the horror and infamy of dying unburied, the body being thrown into an accursed place once devoted to a hideous idol worship.

Death, then, with all its degradations and corruptions for "an abhorring unto all flesh," was the literal significance of Tophet. Such was the type — what was the antitype?

Universalists maintain that the special punishment of *gehenna* was accomplished in the destruction of Jerusalem, in fulfilment of the prophecies in Jer. vii. 31-34; xix. 6-13. (See Balfour, *First Inquiry*, pp. 123-128.) It seems to me difficult to refer to all the passages that contain the expression, particularly James iii. 6, to that particular event. Yet I am willing for argument's sake to suppose that they contain no allusion to a punishment after death. It will still remain for the Universalist to show that the Jews who suffered that punishment have any resurrection either to "everlasting life," or to immortality. This point will be examined soon.

But suppose we take Schleusner's statement, that among the Jews "any severe punishment, especially a shameful kind of death, was denominated *gehenna*." And also that the phrase "soul and body" was a proverbial expression, as above named. Setting out from this view, we naturally inquire how the Jews themselves came to use the term *gehenna*. Its general import is likely to appear in their traditions, though in these traditions may be many things foolish and puerile. In this view I quote a few passages from the Targums and the Talmud, premising that the doctrine of annihilation was adverse to the philosophic doctrine of the "immortal soul" which had begun to affect the Jewish mind. And again, I think I shall show that the early Christians, no less than the Targumists and Talmudists, held the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked.

In the Jerusalem Targum on Gen. iii. 24, it is said: "He

made gehenna for the wicked, like a two-edged sword, cutting either way; and in the midst of it sparks and coals, burning up the wicked." In the Targum on Ps. xxxviii. 20: "And they shall be consumed in the smoke of gehenna." On Eccl. viii. 10: "They have gone to be consumed in gehenna." And on Isa. xxxi. 9, gehenna is spoken of as "a fire which goes forth from the bodies of the wicked and sets them on fire; for it is said, "Ye shall conceive chaff, and bring forth stubble; your breath, as fire, shall devour you." This may illustrate the phrase in James, iii. 6: "set on fire of hell." The writer of the apocryphal book, Ecclesiasticus, evidently alluding to "gehenna punishment," says: "Humble thy spirit very much; for the vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms" (vii. 19). And again: "He that joineth himself to harlots will be reckless. Rottenness and worms shall inherit him; and he shall be lifted up for a greater example; and his soul shall be taken away out of the number." (xix. 3.) The Jewish Talmud also says: "Those who sin and rebel greatly in Israel, as well as gentile sinners, shall descend into gehenna, and there be judged during twelve months; at the end of which the body is consumed, the soul is burned up, and the spirit is scattered beneath the feet of the just, as it is said in Mal. iv. 3."

What, then, was "gehenna punishment," even if we take the disputed word as an adjective, signifying simply the severest judgment, as Universalist writers explain the words in Matt. v. 22?

That "extermination is the greatest of all punishments" is a common remark of Maimonides, the "Eagle of the Jewish Doctors," and of other Rabbies. One of these, speaking of the death of the soul, says this is "perfected punishment, and excision absolute, and perdition and corruption, which is never reversed, and is the greatest among all punishments." And we dismiss the passage in hand with the words of Dr. Bentley, partly as confirming our interpretation, partly as showing that the punishment may not be severe beyond all reason or thought of man: "Oh, dismal reward of Infidelity! at which Nature does

shrink and shiver with horror. What some of the learnedest doctors among the Jews have esteemed the most dreadful of all punishments, and have assigned for the portion of the blackest criminals of the damned,—so interpreting Tophet, Abaddon, the Valley of Slaughter, and the like, for final extinction and deprivation of being,—this atheism exhibits to us as an equivalent to heaven.” (Boyle Lecture, Sermon I.)

2 Pet. ii. 12: “But these, as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption.”

Granting, for argument's sake, that this refers to a temporal destruction, it will remain for the Universalist to show that the phrase “shall utterly perish” allows a subsequent resurrection to immortality. It may also be compared with Acts iii. 23, where Peter quotes from Deut. xviii. 19, and says: “Every soul which will not hear that Prophet shall be utterly destroyed (*exolothreuthesetai*) from among the people.” This was the punishment of extirpation, and it is explained in the Mishna, the text or older tradition of the Talmud, as cutting off from the life of the *olām habbā*,—a Hebrew phrase denoting the world or age which the Jews expected to inherit in the resurrection of the dead, and which they expected would continue for ever. What the phrase means we are to decide. I will only say for the present that it seems connected not only with the phrases, “world to come” (*aiōn ho erchomenos*, Mark x. 30; Luke xviii. 30, *mellōn aiōn*, Heb. vi. 5), and “that world” (*aiōn ekeinos*, Luke xx. 35), but also with the *zōē eis ton aiōna*, and the *zōē aiōnios* which are the subject of our next inquiry; and that it was a common expression in the Mishna that such an one is “worthy of the *olām habbā*” (see Schoettgen, *Horæ Heb.*, in Luc. xx. 35).

§ 5. *Do the phrases zōē aiōnios, (rendered in our version “eternal” or “everlasting life,” by Universalists, “age-lasting” or “aiōnian life,”) and its equivalent zōē eis ton aiōna, imply immortal life?*

It is freely admitted that *aiōn* and *aiōnios* are often used in

a limited sense. The former word does not necessarily mean *eternity*; nor the latter a duration strictly *eternal*. The same is true of their English equivalents. The word *ever* is apparently derived from the Latin *ævum*, which is the same as *aiōn*. When one says, "I have *ever* loved flowers," the phrase limits the term to a very few years. Yet, when it is asked whether the earth will endure *for ever*, we understand an absolute eternity. In the same way the phrase *eis tōn aiōna*, like its Hebrew equivalent, *ʿolām*, may signify a duration without any limit, assigned or conceived. And the word *aiōnios* is doubtless thus used. (Rom. xvi. 26; 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18; v. 1; 1 Tim. vi. 16; 2 Tim. ii. 10; Heb. v. 9; ix. 14, 15; 1 Pet. v. 10.)

As already remarked, the phrase *zōē aiōnios* is used forty-five times in the Bible, and in most instances partitively, or with reference to a class. It is therefore important to the Universalist argument to show, if possible, that the phrase does not signify "eternal life," in the strict sense of that expression. Either the adjective *aiōnios* does not refer to duration at all, but signifies the *nature* or *kind* of life spoken of, or it refers simply to the future age or dispensation, as distinct from the expiring Jewish economy. The latter view, I think, is that preferred by Universalists. The phrase *eis tōn aiōna* would, of course, be taken in a similar sense.

To the first view, — that *zōē aiōnios* denotes a gospel or spiritual life, derived from Christ, as the Lord of the gospel age, or (according to Maurice) a divine life, that relates us to the Eternal One, — I simply reply: Granting this as the *primary* sense of the word, then is not the endless continuance of the life implied as a *secondary* sense; and if so, do not the "perishing," "death," and "not seeing life," put in contrast with it, denote a falling short of immortal life?

To the second view I find several objections:

1. The matters of contrast, and the connected and paralleled expressions, do not favor a reference merely to the gospel dispensation. Contrasted are the expressions, to "perish" (John iii. 15, 16 (comp. vi. 27); x. 28); "persecutions in this time"

(Mark x. 30; Luke xviii. 30); "death" (John v. 24; Rom. v. 21; vi. 23); "abiding in death" (1 John iii. 14, 15); "corruption" (Gal. vi. 8). The following expressions are connected: "Ye judge yourselves unworthy of" (Acts xiii. 46); "As many as were ordained to" (ver. 48); "To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor and immortality" (Rom. ii. 7); to "lay hold on" (1 Tim. vi. 12, 19). The phrase "to live for ever" (*eis ton aiōna*) occurs in John vi. 51, 58, which should be compared with *chajah l'olām* (Gen. iii. 22; Deut. xxxii. 40; Ps. xxi. 26; xlix. 9). The following expressions are also important: "They [Christ's flock] shall never perish" (shall not perish *eis ton aiōna*, John x. 28); "shall never die" (shall not die *eis ton aiōna*, John xi. 26); "shall never see death" or "taste of death" (*eis ton aiōna*, John viii. 51, 52); "shall never thirst" (*eis ton aiōna*, John iv. 14); "He that doeth the will of God abideth for ever" (*eis ton aiōna*, 1 John ii. 17). I also venture to name as parallel the phrase "neither can they die any more" (Luke xx. 36), because it stands in connection with the phrase "to obtain that world" (*tou aiōnos ekeinou*, ver. 35).

2. If the phrases in question are referred to the Christian dispensation, many of the passages where they occur will be hard to translate. The following are examples: "Shall not thirst during the Christian dispensation." "Shall not perish during the Christian era." "Shall not perish for the age to come, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." "Shall live during (or into, *eis*) the future age." "Abideth during the Messianic kingdom." "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have life for the age." "Whosoever liveth and believeth on me shall not die during the *aiōn*. Believest thou this?"

I do not wonder that in the argument which confines these phrases to a dispensation, the terms "aionian life" and "æonic life" are found so convenient and occur so often. But this is not to *translate* the words of life; and we should not be con-

tent with a mere *transfer*, when a translation involves or betrays no difficulty.

3. It would follow that immortal life is one of the rarest things named in the Bible. It follows that he who "brought life and immortality to light," and who "had the words of eternal life," spoke of immortal life in only a single recorded instance. (Luke xx. 36.) In this view, about fifty passages are given up at once as containing no assurance whatever against the final annihilation of all mankind. And the whole doctrine of immortality, either for all men or for any select class of men, rests upon half a dozen passages or less. For not only the fifty passages that speak of "aionian" life will fail in this great argument, but all which speak merely of "life" or of "salvation;" for life and salvation might be only for a temporary existence. But if these words are supposed to *imply* immortality, then those who have not life or salvation, may have no immortality.

And here, before proceeding to the few passages on which depends the last hope of immortality, I must repeat the caution against the *assumption* of man's immortal nature. Mr. Balfour, in his "First Inquiry," has very properly remarked on this subject: "Is not the doctrine of the soul's immortality revealed in the New Testament? No; for if it was taught there, it would be no revelation from God to the world, for it was a popular doctrine among the heathen nations many centuries before the Christian era. With more propriety it might be said that the heathen revealed this doctrine to God than that God revealed it to them. Had the New Testament writers believed the soul to be immortal, why did they never speak of it as such?" (Pp. 332, 333.)

The sum is this. The Scriptures reveal no "immortality of the soul." And they announce the "aionian" life, not of all mankind, but of those who through faith become righteous or good. If, now, "aionian" life *does* imply immortal life, the numerous passages in question teach most decidedly the immortality of a class.

§ 6. *If "aionian" life does not imply immortal life, then do any who fail of it finally attain immortal life?"*

This question is important in the Universalist argument, and complicated generally. Important, because some Universalist writers admit that a sin has been committed of which it is said there is never forgiveness, neither in this age (*aiōn*), nor in the age (*aiōn*) to come. (Mark iii. 29.) Mr. Balfour, treating on this passage, makes temporal death the irremissible penalty in either age. He says: "It is generally admitted that temporal death was the punishment of crimes under the old dispensation; and that temporal death was inflicted for crimes under the new, no one will dispute; for Ananias and his wife, persons in the church at Corinth, are noted examples; and John speaks of a sin unto death, for which even Christians were not to pray, 1 John v. 16, 17." (Second Inquiry, pp. 279, 280.) Thus Mr. Balfour. It remains to be shown that Ananias and Sapphira, failing signally of "aionian" life, shall yet attain pardon of soul, and immortal life. Is there a *third* dispensation, of forgiveness for sins unpardonable in the second? The language of the Epistle to the Hebrews I think hardly allows that. "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the age (*aiōn*) to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance; seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to an open shame" (vi. 4-6). "For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins; but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and of fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries" (x. 26, 27). Granting this "judgment and fiery indignation" to signify the destruction of Jerusalem, where is the "sacrifice for sins" thereafter?

Mr. Paige endeavors to show that Mark iii. 29, does not preclude final forgiveness, with a noticeable remark: "If, by *never forgiveness*, it be denoted, strictly speaking, that the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall never be given, then there

is a direct contradiction between this verse and verse 28; for there it is positively asserted, without any limitation or exception, that 'all sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and *blasphemies wherewith soever* they shall blaspheme.' (Comm. in loc.) This would be called by Coleridge an asthmatic exegesis. Need any one be told that the 29th verse is the limitation and exception to the statement made in verse 28? This statement is in fact worse than nonsense without such a limitation. Aside from the qualifying exception, it is a proclamation of unbounded license to sin and blasphemy. If any one doubts this, let him read the 28th verse without the 29th. And then, as he shudders at the repeal of all moral law which stares him in the face, let him ask what the 29th verse does mean. I do not see how one can then avoid the notion of an unpardonable sin.

And if we take the whole expression as a strong, proverbial mode of speech, — as if it were said, "That is the blackest guilt of all; God will forgive any thing else but it," — I do not see how we can escape the same conclusion, that there may be a sin unforgiven in the age to come, whether that age or *aiōn* be temporary or eternal.

And some of the expressions before cited show that the Jews regarded a certain guilt as finally unpardonable. "This hath been decreed by the Lord, that this sin shall not be forgiven them until they die the second death." "They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the Lord."

But the question I have raised is also complicated. For it involves the whole doctrine of the Resurrection. Is this moral and spiritual, consisting in the conversion of the soul? or, is it physical, initiating the immortal life? Does it occur at the death of the body? or is it an event yet future to the human race? If future, is it simultaneous, and homogeneous for all? or, is there a twofold resurrection, one to immortality, and another abortive, ending in a sleep that knows no waking?

I shall have neither time nor occasion to resolve all these complications. All these shades of opinion are found in almost

every denomination of Christians, and only one of them is peculiar and essential to the Universalist view. I need only show that there is not a final resurrection of all to immortal life. The supposed proof of this rests upon two or three passages, which must be the final resort of the Universalist faith. I have already alluded to them, and we will now examine them.

Luke xx. 34-38: "The children of this world (age, *aiōnos*) marry and are given in marriage. But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world (age, *aiōnos*), and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection. Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed, at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him."

Some have supposed that the expression, "a God of the living," proves that the dead are now alive. But this would manifestly vacate the proof of a resurrection—the very thing that Christ was to show. What need of a resurrection for those who live? Thus Tyndale, answering the Platonic Thomas Moore, says: "Ye destroy the arguments wherewith Christ and Paul prove the resurrection. . . . If the souls be in heaven, tell me why they be not in as good case as the angels be? And then what cause is there of the resurrection?" The sense is this: God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not because they were then alive, for the Jews never thought of them as such, but because they *were to live*, in the resurrection. Here is the figure of *prolepsis*, before noticed. God "calleth the things that are not [yet], as if they [already] were." The heirs of life belong to the living God; they "live unto him" because his eye is upon them, and no power can pluck them from his hands, but they shall be raised up at the last day. They have a life hid with Christ in God. But not so the children of death. This explains an expression already cited from the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, ii. 23: "By the envy of the devil death came into the world, and they follow him that are of his side."

But it is said, "For *all* live unto him." This expression is important in the Universalist argument. But it proves nothing; for the context naturally refers the "all" to the subjects of discourse, either the patriarchs just mentioned, or those "accounted worthy to obtain that world," in ver. 35. Then it will be perfectly proper to read, "For *they* all live unto him." The Greek always allows this whenever the context can suggest it; for the pronoun is implied or rather contained in the verb, and is never separately expressed when the context does suggest it. And in the Syriac, as given us by Dr. Murdock, we actually have the translation I offer: "For *they* all live unto him."

The same phrase is used in Rom. vi. 10, 11, and Gal. ii. 19, apparently with reference to the future and immortal life. There is nothing in either context to suggest its application to the entire human race.

This phrase has also a historical interest. It occurs twenty-four times in the "Book of the Shepherd," written by Hermas, about A.D. 140. Clement of Alexandria cites a passage from it as "divinely expressed." Origen thought the book "divinely inspired." Chevalier Bunsen calls it "one of those books which, like the Divina Commedia and the Pilgrim's Progress, captivate the mind by the united power of thought and fiction, both drawn from the genuine depths of the human soul." All these admirers of the book rank as Universalists. It was read by the churches of Greece as late as the time of Jerome, and was the great exponent of the religious mind of the second century. But this favorite phrase, "shall live unto God," is in every instance referred to a class and never to all mankind. As used by Hermas it seems to refer to the future and immortal life.

But it is asked, Is not the resurrection here spoken of universal? This can not be inferred from the expression "*the* dead" (ver. 37); for the article does not, of course, make the expression universal, and in several of the like expressions in 1 Cor. xv. the article is omitted. Again, the expression in ver. 36 is peculiar. The "resurrection *from* (*ek*) the dead" is different from "the resurrection *of* the dead," and there are

strong reasons for referring the phrase to the so-called "resurrection of the just," as if this were a resurrection *from among* the dead, either by priority in time, or by their prerogative as being worthy of life. In Luke xiv. 14, we read, "Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just." In Acts iv. 2, we read of "the resurrection of Jesus from (*ek*) the dead," — the last phrase being the same with that under consideration. So likewise in Acts xxvi. 23, and Rom. i. 4. In Phil. iii. 10, 11, Paul says: "That I may know him [Christ], and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." In this remarkable passage the term rendered *resurrection* in ver. 2, is itself peculiar. It is not *anastasis*, but *exanastasis*, — an *out-rising*, or a *rising up from among the dead*. Universalists think Paul can not here refer to a literal resurrection, because he was sure of that, and because it would be absurd to say of it, "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect" (ver. 12). But there was reason why Paul should say this. There were those who said that the resurrection was past already, subverting the faith of some (1 Tim ii. 18). These were the spiritualists of that day, denying that Christ had come in the flesh, and affirming that the resurrection was rather an escape from the body or the "form," than a being clothed upon after the pattern of Christ's glorious body. Paul had, moreover, good examples to follow — some in that "great cloud of witnesses" — in striving after a resurrection. Women had received their dead raised to life again; and others accepted not deliverance from torture, "that they might obtain a better resurrection" (Heb. xi. 35). This could not have been conversion. Again, the phrase "were already perfect" evidently does not refer to moral perfection, or holiness, but recalls the expression in Heb. xii. 23: "the spirits of just men made perfect;" and this apparently signifies the being made complete, in the resurrection state. It is in almost so many words, "the resurrection of the just." Again, to say that Paul was sure of a resurrection is not to touch the point in question. To be

sure of an *anastasis*, was not to be sure of the *exanastasis*. In this might specially appear "the power of Christ's resurrection," — in a "resurrection of life," clothing the heirs of life with spiritual bodies, of which his own risen form was the type and the assurance to all that "live and believe" on him, or have *living faith* in him, that they may "never die." Compare what is said in Rev. xx. 5, 6: "This is the first resurrection. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection; on such the second death hath no power." This might be emphatically *the* resurrection, compared with which that of "the unjust" should be sometimes nameless or forgotten. Why, then, should Universalists dwell so much on "the resurrection of the dead, both of the just and the unjust" (Acts xxiv. 15) as *literal*, while they take as simply *moral* or *spiritual* the words in John v. 28, 29? "All that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of condemnation."*

And once more. We have already remarked that the expression "they which shall be accounted worthy," is, *in form*, the description of a class of persons, and does not *refer itself* to all mankind. The equivalent expression in ver. 36, "the children of God," also frequently occurs apparently denoting a class; e.g.: Matt. v. 9; John xi. 52; Rom. viii. 16, 21; ix. 8 ("They which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God"), 26; Gal. iii. 26; John iii. 10 ("In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil"); v. 2. It is sometimes urged that the phrase "accounted worthy" does not denote *moral* fitness, but simply being thus "honored." This I admit for argument's sake.

* The words in ver. 21, certainly look to the literal sense. "As the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the son quickeneth whom he will." Also ver. 20: "Greater works than these, that ye may marvel." Christ had just healed the impotent man. The resurrection of the son of the widow of Nain, and of Lazarus, occurred not long after. This may explain the expression in ver. 25, "The hour is coming, and now is," which is not repeated in ver. 28

Still we read of those who "judged themselves unworthy of eternal life" (Acts xiii. 46), and who were apparently taken at their word.

And this suggests my closing remark on this passage. What was this eternal or "aionian" life, which Luke records as having been rejected (Acts xiii. 46), if not the very life of which Christ is here speaking (Luke xx. 34-38)? The "that world" of which certain are "accounted worthy," is the *aiōn*, precisely the *age*, *dispensation*, or whatever it be that is contained in the expressions "for ever" (*eis ton aiōna*) and "world to come" (*ho mellōn aiōn*), and which gives us the adjective *aiōnios*, so often rendered "eternal." It is the word used in Mark iii. 29, where it is said that for a certain sin there is "never forgiveness." But Universalists confess that in such an *aiōn* the sin is unforgiven. Now these were not two distinct *aiōns*. The phrase "world (or *aiōn*) to come," often used in the New Testament, seems to have been also proverbial with the Jews, so Christ might speak of it as "that *aiōn*." If, then, the phrase "hath never forgiveness" applied to this *aiōn*, admits an after forgiveness, why does not the phrase "neither can they die any more," admit a subsequent dying? The adverbs (*oudepote*, Mark iii. 29, and *ouk eti*, Luke xx. 36) are equally strong. If the latter signifies immortal life for all, the former gives us contradiction. Who will tell us the way out of this dilemma? It may be said there *must be* some distinction between the two *aiōns*. But the utmost I can conceive is, a difference in form, leaving the *aiōn* single; the *aiōn* of the church militant, and the *aiōn* of the church triumphant; the kingdom on earth, and the kingdom in the heavens; but each including the same persons, and leaving to those who hear the gospel the duty to "lay hold on eternal life" as if no other life were immortal.

The next passage to be considered is, —

1 Cor. xv. 22: "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive."

Two questions arise here. 1st, Does the term "all" in each member of the verse include the entire human race? 2d, If

so, does it preclude the distinction of a twofold resurrection, of the just and of the unjust, one class to life and the other to condemnation?

1. There would be no exegetical violence whatever in applying the word "all," in each member of the verse, to the subjects of discourse in the previous context. These were, those who had "fallen asleep in Christ." It was doubt respecting their destiny, that troubled the Corinthian Christians. The expression, "if in this life only we have hope, we are of all men most miserable," goes to make the case of believers, — who then found little good in life, and who were killed all the day long, — the burden of the argument. Again, where our translation speaks of "the dead," the article is commonly omitted in the original. This is a matter of some account if the being "made alive" is taken as the "resurrection of life." The article is found only in verses 29 (baptized for the dead), 35, 42, 52. Here the righteous dead, whether a part, or all mankind, are doubtless intended. But in every other instance (ver. 12 (twice), 13, 15, 20, 21, 32) the article is omitted. We may then translate, e.g. in ver. 16, "If dead persons rise not, then is Christ not raised." We are not warranted in saying that in these verses "the dead" means of course all the dead. For all these reasons I find no difficulty whatever in rendering ver. 22 with reference to Christians, designated in ver. 18, 19, 20: "For as they all die in Adam, even so in Christ shall they all be made alive." The Greek admits this no less than in Luke xx. 38, where, as we have seen, the Syriac requires it. The very common word "all," very naturally used as I have taken it, does not require a sudden extension of the subject to embrace all mankind.

Yet granting that the word "all" in the first member of the verse applies to all the children of Adam, it may in the second member apply to all the "children of God" in Christ, and to none others. Such a comparison of two families and of their respective heads would not be unnatural. I choose, however, not to argue this point, partly because this would require some space, and partly because it is done by those in the orthodox view, and is less necessary for me.

2. But admitting that the word "all" applies in the second clause to the whole human race, we find in the next verse a distinction which may imply a resurrection of some "to condemnation." "But every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterwards *they that are Christ's*, at his coming." Here it seems to be implied that there are some who are not Christ's. After Christ, the first instalment of the resurrection is of a special "order" or company; evidently the same with that spoken of in 1 Thes. iv. 14, 16, where Paul writes with much the same purpose (ver. 13): "For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. . . . The dead in Christ shall rise first." And this reminds us of the "first resurrection," on whose subjects "the second death hath no power" (Rev. xx. 5, 6). And as we read on in 1 Cor. xv. 24, 25, about "the end," and the "putting down all rule and all authority and power," and "putting all enemies under his feet," we find no warrant in inferring the *conversion* of these adverse forces. The same event seems to be predicted in Ps. ii. 8: "Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession." But the next verse indicates a severer conquest than conversion: "Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel." And ver. 12: "Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way."

We have cited 1 Thes. iv. 14-16, which doubtless describes the same fact with 1 Cor. xv. 23. The passage in 2 Thes. i. 5-11, apparently refers to the same period. Here Christians are spoken of as "counted worthy of the kingdom of God" (ver. 5), and Paul prays that "God may count you worthy of this calling" (ver. 11), using the same word that occurs in Luke xx. 35. But here wicked men are explicitly said to suffer a very grievous destruction. They "shall be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and from the brightness of his power." This everlasting or "*aiōn*-ian condemnation, is apparently *in* or *from* the same *aiōn* that is named in Luke xx. 35, and which is the period of Christ's

kingdom. Grant, for argument's sake, that this coming of Christ was at the destruction of Jerusalem. Still where is the proof that they who suffered the "destruction," and who are so plainly excepted from the "order" or company named in 1 Cor. xv. 23, are yet the heirs of immortality?

Passing on to verse 26: "The last enemy, death, shall be destroyed," this is good against the orthodox view of immortal death. But it proves nothing against the view I hold, either in reason or interpretation. There is no more death, when all who live are immortal. So it is said in Rev. xxi. 4: "And there shall be no more death." But it had been previously said (xx. 13, 14): "Death and Hades delivered up the dead which were in them; and they were judged every man according to their works. And Death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death." That this "second death" may have had power upon some, seems implied in ver. 6. The resurrection which precedes it may be an after instalment, of another "order" or company of the dead, not particularly named in 1 Cor. xv. And that some may suffer the "second death" seems also implied in ch. ii. 11: "He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death."

And the failure to name the secondary "order" of those raised up, agrees well with what I regard as the scope of the chapter. This was to comfort the doubts of the Corinthian Christians respecting their deceased brethren, and to meet certain difficulties respecting the possibility or the nature of a resurrection. In this view the closing argument of the chapter is plain enough, without supposing any allusion to the ungodly. As the immortal life was to be in a spiritual body, Paul might speak to those who professed to be spiritual, and with reference to such only. "He that soweth to the spirit shall of the spirit reap life everlasting." "To be spiritually minded is life and peace." But the early Christians seem to have regarded the ungodly as having a soul without the spiritual nature, a view which agrees with the proper sense of Jude ver. 19: "Soul-ual (or psychical, *psuchikoi*), not having spirit." And Paul draws his glorious argument to its close, not with any raptures

in behalf of all mankind, but using such narrow pronouns as might make the glories of this resurrection the special privilege of those that "by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality" (or incorruption, the *aphtharsia*, of vs. 42, 50, 53, 54). He says: "*We* shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed" (ver. 51). "Thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord; forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord" (vs. 57, 58). And he next speaks about a "collection for the saints." (xvi. 1.)*

Rom. v. 18: "Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life."

It is in this one verse of the whole passage (vs. 12-21) that the word "all" is used in the second member of the comparison. And it is used with the word "men." This apparently denotes all mankind, and their salvation. It seems to me the strongest passage that is or can be adduced in support of that view. And if this interpretation at all agreed with the general tone of scriptural language, if it were not an apparent exception from the usual style of the Bible, I should joyfully and without hesitation accept it as proving the final holiness and blessedness of all.

But the very frequent distinction made between the "saved" and the "lost" compels me to hesitate and examine the passage more narrowly. And I can not rest so fond a hope upon it for the following reasons:—

1. The passage is indisputably valid against all theories of a

* I should here say that while I regard the resurrection as yet future, I do not regard it as bringing back the identical dying body. "That which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be." The immortal life is in a "spiritual body;" not pure spirit, but an embodiment suited to the higher nature of spirit (*pneuma*) as compared with soul (*psuche*). Of the interval between death and the resurrection the Scriptures say little. The early Christians spoke of it as a "detention."

limited atonement. And even more; it seems to assert that in Christ's name the *sentence* of death for sin is annulled in behalf of all. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them" (2 Cor. v. 19). In this view the relation of persons unconverted to God is this: they have not to ask for the pardon of past sins, so much as to accept the pardon already made out. But this is all I can prove from the passage in hand. Comparing it with passages parallel, I at once find a plain distinction between pardon granted, and pardon accepted and received. In ch. i. 16, I read of the gospel as "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth," Jew or Greek. In ch. iii. 22, I read of God's righteousness, or plan of justification, which is "by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all, and upon all them that believe," Jew or Gentile. Here the distinction seems to be fairly made by two prepositions, "unto" (*eis*), and "upon" (*epi*). In the passage in hand the first of these only is used. The phrase might therefore be rendered, "by the righteousness of one the free gift came *unto* (*eis*) all men, unto justification of life." In this view all men are *virtually* justified or pardoned, though by unbelief they may not be *actually* saved.

But it will be said the same preposition is used in the first clause, "upon (or unto, *eis*) all men to condemnation;" and if all actually die, why are not all actually saved? I answer, the sentence of physical death, even, is only virtual, not actual against all. Enoch and Elijah did not die. And Paul believed and taught that a whole generation of Christians would never die, but be "changed," at Christ's coming. All these are born mortal as others; the sentence was "upon" or against (*eis*) them, but it fails to reach them. So there may be those within the range and reach of the great salvation, who yet fail of it.

2. In ver. 17, it is said, "they which receive abundance of grace, etc., shall reign in life." But the word rendered "receive" (*lambanontes*) is slightly ambiguous. It may also mean *accept* or *embrace*. It is often used in the active sense, as well as in the passive sense. Its original sense is *to take*,

and it is used in the common phrase "respect of persons" or *acceptance* of persons. It is also the root of the word used 1 Tim. vi. 12, 10, "lay hold on (*epilabou*) eternal life."

3. In vs. 14, 15, 16, 19, the distinction is made, not between "all" as dead and alive again, but between "many" and "many." The main argument may then rest on the comparison of the children of Adam with the children of God in Christ, which agrees so well with the general tenor of Scripture, and with which the 18th verse, as above explained, does not at all conflict.

4. The whole passage shows that what is gained in Christ has once been lost. This is something more than bodily immortality. It is salvation, in the broadest sense of the word. And the "free gift" or gratuity is said to superabound, or to cover more space than the condemnation could, not because it gives more than was lost, but because one divine act of justification avails against "many offences." Thus salvation is exceedingly gratuitous.

But it inevitably follows that the salvation has been once forfeit. In other words, eternal death was not an unjust sentence to be pronounced upon sin; and Adam might have perished, and the whole race in and with him, without wrong to man. The passage confirms what I have before remarked,—that annihilation has been invited and confronted. That God interposes to save is doubtless in keeping with His nature as Love. We may even say that in saving man God is simply just to Himself. But to man he is *more* than just. It is strictly true: "By *grace* are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gratuity of God." "The wages of sin is death; but the amnesty of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord."

I dismiss this passage by remarking that Tholuck, a learned Restorationist, of whom hereafter, in his Commentary on the Epistle, finds no proof here of the final salvation of all.

There are several other passages on which Universalists more or less rely, all of which I have not time to examine. Of the whole class given at the close of my "general tenor of

Scriptural language," I will say that while they show a final universality of holiness and blessedness, or an end of evil, and are thus valid against the orthodox view, very few can even be offered as applying to all *individual* beings now living. And one or two might be applied to all brute creatures, as well as to all human beings (Rev. v. 13). I may hereafter consider such as my affable opponent shall offer. But I will here say a word respecting two or three.

Acts xxiv. 15: "And have *hope* toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust."

The word "hope" here used is frequently insisted on as showing that the resurrection of "the unjust" is a blessing, a resurrection of salvation. But I think this does not follow for three reasons:—

1. It was natural that Paul, quoting that Jewish faith which he accepted, should name the *whole* of it; and that he should name it as his hope, if it were on the whole desirable. Now Christ very strongly asserted some sort of twofold resurrection,—of well doers to life, and of evil doers to condemnation. Does the latter sound like a thing desirable? No more so than a thousand calamitous events that have actually occurred. I should never have hoped for the Lisbon earthquake. Yet it did happen, and the existence of all Portugal was desirable nevertheless. So the complex resurrection Christ named was desirable; and no less to be hoped for was that which Paul named, though it were the same; especially if it ends in an immortality of goodness, and a universality of righteousness.

2. The Scriptures elsewhere speak of things partly good and partly evil as matter of thanks. There is an apparent instance in Rom. vi. 17: "God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin; but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you." A plainer example occurs in the 136th Psalm: "Oh, give thanks . . . to him that smote Egypt in their first-born; . . . and slew famous kings; for his mercy endureth for ever." Such thanksgiving seems at least as misanthropic as Paul's "hope" in question. Yet the whole Psalm means doubtless well enough. But

3. The resurrection of the unjust, though it be *unto* condemnation, and to the "second death," yet may not be *for* that purpose, as if God were vindictive, or as if the claim of his law for so much penal suffering were inexorable. The Orthodox, regarding annihilation as better than the lost deserve, sometimes represent it as a "*coup de grâce*" to end their woes. Not thus do I "hope" for it. But if their resurrection be itself the overflowing of the fountain of life, if they who "will not come to Christ that they may have life" do yet in spite of themselves get more than they wish, so that they die by instalments and even die hard, I can rejoice in all the preternatural life they have. In all God's realm no vitality is wholly lost that is lived, though it come to an end. So I can very comfortably "hope" as I think Paul did.

1 Tim. iv. 10: "The living God, who is the Savior of all men, specially of those that believe."

It is noticeable that the only instance in which God is said in so many words to be "the Savior of all" is with such an immediate qualification. I simply remark: 1. In the Universalist view, of the final faith and salvation of all, the more natural phraseology would have been, "especially *when* they believe." 2. This is one of the few instances in which *God* is called a Savior, rather than Christ. The word (*Sōtēr*) has in the classic Greek the more general sense also of *Preserver*, which it may have here, in obvious harmony with the specification named. 3. Waiving this, the distinction between salvation in the reach of all, and salvation "laid hold on" by all, will allow the *especial* deliverance here indicated.

§ 7. *The Two Theodores. Change for Authorities.*

In the late discussion between my opponent and the Rev. Dr. Adams, the concession of the Rev. Theodore Parker that the Scriptures teach the doctrine of eternal punishment was adduced, against which was offset the Rev. Theodore Clapp's recantation of that view after an independent examination. In a grave question of this kind no one should, or honestly can, rest his belief on any other man's opinion. Neither Dr. A.

nor Rev. Mr. C. wished the names they respectively gave to turn the scales of judgment in any man's mind. That would not be a Protestant wish. Yet both those names were properly offered, because men must respect the honest opinions of learned and thinking men. They have their weight, their importance, and their office, to command attention, and invite people to ponder a subject for themselves.

Partly for this purpose I shall offer a few names from my corner of the triangle, in my next chapter. But I may here offer one or two names in the question between my respected friends, which may command the attention of them both. And it is specially proper for *me* thus to offer names to gentlemen both right and both wrong in my opinion.

The first name is that of Augustus Tholuck. A few of your readers may need to be informed that he is the man who has done more than any other in Germany to secure a hearty love of the Scriptures, opposing at once the rationalism and the dead orthodoxy which are their equal foes. He is master of more languages than almost any other living man, especially of those which contribute to a right understanding of the inspired Word. Nor is he a mere bookworm, with more of uncommon than of common sense. He spends a large part of his time in walks and entertaining conversations with students in the University, and in visits and varied correspondence. He is one of the most eloquent pulpit orators of Germany. He is an admirable teacher and lecturer, fresh and suggestive, with none of the pedantry or false profundity of German scholarship.

He has written commentaries on the Gospel of John, the Epistles to the Romans and to the Hebrews, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Psalms. Most of these have been republished in English translations. Dr. Schaff tells us: "As a theological writer, Tholuck has devoted his best hours to biblical exegesis. Here he has achieved his most enduring merits."

Now Tholuck is both orthodox and Universalist. He was one of those who in the World's Evangelical Alliance opposed the article on future punishment. His attitude on this subject is indicated by the following conversation between him and Dr.

Sears of this country, held in London some years since. I take the account from Prof. Crosby's "Appeal to the American Tract Society," pp. 49, 50.

"*Tholuck*. I suppose my American brethren would consider me orthodox in general, except in my Universalism.

"*S*. Where did you find this doctrine—in the Bible, or in your philosophy?

"*T*. In both.

"*S*. What are the passages of Scripture on which you principally rely?

"*T*. My main passage is 1 Cor. xv. 28. . . . Also Rom. xi. 36. . . . Another passage is Phil. ii. 10. [His argument may be considered in the sequel.]

"*S*. Do you find no passages of Scripture which positively assert the everlasting punishment of the wicked?

"*T*. Yes : Matt. xxv. 46, and others like it.

"*S*. Can those passages which you think favor Universalism be understood in any other sense without violating the fundamental laws of interpretation?

"*T*. Yes, they *can*, but the construction would not be so easy and natural.

"*S*. Can the other passages, which speak of endless punishment, *possibly* bear any other construction?

"*T*. I do not see how they can.

"*S*. Well, what are you going to do with them?

"*T*. That is my only difficulty." . . .

The remainder of the conversation I can not quote. But it sustains the following statement by Tholuck, made in 1887, of what he had said in 1834 : "Dogmatically, i.e. as a theologian, I feel myself drawn toward this opinion [the Universalist]; but exegetically, i.e. as an interpreter, I do not know how to justify it." (Selections from German Literature, by Edwards and Park, p. 215.)

I will close with a passage from one of the best biblical scholars in this country, Dr. G. R. Noyes, Professor in Cambridge Divinity School. He is a Restorationist. In his review of Maurice's "Theological Essays," (*Christian Examiner*,

March, 1855, pp. 294, 295,) he says: "Even in the writings of Paul, who is very strong in denouncing punishment against the wicked, there are passages in which he speaks of the purposes of God, and of the riches of his grace, in such a manner as to make it difficult to believe that he contemplated the strictly eternal punishment of all who die in sin. We refer to the manner in which he speaks of the salvation of all Israel in Romans xi., and the putting down of all enemies to the kingdom of Christ in 1 Corinthians xv. 25-28. *We can not, indeed, find an express declaration in the Scriptures of the final salvation of all men.* Enemies may be put under one's feet by confinement in a place of punishment, as well as by being converted into friends. But the spirit of these passages, which makes so much to depend on the means which the wisdom and mercy of God have, as it were, in reserve, is not very favorable to the doctrine of the endless misery of all who are leaving the world with a sinful character, or who have left it since the creation of man. The thought of Paul logically carried out leads to a very different conclusion, and awakens the most cheering hopes." He adds in a note: "The impartial and sharp-sighted De Wette finds still more actually expressed in 1 Cor. xv. 28, than we can."

This passage is very good argument against the orthodox view. But the words I have italicized would reduce the Universalist view very nearly to an arcanum. These words are the more noteworthy as the writer was in so close neighborhood to verse 22, which Universalists regard as so fully stating their view. But in the view that all who live for ever will be holy we find a restitution of all things, and a universal dominion of Christ; and "the thought of Paul logically carried out" may prove no more than this.

CHAPTER IV.

THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT.

IN the words and by the work of Christ "Life and Immortality were brought to light." But that light, either for its original obscurity, or by its passage through the clouds and shadows of eighteen centuries, has come to have three widely different interpretations, of which one only can be true. How shall we select this and correct the errors of the remaining two?

Besides the examination of the Scriptures themselves, another method is perfectly legitimate. We may also inquire, What light was *needed* when Christ came? What light seemed to be immediately contributed by his coming? or, How did the early Christians understand his words? And again: What effect had philosophy when afterwards added to the gospel? In reply to these questions I propose to show —

1. That Christ came at a time of general despondency and despair respecting all future life.
2. That the early Christians understood his words as assuring immortal life to be received by faith in him.
3. That the subsequently added doctrine of the soul's proper immortality was the common occasion, first of the orthodox and then of the restorationist view.

§ 1. *There was deplorable need of light on the subject of immortality when Christ came.*

Because man was made *for* immortality, there had ever been, both among Jews and Gentiles, many thoughts about it. There could have been no welcome of the coming light if there had been no thoughts — even anxious thoughts — on the subject. But notwithstanding the natural thinking respecting

a future life, and even the strong desire for it, the opinions of men just before Christ came indicate a growing, often an utter, despair. Among the Hebrews, it has been questioned whether the Scriptures taught, or were designed to teach, any thing clear on the subject. Certain it is, that the Sadducees, denying all resurrection and spiritual existence, formed a most respectable party among the Jews, being sometimes represented in the Sanhedrim and in the priesthood. They to whom were intrusted the oracles of God, in which some "thought they had eternal life" (John v. 29), were in need of light.

Much more the Gentiles. If among the Jews, by various culture and intercourse with other peoples and influence from their opinions, there had been *progress* in the doctrine of an after life, on the other hand there was among the Greeks and the Romans a great and manifest *decline* of faith. The immortality of the soul was as old as Homer. It was older. Herodotus said that the Egyptians were "the first of mankind who defended the immortality of the soul." But the Hindoos, probably, had it quite as old, and the Persians not much younger. Yet, in the very form in which it was held by the Hindoos, and afterwards by the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, we discover the need of a revelation, and some cause of the doubts that followed. The Bhagavad Gita, which contained the essence of the Brahminical philosophy, asserted that the soul is not only immortal, but eternal. This was the doctrine of Pherecydes, the Assyrian, the hearing of which converted Pythagoras from a wrestler into a philosopher.

I need not follow the Greek philosophy on this subject through its forms and changes. The decline of faith which I assert is apparent in Socrates' time. He calls the soul's immortality an "old doctrine, long ago shadowed forth by the founders of the mysteries," and appeals to antiquity in support of his own view of the spiritual, undying nature of the soul, against the scepticism of his age. "Can the soul," he asks, "which goes to the presence of a good and wise God (whither, if God will, my soul will shortly go)—can this soul of ours, when separated from the body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, *as most*

men assert ?" Aristotle, it is now generally conceded, neither taught nor held an after life, but the opposite.* The famous argument of Cicero, who so greatly admired Plato, does *not even pretend* to prove the doctrine in question, as its very name imports ("De Contemnendâ Morte," on the Contempt of Death). He labors to show that death is not an evil, because, if it is an eternal sleep, we shall not suffer during its continuance. This explains the passage in which his pupil wishes that, if the birds of prey should come for his body, he might have a stick to drive them away. And all are familiar with the expression about the *Phædo* of Plato: "I have read it, over and over again; but, I know not why it is, while I read I give my assent; but when I have laid the book down and begin to think on the subject myself, all that persuasion glides away." And this is said by one who "would rather err with Plato than think the truth with those contemptible philosophers" who denied a future life. And the familiar letters of Cicero, in which he would most naturally express his real sentiments, show no hope beyond the grave. To one friend he says: "Even we who are happy should despise death, since we shall have no sense nor feeling beyond it." And Seneca, whose "*Morals*" are thought by modern pantheists about as good as those of the Bible, writes to one bereaved: "Death is the release and end of all pain, beyond which our evils do not pass. It restores us to the same tranquillity in which we were before our birth." And in one of his poems he says:

"Chaos and hungry Time devour us all.
Inevitable Death the body kills,
Nor spares the soul."

* Mr. Landis (*Immortality of the Soul*, p. 98, note) claims Aristotle as holding immortality; taking no notice, however, of my quotation from Ritter and my citation of Pomponatius and Mosheim to the contrary. (*Debt and Grace*, p. 275, note.) Even Cudworth says: "It must needs be left doubtful whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us." (*Intell. System*, I. 97, Harrison's ed.) See, also, Wm Archer Butler, *History of Ancient Philosophy*, II. 426-429.

Epictetus is another moralist of that age for whom some would dispense with the gospel light. "Whither do you go?" he asks. "Nowhere to your hurt; you return from whence you came, — to a friendly consociation with your kindred elements. What there was of the nature of fire in your composition returns to the element of fire; what there was of earth, to earth; what of air, to air; and of water, to water." And the elder Pliny: "The vanity of man, and his insatiable longing after existence, have led him to dream of a life after death. A being full of contradictions, he is the most wretched of creatures, since the other creatures have no wants transcending the bounds of their nature. Man is full of desires and wants that reach to infinity, and can never be satisfied. His nature is a lie — uniting the greatest poverty with the greatest pride. Among these so great evils, the best thing God has bestowed on man is the power of taking his own life."

Such were the doubts and despair of men, waiting in the gloom of the shadow of death for the true life and light. And when the Life-giver came, how natural, if all mankind were the appointed subjects of immortal life, that this should appear in the ordinary speech of him who "had the words of eternal life." How strange that he and the apostles who heralded all through the Roman Empire what they called a gospel, should only speak of a certain "aionian" life, and even of that ambiguous duration as if it were the prerogative of a special class, to be had by striving for it; leaving the great and long-debated question of immortality in as great obscurity as it was before. Truly, if man is at all immortal, his immortality was not then at all brought to light. It was not revealed in that phrase, "the resurrection, both of the just and of the unjust;" for this was a tenet of the Pharisees, to which Paul made appeal on a certain occasion of self-defence. If this was the revelation, it came not so much from Christ as by those of whom he said, Beware! For the doubts which Christ found prevailing, there were, as I have intimated, various causes. The philosophers had tried to prove too much; not only that all souls are immortal, but that the soul is eternal. And the new revelations

on the subject would have to encounter men's philosophy. How natural, if man has immortality in any form, that he who contributed the great light on the subject should have somehow recognized the essential fact; so that one thing at least should be settled.

Does the objector anticipate the varying opinions of the second century, and say that *nothing* was settled by Christ's revelation? I answer, one thing was settled, so as to be never since disputed as a Christian truth. And that is, Whoever shall have *Life* — whatever the word means — has it through Christ; and by *Faith* — whatever that word means — does he accept and receive the life.

If this is a Universalist formula, I yield the argument. Whether any thing else was settled on the side of universal immortality, we are next to examine.

§ 2. *As the early Christians were not "orthodox," so they were not Universalists.*

An orthodox writer, in a late work, says "it is to be lamented that they [the apostolical Fathers] either wrote very little, or else their writings have, for the most part, perished." (Hovey, *State of the Impenitent Dead*, p. 131). I think I have elsewhere shown that there is reason for such regret as respects the orthodox argument; or that the early Christian writings do not support that view, but rather the view I offer. I will now cite a few expressions to show that they were not Universalists.

The so-called apostolical Fathers were Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, and Hermas. The epistle ascribed to Barnabas is probably not genuine, though of a very early date. The writings now extant under the other names are partly genuine and partly spurious. I will quote from the former, making allusion to the latter only as indicating the sentiment of the age in which they were written.

Bunsen assigns the so-called epistle of Barnabas to the reign of Domitian, in the first century. The phrase "eternal death," not occurring in the Scriptures, is here found, in the following

passage: "The way of darkness is crooked and full of cursing (or, wholly accursed). For it is the way of eternal death, with punishment; in which they that walk meet those things that destroy their own souls" (c. 20).

The whole expression, "eternal death, with punishment," which some might take as supporting the orthodox view, seems to be otherwise explained by the following expressions in the Homilies ascribed to Clement: "They wholly perish after punishment" (Hom. iii. c. 59). "By the greatest punishment they shall be utterly extinguished," (Hom. vii. c. 7. See also Hom. xvi. c. 10.)

In the same chapter of the epistle it is said: "He that chooses the other part shall be destroyed, together with his works. For this cause there shall be both a resurrection and a retribution." Again: "They that put their trust in him shall live for ever" (*eis ton aiōna*, c. 8). "Who is there that would live for ever? (*eis ton aiōna*;) let him hear the voice of thy Son" (c. 9).

The phrase *eis ton aiōna* is rendered in the Latin *in æternum* and *in perpetuum*, by Cotelarius. It was undoubtedly used by the early Christians to denote an eternal duration, and we shall therefore accept the common rendering, "for ever."

One epistle of Clement to the Corinthians was publicly used in many of the churches. Mosheim and Neander think it interpolated in some passages; yet Bunsen regards it as of great importance, "historically, constitutionally, and doctrinally."

The author, speaking of the "condemnation to come," asks, "What world shall receive any of those who run away from Him?" (c. 28.) Again: "Wherefore we being the portion of the Holy One, let us do all those things that pertain unto holiness" (c. 30). "How blessed and wonderful, beloved, are the gifts of God! life in immortality! brightness in righteousness! truth in full assurance! faith in confidence! temperance in holiness!" (c. 35.) "By him would God have us taste the knowledge of immortality" (c. 36).

Of the eight epistles ascribed to Ignatius, three are deemed genuine. The following expressions fairly indicate his views:

"Be vigilant, as God's athlete. The meed is incorruptibility, and life eternal" (Polycarp, c. 2). "Those that corrupt families by adultery shall not inherit the kingdom of God" (Ephesians, c. 16). "For this cause the Lord suffered the ointment to be poured upon his head, that he might breathe immortality into his church" (Ib. c. 17). "I seek the bread of God which is the body of Christ; and his blood, which is love incorruptible and perpetual life" (Romans c. 7).

The views of Polycarp appear in the following passages of his epistle to the Philippians: "To whom [Christ] all things are made subject, both that are in heaven, and that are in earth; whom every living creature shall worship; who shall come to be the judge of the quick and dead; whose blood God shall require of them that believe not in him. But he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also raise up us in like manner, if we do his will and walk according to his commandments, and love those things which he loved" (c. 2). "Whom if we please in this present world (*aiōn*), we shall also be made partakers of that which is to come; according as he has promised us, that he will raise us from the dead; and that if we shall walk worthy of him, we shall also reign together with him, if we believe. . . . And neither fornicators, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, shall inherit the kingdom of God; nor they who do such things as are unbecoming" (c. 5). The Lord "grant you a lot and portion among his saints; and us with you, and to all that are under the heavens who shall believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and in his Father who raised him from the dead" (c. 12). This epistle was read in some of the churches as late as Jerome's time.

The "Shepherd" of Hermas has been already cited for the phrase "to live unto God." I will here add the following expressions: "They who are of this kind shall prevail against all impiety, and continue unto life eternal. Happy are they that do righteousness; they shall not perish for ever" (Vision ii. 3). "Fear God and thou shalt live; and whosoever shall fear him, and keep his commands, their life is with the Lord; [they

shall live for ever. *Dressel*,] but they who keep them not, there is no life in them," (Command vii.) "They that are subject unto evil desires shall die for ever" (Command xii. 2). "The trees which are green and righteous shall possess the world to come. . . . The wicked, like the trees which thou sawest dry, shall as such be found dry and without fruit in that other world. And like dry wood they shall be burned." (Similitude iv.) "They who have known the Lord, and have seen his wonderful works, if they shall live wickedly, shall be doubly punished, and shall die for ever" (Similitude ix. 18).

I might cite another document belonging to this age, a part of the so-called "Apostolical Constitutions," which Bunsen calls the "Church and House Book," as further showing that there were as yet no traces or indications of Universalist faith. But I do not know that I need have cited a single word. I do not know that any Universalist expressions or writers are claimed before Clement of Alexandria, about A.D. 200, with one exception to be noticed presently. I find some traces of such views also in Athenagoras, who preceded Clement by a few years, and will grant him to the Universalists, though they have not claimed him.

Here, then, we come to a very critical question :—

§ 3. *Whence did Universalist views take their rise?*

And I propose to show that not the Scriptures alone, but Platonic additions to scriptural doctrine, were the occasion, first of Orthodoxy, and then of Universalism.

The orthodox view requires three conditions: a doctrine of indefeasible immortality; a doctrine of salvation conditioned within certain limits of time; and such fiery heat as shall fuse these together into the faith of men. They can never be first combined in calm deliberation, however coldly they may be received as a tradition.

The conditions I have named were brought together in Rome, about the year 138. The bloody hand of the imperial power was invoked to revenge the lust of a heathen husband

upon a Christian wife. Her teacher in the faith of Christ is accused, and martyred. Two other persons, remonstrating against such flagrant wrong, are devoted to death.

The fierce fire of such persecution offered to combine the requisite doctrinal elements, and the materials were not wanting. Justin, surnamed "the Philosopher" and afterwards "Martyr," was a recent convert from Platonism to Christianity. Of a warm and generous nature, he was moved to address to the emperor his first "Apology" or defence of the proscribed faith. That Apology I believe to be the oldest "orthodox" book. Now Justin brought, along with the name of Philosopher, much Platonic faith. He claimed for many doctrines of Philosophy and Christianity a common origin in an original revelation. The philosophers, he thought, had borrowed some things from the Hebrew prophets. And though he does not speak in distinct terms of the soul as immortal, there is very little in this book to indicate any opinion that the soul can die, but much to suggest the contrary.

On the other side, there is nothing in his book or in our history thus far, to indicate any opinion among the Christians of the final salvation of all. He regarded man as on probation during life, awaiting a judgment after the resurrection. "Plato," he says, "held that the wicked will stand before Minos and Rhadamanthus, to be punished by them. We hold the same event, but before Christ as judge; that they may be punished in their reëmbodied souls, not a thousand years, as Plato said, but eternally. If any one thinks this incredible or impossible, the error is of little account so long as we are not convicted of any evil conduct" (c. 8).

This is very mildly said, and with a protest of the paramount importance of practice over belief. The severe faith, however, was a burden to Justin's own mind. Yet the opinion being once expressed, in an hour of darkness and in a book of philosophy to make it respectable, was able to hold its way in the church.

Justin, I said, does not put the soul's immortality into a formula. He uses one expression in this very book which

might indicate an acquaintance with another view. "We have learned," he says, "that they only are made immortal who live piously and virtuously before God" (c. 21). Other passages will hardly allow this to be strictly taken. But as I have shown this to be the prevailing faith until his time, I may here add a very important fact confirmatory of my history.

One of the earliest questions in Christian philosophy, was that respecting the nature of the soul. Is it naturally mortal, or immortal? All the gentile philosophers who had at all asserted a future life, — excepting a few of the Stoic school, — and all the native pride of man, had said, "immortal." But the Christians said otherwise. And their almost uniform view on this question of nature is the more remarkable, because it is given by those who differed most widely in the question of fact, whether the soul would die. The following quotations will show their opinion :

Tatian, a disciple of Justin Martyr, says: "The soul is not in its own nature immortal, O Greeks! but mortal. Yet it is able not to die. For it does die, and is dissolved with the body, if ignorant of the truth; but it rises again with the body at the end of the world, receiving death in immortality for its punishment.* Whereas the soul that receives the knowledge of God, though dissolved for a time, does not die." (*Oratio ad Græcos*, c. 13.)

Theophilus of Antioch, who also belonged to the school of Justin, says: "Some one will ask, Was Adam by nature mortal? By no means. Immortal? Not thus, either. What then — nothing at all? I answer, neither mortal nor immortal; for if the Creator had made him from the first immortal, he would have made him a god. If mortal, then God would appear as the author of death. He made him, then, capable

*Prof. Hovey (p. 140) speaks of Tatian as teaching "the *final* extinction of the wicked." That the above expression gives his real view — of *temporary* extinction followed by eternal suffering — is believed by Morell, Ducæus, Oporinus, Teller, Dodwell, Daniel, and Redepenning, cited by Otto in his edition. The notion of a temporary extinction was the heresy of the sect of Arabians.

of becoming either ; so that by keeping the command of God he might attain immortality as his reward, and become a god. But if he should turn to mortal things, and disobey God, he would be himself the author of his own death. For God made man free and with power of self-control" (Ad Autolyceum, l. 2, c. 37). He elsewhere calls man *mesos*, "intermediate." He seems to have held the orthodox view.

Lactantius, "the Christian Cicero," (about A.D. 300,) was doubtless orthodox. But he says: "There would be no difference between the just and the unjust, if every man that is born were made immortal. Immortality, therefore, is not a law of our own nature, but the wages and reward of virtue. . . . For this reason God seeks to be worshipped by man as Father, that he may attain virtue and wisdom, which alone impart immortality." (Instt. Div. l. 7, c. 5.)

These expressions of three different writers, and the last remark cited from Justin, are obviously inconsistent with their doctrine of immortal misery. And I have sometimes queried whether this apparent inconsistency might not be due in part to corruptions of the text. Indeed, Cotelerius, the editor of the apostolic Fathers, including the Clementine Homilies, remarks on those passages that plainly teach the immortality of the righteous only, that they disagree with other passages asserting the eternal suffering of the wicked, so that "the Pseudo-Clement must have written inconsistently, or must have been *here* interpolated." I find but one passage in the Homilies plainly asserting immortal woe ; hence I should suspect the interpolation to be not "*here*" but *there*. But waiving this question of genuineness to the profounder critics, I proceed with my citations.

Augustine, the great light of orthodoxy, applies the same view to man's bodily nature: "Before man's sin the body might be called mortal in one respect and immortal in another ; that is, mortal because it was capable of dying ; immortal because it was able not to die." (De Genesi ad literam, l. 6, c. 25.) His view of the *soul's* immortality is Platonic enough,

and his arguments for it are worthy of the Schoolmen and of Samuel Drew.

And Justin Martyr himself, in his later work, the Dialogue with the Jew Trypho, says: "I neither regard Plato nor Pythagoras, nor any of their way of thinking. . . . The soul either has life in itself, or it receives it from something else. . . . But the soul partakes of life, because God wills it to live; and just so too it will no longer partake of life, whenever He does not desire it to live. For it can not live of itself, as God does. But as the personal man does not always exist, and body and soul are not ever conjoined; but, whenever this harmony must be dissolved, the soul leaves the body and the man is no more; so likewise whenever it is necessary that the soul should no longer be, the vital spirit leaves it, and the soul is no more, but itself returns again thither whence it was taken." (c. 4.) He never spoke of the soul as absolutely immortal, and in one or two expressions of this dialogue, he distinctly withholds such an adjective. *

The settled opinion of Athanasius, the "Father of Orthodoxy," on the main question, I think can not be proven. On the question of man's *nature*, he says: "God desired man to continue in incorruption. But man, neglecting and departing

* Professor Hovey, in his "State of the Impenitent Dead," quoting a passage from Justin's Exhortation to the Greeks, says: "Mr. Hudson refers to the above, in proof, it would seem, of the following statement: 'In the same treatise he names as truths held *in common*, by the philosophers and the Christians, the doctrines of the divine origin of the world and creation of man, of the soul's immortality, and of judgment after this life.'" (P. 137.) Again he remarks: "'In the system of Athenagoras,' says Mr. Hudson, 'the immortality of the soul is certainly of nature.'" (P. 139.)

I am much surprised that my learned friend should cite me thus, as if these were either concessions, or indications of the Christian doctrine of the age; making no allusion to my many quotations showing that the single expression of Justin about immortality did *not* represent the common sentiment, nor the maturer opinion of Justin himself; and giving his reader no intimation that I regard Athenagoras as leading off a dissent from the common opinion, and preparing the way for the Restorationism of the Alexandrian school. (See Rejoinder, p. 423.)

from the knowledge of God, and devising and regarding that which was evil, incurred the threatened condemnation of death. . . . By transgression they reverted to their native condition; so that, as from non-existence they began to be, they must now in due time suffer the loss and destruction of their being. . . . For man is by nature mortal, seeing he was created from non-being. Yet, as made in the likeness of the true Being, to be preserved by the knowledge of him, he might have escaped the force of corruption and remained immortal." (De Incarnatione Verbi, c. 4.)

In the fifth century, Nemesius, a Neoplatonist, became a Christian and bishop of Emesa. He is a Restorationist. But he says: "Since the soul is not yet known in its essence, it is not suitable to determine respecting its energy. The Hebrews say that originally man was made evidently neither mortal nor immortal, but on the confines of either nature; so that, if he should yield to the bodily affections, he would share also the changes of the body; but if he should prefer the nobler affections of the soul, he should be deemed worthy of immortality." (De Naturâ Hominis, c. 1.)

I would call special attention to this passage, both as testimony of Hebrew doctrine needing special explanation in the New Testament if it was not to be strictly taken, and also as coming from a Restorationist.

Nicholas of Methone, of the twelfth century, is regarded by Neander as the most learned theologian of his age. He says: "It is not every soul that neither perishes nor dies, but only the rational, truly spiritual, and divine soul, which is made perfect through virtue by participating in the grace of God." (See Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, § 174.) I do not know his opinion on the main question. *

Deferring the opinions of Irenæus and of Arnobius for a moment, I come back to Athenegoras, the first of the post-apostolic Fathers who does *not* recognize the intermediate nature of man. We know little of his history, but we are told he was a catechist at Alexandria, before Clement. In the strength of his expressions, though not in their frequency, he

makes very free of immortality, and he presses his argument for the resurrection as completing the being of man whose soul is immortal. The body, he says, was made originally immortal, yet continuing by the sole will of the Creator. But man has an unchangeable continuance with respect to the soul. (De Resur. Mort. c. 16.) I can not give all my reasons for calling him a Restorationist. Some of his expressions might be taken as orthodox. Professor Hovey claims him as such. But he cites no expression strong enough, I think, to overrule the general tenor of his doctrine of man, and especially his argument that as man is an end in and to himself, no reason can ever occur why he should cease to be. (c. 12.) No orthodox view of the economy of eternal woe is at all admissible by the side of this statement. It is all that any Universalist can ask, unqualified as it is left. Hence I conclude that if Athenagoras was not consciously a Restorationist, he at least laid broad the foundations for the restorationism of the Alexandrian School.

I have spoken of a claim made by Universalists that there was restorationism before the time of Clement. This is done by Dr. Ballou, in the *Expositor*, May, 1834, p. 189, where he cites a passage in the second book of the Sibylline Oracles, of which, however, he makes little account. Dr. B. relies upon the date which had been usually assigned to this work; namely, the middle of the second century. But the critical labors of Friedlieb, who has edited the work, give the following results: Of the twelve books of these Oracles, the oldest was written about the year 160 before Christ; the latest towards the year 300 of the Christian era. The *second* is assigned to the beginning of the third century. Alexandre, another editor, agrees with Friedlieb in the main. My information is derived from a very able article on the subject in the *Methodist Quarterly*, 1855, pp. 510, 512.

The restorationism of Clement is not very explicit, though indubitable. He does not call the soul immortal, perhaps because this was a Gnostic style of speech, of which the Christians were somewhat shy. In one instance he speaks of the soul as saved, by present grief, from "eternal death;" but he uses the word

"eternal" much as Maurice takes it, — as referring, not to duration, but to kind; death in sin and ignorance. He held all punishment to be chastening and reformatory, and speaks of a certain "discreet fire," or *ignis sapiens*, in a style suggesting the notion of purgatory, which was now taking its rise.

I need not tell my Universalist friends that Origen, "the Adamantine," was one of themselves. And I freely concede he was as adamant for his virtues as for the power of his learning. I only ask that some regard should be had to all his opinions bearing on the question in hand. Neander speaks of him as attaching great importance to the natural immortality of the soul, as related to God. He is well known also to have held its preëxistence. He made much of the doctrine of free will, supposing that not only the lost, including Satan, might be saved, but that the saved might be lost again; in other words, he made evil an eternal vicissitude. A passage cited by Tholuck on Rom. v. 18, confirms the common belief that he regarded the doctrine of universal salvation as an arcanum, not to be generally published. And a passage in what may be called his Confession of Faith is remarkable for two reasons: it is the first in which the nature and destiny of the soul are told in extra-scriptural language; and it is hypothetically orthodox. He says: "Now that the soul hath its own substance and life, it shall receive according to its merits when it departs from this world; to possess eternal life and blessedness, if its deeds have secured this inheritance, or to be given over to eternal fire and punishments, if the guilt of its sins shall bring it to this doom." (De Principiis, Præf. apud Rufinum.)

Of his allegorical method of interpretation I shall say nothing. He thought and spoke very much as I might have done, holding in one hand the doctrine of an indefeasible immortality, and in the other a Bible very infallibly true, and as of very elastic interpretation.

Origen lived about A.D. 225. His Universalism, with all its modifications, was obviously a late and incomplete development of the doctrine if true. I think the history shows what I proposed, — that it was due more to Platonic philosophy than

to exegesis ; or to the doctrine of the soul's immortality super-added to the Scriptures.

I need not trace its history further. Some of my orthodox friends may need to know that more than half the Fathers of the Eastern Church were Restorationists ; and Gieseler tells us that "the belief in the unalienable power of amendment in all intelligent beings, and in the limited duration of future punishment, was so general even in the West, and among the opponents of Origen, that it seemed entirely independent of his system, to which, doubtless, its origin must be traced." I need only show, in conclusion, that besides the orthodox opposition, two strong protests were made from the position I hold ; one during the process of the change, and the other at a later date.

Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, was a disciple of Polycarp, who had personally known the beloved disciple, John. He suffered martyrdom in A.D. 202. His principal work is a refutation of existing heresies, principally the Gnostic ; and with Gnostic views the soul's strict immortality is associated in his book. Of his general merits of character the Restorationist Eusebius shall be our witness. Irenæus says : The Scripture "saith of the salvation of man, 'He asked of thee life, and thou gavest him length of days for ever and ever ;' the Father of all making a grant of continuance for ever and ever to those who are saved. For life is not of ourselves, nor of our own nature, but a gift of God's favor. And therefore he who preserves the grant of life, and renders thanks to Him who bestows it, shall receive length of days for ever and ever. But he who rejects it, and proves unthankful to his Maker for creating him, and will not know Him who bestows it, deprives himself of the gift of duration to all eternity. And therefore the Lord speaks thus to such ungrateful persons : 'If you have not been faithful in that which is least, who will commit much unto you ?'—signifying that they who are unthankful to Him for this short temporal life, which is His gift, shall justly fail to receive from Him length of days for ever and ever. . . . Souls therefore receive their life and their perpetual duration as a donative from God, continuing in being from non-existence

because God wills them to exist and to subsist. For the will of God should have rule and lordship in all things; all else should yield and be subservient thereto. And of the creation and duration of the soul let so much be said." (Adv. Hær. l. 2, c. 34, §§ 3, 4.)*

The second protestant was Arnobius, A.D. 303. He had been a rhetorician of Sicca, in Numidia, and so bitterly opposed to the Christian faith that the sincerity of his conversion was

* Prof. Hovey (p. 141) raises a doubt whether Irenæus really held the opinion for which this passage is offered, and cites two authorities. I have not in my book ignored this doubt. But I have found the same doubt respecting Arnobius by one of his editors, which is as plausible as if he had said that daylight is green. I have found one editor of Irenæus remarking that such a passage favors "the error of Arnobius." Cotelarius also, encountering the same "error" in the Clementines, says it is best explained by the passages in Justin, Irenæus, and Arnobius. And I have met a very intelligent member of the Catholic clergy who remarked that Irenæus had been criticized for the view. I may at some time present more fully the expressions of Irenæus and the opinions of the critics. Of the two writers referred to by Prof. H., one takes no notice of § 3, above quoted; and the other — and he not alone — takes the significant expressions in the entire passage as meaning "eternal happiness," but without argument.

Prof. H. closes his "survey" with the following italicized statement: "*The records of the primitive church, prior to A.D. 200, afford no evidence that a belief in the endless existence of the soul was brought over from pagan philosophy into the creed of the church.*" In his "survey" he ignores the entire history of opinion respecting man's intermediate nature, which Athenagoras alone did not hold. He ignores the suspicions of Justin's orthodoxy. He regards Tatian, whom nobody wants, as the first and only annihilationist; though I must think his orthodox expression even without note or comment stronger than that of Athenagoras, which he quotes. And he says nothing of the third century, in which was ripened the seed sown in the second.

Here I am tempted to add a word from Hagenbach, who, after stating the opinions of the soul's intermediate nature in the second century, says: "On the contrary, *Tertullian* and *Origen*, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon immortality as essential to it." (Hist. of Doctrines, § 58). Tertullian was the great defender of the orthodox view, as Origen was distinguished for the restorationist view.

at first doubted. He therefore prepared his book, which ended the doubt. Neander says: "His work does not show the novice, who was a catechumen, but a man already mature in his convictions, if he was not orthodox according to the views of the church." The same historian speaks of the "free, independent manner in which he seems to have come to Christianity, through the reading of the New Testament, especially the Gospels."

Arnobius argues very fully the intermediate nature of man. His rhetoric is strong, but he shows a warm heart. He says: "Souls were formed not far from the yawning jaws of death, yet such that they might become long-lived by the gift and beneficence of the Sovereign Ruler, if they but endeavor and strive to know Him. For the knowledge of Him is, as it were, the leaven of life, preservative against dissolution." (*Adv. Gentes*, l. 2, c. 32.) "Wherefore we should not be deceived or deluded with vain hopes, by that which a new class of men, elated with an extravagant opinion of themselves, tell us: that souls are immortal, next in rank of dignity to the Supreme God, derived from him as Creator and Father, divine, wise, inspired with knowledge, and free from stain of gross matter." (l. 2, cc. 14, 15.) "This we do hold and know; on this one clear and manifest truth do we take our stand,—that all the gifts of God are for the benefit and happiness of all; most full of delight, love, joy, and gladness; yielding pleasures incorruptible and ever-during; freely offered to the wishes and earnest efforts of all; and to be excluded from them is destruction and death." (l. 2, c. 55.)

CHAPTER V.

DOES THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMMORTALITY OF A CLASS ACCORD WITH A JUST PHILOSOPHY AND WITH THE SENTIMENTS OF HUMANITY?

THE present and concluding chapter of my prolonged argument must be somewhat miscellaneous. I must touch briefly the supposed metaphysical proofs of man's immortality; a theological argument, or the doctrine of salvation; the supposed reformatory design of all punishment; and the questions, What is benevolent to man? and, What is worthy of God?

§ 1. *The Ontological Proof of a Future Life.*

The metaphysical argument for the soul's immortality is the lineal descendant of the Grecian philosophy, particularly the Platonic; though it is older than Grecian thought, as appears from Cicero's statements and from some of the Hindoo books. It is found most at length and in the most scholastic form in the early Christian literature, in Augustine. In modern times it is considerably broken down under the subtleties which the schoolmen have heaped upon it, and generally abandoned as unsatisfactory. Yet there is a very frequent presumption that the Scriptures teach or imply it, and that, therefore, we do well to prop it up, for the benefit of sceptics, by the support of pure reason.

The commonest rational argument is based on the immaterial nature of the soul. It is uncomposed — not made up of parts, and so can not fall in pieces. Or, it is a spiritual substance, suffering no change or decay from physical causes and agencies. And, in obscure agreement with the latter view, it is often remarked that *moral* causes can not change or affect the substance or being of the soul.

I grant the immaterial nature of the soul ; for I do not make the mind out of the brain, however dependent it may be, in the present economy, on cerebral action ; rather, I regard the brain and all organism as produced by vital forces. And all life, animal and vegetable, as well as spiritual, seems a higher sort of life than the mechanical or chemical properties of atoms, or even the so-called imponderable agents — heat, light, and the electric, magnetic, and galvanic currents. When we have passed these limits, we find ourselves in a world of myriad forms of life, some of which trench very close upon the human, so that the higher examples of brute life compete with the lower examples of human life, and even bear away the palm. For dignity of nature, perhaps Bucephalus *was* as worthy of a city for a monument, and as worthy of immortality, as a good many men have been. The rational distinction between the human soul and the brute soul is not very well settled yet ; and the fact reflects no great credit on our sagacity, or boasted superiority. And in the question of moral capacity, some dogs seem to have as tender a conscience as some men ever had.

I say these things, not to jostle the human race into rank with the brutes, — for I am as proud as any one of my humanity, though sometimes very much ashamed of it, — but to raise the question whether differences of character may not be even more important than differences of race, in this question of the immortality of souls, whereof the Scriptures say naught. Many good men — Duns Scotus, Ramsay, Dean, Wesley, Clarke, Tennyson, Theodore Parker, Agassiz — have held or allowed the immortality of brutes ; and Bishop Butler and Isaac Taylor have remarked that the metaphysical arguments for our immortality are about as good for the immortal life of our four-footed and our footless neighbors. There is something in them besides atomic pieces of matter. And that something else, it seems to me, may be vital, spiritual substance — a great deal more manifold in its kind than atoms are, of which we have found about seventy sorts — gold, silver, copper, nickel, and so on down. There is a common notion that all spiritual substance is homogeneous ; whence it is inferred that God and we are

made of the same stuff. So the Platonists believed, with inevitable consistency, that the soul is immortal because eternal and divine. I reject the conclusion, because I deny the premise; and I reject the premise, also, because I deny the conclusion. And if we once admit that spiritual substance is heterogeneous, we may, perhaps we must, allow that no kind of created spirit is absolutely imperishable; and the greater frailty of one kind may denote at least a measure of frailty in another kind. In *God* we live, and move, and have our being — not in ourselves. And whether we *shall* live in Him and with Him eternally, may depend on our observance of the precept, “Be strong; quit you like men.”

If I am asked *how* the soul, as a spiritual substance, can perish from being, I will reply by asking how it comes into being. Or, rather,—not to debate the question whether it is created or propagated,—does the soul grow? and if so, how? Is the substance of the infant soul as entire and complete as that of the matured and full-grown intellect, master of a hundred arts and sciences? Is the quantity of being the same in the one case as in the other? I do not ask if the one weighs as many ounces or measures as many inches; but is there, for substance and amount, as much soul in the one case as in the other? If so, then are all souls equal in quantity of being? and if thus equal, whence the manifest and striking differences in their original and native power and capacity? If the brain and the material organism make all these differences, then do disembodied souls *retain* any of these differences, or any differences of constitutional habit or quality, intellectual or moral? If two souls in very different bodies should make an exchange, would they at once exchange characters? and if not, why? Again, if there is acquired power or habit of the soul, is that a *development* of what was in the soul at the outset, or is it something superadded to its nature or being?

I ask these questions for information. I can not answer them myself. And until they are answered, I think we should not hold, with any dogmatism, that idea of the soul which makes it a pure entelechy—a logical entity or substance, imperishable as

truth itself, and which must be precisely similar in all individuals. But if there are real differences in human souls, and real processes of growth, however unlike the growths of matter, then all argument for its proper immortality is at an end. Aside from revelation, we might suppose that the soul has a certain and fixed period of growth, maturity, and decay; a period much longer, possibly, than the three thousand years of the cedar, yet strictly a period beyond which it could not live. And *with* the revelation, I find nothing to oppose this view: viz., that even without a natural and necessary period of life, the soul may suffer in its very being by all that wars against its well-being. The disregarded laws of its life may become the laws of its death. If it may thrive, it may languish; if it may wax stronger, it may grow weaker; if it may become more, it may become less. If the true, the beautiful, and the good are for "the soul's health," the false, the gross, and the evil may give it ill health. If purity may adorn it, vice may contaminate it. If virtue and love may give it power, sin may give it disease. Sin is the transgression of law; and if the "wages of sin is death," that death may be something more than a metaphor, and the disease which causes it may be mortal disease — a sin unto death. I have already remarked that death "in trespasses and sins" probably signifies a sentence of death yet future. And I find nothing in the proper nature of the soul to rescue it from the analogies which make disease the symptom of decay and the pathway of death.

Here I meet the objection that moral causes do not directly produce physical effects. But I am not so sure of this. The *indirect* physical effects of moral causes are legion. The world is full of the produce of mind. We can not glance amiss to see what thought has done. But by what intermediate stages has all the work of the human race grown out of its mind? It has not been by magic, as if we had the lamp of Aladdin; nor has it been done by Leibnitz's rule of preëstablished harmony, which grew out of the notion that spiritual forces could not be harnessed to work in matter. Pyramids, temples, cities, steamships, and railroads have not sprung into existence because men

have dreamed or wished them, nor merely because men *thought* them out. They are the product of thought applied; and applied with many zealous passions of the human soul, and with much labor of brain and muscle, with sweat and toil. At every inch of surface the spiritual force has touched and shaped the material effect.

And has the spiritual force itself been unaffected, unchanged? Many a human body has been killed by a blow of joy or grief struck through the human soul. The pang was first felt within. The outward death came of the inward agony. There are, indeed, trials by which, "though the outward man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day." But this is because the soul is wrought into harmony with a higher nature, or is made more completely a "partaker of the divine nature;"—is regenerated of an "incorruptible seed, which liveth and abideth for ever." And by the same reason, if worse and baser passions sway the soul, they may bring it down toward a real death. The decay of the faculties by vicious habits of thoughts—the deterioration and mental and moral disease so often observed—who shall say, in the assumption of an unrevealed immortal nature, that these are not incipient stages of dissolution, in which, unarrested, the soul itself may become extinct?

The argument may be more plainly stated in its stronger form. The *material* produce of mind is the effect of an unlike cause. This is the marvel and the inscrutable mystery. But mind is like itself; and though the soul's substance is not itself thought, feeling, and purpose, yet it is far more like them than matter is. The soul's substance is the physical medium, as it were, by which thought, feeling, and purpose, have reached the outer world. The *material* produce is both unlike, and at second hand. So much the more may these *spiritual* agencies work changes in the being of spirit, as kindred substance, close at hand as substance to its attribute.

Another form of the metaphysical or psychological argument should be glanced at. I often hear persons say that they are *conscious* of immortality. Well, they have a higher power of consciousness than I have; yet I will confess no inferiority to

them. To be *conscious* of immortality is to be conscious of being alive to-morrow, and a billion years hence, and every moment between. My friends do not mean that. They simply mean that they are conscious of a *longing* and *aspiration* after immortality ; and so am I. And this proves — indirectly, as we presume that God is too good to tantalize and trifle with us — that we were made for immortality. But then the argument comes to the same footing with other longings and aspirations, which are valid according as they are noble and good. It is strictly a *moral* argument ; and its value is settled, I believe, by St. Paul, thus : “To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life.”

§ 2. *The Theology of Salvation.*

In treating the question of universal salvation, we should inquire how the term salvation is used and applied in the Scriptures, and also what it implies. For it is an essential part of the doctrine of forgiveness, involving the question whether we are saved by justice or by grace.

The Greek word for salvation (*sōtēria*, *sōtērion*) and the corresponding verb (*sōzō*) are used in the New Testament, with apparent reference to a final destiny, one hundred times. I may overcount a little ; but I may safely say that if the word does not refer to man's final destiny in *most* of these instances, it does in *none* of them, and it assures the eternal life of no man. It is also worthy of remark that in the Syriac version it is rendered *life*, and the *giving of life*.

And of the hundred instances all except twelve apply the salvation to a class of men. Some of them do so very strongly. Thus Luke xiii. 23, 24 : “Are there few that be saved ? . . . Strive to enter in at the straight gate ; for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able.” Phil. i. 28 : “An evidence to them of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God.” 2 Tim. ii. 10 : “I endure all things for the elect's sakes, that they may also obtain the salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory.”

Some of the instances not obviously partitive will be claimed by my opponent as implying a general salvation. Thus John iii. 17: "God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved." (Comp. ch. xiii. 47.) But here the previous verses make faith the condition of salvation, even while they commend the divine love: "God so loved the world, that whosoever believeth," etc. And "the world" may easily signify all nations as compared with the Jews, who were claiming a monopoly of salvation. Thus, in another of the passages my opponent may claim, Acts xiii. 46, 47: "Seeing ye . . . judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles. For so hath the Lord commanded us, saying, I have set thee, to be a light of the Gentiles, that thou shouldest be for salvation to the ends of the earth." The passage in John iii. 17, seems to me no more to prove the salvation of every human individual than the expression in ver. 26, "all come to him," shows that every Jew was baptized of John. When the Pharisees said of Christ, "If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him" (ch. xi. 48), and again, "Behold, the world is gone after him" (ch. xii. 19), we do not suppose they meant every individual human being; yet in the last expression they use the same word which Christ used (*kosmos*, the world). Christ's promise might be as large, even larger than the Pharisees' complaint, and yet there be many unbelieving, and unsaved.

And when Christ says "the Son of man is come to save that which was lost" (Matt. xviii. 11; Luke xix. 10), the context will show a comparison made between the self-righteous Jews and those whom they hated and despised as having no inheritance with Abraham. Christ came to call not the righteous, or self-righteous, but sinners, to repentance. The poor in spirit, and the meek and lowly, were the true Israel. The passage indicates the non-salvation of those who rested securely and proudly in carnal hopes, i.e., in their Jewish blood, as much as it indicates any thing.

So much for the *extent* of salvation as revealed in the Scriptures. And now for the nature of it. Universalists have well

and truly insisted that Christ came "to save his people from their sins;" that salvation from sinfulness is more important than salvation from punishment—for sin is worse than pain; and that the doctrine of salvation from punishment, aside from the other salvation, is very pernicious, though there is too much of it in the world.

Here I may suggest to my orthodox friends that the doctrine of endless and infinite pain as the result of sin naturally tends to the evil just named. The self-love of man is in advance of the moral sense. And when he is told that he is in danger of undying agony, we may say what we will about his *deserving* it, still he will care more for the danger than for the guilt. The "great salvation" he will think of as the deliverance from the infinite peril; the deliverance from sinful bondage will be comparatively a slight thing. And this will explain the crouching and cringing attitude of some professedly christian minds before God, and the professed feeling of some—we trust unreal—that if annihilation were the end of sin, they would no longer fear God or serve him.

Here I also recognize the Universalist opinion of salvation from this and that sinful habit as a *real* doctrine of salvation, though not the whole doctrine nor the true doctrine. It seems to me a subordinate sense of the term; though I am very glad if any hate sin enough to prize such a salvation very highly, and I am sorry if any can not get any sense or meaning from the idea.

Yet a great question remains respecting the doctrine of salvation. Are we saved by grace, or by justice? Is there strictly any remission of the penalty of sin, or is there none?

I know that the doctrine of remitted penalty is liable to abuse; that corrupt human nature is willing enough to sin and then try to get rid of punishment—and that does not speak well or honorably for human nature. And I thank Universalists and Unitarians for insisting, very correctly, that certain bad consequences of sin are always inevitable; that it brings a bad and unhealthy condition of the soul, which no forgiveness or act of pardon can remedy at once; that the laws of our

moral constitution, like all the laws of nature, are so wisely appointed that even Sovereign grace still respects them; and so when we sin we must suffer.

But here we come at the gist of our question: If a bad condition of the soul, that is, sickness and disease, be the punishment of sin, how long must it last? what is its natural termination? and may recovery be retarded by unforgiveness, or hastened and even secured by a work of pardon?

And here I think I find the common objection to Universalism well founded; viz., that in respect to penalty it has no doctrine of salvation. One can not be saved from what he was never exposed to; nor can one be saved from what he actually suffers. The Universalist, denying both the orthodox and the destructionist view of penalty, finds no salvation in that direction. And the only penalty in which he does believe is always suffered in full tale. Thus, between what is unjust and what is inevitable, there is no salvation.

This result is expressly admitted by Dr. T. S. Smith, in his "Illustrations of the Divine Government." He says: "The advocates for the corrective nature of punishment do not believe that all men will be saved, but that sinners having been reclaimed by the discipline through which they will be made to pass, all men will ultimately be rendered pure and happy." Again: "It is true, that all who suffer future punishment endure the penalty of the law, and therefore, in a popular sense, can not be said to be forgiven." (Part II. c. 3.)

The obvious conclusion is that we are saved not by grace, but by justice, if we are saved at all. Dr. S. endeavors to turn the edge of this objection by saying that penalty itself is merciful and gracious, of which hereafter. But regarding penalty in the light of justice, which Dr. S. himself must in some sense allow, I can offer no better comment than in the words of Dr. Bushnell:

"In the school of modern Unitarianism, it is held that God can not deliver us of the just penalty of our sins at all; that we must bear it in the full and exact measure of justice, and that our only hope is to wear a passage through and get our

deliverance, by the patient process of exhaustion. The argument is, that as God is just, his character requires him to do justice; that he is immutable and can not reverse his decreed penalties; and especially that we are all under the penalty of justice now, in so far as we transgress; the penalty being executed in us by a necessary law of nature, which, as God can not change it without a miracle, must pour its currents upon us, till we become good enough to go clear, under the same retributive laws of cause and effect, which grates in misery and bondage on our bad experience. There is no possibility of a sudden remission, apprehended by faith and sealed by a new spiritual birth. We must begin to grow better, by a regular process of culture and amendment, and we must go on till we run out the flow of penal consequence, and get the laws of retribution on our side." This view "wholly displaces the gospel, as a message of good news from heaven; denying even the possibility of pardon or remission, in any sense that gives it an effective value. Nothing can be said of pardon, save that it signifies a forgiving feeling in God to the penitent. It is that feeling, nothing more." (Christ in Theology, pp. 271-273.)

And the denial of salvation from penalty vitiates the doctrine of salvation from sin itself. For punishment certainly does not save from the sin already committed. Even if we admit the notion of expiation or compensation, — so much pain paying for so much sin, — that is not salvation, but a compounding of losses. And there still remains the bad effect of the sin in the mental and moral habitude. The Universalist theory is that penalty is designed as a tonic to correct this, and so save from *future* sin. But this view formally rejects the notion of "remission of sins that are past" (Rom. iii. 25), and involves another serious difficulty. Punishment is no longer a thing of justice in any sense; it is not even just, but becomes a sheer experiment of discipline. Thus Dr. Smith says: "Punishment is not retrospective, but prospective. You are to be punished, not because you have yielded to an evil volition, but that you may yield to an evil volition no more." (Part I. § 2.)

That is, one is to be punished at a venture for sins that may never be committed! The only escape from this absurdity is in another; viz., that guilt is ill-deserving not intrinsically but only because penalty is annexed; or that the punishment constitutes the crime. This I have endeavored to deduce in treating the difficulties both of the orthodox and the Universalist views on this subject. (Debt and Grace, c. x. §§ 5, 6.)

We come round again to the question, Is the disease of sin in the soul healed by forgiveness? I think the affirmative answer avoids all the difficulties I have alluded to. But this supposes that the moral disease, unhealed, is mortal. For, if a personal immortality remains, that implies a continuance of all the faculties of personal and responsible being, including free agency, and involving the power of self-recovery; and then forgiveness is not needed. But if the disease is threatening, or if "the wages of sin is death," then forgiveness as a healing grace and power is legitimate. There is then "remission of sins that are past," for their penalty is revoked and their power is broken in the same work of the soul's recovery. Justification — or pardon — and sanctification are not divorced, but become inseparable. Mercy and truth are met together. Grace — or gratuitous favor and amnesty — is no repeal of law, but its reënactment, in the returning strength and life of one who was sinking into the outlawry of death.

Here I may remark that all the scriptural language which represents sin as disease and our Savior as a Physician, is specially pertinent to this view. The governmental system of the Roman Empire has, I think, made our theology *too* forensic, and the Schoolmen have made it *too* dialectic. Has it not yet to become, as it were, more therapeutic? And when we make it such, shall we not "hold fast the form of sound words" and of "sound doctrine" (*hygiainouses didaskalias*, healthy instruction, 1 Tim. i. 10; vi. 3; 2 Tim. i. 13; iv. 3; Tit. i. 9, 13; ii. 1, 2)?

• § 3. *The Nature and Design of Punishment.*

A doctrine of punishment has extensively prevailed which is

- much like this: that crime and sin are infringements of law, upon which the law, or the majesty of the law-power, requires penal retribution, for which the severe name is vengeance. The law, it is commonly said, has been violated, "broken." And to "repair" this damage there is a demand for suffering, expiation, satisfaction.

The false element in this theory is indicated by the results to which it has been carried in views of the Atonement. The redemptive work of Christ has been regarded as a compensation, a payment of debt in the sinner's behalf, valid upon the sinner's acceptance of the substitute. That this idea does away with free grace on the part of God is confessed by one author who says: "Sure I am, that debt can never be *forgiven* which is *paid*." The difficulties of the theory are also betrayed by the connected question respecting the *extent* of the Atonement.

The Universalist theory of punishment as solely corrective and reformatory seems to me an extreme reaction from the above view. It has been favored also by the modern reform in criminal codes and prison discipline, and by the discovery that a humane ministry of penalty may reform, where rigorous and unmixed punishment only hardens. This view, however, may easily be carried to an extreme and false result. The transgressor of law may be regarded as simply unfortunate, and not as guilty; that which he *needs* may exclude all notion of what he *deserves*; he may be treated not as deserving any penalty, but as having special claims and rights, and as deserving to be reformed.

We need some view of the subject which shall avoid each extreme. And such a view I think is suggested by the Economy of Pain. To what purpose are the pangs and sighs and woes of which the world is so full? Are they all purely vindictive? Or, are they all reformatory? Neither the one nor the other. But they grow out of a natural system of penalty, very wise and merciful, yet no less just, which is exemplified on a large scale in the nervous system. The *design* of the nerves of sensation, with their exquisite susceptibility of pain, is the protection of limb, life, and health. Take out the nerves from

the body, and it might be maimed or destroyed without one's knowing it. They are the eyes and ears of the system, protecting it by their constant watch and their thousand alarms. Frost and cold are so fearful because they hurt so little, — benumbing and stealing away the senses, and taking the life unwarned. These troublesome nerves, with their magazine of pangs so like Pandora's box of all human ills, are the outposts and sharp sentinels that warn us of danger. They are all *designed* for our good. I thank God, therefore, for all the ministries of Pain. We could not live without them; and many would live longer and better if they had more of them.

At the bottom of Pandora's box, in the fable, was Hope. But do we find hope at the end of all human pains? I find this — that many men push against the terrible dangers of which their kind nerves admonish them, and make a complete sacrifice of health, or limb, or life. And this is done not by holy martyrs only, dying under some lower law, that they may live up to a Higher Law, but by men of the lowest aims, rushing upon ruin in defiance of all law. Men do this sometimes for lucre. They do it oftener for lust; gratifying their queasy or their vicious appetites, purposely "living fast" and slipping rapidly and painfully down into their graves. They do it to glut their revenge; pursuing a foe to the ends of the earth, willing enough to die when he is dead.

In all these cases the punishing nerves demand and receive their dues. But what is the result? They were all designed to reform and save. In the general economy, their pains were salutary and healing, but instead of that they have only killed. In short, they who *disregard* the lesson of penalty, perish under it, and with it. The pains are sharp and very torturing, because they were set to guard a precious treasure of life; and the beneficence which ordained their sharpness, holds out to the end, and lets them die out with the life. They are, like the gospel itself, a sweet savor — of life unto life, or of death unto death, according as they are used or disused. But the beneficence goes on no further than death. When the life is

thrown away, the slighted mercy is not bound to restore the rejected boon. Why should it?

An old writer has laid down the principle thus : —

“Omnes pœnæ non exterminantes sunt reformantes.”

All punishments reform—when they do not exterminate. And our question now is,—Is this true of *all* kinds of penalty, or of the physical only?

I reply, the examples I have offered have all the force of the *argument from analogy*. And the argument is made very strong by the immense number of the instances, and by the fact that we observe no contrary instances. So far as I know, in every department of nature, persistent action against the laws of being tends to deteriorate the nature and destroy the being itself. Real law can never be “broken ;” it vindicates itself as immutable and sovereign, by breaking and crushing all that will oppose it.

But strong as the argument from analogy is, and much as it seems like a reason and nature of things, I doubt whether we are left to it alone. There are some things in the action of Conscience that suggest the same law as applying to man’s moral nature. When its admonitions are disregarded, it becomes blunted. If one will do what he knows is wrong, his feelings of misgiving gradually die out ; the twinges of conscience subside into a dull and dead pain ; regret and remorse often give way to hard-hearted indifference ; the distinctions of right and wrong are confused and obliterated. The talent disused wastes away. Capacity becomes incapacity. The whole doctrine of judicial blindness, which we discover in the Scriptures, may be a verification in the conscience of the rule : “He that hath, to him shall be given ; and from him that hath not shall be taken that which he seemeth to have.” *

* Dr. Bushnell gives, among his “Sermons for the New Life,” one on this passage which so far suggests the thought of annihilation that he considers the doctrine and gives his reasons for thinking that conclusion can not be reached. It should be compared with some expressions in his Discourse on “Endless Life.”

But the conscience is, as it were, the nervous system of the soul. If it is not its *vital* faculty,—the very life of the moral and spiritual being,—it is at least the *regulative* faculty. When it is dead, the feelings and will may get a little remaining control from obvious convenience, or from conventional usage, or from the force of old habit; but there is nothing else to save one from ruin and death. And these mechanical forces can not renew the spiritual life. That can come only from God; and by the supposition the holiness, the purity, the self-sacrificing love of God as exemplified in Christ, have been declined. The economy of grace and truth which gave man a conscience is not bound to reinstate and renew it when man has dethroned and stifled it. That may be a sin unto death. And the natural penalty of the soul's death may be equally merciful and just.

Here, if I have named the true doctrine of *natural* punishment, I may suggest a view of *artificial*, or special and enacted penalty, for consideration. Is it not *anticipative*,—a hastening of painful results of transgression, to bring them into clearer view? a make-weight to get the warning of nature felt and heard? When the reformation of the individual is hopeless, the punishment is justified as protecting the society, and its measure to be determined by the wise discretion of the society. The natural law of punishment still remains, as a divine law; the final execution of which may be the “vengeance” ascribed to God (Rom. xii. 19).

§ 4. *Is the Immortality of a Class unkind to Man?*

Here I must meet a very common objection based on the parental feeling, and will close with one or two direct argument.

1. *It is not a hardship that one should fail to be a parent of immortality.* Many persons, as deserving and as affectionate as the average, are never parents at all, and never will be unless there is marriage in the heavenly state. George Washington was the father of a country, but never of a child. It is not essential, then, to the blessedness of the saved, that they

should be able to claim certain ones as their offspring. You may say that childless saints will be strangers to certain feelings of celestial joy; perhaps they will; yet in the resources of the celestial kingdom they shall lack no supply for any noble and holy capacity of their being; the Lord is their Shepherd, they shall not want.

But to be childless, says one, is not so hard as bereavement, and loss of children. And here I encounter the whole force of the Universalist sentiment: A parent would not let a child suffer or die, if he could prevent it. If the heavenly Father, who loves us better than we love our children, allows suffering and death, it must be because he has something better in store to prove his love.

Such is the argument, offered to show that each human family must find all its members in the heavenly mansions. It seems to me inadequate, for the following reasons:—

(1.) Parental affection is commonly a modification of self-love. The child is a second self. That is why one cares more for his own child than for his neighbor's. But one's desire for a child's immortality should be of as high a moral type as the desire for personal immortality. The promise is no less rigid to the child than to the parent; "To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor, and immortality." If, then, the parental feeling, and I may add, the feelings that lead to parentage, — which, like other qualities, may be inherited, — if these are subordinate to the sentiment of piety, I do not know but one may have high hopes of reunion with the child. Something like this may be implied in 1 Cor. vii. 14. At least there is a "christian nurture" which may devote and train the child for the higher life from its earliest infancy.

But if the parental regard is worldly, and the child is from the first devoted to and trained for the world, one can not complain if it avails no further. And even if the parent shall rise to nobler aims, and shall deplore the fruits of past ungodliness, He who is "able of the stones to raise up children to Abraham" may grant other consolation than an unbroken family circle in the kingdom of eternal life. To be at all a

parent of immortality is exalted honor. Is there unkindness if one is not more?

(2.) Although God is not bound, against the perversion of free will, to make each man's existence on the whole a blessing, still as matter of fact those who finally perish may have much to be thankful for. Most human beings seem to enjoy more than they suffer. And this may be true even if existence is finally lost. It may be almost a law of life that the pains of its decay should not outweigh the joys it brings. It may still be true that the failure of immortal life shall make it morally better that one had never been born. And they who perish may feel this on the same principle that disappointed lovers so often think life a curse—only with a million-fold more reason.

I have used the phrase "parent of immortality," but only for argument's sake. The Scriptures, I think, teach a higher parentage than human, for the immortal life. They who have "power to become the sons of God," are "born not of flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man, but of God." God is the "Father of spirits," and the distinction between soul and spirit may apply in this argument.

2. *The power of evil habit and of memory may render immortality burdensome.* The time has been when death was deemed an emancipation from all earthly habits and minor differences of character. The good, it was thought, would be perfectly blessed as soon as they were dead, and the bad perfectly wretched. And all the good and all the bad were respectively put on nearly the same level. In accordance with this philosophy, or lack of philosophy, some of the early Universalists regarded death as putting an end to all distinctions of character. Sin came of the body; and to be out of it was to be in holiness and in heaven.

Maturer thought has changed all that. The soul, we now think, has its own laws, as every other real thing must have; and all its changes and improvements must observe those laws. Death is no longer the panacea for all its ills. The other world may be very unlike the present; yet it may bear strong analo-

gies. Fatal as its atmosphere may be to those who have rejected its life, its gentle zephyrs may not at once heal all the soul's ills. Though God works miracles at sundry times in his teaching and training of the human race, we may doubt whether there are miracles in the general economy of man's destiny. The result is, we must have some apprehensions, lest the laws of our physical and moral being may, even beyond the tomb, make death better than life.

In bodily sickness death is often preferred to the pains and weariness of slow convalescence. Just so evil habits of thought, feeling, and action, may require so long and weary a purgation on the other side, and may put one so far behind his companions in the heavenly race, that he would prefer not to tax their kindness, or seek their company. One may be so imbruted by habits of unbelief that the capacity for faith in disinterested kindness shall be gone. Cunning philosophers have doubted every such thing here; — who shall say they may not doubt there? Unhappy personal relations may fatally threaten all future happiness. The seducer may prefer never to meet the victim, all whose hopes he has sacrificed for lust. The murderer may decline the courtesies of heaven with one for whom he could find no room on earth. And if, as some have thought, the memory retains all one's past history, how many may be so burdened and stung with poignant recollections that even the freeness and largeness of divine mercy can not give them rest? I believe in God's infinite power. But infinite power can not work contradictions; and it will not disregard the laws of created being, or of man's moral nature. And if God should administer the cup of Lethe to any, and so destroy or change a part of their personal being, out of kindness, he may also, for aught we know, kindly let them die, and may fill his universal domain with those who have earlier and more fully consecrated themselves to goodness.

3. *Many persons, not the worst of men, have no desire for immortality.* This desire has been called natural and instinctive; and we hear of the inextinguishable love of being. But, granting that this is the rule, and that it proves the actual im-

mortality of those who rightly cherish it, there are exceptions so marked as to claim attention, if not to limit the argument. And for examples I will not name those who have doubted immortality because they have never distinctly heard or thought of it, but those who have lived in the midst of the sentiment.

If I mistake not, Joseph Barker, well known as having renounced Christianity, eschews all faith in an after life, and, apparently, all desire therefor. I do not think him an immoral man, though he has shared as a "reprobate" in the honors of a book-dedication. I would not judge him, or say a word against him. I do not devote him to death. But I name him as one who has been an able preacher of the gospel; was specially likely to fall in love with immortality; and is too acute to be necessarily prejudiced against it by what others say or think about it. He now thinks this life and its comforts are as much as any of us ought to wish or care for. I am very sure if he should die out with the rest of us, he would be the last man to complain. And I verily believe if he should be called to die only with a few followers, he would not wish to be disappointed, but would bear his peculiar fate as proudly as a hero. I may be mistaken in my man; but are there not such?

A more noted example is David F. Strauss, the author of "The Life of Jesus," which has made such a stir with its mythical theory. His acquaintance with the doctrine of immortality is even larger than that of Barker; but he rejects it all. In his later work, entitled "Glaubenslehre," or the Doctrine of Faith, he concludes: "The idea of a future world is the last enemy which speculative criticism has to oppose, and, if possible, to overcome."

He, certainly, will not complain of death. I do not say how much such opinions may prove in the question of what will be; but in the present question we must consult the choice and preference of men as they are — especially if they be able men, who may speak for themselves. And upon their testimony I submit whether the doctrine I hold, which is infinitely better than their wishes, is at all unmerciful.

§ 5. *Is the Selection of a Class to Immortality worthy of God?*

I have freely admitted that God would not be just to himself if he were simply just to his creatures. True to his nature as love, he must bestow upon men more and better than they deserve. And because God is not only love, but *infinite* love, my opponent may think the conclusion direct and inevitable that God must bestow upon each moral creature the infinite boon of immortal life, for which his moral constitution adapts him.

From this conclusion I dissent, for several reasons.

1. All analogy favors the idea of a sifting of the human species, and a conservation of the best, or of the individuals that mature. I have not time to array the facts in this analogy, but may refer to what I have said elsewhere on the subject, and quote as follows: "A true analogy would make the probation of mankind not an exception to the rule, but the highest example of it. The law of selection in the case of man is different; the end is the same. The vegetable lifeling is the sport of chance. The animal, with its spontaneity, can help and provide for itself—subject, however, to many dangers which it can not avert, and to man's dominion. Man, by his free will, is elevated to a higher rank—beyond the reach of fate, but not of hazard. Indeed, the nations of men that have not heard the Word of Life are scarcely beyond the reach of fate; though strictly, as moral beings, they are salvable, and perish through unbelief in Him who is 'not far from every one of them.' Those who dwell in Christendom stand higher than they, and may fall further. Yet the design of the species is accomplished in those who are perfected, and who shall never perish, because moral perfectness is an end in itself, and when attained, may be ever maintained. Man, as a race, is still subject to the sifting analogies that underlie him. As free, he is called upon to choose for himself; to make his calling and election sure; to acquit himself as a man. Failing of this, he is rejected, or reprobate, as refuse and worthless. He is likened to tares; to the useless produce of the fisher's net; to the field of briars and stones, whose end is to be burned. Condemned as *morally*

unworthy, his reprobation has a higher ethical significance, while its literal import remains." (Debt and Grace, pp. 239, 240.)

2. While God is bound, in justice or equity, not to make existence a curse, he is *not* bound to make it a blessing. That there is such an obligation is very strongly asserted by Mr. Ballou, in his "Divine Character Vindicated," where he thinks that "human existence, if enforced at all, should be, to each and every individual, when taken as a whole, a good, and not an evil — a blessing, and not a curse." (P. 122.)

This would be true if man had no moral freedom, and were not capable of deserving evil as well as good. But this fact seems to me entirely overlooked in Mr. B.'s statement. But if man may deserve evil *at all*, he may deserve evil *on the whole*; and though his continuance in a sinful and evil immortality would be past all reason, yet there may be the best reason for his failure of immortality. And one may so feel that his brief existence shall be a loss rather than a gain. We may well suppose that this was the case with Judas. "Woe unto him by whom the Son of man is betrayed. Better were it for that man if he had never been born."

But if the individual man may deserve a balance of *finite* evil, much more may he forfeit an infinite good. The infinite boon may be infinitely desirable; and because we would like to have it, we may persuade ourselves that we have some claim to it, or that it is not fairly withheld from us. But if bestowed, it is and ever will be an infinite gratuity.

3. In the economy of God's empire of holy blessedness, a comparative claim of one individual may be overruled by the higher claim of another. In point of right, I must yield to any one who can fill my place in the universe better than I can. Even in propriety and benevolence, I might wish to yield my place to such an one, for the general good. And if I have impaired my capacity of usefulness, it is not for me to say that infinite power, and wisdom, and goodness, too, can not replace me; especially if incapacity and deterioration have gone so far that the process of recovery may be slow and difficult.

4. Virtue is heroic. And it may be worthy of God to select, and to elect, those who are morally heroic, for the inheritance of immortality. The *forms* of heroism may be as various as the christian virtues and graces; yet it may be one essential element of all christian virtue. Self-sacrifice, self-denial, is essentially and peculiarly christian. "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, — yea, and his own life also, he can not be my disciple. And whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, can not be my disciple." Though we may not take those words of Christ literally, they will contain the principle I have named. God has a right to be choice respecting the members of his family, and to require of those who aspire to that honor the most strenuous efforts to prove worthy of it. With all their differences, a close resemblance has been observed between the stoic and the christian systems of morals. And the stoics held the immortality of a class. Christ, teaching a higher virtue, and offering a higher glory, may bestow such immortality by a higher right. The christian race differs from the Grecian games, as it has more crowns than one; yet we must strive, if we would triumph. It is a true hymn that says: —

"Awake my soul, stretch every nerve,
And press with vigor on;
A heavenly race demands thy zeal,
And an immortal crown.

"'T is God's all-animating voice
That calls thee from on high;
'T is his own hand presents the prize
To thine aspiring eye.

"A cloud of witnesses around
Hold thee in full survey;
Forget the steps already trod,
And onward urge thy way."

My argument has already been drawn out to greater length than was anticipated, either by my courteous opponent or my-

self. A few points that might be touched must be passed by. Certain elements of truth, on which my opponent may insist, I have not recognized as fully as I shall be happy to do, though I fail to carry them to his results. I do not offer my argument as perfect, or free from flaws. I never yet saw such an argument on a theme so extended and so complex. I shall be happy to see all my errors corrected, whether essential or trivial. Of their importance, the reader will judge. I have tried to make as few as possible; and if my humble effort shall help any one to think out for himself a solid, scriptural, and true opinion respecting our relations to the endless life, I shall not have written in vain. With sincere thanks to the editor and his readers for their liberal hearing of views from which they so much dissent, I bid you, for the present, farewell.

DISCUSSION OF HUMAN DESTINY.

QUESTION.

Do reason and the Scriptures teach the utter extinction of an unregenerate portion of human beings, instead of the final salvation of all?

THE NEGATIVE ARGUMENT.

BY REV. S. COBB.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS.

WE shall not be guided by the method of our opponent, in respect to the order in which we shall discuss the several topics and review the several arguments which he has introduced. He has marked out for himself and followed the method which appeared to him most convenient for doing the work which he proposed to accomplish; and so shall we devise and order our own plan of procedure on our part. We shall notice all his positions and arguments, and even his incidental thoughts which seem to have any essential bearing, direct or remote, on the great question; but we shall not commence operation upon the outermost twigs of the Bohon-Upas, to destroy it,—nor of the Tree of Life, to cause its growth and fruitfulness. We propose first to establish the great and fundamental principles of truth, and eradicate the ground principles of error, and sweep in the train the incidental and inferential matters. For instance, Mr. Hudson devotes his Chapter I. to the enumeration and statement of seven of what he regards as “Prominent Occasions of the Universalist Faith.” All these we shall duly

notice, — but not primarily, and in our first Chapter, as he has introduced them, because none of them are primary causes of the Universalist faith. We shall show them all to be beautiful confirmations of our faith, and shall concede that one and another of those considerations have invited or impelled persons, some one and some another, to the course of study which has led to Universalism. But our particular notice of them will be the most appropriate and instructive, when we shall have established those great positive principles which alone can induct and establish the mind in the Universalist faith.

There is one thing which we will briefly notice here, suggested by the following remarks in our opponent's "Introduction :"—

"For several generations past the great controversy in the Christian Church has turned on the question of a supposed eternal misery of the wicked, and a supposed eternal evil in the universe of God. Two parties have been arrayed against each other, separated by a twice infinite difference of opinion, inasmuch as endless bliss and endless woe are each infinitely removed, and in opposite directions, from man's original nothingness.

"Paradoxical though it may seem, their twice infinite difference has turned on one point of agreement. They have held alike and in common the actual immortality of all human souls. The paradox vanishes at a single thought, and appears an essential and explanatory fact. For only as immortal beings can sinful men be eternally blessed or endlessly wretched.

"But this common opinion of a general immortality is lately, more than for several centuries past, challenged and denied. It is claimed, by respectable and growing numbers, that man's immortality is not absolute, but dependent on personal goodness and virtue of character."

These remarks ingenuously recognize the fact that the scheme of substituting, to a corresponding extent and on the same conditions, annihilation for endless positive punishment, is a device of recent date. Our opponent shows in the fourth chapter of his affirmative part of this discussion, that the theory was held, in some form, by numbers of the early Christians, after the apostolic age. The bearing of that fact as a historical

argument, we shall examine with much pleasure, and profit to the cause of truth, when we come to a particular review of that chapter. But as it respects the late and present subsiding of Christian people into that theory, we must be permitted, without subjection to the charge of discourtesy, to speak our mind as frankly as our friend has offered his speculations on the "Prominent Occasions of the Universalist Faith."

In our opinion Destructionism is a reaction or revulsion from Orthodoxy, and not a positive principle, or a result of positive principles, attained to by a *de novo* study of philosophy or Scripture. It appears to us, we say it with respect, that men do not walk into it, but they back into it from the repulsive force of the theory of endless punishment. Sick, and faint at heart, from contemplating the great Father as busying himself to all eternity in torturing his children, and yet retaining the same general theory of Scriptural interpretation in respect to a final simultaneous bodily resurrection, and day of final judgment succeeding, they find a little relief from changing the definition of the eternal punishment from endless torture to eternal non-existence. It is less appalling to believe that the great Father will kill off, a second time and finally, those of his children whom he cannot manage consistently with the laws of his moral kingdom, than to believe that he will hold them up in endless being for the sake of their endless suffering.

But, as we may say, it is a poor relief. And it is only by entering it from that direction, backing down out of Orthodoxy, that it is any relief at all, that it is not a source of positive suffering. Take a man from the other direction, say an atheist or deist, who has no hope of a future life, believing that all men die as the beasts die, and, as the French infidels inscribed on the gates of their cemeteries, "Death is an eternal sleep." And, for the test we are about to introduce, we will take, not a sensual and vicious infidel, who might dread to think of a future life from selfish personal considerations, but a high-minded man, (for there are such infidels,) benevolent, chaste, truthful, just, and upright, hating vice in all its forms;—to such a one go and offer for his consolation the Destructionist's pro-

position for a future endless life,—a life to be earned by right faith and right conduct, the precise quantum of the right to constitute the claim being known only to the infinite Judge himself,—the theory of this uncertain and anxiously toiled for immortal life of good being inseparably connected with the position that a greater portion of our friends and our race will rise to another life to languish and die again in killing pain, to live no more, to be seen by their friends no more forever;—if the yes or no of that high-minded infidel could decide the truth or falsehood of the whole proposition, the theory of a future life with such concomitants, he would spurn it from him, body, soul, and spirit. To the humane-hearted atheist, no revelation of the being of an intelligent, creating, and governing God, but that of one who is the father and friend of universal man,—or of a future life, but a higher and better life for our race, could be received as gospel, or good and hopeful tidings.

I have endeavored to analyze my own feelings, selfish, social, and moral, and to distinguish what is most honorable and praiseworthy therein; and I say decidedly and ingenuously, that if I am called upon to decide which view would afford me the least anxious suffering, and enable me to share the greater pure enjoyment in this brief life with all my friends, the doctrine that death is an eternal sleep to man as a species,—or that which offers me the possibility of earning an immortal existence, from which my children, after perhaps being aroused from death's quiet slumber, and in great agony dying off again before my sight, should be forever after missing,—I will say with the emphasis of settled meaning, *the former*.

No, we are confident that the theory of Destructionism is not even a *poor* relief to its believer's mind, but as it is taken as a choice of the lesser of two great evils, or a secession from Orthodoxy.

But we are not presuming to settle the great question before us by these considerations. We are only exchanging work with our friend who has devoted a Chapter to accounting for prevailing tendencies to Universalism. But whether there is

any substantial ground for the theory which in this discussion we oppose, is a question to be settled, not by assumptions, nor appeal to sympathy, but by candid and thorough argument from Reason and the Scriptures. With a full purpose of heart to prove all things and hold fast that which is good, upon this argument we will enter in our next.

Meanwhile we suggest to the reader a question for preparatory consideration, growing out of the following words of our opponent's Introduction. Speaking of the final destruction of the sinner as self-destruction, he says: "This self-destruction may not be complete in the death of the body, but in the second instalment of death;" and adds: "The doctrine of an intermediate state without change, and of an appointed limit of probation on either side of the interval between death and the resurrection, may still be true." The question provoked by this language is, if man has no soul which survives the death of the body, and no future life but by a resurrection of the body, how is there an intermediate state of existence without moral change between death and the resurrection? But more of this in its place.

CHAPTER I.

THE RELATION OF CHARACTER TO PERSONAL EXISTENCE.

SECTION I. *Human Existence is not the Product of Human Character.*

It may seem to the reader an act of supererogation to argue this position, or even to state it. Nevertheless, the tenacity of speculatists for their favorite theories does sometimes impel them to such extremes in support of a position, that it becomes necessary to lay the old foundation over again, and to recognize the rudimental facts of being. The positions and arguments of my opponent impose on me a thorough course of study into the relation of character to existence, and I deem it expedient to commence at the alpha and canvass to the omega of the subject.

I begin, then, with the assumption, to which I shall not probably find an opponent, that *human existence is not the product of human character*. Man could have no character until he had a being, and of course his acquired and practical character did not produce his being. This was the product of the creative act of God. When God had created the world and its furniture, and the fishes, and fowls, and beasts of the earth, his love prompted, his wisdom devised, and his omnific power executed the creation of a higher order of beings. "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." (I will turn aside here to observe, that the plural form of the first person in this case is no proof of a trinity of Gods, or three persons in the Godhead. It has been, in all ages, the style of royalty to use the plural pronoun, *we*, instead of the singular, *I*. And now, though ours is a very literal and prosaic age, we little editors use the same style. But the single editor, when

he writes as *we* and *us*, has no apprehension of being understood as claiming to be several persons in one. The language just quoted is equivalent to saying, "I will now make man in my image, after my likeness.") "So God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them." What is comprehended in the image of God and in this blessing, we shall see hereafter.

So, then, the personal existence of man is a product of God's free, spontaneous, self-moved act of creation. "It is he that hath made us, and not we ourselves; we are his people, and the sheep of his pasture." "Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory, and honor, and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created."

SECTION II. *The Dissolution of Physical Nature, and Termination of the Earthly Life, is not the Product, Result, or Recompense of Human Character.*

This proposition does not ignore the fact that character affects the *condition* of human life. This is granted, and not only granted, but affirmed with emphasis, as a fundamental Bible and Universalist sentiment. Nor does the present proposition overlook the tendency of certain vices to hasten physical dissolution. But they hasten dissolution only by quickening the law of decay. The vices referred to do not incorporate into the human system the law of decay. But as man inherits naturally a mortal constitution, involving the law of growth and decay, of formation and dissolution, certain vices will hasten dissolution by quickening the action of that physical law. So will many other causes hasten this result—among which is the temperature and quality of climate. But the result must come, at length, by the natural operation of the constitutional law aforesaid, let the moral character be ever so pure and good. Innocent children, and those denominated, by way of distinction with reference to prevailing character, the *righteous*, are all alike subject to corporeal death. So, then,

physical death, as a universal fact in the economy of human being, is not the product of character.

1. We will elaborate this subject physiologically. Man in his physical system, is kindred to other animals, and, as it respects the law of growth and decay, to the vegetable world. Like them, he is formed of dust, or of the aliments which come of the ground, and is constitutionally mortal. Viewing him as a subject of the ordinary, and not a continuous, miraculous providence, whether he is honest or dishonest, virtuous or sinful, the fall of a tree upon his body, or the fall of his body from a building, a horse or a carriage, is just as likely to bruise his flesh or break his head or his bones, as the same casualty to a brute creature. And in all that appertains to his rise in life, and his fall in due time back into dust, he is subject to the same physical laws as all the animal creation.

Some of the older Orthodox theologians, seeing this kindred of the animal nature of man with other animal corporealities, and at the same time being wedded to a theory of belief which made the physical death of man to be comprehended in the penalty propounded in Gen. ii. 17, strove to maintain consistency by asserting that the sin of man caused all pain and death in the animal creation. That eminent Orthodox commentator, Dr. Thomas Scott, on the language of the 8th of Romans, in relation to the creature being made subject to vanity, and the whole creation groaning and travailling in pain, says,—“Every thing seems perverted from its intended use.” “The animal tribes are subject to pain and death through man’s sin.”

Such ideas presented to the people in the name of religious instruction, even before the late discoveries of geological research, must have gained access to the mind by stultifying the intellect. No wonder that the fathering upon the Bible of such monstrous incongruities and *prima facie* falsehoods by the rabbies of the church, should beget in thinkers and scholars a distaste for Bible reading. Who could expect to be rationally interested and instructed in the perusal of a book, which begins with ignoring reason, and proceeds with mockery of common sense? To the student of zoölogy, comparative anatomy, and

general physiology, is that theology or that book placed in this ridiculous attitude, which is made to assert that the sin of Adam is the cause of all disease, decay, and death, in the animal creation.

But the recent revealments of science, or of geological research, put an utter extinguisher upon the hypothesis that human sin is the cause of all physical death. The fossil animal remains, found in earlier formations and deeper strata of the earth, demonstrate that numerous generations of animals, of various species, had generated, lived, and died, ages on ages before there was a man on the earth.

Hugh Miller, in his "Testimony of the Rocks," and "Popular Geology," finds eight great periods prior to the introduction of man, indicated by so many formations each of which must have occupied long successive ages, and in which there are fossil remains of animals of rising grades. In subsequent remarks on statistical facts, he says: "One other remark ere I conclude. In the history of the earth which we inhabit, molluscs, fishes, reptiles, mammals, had each in succession their periods of vast duration; and then the human period began,—the period of fellow worker with God, created in God's own image." (Testimony of the Rocks, p. 178.)

And now it is seen to be, most decidedly, an unconstitutional piece of *ex post facto* theological conjuration, which accounts the sin of Adam as the cause of all that decay and death, which resolved back to dust those generations of brute creatures in the pre-Adamite ages. And as the sin of man did *not* "subject the animal tribes to pain and death," so it did not subject man himself to physical dissolution. For nothing is more clear and determined to the student of anatomy and physiology, than the kindred nature of man's corporeal system with that of the animal creation throughout, and its subjection to the same general laws of growth, health, decay, and death.

Again, this determination of the question before us is confirmed by correct reasoning from the nature of things, or the properties involved in the mortal and immortal. My opponent's treatment of the subject, from beginning to end, seems to oblit-

erate all radical and constitutional distinction between the mortal and immortal. It appears to make the immortal to be a mere extension of the mortal by a continuous miracle of Divine power,—and the mortal to be a cutting short of the immortal by the same interposition.

We use words primarily, for the expression of given ideas; and if we ignore the ideas we may as well drop the words. The idea properly expressed by the term immortality, is incorruptibility, indissolubility, constitutional and necessary freedom from decay, or liability to decay and death. Deny to any subject this quality, and you deny its immortality. Then if Adam and Eve were introduced upon this earthly stage of being in an immortal physical constitution, they could never have failed and died. For, to say that it is possible and natural for incorruptibility to corrupt, and for immortality to die, is simply to talk insanity.

But my learned friend on the “affirmative” of the Destructionist theory, though not clear on this point, seems rather to commit himself to the medium ground, making man to have been constituted, originally, neither mortal nor immortal. In his Chap. iii. § 2,—commenting on the Divine image in man denoted by Paul, Eph. iv. 24, he says, “Character cannot be created by another. Rather, I should take it, man was made with a capacity and design for godliness, or godlikeness, and thus for immortality. Now that which is moral is primary and ruling; that which is physical is subordinate. If the godlikeness fails, the immortality may follow.”

This sentence is somewhat ambiguous. If, by the primacy of the moral compared with the physical, he refers to its dignity and worth in relation to the highest purpose and truest good of life, the idea is a truthful one. But with this construction the sentence is not german to the subject. The subject is the relation of character to the fact of personal existence. And to say that the moral character, in order of time, or in the relation of cause and effect, has the priority of physical existence, is to say what cannot be true. The moral character is a quality of the person. But the existence of the person must be

prior to his development of quality. And the constituent properties of the personal being, and his acquired moral qualities, are radically different matters. The constituent properties of the person as a sentient being, are created, for they are the being ; whereas the moral character is acquired by subsequent education and action. And the direct question before us relates to the essential properties of man as a created entity, an organic personality. Is he mortal, or immortal? We refer, of course, to his primitive state, before he had acquired a moral character as a subject of law. My friend seems to decide him to be neither, but a candidate for both or either.

To this hypothesis, making man "intermediate," he quotes, apparently with approbation, the following from Theophilus of Antioch :—

"Some one will ask, Was Adam by nature mortal? By no means. Immortal? Not thus, either. What then—nothing at all? I answer, neither mortal nor immortal; for if the Creator had made him from the first immortal, he would have made him a god. If mortal, then God would appear as the author of death. He made him, then, capable of becoming either; so that by keeping the command of God he might attain immortality as his reward, and become a god. But if he should turn to mortal things, and disobey God, he would be himself the author of his own death. For God made man free and with power of self-control."

That Theophilus of Antioch, who, from the philosophies of heathenism, was bound to form a system under the Christian name which should eventuate to his mind, however he might torture reason on his way,—that he, I say, should confound the essential constituents of personal being with the moral qualities of the person, we may not marvel. But I do wonder that the capacious and cultivated intellect of my opponent should commit itself even to a seeming espousal of so radical an absurdity.

To say that man in his primitive state was neither mortal nor immortal, is indeed, as Theophilus saw that his hypothesis would import to his readers, to say that he was *nothing at all*.

If he was to be neither mortal nor immortal until he should have determined which by his acts, then he was not to have a personal being until, as a nonentity, he should have determined how, or in what constitution, he should be created. For when created, he was one or the other. If there was, in his corporeal system, the law of decay, he was mortal. If not, if his body was composed of indestructible materials, and combined in an organic structure upon principles rendering them inseparable and indissoluble, then he was immortal. But it was not so. He was mortal, because he was subject to decay and death.

And with regard to man's primitive *moral* nature, though the particular discussion of this will be reserved to another stage of our labor, I will turn aside here to remark, that there is no reason for supposing that it was different from the moral nature of man in the present age. He was a child of mature growth, with intellectual, social, and moral powers, but without a positive moral character, until he formed one in active life. As children now, he was innocent until he had sinned. And, as Dr. Priestley well remarks, temptation had the same effect on them that it has on their posterity, from which we reasonably infer that human nature was in them the same.

2. We will elaborate the important question before us, *Scripturally*.

The great question which leads this discussion, which was framed by my opponent himself, makes appeal to "*Reason and the Scriptures*." We have heard the voice of *Reason* on the question whether human opinion and character gave man a mortal constitution; or in other words, whether physical death is the penalty of sin. And now, as friends of the Bible and Christianity, if we have been compelled, for the sake of a darling theory, to assume a hypothesis which challenges Reason, we must not rashly press the Bible into our difficulties by forced constructions. It is clear to the reader's humble servant, that an easy, natural, and exegetical study and interpretation of the Scriptures, will present their teachings in perfect harmony with the deductions of Reason, so far as the

discoveries of Reason can go in its study of man, and of the fitness and relations of things.

We will commence our examination with the record of the first transgression, to which my opponent has made reference. "And the Lord commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die."

Such is the legal prohibition, and the penalty. We will presently read the succeeding record of the trial, conviction, and sentence of the Court, upon the first transgression, from which we shall obtain decisive information. But we will tarry here a moment, and study the language of the statutory record. Were we to admit, which we do not, that the expression, *shalt die*, refers to physical death, it would not be admitting that man's body was to be constituted mortal by his sin, or that physical death would not have ensued in due time, from the constitution of things. It could only mean that if he should sin, death should be executed upon him immediately, and in a summary manner. He should not live out the long series of years which the laws of his natural constitution would wear if he lived in innocency. We have yet the death penalty attached to some of our State laws. But this penalty is provided for mortal beings; it could not be adapted to any others. It provides for a speedy termination of its subject's mortal life, by a specified process. If our Legislature should come to believe with the Spiritualists, that immortal angelic beings are making themselves familiar with human affairs, and, seeing what mischiefs they are working, in breaking up good families and converting even once amiable Christian ministers into shameless libertines, were to enact the death penalty against these intrusive immortals, the act would be ridiculous in another essential respect besides the difficulty of arresting them. You couldn't kill *immortals*.

No, even if the death enunciated in Gen. ii. 17, were corporal death, it could not be fairly construed to signify the infliction of death on immortals in any respect in which they were

immortal, nor to involve the absurdity that immortality should become mortal. Such a conclusion from such a premise would be a *non sequitur*. It could only mean that the earth life of mortal man should be cut short, by an immediate execution of death.

But I can find no good reason for such a definition of the term death, or the phrase, *shalt surely die*, in this place. Physical death was not executed on our first parents in any such summary manner. It appears from the record that they lived out the full period of natural life, dying by the natural exhaustion of their physical functions upon the full performance of their mission, which, in that primitive period of atmospheric purity, was at the good old age of nine hundred and thirty years.

There is a force in the expression, "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," denoting an intimate connection between sin and its proper death, which the ingenious argument of my opponent, Chap. iii. § 4, fails to overcome. The *prolepsis*, in all the Scripture cases he has quoted, brings the condition and result, or cause and predicted effect, in close proximity and unbroken connection, if not always within the same literal day. When the Egyptians, on seeing the marvellous death of their first born, cried out, "We be all dead men," and when the Israelites seeing the destruction of Korah and his troop by a stroke of divine vengeance, exclaimed, "We all perish,"—they meant what their language naturally imports, a quick and inevitable destruction. And when Pharaoh said to Moses, "For in the day thou seest my face thou shalt die," he intended to execute upon him speedy destruction on the condition proposed. And so in the warning of God to Adam,—the term *day* in the Scriptures is used so indefinitely for time or period of time compassing a certain purpose and mission, that I would not tenaciously argue from it the occurrence of the result between the rising and setting of the same sun,—but the expression, taken in a natural and familiar way, denotes an intimate connection between sin and its evil. Such is the idea which the language plainly and persistently expresses, after all the

efforts of abstruse theorists, by far-fetched interpretations, to torture it out of its propriety, have become exhausted.

One thought more, before I proceed to the record of the conviction and sentence of the culprits, in the Supreme Court of Eden, before referred to. The theory which makes the death threatened in Gen. ii. 17, to be the subjection of man as a species to physical death, or the making of him mortal, shuts up the use and application of that original law and penalty to the first single transgression of the first pair, leaving it in no force of adaptation to mankind of succeeding generations. It would be utter nonsense for the parent to say to his child now, "In the day that thou sinnest thou shalt surely become mortal." For the little prattler knows that he is mortal now, and that his infant sister in the cradle is as mortal as he. Artificial theologies are of dubious use in practical application. But we shall shortly see that, in the light of a legitimate exegesis, this primitive law to primitive man, with all its penal sanction, is in full force, and unvarying practical adaptedness, in relation to you and me, to all men, as subjects of God's moral government. We believe that the subject will be brought to appear to our readers in such a light, that we, that all religious teachers will clearly stand authorized to proclaim to all the people, in the language of the original admonition, and in all its primitive significance, "In the day (in the time, in the sphere) in which thou sinnest, thou shalt surely die."

But the first pair committed transgression, and incurred the appointed penalty. They were forthwith arraigned, examined, convicted, and sentenced, by the Supreme Judge, who was the Lawgiver himself. The sentence of the Judge in this case, may of course be regarded as an exposition of the penalty. In this light is the judgment of courts always regarded, in the adjudication and enforcement of penal statutes. Therefore we will read the report of this case with deferential care and attention, because the decision of the Supreme Lawgiver and Judge on the question before us, the penalty of sin enunciated in Gen. ii. 17, is worth more than that of ten thousand theological speculatists.

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And here it is. The primitive human pair transgressed the law of their Maker. Before Him they were called to account, and confessed their fault, attempting a palliation of it with some foolish apologies. The Judge proceeded to deliver the sentence to the several parties. To the serpent, which, whatever it was, is introduced into this allegorical account as the seductive cause of this transgression, is doomed to utter contempt in its course, crawling in the dust, and at length to be annihilated, having its head crushed by the Seed of the woman. The woman is subjected to multiplied sorrows in her peculiar sphere of life; and oh, how often have later mothers realized this fruit of sin,—not of grandmother Eve's sin, but their own! And lastly, to Adam, whose responsibility was greatest, the Judge says: "Because thou hast harkened unto the voice of thy wife, and hast eaten of the tree, of which I commanded thee, saying, Thou shalt not eat of it: Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life; thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth unto thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field: in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread, till thou return unto the ground: for out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return."

And this is all. The punishment of their sin was to be found in the sorrows which it occasioned their lives. Adam was not told that he had made himself mortal and perishable by his sin, and that he should return unto the ground in consequence of it. But the reverse is decisively implied. In consequence of his sin he should find his course beset with thorns, and suffer certain discomforts, *till he should return unto the ground*. If a father says to an offending child, "Because you have done this, you shall suffer certain privations till night," that would not be saying that night should come in consequence of the child's misbehavior. The night is referred to as a naturally marked period, to which the father limits the punishment. Just so in the sentence of the Judge in the case of Adam. Because of transgression he was to suffer certain troubles *till he should return unto the ground*; thus denoting

that event, not as occasioned by sin, but as an event before provided for in the order of nature, and referred to as the limit of sin's evils.

And, then, more determinately to settle the question in the negative, whether the event of returning to the ground, — that is, the event of corporeal death, or physical dissolution, were the penalty of sin, God the Judge proceeds to explain the principle on which man should return to the ground, in these words: "For out of it wast thou taken: for dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." This is a divine testimony to the same principle which came so clearly out of our physiological canvass. The assurance that man, in his animal constitution, should be resolved again into dust, is predicated on the fact that he is of the dust, "of the earth, earthy." By the laws of his physical economy, his sphere of animal life was a determinately limited sphere, which fact is clearly implied in the first words of God to Adam in the capacity of Judge, — "Cursed is the ground for thy sake; in sorrow shalt thou eat of it *all the days of thy life*." This implies that his earthly life was naturally limited, not by the act of Adam then on trial, but by a previous constitution of things. It is referred to as a fixed data, for defining the extent of sin's evils. Human character affects the *condition* of human existence, but, as a general economy, it neither creates nor destroys the fact of personal existence itself.

In relation to the saying in this connection, that God drove man out of Eden, lest he should put forth his hand, and take and eat of the tree of life, and live forever, I will notice it more particularly hereafter. Suffice it now to say, that this whole account of the garden of Eden and its transactions is evidently allegorical. I am not able to conceive how any man can understand it otherwise. If any one adopts it as a literal geographical history, I will ask him, where is that garden now? Where is the prohibited tree? Where the tree of life? and where the cherubim with a flaming sword? Are all the facts which that story of the garden was designed to record annihilated? Is there no prohibited fruit now? Is there no cherubim

now with a flaming sword to prohibit polluted hands from taking of the tree of life? Verily, all these facts are now realities, as much as in the morn of human existence. Though we have no sketch of travel, from the oldest time, from which it appears that such a garden was ever discovered, or such a cherubim confronted, yet, in a moral point of view, all the facts and principles represented here are found to be sober realities. The law of right, the serpent tempter, the fruit of evil mixed with good, the lacerating thorns in sin's delusive ways, and the repulse of moral uncleanness from access to the tree of life, — all are sober, practical realities. And all these realities are beautifully represented in the Mosaic account before us, when we receive it as a divine allegory. As such, I say, it is beautiful. But taken as a literal history, it is ridiculous. What could be more repulsive to common sense, than the idea that the first human transgression was induced by a colloquy of a snake with the woman? Away with such abuse of the Scriptures. But as the serpent, in all ages, has been employed as an emblem of low cunning, this "beast of the field" appears beautifully appropriate in an allegory, which was probably recorded at first in hieroglyphics.

We are prepared now for a more critical and extended investigation of the nature of the death which is the fruit of sin.

CHAPTER II.

HUMAN CHARACTER AFFECTS HUMAN CONDITION.

The Death of Sin.

"IN the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Gen. ii. 17. "The wages of sin is death." Rom. vi. 23.

In the preceding chapter I treated the relation between human character and the fact of human personal existence. It was found that, so far as the present life is concerned, the existence of man was not produced by his moral character, seeing that he must have had an existence before he could have formed a moral character. And it was seen to be scarcely less obvious that moral character is not the cause of man's subjection to physical dissolution. It was conceded that sin, in some of its forms, is sometimes the means of hastening corporeal death; and that it is sometimes made the occasion of the occurrence and the execution of such death, in a special and violent manner. But it is a mortal constitution only that is thus subject to hastened decay and violent dissolution. Every child who is old enough to understand the meaning of words and the nature of given qualities, feels that he is reading *prima facie* truth when he reads a statement like this. And when he looks back, by a physiological ken, through the line of genealogical retrocession, from himself to his great-grandparents in Eden, he knows as well as he knows any thing of the past, that they were subject to the same law of gravitation that we are; that if they had lost their balance on a house-frame or scaffold in the air, they would as certainly have fallen to the ground at the cost of broken bones; and that if their house had taken fire and burned down before their escape, they would as certainly have been burned to death;—and all this before they ate of the forbidden fruit.

But I will not repeat. I only designed to start on the inquiry of the present chapter with the presence in the mind of a clear view of the fact brought out in the preceding one; viz., that man was originally constituted for the earth life, mortal, with the same dependence on perishable aliment for sustenance and growth, and the same ever operative law of decay, which in due time must result in physical dissolution, as other species of the animal creation. Accordingly, natural death, as a universal fact, is not the product of sin. And this has been shown to be as decisively settled by the exposition of the Supreme Lawgiver and Judge, on the trial and sentence of the culprits for the first transgression, as by the physiological and analogical argument. I shall proceed on the ground that it is a settled point.

So, then, the question recurs, *What is the death of sin?*

And here, before entering upon the discussion of this question, I deem it proper to repeat what I said in the beginning, that I shall not follow my opponent in the method which he has chosen in respect to order for conducting the present discussion. I intend, before I close, to notice all his points, and each class of his arguments, but not in the order in which he has presented them. In his long chapter which is devoted to the Bible argument, and comprises his principal affirmative arguments for his distinguishing theory, (I refer to his chap. iii.,) he introduces, intermixedly and interchangeably, all the following topics of discussion, — the immortality of the soul, in the Orthodox technical sense; human mortality and corporeal death as the product of sin; life, and aionian life, as the reward of faith and virtue, and as the immortal existence; a nondescript life beyond physical death, which shall die out again as a second instalment of death; the resurrection of the dead; the general Universalist Scriptural argument, etc., etc. He followed the dictates of his own judgment in pursuance of his own plan in this order of arrangement, and we have no fault to find with his method. But though all these topics may have a remote relation to each other, yet in the most essential respects they have respectively so distinct and unique significance, that we calculate best to

promote a clear and satisfactory understanding of the whole, by investigating, in consecutive order, each by itself. We have no fear to investigate freely and announce our conclusions fully on one point, lest such a decision should run us into trouble with some other point to be subsequently considered. All truths harmonize. And we are sure that if we come to a correct understanding of one point, all other points, when correctly understood, will be seen to fall into the line of perfect agreement.

One thing more we may as well say at this stage of the discussion; that is, that Prof. Hudson has devoted considerable space to the controversy on the immortality of the soul as a distinct entity or separate person in man, and on the silence of the Bible in respect to the proper immortality of man as at present constituted, which would be in place in a discussion with a representative of Orthodoxy, but has no use in a discussion between him and us. There is no principle of Universalism which is suspended on a metaphysical determination of this question. We have no occasion for subjecting the soul to any chemical analysis to test its constituent properties; nor have we a dissecting knife by which to separate, for distinct inspection, soul from body, and spirit from soul. We shall, after the manner of the Scriptures, treat man *as man*, possessed of a compound nature, in his higher nature made after the image of God, now in a mortal state and constitution, and to be raised in an immortal state and constitution. Mr. Hudson's concession that "man is made *for* immortality," is sufficient for us; for out of it we can show all the present immortality in our race that is essential to our faith, and he and I will differ only on the question whether man will prove to be that for which he was made, or whether creation will prove a failure.

One other matter among the preliminaries I must state distinctly, in this stage of the work before me; to wit, that I must meet my opponent on some definite position, in order to discuss the main question understandingly, and to the interest of the reader. On some points he appears to be rather indefinite, which I ascribe to the fact that his discerning and culti-

vated mind recoils from the gross materialism of the advocates of Destructionism generally, and yet that he cannot wholly rid himself of that materialism without ignoring the Destructionist theory. For instance, with regard to natural death, he seems at times to regard it as the utter extinction of the whole being, as death is commonly regarded to the brute creatures. This, I believe, is the Destructionist theory, as it is usually held. I have before me a verbatim report of the discussion of last winter, between Rev. Dr. Litch, Presbyterian, of Philadelphia, and Elder Miles Grant, of Boston, Destructionist, in which the latter labors to great extent to prove that man has no soul but the blood, which is the life; and no spirit but the breath, which is wind.

It will shortly be in place for us to expose the fault in this scheme of Scripture exposition — the tying up of a word to the same shade of meaning throughout the Scriptures, without reference to the occasion of its use. We refer to the case now, in explanation of the necessity which we feel to press upon us, to locate our opponent somewhere on this point. He appears at times, as we have said, to occupy this position of his school. He says, Chap. iii. § 4, "I take the meaning of Gen. ii. 17, to be, then, that life was forfeit by transgression. And this might be the life of the soul no less than of the body; nay, it must appear so if there were no clear intimation that the soul was spared." And, in the way of confirming his own opinion by that of others, he quotes in this immediate connection from a Jewish rabbi of the tenth century:—"The wicked in their lifetime are called dead, and their soul is to be destroyed with the ignominy of the body, and will not have immortality or eternal life." And it is to this view of what we call physical death, which he ascribes, erroneously, as I have shown, to sin as its cause, that my opponent quotes largely, and refers much more largely, to the Scriptures which speak of death, destruction, etc., as the fruits of sin.

Let this be distinctly borne in mind, then, by the reader: that my opponent has associated with natural death and temporal destruction, as if essentially involved therein, the idea of the

loss of all existence by forfeiture, even subjection to eternal nothingness. I am confident that this will be seen to be an utterly gratuitous assumption, without the authority of the inspired Word. When the terms, *to die* and *death*, are used to denote physical dissolution, we shall find them in the Scriptures to refer to that simple event merely, without any reference to the question of a future life. They mean in the Scriptures just what they mean in our common usage, the termination of this earthly form of life, — no more implying that those to whom we apply the expressions shall not or may not live again, than our saying that the sun is set, implies that it shall never rise again.

And now we will come directly to the question proposed, What is the death of sin?

It is shown in Chap. i., that the death of sin in Gen. ii. 17, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," is not corporeal death. In the Supreme Court of trial and sentence on the first transgression, it is shown, not as a part of the sentence, but incidentally in the way of bounding the sentence, that corporeal death is a natural result of the physical organization out of the dust of the ground. The Lawgiver and Judge, in the explanation of the penalty through the delivery of the sentence, distinctly defines it to consist in the troubles and sorrows which sin adds to the cup of human life. In the allegorical style, and perhaps hieroglyphical record, thorns and briers are represented as springing up in the path of the sinning man, and the way of life to him is a wearisome way. And this is all. There is no mistake here; there can be none. There is no method by which a different sentiment, by any interpretation, can be crowded in here. The Court record of the judgment for the first sin of the first man, can not be tortured into any different construction. Theorists may obliterate the record, and substitute a darling hypothesis, but they can make nothing else out of the record by construction.

And now that I am on this primitive record, though it may seem to be loitering by the way, it will be time gained and labor saved instead of lost, to make a little more plain, just at

this stage of progress in the discussion, the theory which I adopt of the hieroglyphic character of the original entry of this ancient narrative. It is important that we stand right at this starting point, as it will afford us valuable facilities for successful explorations of the way of truth in all succeeding research.

Receiving Moses as God's chosen and specially qualified servant, for the important mission which was assigned to him, in which is included the instruction of the world into a knowledge of the origin of the universe, and of man, and of the state and responsibility of man as a moral being, it is the most reasonable and reverential, and the most in accordance with God's usual method of work, to presume that he guided Moses in the gathering of old facts for his new record, into the use of such previous records as were reliable. And unquestionably the servants of God, through the line of patriarchs from Adam to Moses, had made some sorts of records of the ways of God with men ; and it is well agreed that the earliest form of writing was the hieroglyphic.

Now we will place our minds in an attitude to conceive of the act of the patriarch who made the original record in hieroglyphics, of the moral state of man as a subject of law, and of judgment. He will, of course, draw the representation of a garden with man placed in it, to signify that he is placed in the midst of cares, labors, and responsibilities. To indicate the many privileges and blessings provided for him, and also that he is a subject of law, and will meet with objects of desire which are evil and must be repressed, to one tree in the garden he will attach a mark of interdiction. To represent the deceitful lust and lure which enticed to sin, he will, as was shown in the preceding chapter, introduce the likeness of a serpent in the interdicted tree ; for the serpent is a universally adopted emblem of low and deceitful cunning. And when the primitive pair had yielded to temptation and partaken of the interdicted fruit, how, in carrying out the hieroglyphic record, could the consequent loss of the privileges and pleasures of innocence be represented so well, as by picturing the sinning man as expelled from

the beautiful garden? And then, to indicate the annoyance to life, and the low, troublous aims of sin, how appropriately the primitive historian painted thorns and briars as springing up in his path, and him in the attitude, not of sprightly labor, but of wearisome toil, with eyes dejected to the ground, and throbbing, sweating brow.

Here, then, we find in the primitive record of the Divine judgment upon the first sin of the first man, the answer to the main question before us, *What is the death of sin?* — and an answer which we shall find confirmed and attested in countless forms of expression and modes of illustration, in all the Bible, and in profane history, and observation and experience. It is the evil, in all its forms, of which sin is fruitful to human life.

It is one of the internal evidences of the divinity of Scripture doctrines, that they are deeply rich in wisdom which was not the offspring of the human mind of those primitive ages, and which is not comprehended by the wise and prudent even of the present time. They estimate virtue and good as *life*, and sin and evil as *death*. On the contrary, the wisdom of the world, even now, seems to know but little of what it is to *live* but to *vegetate*, or to *die* but to cease *breathing*. This event of physical dissolution is not even called *death* in the primitive reference to it as the boundary of sin's evils, but *returning to the ground*. And in the genealogical records of the Hebrews, though they often called it dying, it is familiarly recorded as *falling asleep*. And it is seldom if ever, I think never, spoken of in the Scriptures as a subject of fear, except when to be prematurely induced in a distressing and shameful manner by vice, or executed by violence or judgment. Yet my opponent seems at a loss to find any other real death at all than that of ceasing to breathe. Even the condition which St. Paul so emphatically denominates death in trespasses and sins, Prof. H. does not conceive as being any death at all, only as, by the figure of *prolepsis*, it is spoken of as a present cause which is to result in stopping the breath, or in physical dissolution. "In this view," he says, "to be dead in trespasses and sins will mean, to be subject to death by reason of trespasses and sins." If this dis-

posal of the passage is correct, then the saying, "you hath he quickened," must be taken as a case of *prolepsis* also, not expressing a present experience or a moral reality, but a future and physical event. (More on this passage in another place.)

But the holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit, and had their souls imbued with heavenly truth, saw and described virtue and good to be the real life, and sin and evil the real death. And, having been put upon this course by the primitive record of the death or penalty of the first sin, we will pursue our search of the Scriptures for light on the subject.

Moses, addressing the great congregation of the people of Israel, whom he had been faithfully instructing in the laws of the Lord, describing the sources of prosperity and happiness, and also of calamity and evil, and depicting that desolation and ruin which should be seen by surrounding nations to comprise *all the curses which are written in the book of the law*, said unto them, (Dent. xxx. 15-20,) "See, I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil; in that I command thee this day to love the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways and to keep his commandments, and his statutes and his judgments, that thou mayest live and multiply; and the Lord thy God shall bless thee in the land whither thou goest to possess it. But if thine heart turn away, so that thou wilt not hear, but shalt be drawn away and worship other gods, and serve them, I denounce unto you this day, that ye shall surely perish, and that ye shall not prolong your days upon the land whither thou passest over Jordan to go to possess it. I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, and blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live; that thou mayest dwell in the land which the Lord swear unto thy fathers, to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, to give them."

One of these verses, the 19th, my opponent quotes with a list of passages which he sets forth as showing the general tenor of Scripture language to imply that the proper death of sin is annihilation, which a good life may avert, procuring an

immortal existence. And I suppose that this passage is as good proof of such a theory as any of the catalogue quoted or referred to. But it is unfortunate that so noble a mind should be by lot entangled in a theory which imposes on him the necessity for so strange and indefensible a handling of the Scripture language. Moses does not here express his thoughts dubiously and enigmatically. He is so explicit and descriptive in his language, that we may say of it as we said of the court record in Gen. ii., it cannot be misinterpreted. It explains itself, and the commentator must either receive it as it is, or trample over it, and set up a forgery in its stead. A man may say that the death here spoken of means the annihilation of the soul, or the forfeiture of the resurrection life; but he cannot make the language of Moses say or mean this. For, in so far as the terms death, and perish, are made to include the idea of physical dissolution, it is defined to be, at the extreme, a catastrophe that should cut short their days in the land which the Lord had promised the fathers that their seed should inherit. Neither can the life here denoted as the fruit of obedience, be construed to signify an immortal state of being by the resurrection of the dead,—because, in its furthest extent, when taken to involve the idea of literal personal being, it is distinctly defined to be the prolonging of their days in the land of Canaan.

But it is not primarily and chiefly corporeal death that Moses denoted in this place as the wages of sin and transgression. That would be the ultimate result, in so far as to prove the temporal destruction of their national polity along with the hastened and miserable death of many of the individuals; that is, the shortening of their days in the land of their habitation. But chiefly the terms life and good are here used for a prosperous and happy condition of life in their land,—and death and evil, for a condition of unrest, distresses, troubles, and miseries. In this sense, *life* and *death*, and *blessing* and *cursing*, are synonymous and convertible expressions.

So in Prov. viii. 35, 36: "For whoso findeth me, findeth life, and shall obtain favor of the Lord. But he that sinneth

against me (Wisdom), wrongeth his own soul ; all they that hate me love death." Here the word *death* is put in opposition to the life of which the acquisition of wisdom maketh one the possessor. That life is not mere animal and vegetative life, though the wisdom here commended conduces to the prolongation of that. But the high purpose of living, the true good of life, is evidently comprised in this word *life*. The same sentiment is in Prov. iii. : " Her ways are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace. She is a tree of life to them that lay hold upon her, and happy is every one that retaineth her." This life of true manhood it is, the opposite of which is the *death* which they practically choose who hate the counsels of wisdom.

My opponent refers to Ezek. xviii. : " The soul that sinneth, it shall die." This is among his classifications of Scripture passages which he takes to indicate that physical death, and beyond that the extinction of being, is the recompense of sin ; and the acquisition of life immortal beyond death, the reward of right living. We will test this application by pertinent inquiry. The prophet proceeds to say, " But if a man be just, and do that which is lawful and right, — he is just, he shall surely live, saith the Lord of hosts." Nor will Prof. H. aver that the last described person should not die a corporeal death. He will assert no such thing. He knows that Ezekiel never preached any such doctrine as that the virtuous portion of citizens should find their animal bodies immortal, never to decay and return to the ground. Then, of course, that prophet did not teach that corporeal death, as a universal fact in human experience, that is the mortality of the physical constitution, is the penalty of sin. For whatever death he intended to announce as the fruit of a sinful life, he encouraged them to avoid by a life of virtue. If *violent* and *premature* physical death be supposed to be meant, no absurdity or disharmony is forced upon the passage. For such death, that is, violent and premature physical death, may be incurred by vicious practices, and avoided by a life of circumspection and purity. And, as we have conceded before, life and death, in this sense, are familiarly spoken of in the Old Testament, as the reward of good and

evil conduct. "That thy days may be long in the land," and, "That soul (or person) shall be cut off from Israel," are familiar forms of Old Testament expression.

But in the 18th chapter of Ezekiel, there appears to be much of the moral in the terms *live* and *die*. The prophet goes on to explain: "But if the wicked will turn from all his sins that he hath committed, and keep all my statutes, — he shall surely live, he shall not die. All his transgressions that he hath committed, they shall not be mentioned unto him, in his righteousness that he hath done he shall live. But when the righteous turneth away from his righteousness, and committeth iniquity, — shall he live? All his righteousness that he hath done shall not be mentioned; in his trespass that he hath trespassed, and in his sin that he hath sinned, in them shall he die."

This teaching seems to imply that there is something of what is here termed death suffered by the sinner while in his sinful career. For, after the declaration that the person that sinneth shall die, *in his sin* that he hath sinned he shall die, it is added, "But if the wicked will turn from all his sins, he shall not die, — *in his righteousness* that he hath done he shall live."

Now suppose a man lives fifty years in immorality and vice. Is he not a subject of that law whose unvarying edict is, "The soul that sinneth shall die; — in his sin that he sinneth he shall die?" We must conclude that he is, or there is no definite point, no assurance of truth, no striking home of the fact of accountability, in those Scripture declarations. For if after fifty years of immoral life he reforms, he shall *not* die, he shall live. If we take it to mean that he shall not continue to die, but shall pass from death unto life, referring, of course, to a death of moral torpor, unrest and anguish in sin, all is clear and consistent. But take this as referring solely to physical death, or even a *premature* physical death, and, in respect to the vile transgressor of fifty years, you make false the edict of the law of God, "The soul that sinneth shall die, — *in his sin* that he sinneth he shall die." Nay, he was all that time dying in his sins; and in turning from sin he was emancipated from that death.

This idea of a living death in sin is more constantly and conspicuously brought out in the more spiritual teachings of the New Testament. "The wages of sin is death." (Rom. vi. 23.) The Greek word *opsonion*, here rendered wages, primarily signifies "whatever is bought to be eaten with bread," "victuals," etc. The lexicographers illustrate by reference to the fact, that hired soldiers were at first paid partly in meat, grain, fruit, etc. Hence the word is used by our Lord, as reported by Luke, (iii. 14,) for the fare of soldiers, where it is translated *wages*. "Be content with your wages." It would be a more literal rendering to read it, "be content with your fare." The word signifies that which enters into daily living. The *opsonion*, that which is eaten with the daily bread, of sin, is death.

This idea is in perfect harmony with the sentiment of the preceding context. "What fruit had ye, then, in those things whereof ye are now ashamed? for the end of those things is death." Here, as in the other case, the sentiment is plainly and unmistakably expressed. The apostle would have his brethren appreciate the great difference between sin and holiness, in respect to their account to the real good of life. He asks them to recall to mind the enormous evil of sin, as it had affected their own experience. "What fruit *had* ye in those things of which ye are now ashamed?" And he adds, "for the end of those things is death." Here he uses the word *end* for purpose and result; all which, in the case of sin, is death. He refers, of course, to the death which is involved in the daily wages or fare afforded by sin, else there would be no sense in the connection in which this is placed, by use of the conjunction *for* or *because*. "What fruit *had* ye in those things whereof ye are now ashamed? *for* the end of those things is death." It is as if he had said, You know what is the fruit of sin, for you had the experience of it in those things whereof you are now ashamed, and you know that it is death.

In direct expression of the same sentiment, by a metonymy of speech, the same apostle says to the same church, "To be carnally minded is death." And with reference to their past

experience of the same death, and their deliverance from it by the spirit of truth and love, St. John says, (1 John iii. 14,) "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren. He that loveth not his brother abideth in death." If there is any power in language to express a thought decisively, we have here a decisive proof of the presence of the death of sin in the service and power of sin.

To this point the language of Paul to the Ephesians is decisive: "And you hath he quickened, who were dead in trespasses and sins." My opponent refers to this passage, with remarks which, if I understand his intent, imply his opinion that it refers, not to an actual experience of the death spoken of, but to an exposure to it. His cause is a doomed one, since it imposes on him the necessity of breasting the general train of Scripture testimony on this subject, with an effort to parry its direct and natural force. In this case, the language admits of no construction to obliterate its direct expression, that the death spoken of was what had been actually experienced by those whom he addressed, and from which they were actually quickened. The same fact is reiterated in the succeeding context with equal directness. After saying that they had been, in the corruptions of their past gentile life, "children of wrath, even as others," he proceeds to say, "But God, who is rich in his mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us, even when we were dead in sins, hath quickened us together with Christ (by grace are ye saved), and hath raised us up together, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus."

In relation to the phrase, "dead in trespasses and sins," Prof. H. argues thus: "Allow for a moment, that 'death in trespasses and sins' denotes morally or spiritually dead. What is gained either to the Orthodox view or the Universalist? If this death is like disease, it remains to be shown that it is not mortal,—that sin is not to the soul what fatal disease is to the body." Here he challenges us to prove that death in sin is not an incurable disease to the soul, which shall terminate its being beyond recovery. And yet he had the proof before him, in

his mouth and on his pen, as he transcribed the words of the apostle; for his words declare the very fact of a quickening to life from this same death.

But I need not prolong this train of quotation and argument. The multitude of texts which my opponent refers to as showing the general tenor of the Scriptures, press upon our understandings the fact, that the life and good which is the fruit or reward of faith and virtue, and the death and evil which is the fruit or recompense of unbelief and sin, are experienced when and where those respective qualities are possessed and exercised.

In concluding this chapter, I will take occasion to remark, that my opponent's theory in respect to the death which is the wages of sin, takes it from our power to preach the primitive law of God, and its penal sanction as a motive of obedience, to the living age. For if we should stand up in a Sunday School, and urge upon the children a virtuous life in consideration of the hypothesis that by this means they will prolong their days on the earth to all eternity, and never know the event of corporeal death, they would propose to their teachers to have us kindly cared for in the insane asylum. It is the beauty of our theory, that it is a practical one, perfectly adapted to the wants and interests of men as presenting a rational and satisfactory system of faith, and just and truthful motive of practice.

In addition to the living evils of sin to human life, which are significantly denominated death, the Scriptures, as we have conceded, especially the Old Testament, treat much of physical death and destruction, to individuals and nations, as being signally executed by special judgments for flagrant and persistent unrighteousness. But none of these records, either of the catalogue to which my opponent has referred, or of the residue, reach at all to the question of life or death beyond the grave. These matters we will discuss with reverent care, when we come to lift the veil, and look, by the light of gospel revelation, at the things which are unseen and eternal.

CHAPTER III.

THE ARGUMENT FOR IMMORTALITY.

SECTION I. *The Philosophical Argument.*

WE have accompanied our opponent in his range amidst the varied scenes of human life; scenes of virtue and vice, sin and holiness; scenes of sorrow and trouble in sin's hard service, and of death and destruction. But our survey of these scenes carries us only to the verge of mortal time. We lose sight of the subject of them when he sinks into the domain of death; and all further discoveries concerning his condition must be found in connection with the testimonies of a future state of being. And the question of such future being, as a question of fact, is entirely distinct from that of the evils, and the dissolution of mortal life.

Prof. H., after the manner of the Destructionist school in general, lays much stress on the words *perished*, *destroyed*, *perdition*, and *destruction*, as cutting off the hope of immortal life. The following are among the strongest uses of these words in the catalogue of texts to which he has referred as favoring his theory: "Shall utterly perish in their own corruption." (2 Peter ii. 12). The whole connection of this passage, speaking of the perishing of the characters referred to being as that of "natural brute beasts made to be taken and destroyed," and of their riotous and adulterous living, renders it clear that temporal destruction was the subject of the prophecy as the natural and inevitable end of such a course of living. The same idea is expressed, in respect to the result of a given way of life, in Phil. iii. 19, (which is also quoted in part by my opponent,) "Whose end is destruction, whose God is their belly." The second clause explains intelligibly enough what kind of destruc-

tion is signified. We not unfrequently see, in our own time, the walking putrescence of those whose breath is lasciviousness and whose God is their belly, — and who suddenly and “utterly perish in their own corruption.”

Another of my opponent's texts is Acts iii. 23, and Deut. iv. 26. “Every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be utterly destroyed from among the people.” This so fully explains itself as referring to a temporal destruction, being cut off from among the people, that I wonder that it should be quoted as expressing or implying any other destruction. The word *utterly* is doubtless relied upon as implying something further, but without reason. The word *utterly* does not change the subject, but only gives force to the subject in hand. It qualifies the destruction spoken of, and no other. And that was a destruction which excised the transgressor from among the people. Nothing more, nothing less, is here implied.

Again, Prof. H. quotes, under the word *perdition*, “Foolish and hurtful lusts, which drown men in destruction and perdition. (1 Tim. vi. 9.) What kind of destruction and perdition it is in which foolish and hurtful lusts drown men, everybody understands; and such passages have no more bearing upon the question of life from the dead, than the saying, “And Moses fled from Pharaoh.” If my opponent depends, for his position, on the mere force of any or all of the words he has exalted to that purpose, I see not but that he would be just as pertinent, as in the quotations he has made, to turn us over to the following catalogue also: “And ye shall *perish* among the heathen, and the land of your enemies shall eat you up.” (Lev. xxvi. 39.) “I (Esther) will go in; and if I *perish*, I *perish*.” (Est. iv. 16.) “Unless thy law had been my delights, I should have perished in mine affliction.” (Ps. cxix. 92.) “Lord save us; (the disciples on the lake,) we *perish*.” (Matt. viii. 26.) “The righteous *perisheth*, and no man layeth it to heart.” (Isa. lvii. 1.)

We might cover acres of paper with multiplied quotations of Scripture passages of this description, and explanatory remarks, and it could not be rendered more clear than it is to the careful reading of them in the Record as they stand, that they re-

fer to dissolutions, physical and moral, which to the wicked are the concomitants and the results of transgressions and sins in the visible sphere of life,—and, to the righteous temporal afflictions from unavoidable relations in the world, to other men, and to general providence.

And, to the thorough, orthodox Destructionist, what more can possibly be signified or implied by any or all the Scripture declarations, denouncing destruction and perdition upon few or many of the inhabitants of the earth, than the dissolution of the corporeal system, or termination of the earthly life? This, to that theory, is all there is of man. Physical death is utter annihilation, and irreclaimable. We may as well look this theory in the face as not. If there is no soul of man but the animal life, or as Elder Grant defines it, the blood, and no spirit but the breath or wind,—then, when the body dies, and the breath goes to its native atmosphere, and the blood, and the other substances of the body formed by it, are resolved back to primitive dust, the man is annihilated, and can never have a resurrection; for there is nothing of him to be raised. If a man who weighed two hundred pounds last year, is now reduced by disease to one hundred pounds, that hundred pounds of his body which has evaporated into the primitive elements by decay, is now no part of the man. So when his whole body moulders and wastes away into earths and gases, it is no longer the man, nor any part of the man. It is the same with him as if he had never been. And we may as well talk about the resurrection of a host of *nothings*, of sheer nonentities, as the resurrection of the dead upon this hypothesis. The earths and gases into which human bodies are resolved, may enter, in the form of vegetable nutrition, into fruits and esculents which living men may eat, and may thus become particles of their living bodies,—but not consciously. These particles bear with them no identity of the other living body of which they had been components; nor has the eater who has received and assimilated them any consciousness of the position they had once occupied.

Again, if God, by a miraculous exertion of power, as when he created the first human pair, should condense and reconstruct

into a human body the same particles of matter which composed the body of a man that was, say of Gen. Washington, when he died, and then inform and inspire it, not with Washington's spirit, that being mere wind in common with all other wind, but with his (God's) own spirit, or his power rather, as in the case of that primitive creation, so that the new created man should become a living soul or creature, it would not be Washington raised from the dead. It would be a new created being, with no more consciousness of being Washington than another generation of men to come will possess of being the present generation.

Neither will it be possible for all men, after their bodies have been decomposed for a longer or shorter intervening season, to be reconstructed of the same particles which composed their bodies at the time of their death. Suppose, for instance, a cannibal subsists principally on the bodies of other men for five or seven years, in which time the entire substance of the human body is changed, the old particles having gone to waste, and new ones being supplied from the aliments received into the stomach. Then he dies, his body being composed of the substances of other human bodies, on which he has subsisted the seven years. It is impossible that he should have a resurrection body constructed of the same particles which composed his physical system when he died, and also that all others should in like manner have resurrection bodies composed of the same matter that formed their bodies at their death, because their bodies had gone to compose that of the former who had subsisted upon them.

If you attempt to crowd this impossible theory upon me under the sacred name mystery, I say to you that, while I love sublime mysteries, bald absurdities I can never relish.

The great apostle of the Gentiles, in treating the subject of the resurrection, keeps all along in recognition something which constitutes the *me*, the moral child of God, the heir of immortality, as not destroyed by death. But more of this when we come to the Bible argument.

In whatever respect Prof. Hudson differs from the popular

theory of the denominational party with which he is classed, I will give him due credit in its place, if I shall be able to understand it. But, as I engaged in this discussion principally for the purpose of answering the calls which have been made upon me for a review of the Destructionist theory as it prevails and is becoming more and more popular throughout our country, I deem it requisite that, while I neglect not Prof. Hudson's peculiar shades of opinion on some points, I should bring into the canvass the theory in its usual and popular form. And that I may do this fairly, I will make some instructive quotations from their standard authors.

Elder Miles Grant, editor of the religious journal representing the Destructionist theory in New England, in his late discussion with Dr. Litch, reported verbatim by Mr. Yerrington, gives us the following disquisition on the soul and spirit of man, in Scripture usage. Having shown that the word rendered *soul* in the Scriptures, is sometimes used for the *person*, but generally means the *animal life*, he says:—

"I think, gentlemen of the chair, we have settled the point without going any further, that "soul" primarily *means* the whole being—the *whole man*. Hence we read, eight *souls* were saved in the ark. Paul speaks of a certain number of souls that escaped at a time of shipwreck. We say, so many *souls* perished on board a wrecked ship. What do we mean? Every one understands us." P. 11.

I will stop here to say, that every one will not be able to understand such expressions from the elder and his compeers unless he has studied their vocabulary. In their vocabulary *perishing* is *annihilation*. Therefore when *they* say that "so many souls perished on board a wrecked ship," they mean that the drowned persons, good or bad, saints or sinners, are annihilated. And who can show us that those who are annihilated can have a resurrection?

Passing at length from *soul* to *spirit*, and having referred to several passages where the same original words are rendered variously, *spirit*, *breath*, and *wind*, the elder proceeds:—

What is this *pneuma* or *ruakh*? There are four uses of it

in the Bible. *First*, "spirit" is used to represent a being. *Second*, to represent an influence proceeding from a being, as the Holy Spirit proceedeth from the Father. And there is a spirit proceeding from every man. We see it in mesmerism and psychology. If I shake hands with a man in the dark who is my enemy, I recognize him as such. I know it by some spiritual communication.

Third, it is used to represent a state of mind, as "haughty in spirit," "proud in spirit," etc. And *fourth*, — which is the point we wish to come at, — it is used to represent the air we breathe. This word, as I have remarked, occurs three hundred and eighty-five times in the Old Testament; it is rendered wind ninety-seven times, and is the only word rendered wind in the Old Testament. P. 13.

"He stretcheth forth the heavens," referring to the commencement of things in this world's history, "and layeth the foundation of the earth." There is another act of creation. What then? "And formeth the spirit of man within him." Now, gentlemen of the chair, I wish to show that this spirit here referred to is the *air* we breathe.

* * * * *

In the forty-first chapter of Job, and the sixteenth verse, when speaking of the scales of the leviathan, we read, "One is so near to another that no *air* can come between them." The same word that is rendered spirit. Is that the man? If this breath of life is the man, then wherever we find it we have found a man.

If it takes this particular organization to constitute a man, then wherever we find that, whether it is on the earth, or on Jupiter, or Saturn, we have found a man. Again, in Job i. 19 — "And behold there came a great wind." The same word that is used where he says, "He taketh away their breath, they die."

Job vii. 7. "Oh, remember that my life is wind." The same word that is rendered spirit. My life is dependent upon air, the wind; I cannot live without it. Chap. xii. 10. "In whose hand is the soul of every living thing" (then every living thing has a soul), "and the breath of all mankind." The same word which is rendered spirit in the passage where it says, "And he formeth the *spirit* within him." "And, lo, he that formeth the mountains, and createth the wind, and declareth unto man what is his thought, he createth it." Pp. 24, 25.

Such are specimens of doctrine in the theory of orthodox

Destructionism. We concede that Elder Grant is right in his literal definition of *pneuma*, and in his view of its most common usage in the Scriptures. But when we were reading the report of his arguments, and observing his iron rule of putting a word through in its radical sense, we thought that the rule which could so felicitously make the passage, "There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding," to mean that there is wind or breath in man; and the words, "The spirit (returns) to God that gave it," to mean that the breath returns to God, — can with all convenience make the words of Jesus, "God is a spirit," to mean that *God is wind*.

We commend, to be sure, to all students, a recurrence to the primitive meaning of words, and to their common use, of course. And where we find a Scripture word perverted, by theological assumption and usage, from its proper meaning, and appropriated to the service of false doctrines, it becomes imperiously necessary that we have recourse to its primitive meaning, and its general use, that we may gain attention to its true sense in a given case, by the study of the connection and subject of discourse in that particular instance.

But it should be borne in mind that the speakers and writers of the Scriptures do not speak with hesitating and cringing timidity and nice arithmetical particularity, as if anticipating objections and dodging difficulties. They speak with open and ingenuous freedom, correctly, but liberally, knowing that they can only instruct the willing mind. There are but few words applied to moral and spiritual subjects, but what have a primitive reference to material things. The original for *heaven*, is *ouranos*, which literally signifies the region of the atmosphere, in which the clouds are upborne and the fowls fly. Yet it is used, without explanation, for the spiritual reign of Christ; and in one place at least, Heb. ix. 24, for the immortal resurrection state; and, in its adjective form, for moral or spiritual qualities. And there was no need of explanation in these cases; for as the atmosphere is the most subtle, refined, and incorruptible of the common classifications of the material ele-

ments, when the word describing it is applied to a spiritual entity or a moral subject, we know that it is used, not so much in a figurative as literally in a moral sense, and its natural import in such a connection is plain and unmistakable. We are in no danger of taking the phrase *ouranios Pater* to mean our *airy Father*; nor would it seem that we should be any more likely to take the testimony that "there is a spirit in man," to mean that there is wind in man, especially as it is added, as showing a reference to a nature in man above the animal and allied to God, "and the inspiration of the Almighty giveth them understanding."

But I must not extend my research in this direction. I have deemed it requisite, in order that I may have definite positions to meet, and may discuss the whole subject to the profit of the reader, to bring out, thus far, in its proper shape, the Destructionist theory, — the theory which my respected opponent lingers around and clings to, and, though with averted eyes, classifies Scriptures to support. It recognizes man as a mere animal, one of the higher orders of animal, to be sure, but only animal, composed of earth, blood, and air, which, at corporeal death, are resolved back into their primitive material elements, leaving all as when he had not been. This theory destroys the natural or philosophical argument for a future life, as it leaves nothing in man allied to the great spiritual Father, and consequently nothing to constitute an heirship of a coming spiritual life. And though it holds to the Scripture testimony of a resurrection from the dead, at least to a limited extent, it makes the term *resurrection* a *misnomer*, as the fact represented is really a new creation, there being nothing of man to raise.

Now, therefore, after this protracted but necessary course of preliminary observation, we come at length to the proposed *natural or philosophical argument for human immortality*.

1. *The Image of God in Man.* When God had created the earth and its furniture, and the fishes, fowls, and beasts of the earth, then "God created man in his own image; in the image of God created he him, male and female created he them; and God blessed them." When this passage was quoted for

another purpose in a former chapter, I reserved the consideration of it in the bearing which now interests us, to this stage of the discussion. We raise the question now, *What is the image of God creatively constituted in man?*

Prof. Hudson, in his Chap. iii. § 2, wherein he classifies Scripture texts to the same point and purpose as that labored by Elder Grant in respect to the soul and spirit, assumes that the image of God referred to in this place is a moral image. He quotes two Scripture expressions, which, to him, "seem to denote that the divine image in man is a moral likeness." Eph. iv. 24: "Put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." Col. iii. 16: "And have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him." The Professor comments on this as follows: "From this we should not infer that *actual* holiness was created in man; for character cannot be created by another. Rather, I should take it, man was made with a *capacity* and design for godliness, or godlikeness, and thus for *immortality*." In this argument he seems slightly confused. His proof texts speak of an image or likeness of God, into which the disciples addressed had been actually and practically renewed. But his commentary makes it to be only a *capacity* for godliness. If Christian regeneration only installs men into a *capacity* to do right, then before regeneration they have no such capacity. What then becomes of all our worthy Professor's free-willism, to which our attention will be drawn by and by? This is bold Calvinistic innate total depravity, involving utter inability. I do not suppose that my friend directly espouses this doctrine of utter human inability, though his argument in this instance virtually involves it, and the old Calvinistic doctrine on this point seems to be shadowed in his use, in another place, of the stereotyped Calvinistic phraseology on the "fall of man." It is essential to that theory to make the image of God in which man was originally constituted to be a moral image, a *perfectly holy nature*.

But this hypothesis would render the moral fall impossible, just as the theory of his original immortality in his earthly

constitution would render his subjection to physical death impossible.

That learned Orthodox authority, Rev. Dr. Emmons, whose logic was infallible, and who never erred but in the assumption of false premises, reasons on this point with force irresistible. He held the assumption, it being essential to his Orthodoxy, that Adam was originally constituted perfectly holy; but he ingenuously admits what I have now remarked; viz., the natural impossibility of a perfectly holy being consenting to commit sin, — and he proves it by the following logic: —

“While Adam was placed in such a perfectly holy and happy situation, it is extremely difficult to conceive how he should be led into sin, without the immediate interposition of the Deity. His perfect holiness would naturally lead him to repel with abhorrence every temptation to disobey and dishonor the Being whom he supremely loved. Our Saviour’s supreme affection to his Father prompted him to resist the Devil, and baffle every temptation to sin which his malice and subtlety could suggest. And though the tempter pursued him with his assaults forty days, yet he could find nothing in the perfectly holy heart of Christ, for any temptation to take hold of.

“So there was nothing in the perfectly holy heart of Adam, that could give Satan the least advantage against him. His perfect holiness, as long as it continued, was a perfect security against any temptation which any created being could suggest.

“The first Adam was as totally disposed to resist the Devil in Paradise, as the second Adam was to resist him in the wilderness. They were both perfectly holy; they both stood superior to all external temptations. It is in vain to account for the first sin of the first man, by the instrumentality of second causes; and until we are willing to admit the interposition of the supreme first cause, we must be content to consider the fall of Adam an unfathomable mystery.”

Such is the reasoning of that great theologian; and it cannot be faulted. We escape his difficulty only by discarding his false premises. The image of God in which man was originally constituted was not perfect holiness. My opponent’s definition

of the divine image in man, which he erroneously applies to that in which the believers were renewed by regeneration, if applied to the primitive constitutional state of man, is about half right. It would make it to consist in the possession of a moral nature, and *capacities*, of course, for doing right.

This, I say, is about half of the truth in the case. But the truth embraces more. The image of God in man as originally constituted, is not a question on which we are required to rack the brain with learned theological metaphysics. It is plainly and obviously that which distinguishes man from the lower orders of the sentient creation. When all the grades of brute creatures had been created, God said, "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. So God created man in his own image." This is not said of any other grade of creatures, and it is here said to denote the characteristic distinction of man. And what is that? Every child knows what signally distinguishes man from the mere animal creatures. It is his *intellectual* and *moral* and *spiritual* nature. This, therefore, is what is here meant by the image of God in man. It is not a likeness of acquired moral character, but a constitutional likeness in which he was primitively and *is* created. In which he was and *is* created, I have said, — for man has never lost that image of God in which he was originally constituted. However the higher nature, comprising reason, spirituality and moral sense, may have become marred by the influence of sensual passions and sordid aims, this nature is not lost. These principles and faculties he yet possesses. He is yet, though in an animal body, a rational, moral, and spiritual being, and as such bearing the image of the creating MIND. If it were not so, he were not an accountable being. But he *is* an accountable being, on the filial principle. All men are required by the law of eternal truth to love and serve God. No service is acceptable to God but the filial. But filial love and service can only be based on the fact of an existing filial relation. And the filial and paternal relations involve the existence, in some essential sense, of a likeness.

I have spoken of the image of God in which man was and is created. St. James speaks of men as being *now*, as well as primitively, made in the image of God. Speaking of the improper and shameful use of the tongue, he says, "Therewith bless we God, and therewith curse we men, who are made after the similitude of God."

Now, standing here, in the light of this primary and indubitable truth, that man in his higher nature bears the image of God,—I stand in the full consciousness that I have a presumptive argument for human immortality.

And here I will guard against being misunderstood. I am not speaking of an *immortal soul*, in the orthodox technical sense, in which it is familiarly talked and preached about, as if it were a separate entity within us, but no component part of us, and were to be saved from or lost in hell, in the future world, by our stultifying ourselves with or standing aloof from an absurd creed in the present life. The scheme of soul-saving, rested upon this theory, has been a tremendous business in our world. I am aware that the word *soul*, from the Greek *psuke*, is commonly used for the *person*, and for the *animal life*; and sometimes for the *affections of the mind*, as in the requirement that we should love the Lord our God with all our heart, and with all our soul. And I do not now think of any instance in the Scriptures, where the word is used as the name of a distinct immortal being in man, to be separated from him at death. Such a use of the word *soul* is of no consequence in my argument; nay, it is all the stronger without it. My opponent may fill a volume with Scripture quotations to show the general use of *psuke*, and the absence of any announcement to man that he has an immortal soul; but it would avail nothing in this discussion. My subject in the present lesson is *man*,—man as a compound being of course, allied both to earth and heaven, but as a single personality; in his present rudimental form of life, mortal; but in his essential being, immortal.

Prof. Hudson, chap. iii. § 1, on the question, "*Is the proper immortality of man assumed in the Bible?*"—devotes a column

to the contrast between the Bible treatment of the immortality of man, and of the being of God. He says:—

“Whether God exists at all and whether man lives for ever, are questions of equal moment to man. Hence I say that in the revelation of God’s character and of man’s destiny, these two doctrines, if equally true, should be treated alike; we should expect to find them on the same footing.

“If, then, one of these cardinal truths is stated in the Bible explicitly and directly, we should expect the same of the other. If one is expressed not directly, but explicitly assumed, with frequent mention and allusion, we should expect the same of the other. If one is assumed implicitly and silently, — taken as a doctrine too clear for doubt and scarcely needing to be named, we should expect the same of the other.

“But in fact these doctrines receive in the Bible the widest differences of treatment. That of the divine existence, as I have already remarked, is not directly asserted; but it is assumed as too clear for assertion. It is taken as a first truth of the religious consciousness, to prove which would be preposterous.

“If we strike out from the records those passages that tell of His being, and His works, we reduce the dimensions of the volume almost by half, we make it a book without sense or meaning, we exchange its radiant light for midnight darkness.

“But if we expunge from the same book all those passages in which man’s immortality is expressly mentioned or unquestionably assumed, we leave the volume unchanged.

“The sum is this:—The Scriptures, given to reveal God’s character and man’s duty and destiny, speak of the divine existence many hundred times and in considerable variety of ways; but they speak of man’s proper immortality, equally important to himself, never.”

Now I am compelled to convict my learned friend again of slight confusion; or, at least, of a method of argument calculated to confuse his readers. There is a want of relation in its parts. It is as if, in executing a proposition to describe the prominent difference between two men, he should say, one of them is six feet tall, and the other is black. Stature and complexion are not comparable traits of being. So my opponent, by comparing the Bible treatment of the *existence* of God, with that of the *immortality* of man, forces into connection two

things which in their nature can bear no comparison. If the *being* of God is taken for one of the factors in the problem, the *being* of man must be taken for the other. And if the *immortality* of man is placed on one side, the *immortality* of God must make the other side of the comparison.

Well, then, let us try the comparison of this just and lawful method. First, view the Scripture recognition of the *being* of God, in connection with the Scripture recognition of the *being* of man, — and of man's being, too, as God's moral and accountable child. We shall find the continuous frequency and familiarity with which the Scriptures recognize the being of man in this relation and capacity, far to exceed that with which they make direct reference to the being of God. Secondly, bring into comparison the direct Scripture recognition of the *immortality* of God, and that of the *immortality* of man.

As it respects the word itself, it occurs but once in its adjective form, and is applied to God, 1 Tim. i. 17; "Now to the King eternal, *immortal*, invisible, the only wise God." In its substantive form, *immortality*, it occurs in the Bible but five times, once only with reference to the Deity; (1 Tim. vi. 16;) twice, to man, (1 Cor. xv. 53, 54,) from *athanasia*, which signifies immortality proper, in the common acceptance of the word; and in two other instances to man (Rom. ii. 7; 2 Tim. i. 10,) from *aptharmia*, which signifies incorruption, either of substance or moral principle. All these cases will be considered in the Scriptural argument for immortality; but I refer to them now for the purpose of showing how the direct testimony of the Bible stands, comparatively, in relation to God, and in relation to man. True my opponent may plead that the cases in which the direct testimonies of immortality are applied to man, refer to the subject of Christian hope, and not to a present possession. But when we shall have learned from the Scriptures man's proper heirship of a future immortal life, we shall probably be able to show that there is comprised in that doctrine of hope all the present immortality for which we care, and for which we contend.

But, in respect to the immortality of the Deity, it is only

asserted incidentally in the single case which we have referred to; and the same idea in other words, such as that his "years shall have no end," is but incidentally expressed. His immortality is necessarily involved in the very idea of his being as God.

As it respects man, that his immortality, or his ultimate visible inheritance of it, was not made a subject of direct and full revelation in the earliest ages, is not a circumstance weighing in argument against its truth. It is according to the general economy of God's dealings with our race that he reserved the full and explicit revelation of this truth to an age when the more advanced of the nations were prepared to appreciate and live the higher and more sublime moral and spiritual principles which must legitimately belong to a system comprising such a revelation. In the infantile ages of the race, as the immortality of God was involved in a proper conception of his being in the character in which he addressed them, as the I AM, and the Creator and Supreme Governor of the world,—so his address to men as his children bearing his image, and as responsible subjects of his moral government, involved, though not then well understood by them, yet involved, in a good sense, their immortality.

"So God created man in his own image. In the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. *And God blessed them.*" Gen. i. 27, 28.

We have found the *image of God in man*, consisting in his intellectual, moral, and spiritual nature,* to comprise a presumptive argument for his *immortality*.

* By the *spiritual* nature, as distinguished from the intellectual and moral, I mean that innate principle which instinctively impels to the worship of a supreme Being. It is usually called the *religious* nature. The intellectual faculty reasons,—the moral faculty judges of right and wrong; but there is a spiritual nature which evinces a natural relation to the Deity, in that, not waiting for the deductions of reason, or the question of right and wrong, it instinctively impels to worship. It develops itself in all nations and tribes of men alike, even the most ignorant and barbarous. Through ignorance and false teaching it often pays its devotions to unworthy objects. But there is the inherent principle; there is the child feeling after its parent.

More forcibly and indubitably is this argument evolved from the sublime announcement of *blessing* upon man, just heard from the word of Jehovah. "AND GOD BLESSED THEM."

But the querist will urge in default of this argument, that a blessing was also pronounced upon the other grades of creatures, — and hence that it does not evolve an argument for immortality for man, unless it does so likewise for the other creatures. Ah, the very fact which the querist now refers to, yields efficient strength to my argument! The word, "and God blessed them," is not a mere formal piece of etiquette, like that of the villain who, smiling, lips the "God bless you," while his heart festers with schemes of malice. It is a purpose wrought into the constitution of things and the correspondence of providence, embracing the whole compass of being. All creatures are formed with their respective capacities and wants, and the blessing of each grade consists in the opportunities for the development of its powers, and the provisions to meet its wants. And all the brute species find in the arrangements of this mundane sphere, opportunities for the full development of all their powers, and provisions for the full satisfaction of all their wants. They have various powers, but not a power that does not fulfil its whole mission, — and various wants, but not a want that does not find its full supply in this earthly life. In these earthly opportunities and earthly supplies, then, they are fully blessed, according to their kind.

Not so with man. He has capacities which in no case have full and adequate opportunities, and wants which never find competent supplies in the earthly life.

And here, let it be distinctly observed, we are on a class of capacities and wants which are not "partitive;" which have no relation to moral desert. We are not about to analyze a class of facts which appertain exclusively to a set of clever fellows, or to the sect of Destructionists, or of Calvinists, or of Universalists, or of Mohammedans, or of Hindoos. We shall find no introduction here to a pathway which shall lead us out into our opponent's ultimatum. The capacities and wants which we are about to study, are not acquired, but constitu-

tional; not traits of this or that character, opinion, or party, but of man as a species. They are inherent in all men, of all nations and tribes, even the most barbarous and degraded.

First, — Of the *capacities*. I have said that man has capacities of mind, which in no case have full and adequate opportunities in the earthly life. In his animal nature he attains to perfection here, to a fixed corporeality, the fulness of the stature of a man; but in his higher nature, never. The mental capacities and acquirements, in the most advanced cases, do but exhibit here a mere budding stage, a shooting forth, a power and aspiration for advancement in knowledge. The philosopher, Newton, that mind of comparative gigantic growth, after all his vast acquirements of wisdom and knowledge, said at last that he felt himself to be but a little child picking up pebbles on the shores of the great ocean of knowledge. So, then, that master mind, with all its attainments, was, in the intellectual sphere, but a mere blade, just beginning, as it were, to develop its capacities, tendencies, and aspirations, for the eternal exploration of the exhaustless mines of wisdom and knowledge.

Is there any thing like it in any or all other departments of creation, unless there is for man another and higher life, a future and wider sphere for mental development and growth in knowledge? There is no species of plants or animals below man, that never as a species attains to a state of maturity. All species of plants that do not attain to maturity the first season, rise to life again, and fulfil the purpose bespoken by their constitutions, beyond the death of winter. And if God does not falsify his own rule of correspondence in his works, in the crowning order of his creation,—if he does not make the constitution of man in his higher nature to utter and reiterate a perpetual lie,—there is for man another and higher sphere of being and blessing.

Second, — Of the *wants* of man. This is another fact in the constitution of the higher nature of man, which argues that there belongs to him, as a part of the original plan of his being, another, a higher, and immortal life. All other creatures,

as we have seen, have provisions of earthly yield, which are adapted to the full satisfaction of all their wants; and herein are they fully blessed according to their kind. But man, — not a sect or party of men, but man as a species, has irrepressible wants and aspirations which nothing earthly satisfies. With health of body, he may have at his command every means of physical gratification, and an estate which is a life security for temporal support, — and if this is all, he is unhappy. Standing amidst change and decay, without the light of Christian revelation and the living hope of life and immortality, his mind is an aching void, an empty bubble amidst tumbling, dashing billows.

Why is this? Why has God constituted his intelligent family thus — with bodies whose specific gravity holds them to earth, but spirits that feel here to be away from home, hungering for food which must come from a higher sphere? Is there not a fact in the provision of God for man, corresponding to this fact in the constitution of his higher nature? These constitutional wants, these spiritual aspirations for affinities, are not alone. They are not accidental and occasional aberrations of the human mind from its appropriate sphere of thought and interest. They are not factitious. They are natural, and universal. Man were not man without them, — he were a mere brute. And enlightened reason infers that there is a corresponding fact in the economy of God for man.

Something is not attracted to nothing. The philosophic student of nature is never essentially deceived by the indications which he discovers in the constitution of parts in the system of things. If he finds a detached tendril, he knows that it belonged, not to a tree which was competent to stand alone, but to a fragile vine which must needs be supported by sturdier objects unto which the tenacious tendril should cling. If an animal, of a species which he had never seen, is presented him for inspection, by a physiological and anatomical examination he can determine whether it was carnivorous, herbivorous, granivorous or omnivorous; and he will infer with assurance that the corresponding aliments are also realities in the system of things.

Is man, then, an anomaly in creation? Is he alone, who, from his superior rank and position as the crowning workmanship of God, for whom all other things were made, must have shared the Creator's special attention, — is he alone an instance of the want of wisdom and goodness in the Creator — of disorder and discrepancy between the works of creation and providence? He who assumes so strange a position, assumes it against reason, and seems to us to "charge God foolishly."

Mr. J. P. Blanchard, in a pamphlet on "The Future Life," published by Crosby, Nichols, & Company, in 1858, treating this same subject, says:—

"Impressed with the view of this universal hope, some Christian philosophers have held that divine intimations have been given of this future life through nature, and that the declarations of the gospel have merely confirmed these expectations by express assurance of their fulfilment."

This is not a correct statement of the mission of the gospel, in connection with this presumptive argument for immortality. It reveals, brings to light, declares, that for which there had been in nature only indications; and more than this, it gives adoring and soul-inspiring conceptions of the personality, perfection, blessedness, and glory of the future life.

But Mr. Blanchard proceeds to an effort to invalidate this argument for human immortality from the "universal hope" to which he refers. He says:—

"The universal belief of a future existence above mentioned is referred to as a proof of that existence, as it is said that nothing but a divine inspiration could have produced such a general concordance of sentiment; and that this inspiration would not have been given for a falsehood. But this general belief only evinces the general desire for continued existence intensified to a hope, and gives no warrant for any inspiration other than natural desire of life, in which brutes participate, and no promise of its fulfilment."

Here the argument from the universal want and hope, is not truly represented. We do not assume that the impressions

which are general with the human species, in respect to a future life, come by "divine inspiration," in the common acceptation of the words. They are instinctive impressions of the spirit (which has immortality in its elements), and inductive sentiments from the constitutional want of the human mind. To resolve all this into the mere love of life, which is common also to the brutes (Mr. Blanchard says, the "*desire* of life;" but that the brute has a *desire* of life for any purpose in the future, remains to be shown)—to resolve, I say, all this which we have seen to characterize universal man, developing an affinity higher than mere dust, into the mere animal love of life, seems to us to indicate a neglect of the proper study of man. Or it may be an act of disagreeable necessity to ignore philosophy, confront the testimony of man's creation in the image of God, and sink man to the brute,—for the sake of a wedded theory.

So far, then, as it respects man as man, in his whole being as now constituted, Mr. Blanchard, with his Destructionist school, is precisely with the atheist. He recognizes nothing in man which allies him to a higher life, nothing which is an indication of a higher destiny. But the *gospel*, he thinks, reveals the purpose of God to give "a future life of some sort" (and on some sort of conditions), "to some of mankind." Well, then, it is an extraneous and arbitrary bestowment, forced upon a species of beings who have no constitutional fitness for it, no natural want of it, no aspirations towards it, nothing that could suggest to the keenest philosophic eye that the Author of their being might have made them heirs to such an inheritance, or have contemplated the bestowment of it.

Neither, upon this hypothesis, would the *gospel* revealing the immortal life, be to man what the Scriptures throughout describe it to be. They represent it to be bread and water to the soul. Nothing can serve as refreshment to the physical system, but what is of kindred nature with it. A cup of dry sand would afford no nourishment to the hungry, because the system has no affinity for it, and there is no assimilating relation between it and the stomach. That which shall serve as bread to man must be adapted to his constitutional wants, and

congenial to his nature. In perfect accordance with this philosophy of the fitness of things, the gospel revelation of immortal life and good for man is bread and water and wine and milk to man's higher nature, because that nature has an affinity for it and a constitutional want of it. Man would not have received the gospel revelation with a rapturous joy, if he had not needed it, and perhaps been anxiously looking for it, to satisfy an eminent want of the soul. What beauty there is in the harmony and fitness of truth in all its departments! We know that this earthly body must fail, and crumble back to dust. This we do not lament. But the noble mind, made after the image of the Eternal, cannot in its own conceptions lie down and stay pent there, in that little habitation of six feet in length. It will break forth, and soar, and stride among the stars, and claim kindred with immortals, and crave immortal food. And this superior bread, this hope immortal, the mind must participate, or it cannot enter into that enlarged sphere of pure and rational enjoyment it is capable of and aspires to.

But my learned friend, Prof. Hudson, starts back and recoils from the low depth to which his Brother Blanchard and others go, who ignore all in the constitution of man higher than the animal nature, which should be taken to indicate another life and a higher destiny. In his Chap. iii. § 2, on the creation of man in the image of God, he says:—

“I think this can prove no more than the creation of man *for* immortality, of which, nevertheless, he might fail. I think the expression in the book of Wisdom, ii. 23, denotes just this: “God made man for immortality (*ep' aphtharsia*), and to the image of his nature made he him.”

Again, chap. iv. § 1, he says:—

“Because man was made *for* immortality, there had ever been; both among Jews and Gentiles, many thoughts about it. There could have been no welcome of the coming light, if there had been no thoughts—even anxious thoughts—on the subject.”

This is substantially the same sentiment which I have just expressed on the subject. But could my opponent have meant all which his language imports? If so, he saps the foundation

of the Destructionist theory, and repudiates the position in respect to the constitution of man, which he was affecting to sustain. He takes away the groundwork of his Brothers Grant and Blanchard, from beneath their feet. For if man was made for immortality, in such a sense as to generate, among all nations, Jews and Gentiles, instinctive impressions, and dreams, and "thoughts about it,"—and to set them at raising hypotheses and framing theories about it,—then man is immortal, in the good and rational and proper sense in which we assert for him this dignity and blessing. He has in him the principle, the germ, the element of immortality. If there were no such element in him, there were nothing in him to inspire aspirations and "thoughts" for immortality. If immortality were altogether an extraneous thing, for which he has no affinity and relation in his present being, the fact of that arbitrary decree of God when it is not directly revealed, would not inspire in man any thoughts and aspirations about it.

Furthermore, the essential end or purpose of God, for which he has created any class of existences, is projected and secured in the very constitution of their being, and even in their embryo. There are appropriate means appointed, to be adapted from stage to stage in the work of development; but, in Prof. Hudson's figure of *prolepsis*, the purpose of the whole being is perfect in the embryo.

As I look out of my window while resting my pen for a moment, viewing some thrifty vines of my wife's planting, and admiring the tenacity with which their tendrils clasp the twigs of trees and shrubs, and thus support the vines, she philosophically remarks, "And these tendrils were all in the seed." Yes, I rejoin, and you have unwittingly given me a beautiful illustration of the subject in hand. It is indeed so. The seed was made for a squash vine and fruit; and the vine and the tendrils and the fruit all existed in embryo in the seed. There was not a waiting till the vine had run to where there was danger of a fall, then to put on a tendril for the emergency. The structure and wants of the vine were all provided for beforehand, and comprised in the principles created in the seed.

There is a species of worms, which, at a certain season of the year, run about as if away from home, and at length wind themselves up in a mysterious ball, and seem to be dead. But shortly they come out in a beautiful butterfly state. Now this butterfly life belonged to the constitution of the worm. No creeping thing not made *for* a butterfly life, is ever made a butterfly. The creatures made *for* butterflies, had that design inwrought with their constitutions.

Mr. Blanchard, in the work before referred to, takes notice of the transition of the worm to a butterfly, but thinks it argues nothing in favor of the resurrection of man, because the worm is not a vertebral creature, and none of the vertebrata pass through such a transition. But we do not refer to this case for *proof* of a resurrection. It is only for illustration of the point in question—the constitutional adaptation of all things to the end *for* which they are made. And then, in respect to the resurrection as a matter of fact, this is a beautiful illustration of the interesting possibility. But it is understood by all, that an illustration is not the thing illustrated. It is an analogy of some important point to which it is applied.

Let it be further noted here, that the death of the caterpillar, as it passes into the chrysalis state, answering to the *hades* of man, is not annihilation. There is death to the old animal form; its carcass is left behind; but here, as in the case of the *germ* employed for illustration by St. Paul, there is a germ that never dies. In the human kind, this immortal germ is the *proper soul*, and will bear into the future life his personal identity. This will be rendered more clear in the Bible argument. I mention it now as an introduction to some philosophical observations on a point which has troubled many minds. Men have not conceived of spirit as substance, or of a spiritual element in the universe of God which is a positive entity, as much, and more so, than any of the grosser elements. Hence they have conceived of nothing in the form of personal existence between the gross visible body composed of earth, and an airy, shadowy phantom. Accordingly, the Hebrews, because the instinct of their immortal natures could not submit that

there should be an utter extinction of being, conceived of *hades*, the state of the dead, as a kind of shadowy, dreamy state, unsuited to any work or purpose. And when they contemplated a resurrection into a personal, tangible, capable, and active state of being, they conceived of the rising again of the earthly bodies. It is in this view of a resurrection that the fables of the heathen Elysium and Tartarus,—and of the Mohammedan, and the partially *Christianized* heathen heaven and hell,—have abounded in gross instrumentalities of physical tortures, and of sensual indulgences. In this gross conception, the aborigines of our country were in the habit of burying supplies of provisions with the bodies of their dead.

But science has discovered that the most substantial and abiding realities are the invisible elements and forces. The visible forms of matter are changing and unsubstantial, and dependent on invisible forces. But the invisible are real and abiding. Even to material existences the language of the apostle will apply with truth: “the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal.”

And now the reflection of true wisdom is this,—that since God, at whose perfect control are all the elements and forces of nature, was able to organize out of the gross earthly elements such a sublimely beautiful and appropriate body for the corporate being of his super-earthly child, man, in this rudimental state, how easy it is to conceive of the sufficiency of such omnific power, when the earthly tabernacle fails us, to form unto us heavenly bodies, of the superior elements. This reflection is only designed as a recognition of the practicability of that glorious work, of the purpose to perform which God has given us intimations in the constitution of our present being.

An interesting beauty in the philosophy of the facts and indications in the constitution of man, is, that while it gives us something to be raised, and clothed upon with a spiritual body, it supersedes not the doctrine of a proper resurrection. It is free from the difficulties and absurdities of the two extremes—Destructionism and Orthodoxy. The former, by making man all animal and wholly resolved at death into the earthly ele-

ments, leaves no essential element of the man to be raised with conscious identity. The latter makes the soul of man to be a perfectly organized person inside the body, with no dependence on the bodily organization for its functional developments, assuming that this person goes out at death into the spirit world a perfect being, an angel of heaven or of hell, — yet not allowing this to be a resurrection. Then there is no demand for a resurrection of the man. The gathering up of the old ashes of the dissolved earthly body, and attaching them, as a covering, to these perfectly organized angelic beings, “the spirits of just men made perfect,” would not be a resurrection of the man. It would be more reasonable to reckon it an encumbrance. And then we have seen that it is not possible that the same dust which composed the body of each at death should be appropriated again to each in another life. And what should those angelic beings want of duplicate bodies of earth and dust?

But in the light of the philosophy of facts and inferences which have come in the course of this study of man, the passing of the spiritual nature, the proper man, from the wreck of the mortal tenement into the higher organization, is the resurrection. And the resurrection work is necessary to the re-organized and perfected personal being of the man. It may be that, as there are laws in the constitution of things, by which the substance of life in the larva, through the aurelia, comes out in the new and more beautiful body of the butterfly state; so there are laws in the constitution of our higher natures, by which the spiritual, intellectual, and moral man, on the dissolution of the rudimental frame, forms to itself out of the superior elements, by nutrimental assimilation, the new and heavenly body. But it is an event of such stupendous interest, surpassing that of creation itself, the transition *for* which man was made, and which occupies so special and eminent a position in the counsel and care of God, that our faith is instructed to rest it in his fatherly love and regenerating power. So Jesus teaches us, to rest the assurance of it in “the Scriptures and the power of God.” And on his own exit from the mortal constitution,

he exclaimed in childlike trust, "Father, into thy hands I commend my spirit." And the apostle says, "And God hath both raised up the Lord, and will also raise up us by his power."

In leaving this philosophical branch of the subject, I will note three things which I would have the reader treasure up in his memory.

(1.) Our philosophical argument for immortality, is subject to no embarrassment from the question with which Elder Grant, all through the oral discussion before referred to, hectoring Dr. Litch, — to wit: "which part is the man, the body, soul, or spirit?" To be sure, when we speak discriminatively, emphasizing what distinguishes man from the brute, we say that the higher nature, comprising the spiritual, intellectual, and moral qualities, constitutes the man. Or, in the common phraseology, "the mind makes the man." But familiarly and historically speaking, it requires all, *soma*, *psuche*, and *pneuma*, — body, soul, and spirit, — to constitute the person denominated man. And so in the future life and forever, man will comprise body, life, and mind; but the body will not be that which now is, but spiritual, heavenly, incorruptible, and glorious.

(2.) Our philosophy meets with no trouble from the position urged by the controversialist above cited upon his perplexed opponent; viz., That if the body is essential to the present personality of man, as represented by the Scriptures which testify that man was formed of the dust of the ground, then when the man dies, which in the primitive account is described as his returning to the ground out of which he was taken, his entire being is literally destroyed, and he is as if he had never been. In the light of our philosophy, such assaults upon our faith are "As the idle winds which we respect not." Knowing, just as well as that we have a physical nature, that we have also a nature above the animal, and kindred to heaven, we infer with unmistakable assurance that the whole work of creation is not described by the saying that *God formed man of the dust of the ground*, but that the testimony that *God breathed* into his nostrils the *pneuma*, the *spirit of life*, and made him a living

creature, means something more than that God caused the wind to inflate the lungs of a lifeless body. Here is something which did not appertain to the brute creatures. It is not that God made the wind blow into man; but that God *breathed* into man the spirit of life—his own spirit. And if God is not wind, here is a divine afflatus, which constitutes a finishing part of the creation of man in God's image, making him in an eminent sense his child, in the image of his eternity.

But the sacred record (thank God) is not a metaphysical disquisition, couched in terms of mathematical precision. It teaches by the use of free and familiar expressions, and its historical recitals are adapted to beings in this earthly sphere, addressed to our senses, delineating visible phenomena. And this is as it should be. It is the same mode of expression by which we familiarly, and, in the practical and intended sense, *truly*, speak of the rising and setting of the sun. This expression, applied to the sun, the captious critic may pronounce a lie; and Deacon Homespun may quote it from astronomical authority to disprove the Copernican system. Nevertheless the Copernican system is true; and the popular language which we have instanced is also true, in the sense in which we employ it, and in which we must employ it as the only intelligible description of a fact in every day's observation.

So with regard to the sense of the term *death*, as it is applied to man. It signifies the dissolution of the corporeal system, — the end of life to the visible person whom we know as man. This is what the Scriptures mean by it, and what every-body means by it, — no more, no less. The word involves no reference to any metaphysical or theological question in respect to a spiritual nature of man, and the subsequent destiny of man in that higher nature. When St. Paul says of the grain sown, that it "is not quickened except it die," he does not mean by the death of the grain the utter perishing of the entire kernel. If the entire kernel perished, it could not be quickened. He means by the dying of the grain the perishing of its body, that the germ may rise into newness of life, and

bring forth other grain. Babes can understand these things. The "wise and prudent" only are puzzled by them.

(8.) The entire philosophical argument for human immortality, is deducible from a study of the constitution of man, and not of his acquired opinions and character. If the boy plays truant to-day, we do not find from any chemical or metaphysical analysis that he has thus lost from within him the germ of immortality. Then, if he is obedient to-morrow, we do not discover a new constitution of his personal being created by his merit, so that now he is immortal. His changes of religious opinion or of moral character affect the enjoyment of his life; but these changes do not change, add, nor subtract, any constitutional function or constituent organ or substance of his personal being. We find no authority from our study of man to say to the weeping mother, who bathes with her tears the temples of her deceased babe, that even if she should work out an immortal life for herself, she will never again greet the darling whom she loved better than she loved herself, because he had formed no moral character which should create within him the life immortal? With profound respect for our learned opponent, we are constrained to say of the theory into which circumstances have forced him,—the theory which makes immortality to be off and on, from day to day, according to the fluctuations from right to wrong, and from wrong to right, of his belief and his moral principles,—that it is as baseless as the fabric of a vision. All the facts and indications which the scrutinizing eye discovers in man as an heir of immortality, are developed in man as a species, throughout all nations and religions and characters.

And now we will advance to the Scriptural argument.

SECTION II. *The Scriptural Argument.*

(1.) *The NECESSITY of a Supernatural Revelation.*

We have presented, in the preceding section, what we regard as a strong natural or philosophical argument for human immortality. Some rationalistic philosophers, seeing how

strong is the presumption for immortality from this species of argument, have pronounced it of itself sufficient ; and from the assumed sufficiency of this argment they have inferred that no other or special revelation was needed ; and that, none being needed, none has been given. Hence they conclude that the gospel teachings are the mere deductions of human reason.

But these philosophers have failed to give credit to the source whence they obtained the eyesight to read the teachings of nature so clearly. Their minds being full of Christian light derived from a Christian education, they can see to what the constitutional capacities and wants and aspirations of the human mind are all pointing, and these appear to them like demonstrations. But to minds that never had the teachings of a higher revelation, these capacities and wants did not comprise all the needed knowledge and assurance. We have found in the human soul the constitutional *want* of this knowledge ; but it is false philosophy to assume that the *want* is itself the knowledge. If human need were itself the thing needed, mankind could never know the suffering of want. Our wants constitute a hope that it may be found practicable to obtain the thing needed, and stimulate us to action in pursuit of it. Our hunger and appetite do not constitute nor create the food they crave, though they constitute a presumptive argument that the corresponding provision is somewhere a reality. So much we have inferred from the soul's instinctive want of a knowledge of God, and of his gracious will and purpose in relation to our destiny.

But who can show us this knowledge ? I repeat, the needed knowledge is not in the want. Where the light of the Christian revelation has not shed its beams, this want of the soul is even unable to shape and define its objects. By the revelation of the Bible, in relation to the being, the unity, and the adorable perfections of God,—and the harmony of all the apparently conflicting dispensations of his government with those perfections,—and the resurrection of the dead into a personal immortal existence, together with the perfection and glory of that existence ;—these things, I say, are, by the Christian revelation,

brought out in a form which it had never entered into the heart of man to conceive. Yet, when revealed, they are seen to completely fill and satisfy the soul's wants, and the revelation is the bread of God from heaven.

So, then, while the inward want of the soul is an important testimony in its place, shining more clearly as it comes to reflect the light of higher testimony, yet it will be borne in mind that this want, without the light of revelation, is unable even to give tangible shape to the objects of its need; — much less does it constitute all the needed *revelation* of the knowledge of those objects as facts. It merely constitutes that travail of soul for unknown and unexplored future good, and for the knowledge of the origin and government of the universe, to which reference is made by St. Paul as follows: "For we know that the whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now." (Rom. viii. 22.)

The same idea is expressed by the apostle in the preceding context, thus: "The earnest expectation of the creature waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God." The phrase *earnest expectation* is the rendering of a Greek term which denotes *an earnest and solicitous looking for, as with the neck stretched out and the head thrust forward*. "The manifestation of the sons of God" is the revealment from God of the truths for which there is such earnest desire, through his inspired servants, called by way of eminence his sons. This gospel revelation it is, and this alone, which brings out, in a clear light and tangible shape, the realities which fill with their fulness the inmost wants, and bountifully supply the soul-travail of the human creation.

We may gain valuable information on the question before us — the need of a revelation, by a glance at the workings of the gentile mind, in its religious aspirations. Here were as great philosophical heads as any of those who now boast of their power to read all truth without a revelation. But their only text-books were the inward wants and external phenomena of nature, without the shining down of the higher light to make legible the handwriting of Nature's witnesses.

Accompany the march of mind with the founders of Brah-

maximism. They first conceived of the Deity as abstract reason, or a pure intelligence. This was their *Brahm*. But they soon saw themselves in the midst of facts and phenomenal mysteries which this characteristic of a Deity alone could not solve. There must be a planning, active, producing cause, and thus their *Brahm* becomes *Brahma*; the operative wisdom which flows from the source of wisdom. But even then they could not elevate their conceptions to a God above nature, and the Author and Governor of it. They sunk into Pantheism, making nature itself to be God. Yet there was need of a conception of some Divine personality, some Deity in a mode of being capable of voluntary thought, love, and expression. And this want of a Deity impersonated, led to the deification of a Brahminical order, and of idols.

The evils resulting from this state of things caused a counter rush back into the broad fields of nature, for study and relief. Here, sick of the effort to find God in feeble man and graven images, they look for him in the arena before them. They see order, beauty; supply, protection,—and in these things they recognize a *preserver*,—and this is *Vishnu*. *Vishnu*, the *Preserver*, is the God of the new sect; and this sect prevails.

But they have not yet attained to the object of their souls' travail. They are in darkness and tribulation. This Vishnu worship could not satisfy the devotees to the new God, when they were tormented with a sense of evils within and about them. Their sad experience and startled observation bore impressive testimony of brutish passion, fiendish device, hydra-headed disease, blight, mildew, famine, pestilence, storms, earthquakes, devouring fires, overwhelming floods, and death in countless forms. Whose work is this? Ah, this is not the *Preserver*! It is *Siva*. The evil God was thought to share the kingdom; and he too must be worshipped, at least, to be appeased. Hence human sacrifices were instituted, and incredible cruelties were inaugurated, as the fit and appropriate devotions to the fiendish and insatiable *Siva*.

And thus went on the labyrinthian course of the human mind with nature's light alone. Deities were multiplied as

new phases in nature's developments were noted ; and images and temples were erected for the abodes of the different divinities. And the very services of devotion appropriated to some of their divinities were practical defilement and corruption.

But it is not necessary that I enlarge on these historical surveys. The whole history of the Hindoo system and Hindoo life, demonstrates that there is that in man which *demand*s a revelation, — and that there is *not* that in man which *makes* the revelation. We see the earnest expectation, the solicitous looking-for, the travail together in pain, — but not the light which achieves the victory of faith.

Go with St. Paul, and visit Athens, the emporium of literature and philosophy in polished Greece. There are the learned scholars of Solon, Socrates, Xenophon, Plato, Zeno, Aristotle, Antisthenes, and Diogenes, embodying the wisdom of all those master minds, and superadding their own improvements. And what do they know of the unity and perfection and purpose and government of the self-existent and unchangeably wise and loving Creator and Governor of the universe? No more than the devotees to Brahm, Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. The great apostle charges them with being over-much religious, but blindly so, — paying their devotions to countless “works of art and man’s device.”

There, then, in that classic city, the school of philosophy in which culminated the human wisdom of the ages, they were practically “without God and without hope in the world.” They were not without those wants and earnest longings which the apostle expresses by the word hope, when he says, “the creation was made subject to vanity — in hope ;” — but they were without a clear conception and enlightened assurance of a distinct, personal, glorious existence beyond the grave. They had, to be sure, their fables of Elysium and Tartarus. But the philosophers understood them to be poetic romance, inspired by the common want of humanity, and shaped by fancy after the model of earthly tyrannies. Coming to sober sentiment, their happiest theory was that of a series of transmigrations,

and ultimate absorption in the fountain of being, to the loss of personality.

This train of fact and inference which I have presented in proof of the need of a revelation, is not controversial in relation to my friend, Prof. Hudson. In his chap. iii. § 1, proposing to show that "*there was deplorable need of light on the subject of immortality when Christ came,*" he presents substantially the same view of the general condition of the Gentile mind, which I have just exhibited. It is not alone to controvert positions assumed by Mr. H., that I write in this discussion. There are many views of his which I have no disposition to controvert. But I labor to produce a completeness in the present work, that it may aid the Christian student to a systematic view and clear understanding of the great and fundamental principles of Christian doctrine to which my friend has called attention.

The reader will perceive that it is the object of my labor thus far, in this division of the current section of this chapter, to set in its true position the philosophical argument of the preceding section, in relation to the constitution of man as being made *for* immortality, and to the gospel revelation of the destiny for which he is designed. I have thus far endeavored to present and elucidate the beautiful symmetry in the Christian theory of hope, not ignoring the philosophical argument, nor making that to supersede the Scriptural. They are two parts of one magnificent whole, neither of which is complete without the other. For it has been sufficiently shown that the philosophical argument is not complete without the gospel revelation; and we have also shown, and our learned friend had conceded, that the Christian revelation of our immortal inheritance could hardly have been to us a gospel, if it had not its counterpart in the constitution of man's higher nature.

The circumstance that mankind, without the gospel revelation, did not clearly understand the force of the testimony of the facts in their higher nature, is no discredit to the force of that testimony. We who stand in the light of the gospel, in which all other testimonies culminate, can see and appreciate

the force of those other testimonies, as they could not who were shut up to those others alone.

It is the case with man, in all branches of study, that when he is a novice in the rudiments of any system or science, he understands not even those rudiments themselves, as he does when he has advanced to the higher stages, and sees those rudiments in their relation to the whole. It is not unfrequently the case that a rudimental lesson in an isolated position, is entirely misunderstood as to its indications and bearings, until a more advanced lesson sets all right. But then the rudimental lesson is not lost; for it intensifies the light and enhances the enjoyment of the truth, when the whole schema, in the beauty of its harmony, comes to be understood.

The Hebrews of the prophetic ages, including the prophets themselves, expected the Messiah, of whom they had the promise, in the character of an earthly prince, who should achieve universal empire. There was this misunderstanding, I say, even with the prophets themselves. If they had prophesied out of their own understanding and mental forecast, they must be supposed to have understood the meaning of their predictions. But as their prophesying came by inspiration of God's spirit in visions, they recorded what was imaged to them, and then must exercise their own judgment, as other men, in regard to the meaning of the prophecies. It is not supposable that they understood the meaning, the beautiful and glorious significance, of the prophecies given of God's spirit through them, in respect to the nature of the Messiah's kingdom, and the vastness of its achievements. Even the apostles of Christ did not understand these prophecies, until Christ had been put to death, and raised from the dead. But the incapacity of the prophets of old, and their people, — and of the disciples of Jesus while he was in the flesh, to fully understand the import of the Heaven-inspired prophecies, does not impeach the truth of those prophetic teachings, nor diminish their value. He who stands in the higher light of the Christian revelation, can see clearly what was the mind of the spirit which inspired these

evangelical prophets. And we hold them in infinite value as the substrata of the gospel revelation. The circumstance, indeed, that they were not fully understood in the age of their delivery, enhances their value as divine testimonies, as it demonstrates that they were not the offspring of the Hebrew mind. We verify in this fact the words of Peter, "For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit."

These observations, the like of which might be indefinitely extended, of the truth and value of rudimental principles and teachings in their relation to the great whole, though not well understood in their early stages, we present here to vindicate the soundness of our theory of Christian evidence, which makes so great account of the philosophical argument, while at the same time it insists that, through the insufficiency of this argument alone, there was need of a clearer, higher, interpretative divine revelation.

(2.) *The Times and Seasons of the Gospel Revelations.*

It is a trite question, If immortality is a truth for man, either in the nature and constitution of things, or in the unfailling counsel of Jehovah, or both, why was it not from the first, and with distinctness, revealed? My opponent presents queries of the same purport, though not with the same distinctive reference as to time. He was treating the subject of immortality in a technical sense, in which he assumes that it is not revealed in any part of the Bible. Our readers have seen, and they will more clearly see, that we take issue with him on this point, in the proper sense of immortality. But it is conceded that man's heirship of immortality was not distinctly and definitively revealed in the patriarchal and prophetic ages. The doctrine of immortality is in the Old Testament, but not definitively stated, so but that it is truly said that Jesus "brought life and immortality to light through the gospel." And to the economy of God in these earlier ages, I will consider the application of the argumentative queries of my opponent as he urges them upon the subject in general. Speaking of human immortality

and the existence of God, he says, "Now I assert that we might expect these two truths to receive similar treatment in the Bible. For the questions of God's existence and man's immortality are of precisely the same importance to man himself." And again, — "Whether God exists at all and whether man lives forever, are questions of equal moment to man. Hence I say, that in the revelation of God's character and man's destiny, these two doctrines, if equally true, should be treated alike: we should expect to find them on the same footing." Chap. iii. § 1.

Now as it respects these two truths as subjects of revelation to man, especially in the infancy of the race, they bear no comparison. The knowledge of God's existence as the Creator and moral Governor, is more essentially adapted to the present condition of men as accountable subjects of his government. But with regard to the immortal destiny of mankind, their present knowledge or ignorance does not affect that destiny. God saw it to be an interest of too infinite importance to be suspended at hazard upon the feeble, fallible agency of an infantile stage of being. Its tenure is "not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." In this light of the subject, it is seen that the communication of this knowledge to men by revelation, assimilates, in the divine economy, with the development of other knowledge the immediate possession of which is not indispensable to their being and advancement. The general doctrines of the Copernican theory of the solar system, were true in the times of Adam and Moses. And if the facts themselves, the very existence and order of the solar system, had depended on human knowledge and faith, it would have been recklessly cruel in the Creator to withhold from men for a day the perfect revelation of them. But God has secured the being and the order of the physical universe in laws which rest not upon human thoughts and volitions, and accordingly, without unwise or cruel neglect of his children's well-being, he might, as he did, place them in circumstances

gradually to acquire knowledge of the fact of the universe in which they live. This knowledge they find to be useful when they obtain it. It gives them more exalted and adoring conceptions of the wisdom and power of God, and in many cases gives them ability to multiply the comforts and conveniences of life. Yet no one impeaches the wisdom and goodness of God for his economy of progressive development, when the great essential facts are fixed in eternal, infallible principles, and the progress is in man's acquirements in the knowledge and enjoyment of them.

Just so, upon our theory of faith, (and we submit, by the evidences of it which are given, and are to be given, whether it is not as true as Heaven,) just so with the economy of God in his system of supernatural revelation. The crowning subject of this revelation, immortal life and good as the hereafter inheritance of man, just as it must have been upon the principles of honor and right in God, is provided by the divine arrangement, and secured by the economy of the divine government, just as independently of men's present knowledge and belief, as the existence and order of the physical universe. Consequently God subjects his feeble children to no unreasonable and cruel loss or hazard, by his system of progressive revelation in religious truth, any more than by the progressive development of discovery in other knowledge. We may query in reference to a thousand things, if this or that discovery is promotive of human good, why did not God, if he is the Friend of man, communicate it to all men at once and from the beginning? But if we find that God has hung no unreasonable hazard upon temporary ignorance, we are perfectly satisfied to trust his wisdom in respect to times and seasons, and progressive order.

But when we bring into this relation, and to this trial, the theory of my opponent, as well as that of the endless-miserian school, we stand appalled at the aspect in which it presents the character of the great Father, and the eternal interests of his children. It represents that the Creator made men "*for immortality*," for a future sphere of endless and glorified ex-

istence in enlarged and enlarging capacities, and increasing enjoyment, never liable to failure or decay ; — and then, that this infinite good, the ultimate realization of which was the great purpose of God in their creation, he has suspended at hazard, to be secured or forever forfeited by their opinion and conduct in this infantile and rudimental stage of being. And, then, *mirabile dictu!* he did not inform his children of this tremendous hazard, these infinite results, hanging upon every motion of thought and deed in the present moment !

It is now seen that Universalism is the only theory which stands free from all difficulty with the question often urged upon us, — if such and such things in regard to the final destiny of our race are true, why were they not more clearly and definitively revealed to man from the beginning? We show that the withholding of this explicit revelation for a time, involves no want of wisdom and goodness in the great Father, because he has not conditioned this purpose of immortal good to rest for its fulfilment on present opinion and character. Placing that great inheritance in a condition of security, “according to his own good pleasure which he hath purposed in himself,” he deals with his children in their infantile state, by such disciplines and progressive developments of knowledge as his infinite wisdom seeth best. And to this economy, every enlightened, believing soul, in supreme love to God, and love to neighbor as self, responds in spirit and truth, *Amen!*

But the doctrine of future, endless reward and punishment, whether in the form of Endless Miserianism or Destructionism, receives its eternal quietus from the very fact and argument now in hand. In all true government the legal promises and penalties compose a part of the law, and are published with it. “The law was given by Moses ;” but it is conceded by the well-informed and candid of all sects, that the doctrine of endless reward and punishment was *not* given by Moses. Then the law has no such promise and penalty.

In this life, God has provided for the physical wants of the child, until its responsible age, in the love of the parent. And for our stimulus and guidance thenceforward, he has

gives us clear and unmistakable knowledge of the means whence must come our physical support, and information in general of the relation between our usual course of conduct and our condition in life. And if he had made the immortal life an object to be procured or forfeited by our present doings, his wisdom and love are a pledge that he would have shown this tremendous fact to every man, woman, and child, of every age. To be sure the very fact of the Creator's suspending, in the first place, such infinite and foreign consequences upon the infantile agency of so fragile children, would represent him either fiendish, or at best indifferent as the crocodile for her young. But the theory which represents that God has suspended such infinite consequences upon the present acts of his children, and then from all the early ages withheld, and from a majority of the race now withholds, the revelation of the astounding fact, is a theory for which our heart can never make room while it is filled with the love of God.

If my opponent says that immortal life revealed in the gospel, as contrasted, not with endless suffering, but annihilation or endless unconsciousness, is not of consequence enough to render God's withholding from so many generations of men the knowledge by which they might have gained it, an act of essential unkindness, — we answer, then it is not of sufficient consequence to render it important to discuss the subject, or to preach about it. But it occupies no such indifferent position in the Christian revelation, nor in the songs of saints. The fact of human immortality changes the whole aspect of human existence, and stands out in the attestation of the infinite goodness of the Creator in his consideration of his creature man. This quality of the gospel, in infinite contrast with my opponent's effort to harmonize the spirit of his theory with the sentiments of humanity and the honor of God, will stand out in bold relief in the progress of this discussion.

(3.) We shall enter with enlarged and illuminated capacities for understanding the direct testimony of the Scriptures on the resurrection of immortal life, by approaching it through the

baptism of the general purpose, tone, and spirit of HIS mission, who is "the resurrection and the life."

I introduce this phase of the Bible argument, with the first breathing of the spirit of prophecy in relation to God's Messiah, and our Emmanuel. "And I will put enmity between thee and the woman, and between thy seed and her seed: it shall bruise thy head, and thou shalt bruise his heel." (Gen. iii. 15.) This is a divine testimony of the purpose of grace devised by the Infinite, to be executed through the instrumentality of one who should be born of woman. And what is the purpose? Moral evil had just entered the world, and subjected to its power God's new-made children. The serpent is presented in the picture as emblemizing this evil. Through the promised one his head shall be crushed, which denotes his utter destruction. There is no guess-work here,—no conditional proposition to men, that they may, more or less of them, if they should prove themselves sufficiently expert and mighty, free themselves from the toils of the serpent's folds, leaving the less expert to be entombed in his maw forever. The serpent himself shall be destroyed, utterly annihilated. The rational creation shall be delivered from evil. All this is signified by this primitive gospel promise of Jehovah;—this or nothing. It admits of no other construction.

This applies more directly to moral than physical death, because moral death or evil is that which the serpent more especially typifies. But physical and moral evil are usually coupled in the Scriptures as belonging to the same world, so that the deliverance of the race from physical evil may be understood to be also involved in this divine word of promise and grace.

But it is the general spirit and purpose of the gospel covenant that we are now particularly engaged in studying. Its opening light exhibits it in its fulness. And it always shines forth in this same fulness, but in rising and increasing brightness. There is much in the Scriptures, from beginning to end, in relation to blessings and curses appertaining to different human characters for the time being. And it must have been

so. The purpose of the communications of God to men, is their instruction, discipline, and advancement, in knowledge, virtue, and happiness. Accordingly, the ministry of God's servants, in its familiar address to the people, must have dealt commonly and freely with the relations between cause and effect, character and condition. But at the bottom of all this they give supreme importance to faith; and the substratum of faith is the eternal truth of God. And, surely, there is an infinite difference between making faith the foundation of God's truth, after the manner of human theology, and making God's truth the foundation of faith, after the manner of the Scriptures.

And this is the manner of the Scriptures, everywhere and always. Whenever the subject of revelation is the purpose of the Saviour's mission in its wholeness, it is exhibited as universal and impartial in its spirit of love and design of good, and efficiently resting on the agency of God. The same sentiment which we have seen to be involved in the word of God in the garden of trial and failure to man, *The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head*, is very explicitly declared by the apostle of Jesus: "For this purpose the Son of God was manifested, that he might destroy the works of the Devil." (1 John iii. 8.)

It will be agreed on all hands that the works of the Devil are sin and all its concomitant evils. My opponent regards physical death as one of the works of sin. He may have his own theory in this case; but I hold him to the consequence. If physical death is the work of the Devil, then this passage proves, as I will show that other passages do prove, that it is the purpose of God, through Christ, to destroy physical death. And this can only be done through a universal immortal resurrection. By the gospel plan, every evil is to be destroyed by its opposite, not as a negation, but as a positive, living, operative principle.

My opponent attempts an escape from the force of this argument by an expedient which cannot be satisfactory to himself. It is not worthy of his capacious and discriminating mind.

Speaking of the comprehensive and significant testimony of St. Paul, 1 Cor. xv. 26, which he rightly transposes to read, "The last enemy, death, shall be destroyed," he says,—"This is good against the orthodox view of immortal death. But it proves nothing against the view I hold, either in reason or interpretation. There is no more death, when all who live are immortal."

This paragraph appears to us to be faulty, both in its turn against the "orthodox view," and in its affirmative argument. In respect to the "orthodox view," the bearing which Mr. H. gives the testimony of Paul against it is obtained merely by the change of the sense of a word. The death which the Orthodox assume to be immortal, is not the death which they understand Paul to mean as that which shall be destroyed. They understand Paul to speak here of literal death, which is obviously the correct view, for it is that from which the resurrection to another mode of existence delivers us. But they believe that there will be another death beyond that, a spiritual death; and so does Mr. Hudson. But they and he differ, in that *they* believe that this post-resurrection spiritual death, which they call the second death, will be perpetuated eternally, while he believes that it will result in another literal death, or extinction of personal being, which shall be final. Consequently, speaking of the death into which mankind will fall when they pass from this earthy life, the mere testimony that it shall be destroyed by the resurrection, does not settle the controversy between the Destructionist and the Orthodox, nor that between us and both of them. But there is another point made by the apostle, in the very testimony quoted by Mr. H., and which he passes unnoticed, though he makes the expression of it more clear by rejecting the interpolated words, *that* and *is*, from the 26th verse in the Common Version,—and a point which *destroys* both endless misery and endless destruction. The point to which I call attention is this,—that the death which shall be destroyed by the resurrection is the "*last enemy*." There is no subsequent death, or evil of any sort, to prey upon *man* or to hold him captive. Subsequent to the destruction

of death in the resurrection, there is "no admittance" to my opponent's favorite "second instalment of death," and destruction" to man, any more than to the Orthodox notion of an "immortal death." "The last enemy, death, shall be destroyed."

But it is the affirmative argument of my opponent that I would scrutinize more particularly in this place; to wit, that "there is no more death when all who live are immortal." This argument, or assumption, in connection with the hypothesis that there are and will be millions of the dead that shall never live, is founded on the idea that if the deceased are eternally unconscious, there is, to them, no more death. If, then, it should prove to be true, as the French infidels inscribed over the gateways of their cemeteries, that, with the whole human race, "Death is an eternal sleep," when all are dead "there will be no more death." If this is the manner in which the saying shall be fulfilled, "And the last enemy shall be destroyed, (which is) death," then this is not the work of an opposite principle of life in Christ Jesus, but it is a mere negation, the work of death itself. Death destroys itself. Then the moment one is dead, or is passed into the state of death, death is destroyed, because he is not conscious of being dead.

But this is not the Bible sense nor the common sense of such language as this of the apostle before us. What does my opponent mean by death? Does he mean by it the mere process of dying? If so, then he ignores the work of Christ in abolishing death in any case, since all must pass through the process of dying. Does he mean by death the state of being dead? Then when persons are dead they are in the state of death, and if they remain in that state forever, death is never destroyed.

If God had not given existence to the human race, there had been no such beings. Then, if there were, nevertheless, a race of immortal angelic beings, they could not say that mankind were all in a state of death, because there never were such a species of beings on the roll of existence, to be the subject of memory or of conversation. But, having been brought

into existence, they have a record upon the roll of primitive being, and a record in the Divine mind, and in the mind of the observant angel host, who have an affection for them as brothers. But they pass off from this stage of being into what we call death. If this is a temporary derangement of the personal functions of the spirit, which is the man proper, to be forthwith, or in a limited period of the resurrection work, re-organized, and perfected in glorious heavenly bodies, then, on their rising into this second and immortal state of being, the state of death is terminated, death is destroyed. But if death is the utter dissolution of the whole man, and that to the whole race, and there is to be no resurrection, — and the angels inquire of one another, “Where are our brothers of human kind, who had natures allied to our own, and from whom we had expected a large addition to our seraph band?” — the answer would be returned, in cadence of sadness, “They are all dead. Death is their final destiny.” Or, if here and there one has induced the Creator, by his faith and good works, to give him a resurrection to immortal life, and a loving brother, roving in the Elysian fields, asks of the glorified Saviour, or of a company of angels whom he meets, “where is my precious sister?” — the answer shall be, “She is dead — forever.” But the record of her being is in the heart, and until undying affection dies out it must remain there; and after a million of years he meets that glorified Jesus, whose blood shed for every man was once a divine seal of undying love for all, and he reiterates the inquiry, “O blessed Master! where is my precious sister? My warm remembrances of love cling to her; she formed so great a part of my own being that my spirit is an aching void without her. Where is my sister?” “Dead,” answers the Master; “she was a very good girl, but she did not afford me quite sufficient help to save her. I desired and intended it, but my mission was to a great extent a failure. Death will hold her forever.”

Ab, then, my dear Professor, death will never be destroyed! Surely, the eternal perpetuation of death will not constitute its destruction, — not, at any rate, in the gospel sense. The de-

struction of death is declared by the apostle as a positive work of the opposite principle of life, in resurrection power. The consummation of the destruction of death, which is the subject of the 26th verse of 1 Cor. xv., is, in verses 54, 55, thus signally proclaimed: "Then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory. O death! where is thy sting? O *hades*! (state of death), where is thy victory?" Thus definitively and decisively are we instructed that the fulfilment of the saying that death shall be destroyed, so that there shall be no more death, shall be effectuated, not by eternizing death, but by swallowing it up in the victory of life immortal, so that the state of death shall hold not a victim.

This truth will be seen to shine more clearly when we shall give our attention to the direct Scripture testimonies of the resurrection. But, desiring to make the argument as decisive as may be as I pass along, I have deemed it expedient to expose in this place the futility of my opponent's effort to ignore the force of the argument which I was educing from the purpose of God in Christ to destroy the works of the Devil. I have been in the habit, for myself, of applying these words of John to the destruction particularly of moral evil. But my quotation of the passage is pertinent, because I am about exhibiting the *general spirit and purpose* of the Saviour's mission. And then, having this strong passage in hand, it was also pertinent that I should show how effectually it explodes the Destructionists' theory, taking them upon that theory itself, with which it is a prominent assumption that literal death is the work of the Devil. In connection with this assumption the passage proves it to be God's purpose in Christ to destroy out of his universe the dominion of even this description of death, involving, of course, a universal resurrection into life immortal.

In respect to the question of priority between physical and moral evil, it is conceded that, the physical nature of man being frail and mortal as it is (of which frailty, as I showed in chapter i., sin was not the cause), moral evil often becomes the proximate cause of physical evil. That is, vicious conduct often produces physical suffering, and hastens physical death.

But the question which I introduce here is, Which, as it respects the relation of cause and effect, has the primary relation of cause? And to this question, it is the concurrent testimony of experience, observation, and Scripture, that physical frailty and evil are primary. We know that our own earliest propensities to wrong-doing, were from the wants, appetites, and passions of the earthly man. Our observation shows this to be the case with others. And the Scriptures are very explicit on this point. St. James says, "Every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust, and enticed. Then, when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin." (James i. 14, 15.) And St. Paul is diffused in his teaching on this subject. "This I say then, Walk in the spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh, and these are contrary the one to the other; so that ye cannot do the things that ye would. Now the works of the flesh are manifest, which are these, adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulation, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like." (Gal. v. 16-21.) Again; "But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members. O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" (Rom. v. 23-24.)

Hence it is seen that physical and moral evil are, in the Scriptures, very much merged together, as co-existent, — the physical, however, when the relation of cause and effect is recognized, having the priority given it as the cause. Nor can we conceive in reason, — any more than we can find in the Scriptures, — of moral evil, in a state of being purely spiritual, where there is no physical infirmity or evil.

I have led the reader into this course of observation, preparatory to an understanding of those passages of Scripture which seem to merge physical and moral evil and death into one estimate, as the work of the Devil, and which some have taken to be authority for making the mortality of man, or his subjection.

to physical death, the wages of sin. But when we consider, as I have shown before, that the sacred writers did not shape their form of expression to metaphysical and mathematical exactness, but spoke with freeness and comprehensiveness, — always, however, carrying the mind unmistakably to the intended result; and when we consider also, how familiarly they viewed physical and moral evil and death, as incidental to the same constitution of things, — it is easy to understand those passages which merge all descriptions of evil into one, and that one under the significant name *death*, when they would exhibit and exalt in one breath the whole magnificent work of His mission, who is **EMANUEL, GOD WITH US!**

An instance of this description is furnished us by the great apostle to the Gentiles, in a passage which comes in here appropriately, as a repetition of the voice of Heaven on the crushing of the serpent's head, to which we gave attention at the opening of this branch of the Bible argument. The instance to which I refer is this: "Forasmuch, then, as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same; that through death he might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the Devil; and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage." (Heb. ii. 14, 15.)

It is with the purpose of the Saviour's mission, as to its result, that my cause and my argument are chiefly concerned in the present instance; so that it is not essential that I determine here to which of the prevalent theories of the impersonation of evil, Paul made reference in the phrase, "him that had the power of death, that is, the Devil." If he employed the figure of personification in the Scriptural sense, sublimated in this case by the occasion and the surroundings, employing *diabolus* as a personification of the principles of all death and evil, physical and moral, the result comprised in his destruction will be the deliverance of the human race from all death and evil. If he referred to the Orthodox theory of the Devil — but he did not, because that is a later invention — but if we put in here the Orthodox theory by way of construc-

tion, the result will be the same. For as they represent that all death and evil lives, and moves, and has its being in their Devil, who is its origin and foster-father, his destruction will involve the same universal emancipation of man. Or, if we take the apostle as conducting his testimony in a manner to give it the more comprehensive significance and effective force to the people of his time, by referring to some Jewish or Gentile theory of the source and power of death and evil, the result comes out the same. Dr. Adam Clark thinks "this is spoken in conformity to an opinion prevalent among the Jews, that there was a certain fallen angel who was called *malak ha-aleth*, the angel of death; i.e., one who had the power of separating the soul from the body, when God decreed that the person should die." (Clarke's Com., *in loco*.) But all the schools of gentile philosophies had their respective theories of impersonating the cause and power of death and evil. But it matters not, as I have said, which of the theories St. Paul had it in mind to refer to. Whether it were to the Scriptural *Diabolus* and Satan, or the Zoroastrian *Abriman*, or the Hindoo *Siva*, or the heathenized Jewish *Malak Hevaeth*, — the affirmative doctrine of the apostle, in the passage before us, is the same; to wit, *The extermination from the universe of death and evil*.

The inspired teachers often placed the minds of the people in an attitude to comprehend the significance and feel the force of their doctrines in an enhanced degree, by accommodation in part to their own conceptions and modes of expression. There is a beautiful and striking instance of this method in Paul to the Philippians, ii. 9–11. "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name that is above every name; that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven and things on earth and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." The apostle here employs the Greek periphrasis for the universe, in his description of the universality of Christ's reign and salvation. And this periphrasis involves the then prevalent theory of astronomy,

taking the earth to be an extended plain; *heaven*, an abode far above it; and *hades*, or *infernium*, an abode as far beneath it. We know this theory to be false. But this fact does not in the least affect the perfect truthfulness and infinite force of the gospel testimony of the passage before us. The apostle employs language adapted to the understandings of the people, making patent to their perceptions his comprehensive grasp of the *universe* as the throne of God's Son. It is as if he had said: "I enter into no parley with you in respect to unessential matters. I do not vouch for the correctness of the present system of astronomy as held in the schools of science, nor of the mythical theories of the schools of philosophy in relation to deified spirits above the earth, and tenants of Tartarian prisons under the earth. But this I affirm, by the spirit of God, that wherever in the universe created intelligent beings may dwell, who are alienated from the life and love of God, whether above the earth, on the earth, or under it, there the saving power of Christ shall penetrate and permeate, filling all their souls with light and beauty, and winning them to loving reverence to Christ, *to the glory of God the Father.*"

It was Professor Stuart's lucid exposition of this passage, and the corresponding one in Revelation, (v. 13,) that brought the learned Walter Balfour into the faith of Universalism. In the great Trinitarian and Unitarian controversy of nearly half a century ago, Professor Stuart, a master champion on the Trinitarian side in that controversy, laid strong hold of this passage for proof of the proper Deity of Christ. He showed that the saying, *every creature in heaven, on the earth, and under the earth*, was a common periphrasis with the Greeks for the universe; and he argued hence that the thing affirmed by the apostle in this case is universal worship to be rendered to Christ. And seeing that this universal worship would prove nothing of Christ's dignity unless it were enlightened spiritual worship, he argued with irresistible force of truth that such shall be, throughout, the character of the worship in this case. Among his methods of argument to this point was the fol-

lowing: Here we have every creature in heaven. All will acknowledge that the worship rendered to Christ by those in heaven is spiritual and holy. Then all creatures on the earth, and under the earth, are grouped together here as employed in the same worship. And the professor makes his climax by saying, "If this be not spiritual worship, and Christ be not the object of it, I am unable to produce a case where worship can be called spiritual and divine." *

By this method of argument Professor Stuart presumed to prove the Deity of Christ. But he irrefutably proved Universalism, and failed to prove Trinitarianism. He showed beyond controversy that universal and spiritual love and worship shall be rendered to Christ; but this does not prove that Christ is very God. For worship is reverence devoted to a superior according to his rank. Such is the reverence which the universe of created beings shall render to Christ; but this is expressly defined by the apostle in this very passage, to be subordinate "to the glory of God the Father."

All this is in the direct line of our present inquiry; to wit, the general spirit and purpose of the Saviour's mission as exhibited in the Scriptures. But the particular point to which I introduced this quotation from Philippians, is, to establish and elucidate the interesting fact which I recognized, that the sacred writers occasionally accommodate their form of expression to the conceptions and usages of the people, not to sanction those conceptions and usages, but the more successfully to carry with them the minds of the people into a full understanding of the resultant doctrine which is the main subject of the discourse. In this economy St. Paul availed himself of the Greek periphrasis for the universe, when he would produce a most comprehensive statement of the gospel promise of universal subjection in spirit to Christ. And the same is his policy in the passage from Hebrews, personifying the principle of death and evil, that in a word he might pledge the utter destruction of the same.

* Stuart's Letters to Channing, pp. 100-103.

It is interesting to observe the unlimited variety of expression by which the same great purpose of ultimate good to man is taught in the Scriptures. Sometimes it is taught inferentially as it applies to man, and positively as it applies to death, sin, and evil. That is, the extermination of death, sin, and evil is directly declared, which necessarily implies the immortality, holiness, and happiness of man. Again the testimony is given in a manner inferential as it relates to death and sin, and direct in its application to man — promising reconciliation, life, and holiness to man, which involves the destruction of death and sin. Instances of the former method we have noted, in the crushing of the serpent's head; and in the destruction of the works of the Devil; and in the destruction of him that had the power of death, that is, the Devil.

I will add a remark on the saying, that Jesus took part of flesh and blood, that *through death* he might destroy him that had the power of death. The passage of Christ through death was, in the economy of God, necessary as a step in the process of the great work assigned him. As the head and representative of every man (for it is written, "The head of every man is Christ"), he went down into the domain of death, — so that in his life from the dead is represented the life of all the members of his body. And it was on his passage, through death, into the resurrection life, that he was "made to be both Lord and Christ, — (Acts ii. 36,) and that there was given to him "all power in heaven and earth." (Matt. xviii. 28.) Accordingly, it is reckoned that he, through his death and resurrection "hath abolished death;" and this "according to the purpose and grace of God, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." (2 Tim. i. 9, 10.) This saying to Timothy, that Christ *hath abolished death*, the London Improved Version of the New Testament, following the judgment of Newcomb and Wetstein, regards as parallel with the expression just had under consideration, of the destruction of him that had the power of death. The apostle is taken by those learned biblical critics, and I think with good reason, to have declared to the Hebrews, with the figure of personification,

the same sentiment which he declared to Timothy without that figure. *The destruction of death* is the virtual idea in both cases.

I will present in this department of my argument, two or three examples of the other form of gospel testimony, *directly affirming* the purposed good to man.* And as I commenced my quotations of the other method, *directly* pledging the destruction of evil and *impliedly* the emancipation of man, with the opening of the gospel record, so I will go back to the early teachings of that record, for my first example of the other method noted. It is the word of Jehovah to Abraham, renewed to Isaac, and again to Jacob, that in his seed shall all the nations, all the kindreds, and all the families of the earth be blessed. (Gen. xii. 3; xviii. 18; xxii. 18; xxvi. 4.) St. Paul assures us that this promised seed of Abraham is Christ; and the blessing, of course, is all that good which God has purposed for man, for *all* men, through the mission of Christ.

The prophets throughout present the mission of Christ in the same broad, comprehensive, and impartial light. "I the Lord have called thee in righteousness, and will hold thine hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles; to open the blind eyes, to bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison-house." (Isa. xlii. 6, 7.) "And in this mountain shall the Lord of hosts make unto all people a feast of fat things, a feast of wines on the lees, of fat things full of marrow, of wines on the lees well refined. And he will destroy in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations." (Isa. xxv. 6, 7.) This mountain, which is Zion, is a figurative representation of the gospel covenant. St. Paul says to the Hebrews (xii. 18-24), "For ye are not come unto the mount that might be touched, and that burned with fire, nor unto blackness and darkness and tempest, . . . But ye are come unto Mount Zion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem." This was addressed to Christians who were educated under the law which was given on Mount Sinai

in the midst of blackness and darkness and tempest, and had then entered into the faith of the gospel. Accordingly, by the mount that might be touched, and that burned with fire, he meant the Mosaic covenant; and by Mount Zion, the heavenly Jerusalem, he meant the covenant of grace in Jesus Christ. And so to the Galatians, (iv. 21-26,) "Tell me, ye that desire to be under the law, do ye not hear the law? For it is written, that Abraham had two sons, the one by a bondmaid, the other by a free woman. . . . which things are an allegory; for these are the two covenants; the one from Mount Sinai, which gendereth to bondage, — and answereth to Jerusalem which now is, and is in bondage with her children. But Jerusalem which is above is free, which is the mother of us all." Here we are expressly informed that the two sons of Abraham, in certain relations, were allegorical representations of the two covenants; one covenant, the old, answering to Jerusalem that then was; and the other, the new covenant, being the Jerusalem above, the new Jerusalem, which is Mount Zion. And in this mountain, the covenant of grace in Christ, is provision made for all people, and a provision which they shall not always remain blind to; for, that it may be effectual, it is provided in the same covenant that the veil of darkness shall be removed from all minds, so that the sweet light of truth and love shall shine in every heart, and illuminate every soul. And it is added by the prophet (which will come legitimately into the next stage of our argument), as a provision of this covenant (verse 8), that "He will swallow up death in victory; and the Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces."

In relation to the present general subject, St. Paul says, (2 Cor. v. 18, 19,) "And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, That God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them." And St. John, (1 John iv. 14,) "And we have seen, and do testify, that the Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." It is the loose impression of many

Christians, with whom, perhaps, my opponent sympathizes, that the gospel testimony is, that the Father sent the Son to *open a way*, whereby it is *possible* for sinners, more or less of them, to be saved. In this manner of construction they throw the whole gospel scheme at loose ends, and make it rather an *experiment* with the Deity, than a *purpose*. But the testimony before us, which is in character with the gospel word throughout, is direct and decisive. The Father sent the Son, *to be, HIMSELF*, the Saviour of the world. Christ has undertaken a *mission to perform*. Whether his mission shall be successful, will be the question of another chapter. With this interesting view of the *spirit and purpose* of the Christian ministry and mission, we will proceed to the direct teachings of the Scriptures on the immortal resurrection.

(4.) The direct Scripture Testimony to the Immortal Resurrection.

The doctrine of a future immortal life to man is *implied* in all the lucid gospel testimonies of the purpose of God in Christ, because the great work of good indicated and the blessings promised cannot be verified but through an existence to man beyond this fleeting state of vanity. Especially do the revealments, noted in the preceding subdivision of this section, of the purpose of God through Christ to destroy the reign of evil, to destroy him that had the power of death, and to abolish death, necessarily involve the advancement of our race into a life immortal and filled with good. But our present concern is with the direct revealments of the resurrection of the human dead.

It has been questioned whether the doctrine of the resurrection is taught in the Old Testament. I have remarked that the doctrine is abundantly *contained* in the Old Testament, though it was not well understood in all its import by the Hebrews, and probably not by the prophets themselves. But the Holy Spirit inspired breathings and utterances of the doctrine, which were meant to be more clearly understood, — and are more clearly understood, when reflecting the light of the more perfect revelation of the Christian dispensation. This spirit of life

from the dead uttered itself through the spirit of Job, in the following prophetic breathings: "For I know that my Redeemer liveth, and that he shall stand in the latter day upon the earth. And though after my skin worms destroy this body, yet in my flesh, (or, as the marginal reading is, yet out of my flesh) shall I see God." (Job xix. 25, 26.) And again, "O that thou wouldest hide me in *hades*, that thou wouldest keep me secret, until thy wrath be past, that thou wouldest appoint me a set time and remember me. If a man die, shall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change come." (Job xiv. 13, 14.) Here, though Job in this very connection, proposes the reflections of the prevailing doubt as to another life, yet the spirit of prophecy within him describes the present life as the only scene of those calamities which are figuratively called the wrath of God, and sings of an inheritance in the remembrance of God, and of a life beyond *hades*, in which it shall be seen that the dispensation of evil shall have passed.

The breathings of the same spirit of prophecy find utterance in Hosea xiii. 14. "I will ransom them from the power of *hades*, I will redeem them from death: O death, I will be thy plagues; O *hades*, (state of death,) I will be thy destruction."

But the most full and explicit expression in the Old Testament, of the great doctrine of life immortal in its victory over death, is uttered by the evangelical prophet, in the passage quoted in our preceding sub-section, on the impartiality and fulness of the gospel provisions. "And in this mountain shall the Lord of hosts make unto all people a feast of fat things; —and he will destroy in this mountain the face of the covering cast over all people, and the veil that is spread over all nations. He will swallow up death in victory; and the Lord God will wipe away tears from off all faces." (Isa. xxv. 6–8.) It was shown in the sub-section just referred to, that this Mount Zion is, in such cases, employed as a figure of the gospel covenant. So here we have the sure word of prophecy, that God has covenanted, in his own covenant of promise through Christ, to destroy death, that is, all death, not by perpetuating death forever,

but by swallowing it up in the victory of life,—not swallowing up physical death in the victory of a living immortal spiritual death of pain and anguish, but in the victory of life and good, inasmuch that *tears shall be wiped away from off all faces*. This testimony of the old Scriptures St. Paul refers to in 1 Cor. xv., averring that it shall have its fulfilment in the universal resurrection. “Then shall be brought to pass the saying that is written, Death is swallowed up in victory.”

We will now give our attention to the doctrine of the resurrection as it was familiarly taught by Jesus Christ. I say, the doctrine of the resurrection was *familiarly* taught by Jesus Christ. I am aware that it has been remarked by some, that, unless Jesus spoke of the immortal resurrection in the case recorded John v. 28, 29,—and in his treatment of *aionion life*, as the fruit of faith, he never promulgated that doctrine but in one instance, and that when he was called out by a question of the Sadducees. And my opponent notes this matter in the same way, as if it had a significance in favor of transferring the other class of passages from their legitimate bearings to the subject of the immortal resurrection as their primary reference. But this is snatching out the fact, used in argument, from all its proper relations, and perverting it to a use which falsifies the whole testimony. This very record shows that the doctrine of the resurrection of the human dead was familiarly and commonly taught by Jesus Christ in his personal ministry. It was as such that the Sadducees encountered him upon it. Having, therefore, the clear and decisive evidence of the record that the doctrine of a future immortal life for man was a familiar and common doctrine of Christ's personal ministry, and having in this case a record, made by three of the evangelists, of his explicit statement of the nature and condition of that future life, this is enough. It is the beauty and excellence of the New Testament records of the Christian system of faith and morals, that they are comprised in so small a compass that they can be so conveniently read, and even understood if read in the spirit of liberty, by the common people. The Gospel by St. John is concluded with these words: “And there are

also many other things which Jesus did, and which, if they should be written, every one, I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the books that should be written." Yet there are written, with sufficient fulness, all the great doctrines of Christianity, both of faith and practice, succinctly stated, and variously illustrated and exemplified — presenting a system so simple in its essential principles that it can be understood by the little child, and yet so vast and magnificent that the greatest minds may explore it to all eternity — and never get through. Is not the hand of God in this? Blessed New Testament! I never read in it but that I discover some new mine of spiritual wealth, and some new glow of spiritual light and beauty.

Yes, the brevity of these records is admirable, — and their completeness is divine. Will you complain that there is a paucity in the record of Jesus' teaching of immortality? It is all here in its fulness. The fact is here that he taught the doctrine familiarly in his personal ministry; and here is the record, taken from his own lips, of his lucid explanation of the doctrine in respect to its subject matter as an object of hope. This is enough, as a declarative announcement and explanatory statement. Yet, the principle of this doctrine so permeates all the teachings of Jesus, that it seems as if we were reading it in all his gospel discourses.

We may take up any other important doctrine of Jesus, and examine the record in relation to it in the same way, and it will be to the same result. The sublime and distinctively Christian doctrine of love to enemies, which seems to the New Testament Christian to stand out on all its pages, is but once directly enjoined by the record, and that is in Matt. v. 44, and the entry of the same in Luke vi. 27, repeated in verse 35. But the same sentiment gleams out in spirit everywhere in the Christian records, Gospels and Epistles.

In respect to the exposition given by Jesus of the nature and condition of the resurrection life, I have a very full examination of it in my discussion with Rev. Dr. Adams, chap. iii., to which I refer the reader. I shall have frequent occasions, in what is to follow of this discussion, to avoid swelling this work

by unnecessary repetitions, to refer to the "Adams and Cobb Discussion;" and I shall regard the two works, this and that, as belonging together as two volumes of one set.

But as Prof. Hudson, having read my Reply to Dr. Adams, yet attempts what I regard as an invalidation of the force and significance of this testimony of Jesus, I feel called upon to go into a re-examination of the same so far as to weigh the force of my new opponent's criticisms.

I have remarked that the conversation of Jesus with the Sadducees on the subject of the resurrection, is recorded by three of the evangelists. As Matthew was an ear witness of this discourse of the Master, and made the earliest record of it, we may look to his record first of all, for an exact report of the facts for critical construction. Mark's record comes next in this scale of estimate. Luke, in the last place, comes with his record, and ingenuously notifies the reader that he was not an eye and ear witness of the things which he writes, but that they were credibly reported by those who did see and hear, and were "most surely believed." He is equally reliable as to the facts of his record; but he was a learned physician, and employs more embellishment in his style of writing. And it is known to all, that when the different evangelists record the same discourse of Jesus in different language, though they all give the true idea, they do not all use the same words, throughout, which were uttered by the Master.

Well, my opponent passes unnoticed the record of Matthew, the apostle, and eye and ear witness, and of Mark, the intimate companion and fellow-laborer with the apostles; and he also passes over the main facts of the record which Luke, the Christian physician, and also companion of some of the apostles, has furnished of the discourse, and seizes upon an incidental embellishment of his, and forces back the interpretation upon the main facts from the embellishment, instead of naturally tracing out the sense of the embellishment from the main facts.

The incidental embellishment to which I refer, which amplifies the record of Luke, is this; "But they which shall be

accounted worthy to obtain that world, and the resurrection from the dead." This my opponent construes as "partitive," and *as partitive* he makes it absorb the whole subject of the resurrection, leaving in the Bible no doctrine of the resurrection of *man*, but only that of a *party*. Indeed, he leaves in the Bible no doctrine of the resurrection at all; nothing of the kind to be preached to man as a truth belonging to him, provided in the counsel of God and the constitution of the moral creation;—no "life and immortality *brought to light*" as the *subject* of faith, but only something of the sort *proposed* as a *reward* of faith. A reward of faith in what? Faith in immortality? No, for that is not yet a truth for man, and cannot be, until after he believes. It is not the subject of faith, but a proposed, hypothetical reward of it. Of faith in what? Echo answers, *What?* This handling of the Scriptures on the subject of immortality, makes that infinite inheritance like Iago's purse:—

"—— 'Tis something, nothing ;

'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands."

What a terrible necessity an unhappy theory has imposed upon the strong and logical mind of my opponent, to impel him to this distracting and unavailing labor on the simple doctrine of the resurrection! When we pass from the genial light and spirit of the gospel into the atmosphere of Destructionism, the change is as perceptible and as revolting as the transition from the sunny field of bloom and zephyrs, into the charnel-house below. Our observation, in the preceding subsection, of the spirit and purpose of God in his Son, or in his covenant of grace, revealed to our admiring view the kind paternal regard of the Creator for all his intelligent family, his purpose to destroy all evil, and to impart immortal and universal good. Describing this better covenant, as the basis of a fixed and abiding faith and a sure and steadfast hope, in contrast with the Mosaic covenant of conditional and uncertain proposals and hypotheses, St. John says, "The law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." The natural import of this is, that the gospel is not a mere moral

code of duties and retributions, but that it is a revelation of truth as it stands in the divine purpose, and of truth full of divine grace. This succinct statement of the character of the gospel is given more in detail by St. Paul to Timothy. Speaking of the nature of the covenant by which they were saved, he says, it is "not according to our works, but according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began; but is now made manifest by the appearing of our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel."

Now it is well known that light does not create objects. It only brings to our view the things that are. Accordingly, the light of the gospel revelation brings to our view, as a subject of promise-receiving faith, our heirship of life and immortality. Prof. H. says, on the expression "brought to light," "It may as naturally signify that he pointed out the way of life; or that he showed that there is (that there *may* be, he should have said) immortality for man, and how it may be gained." (Affirmative, iii. § 1.) No; in the connection in which it stands it may *not* as naturally signify this, and *cannot* signify it. The connection explicitly forbids this construction of the phraseology in question. For this would make it expressly and wholly according to our works; but the connection asserts that, in the gospel scheme, it is "*NOT according to our works.*" And further, this construction of my opponent recognizes no immortality for man as a patrimony, more than there is for the brutes; no heirship for that life until it is earned by our faith and obedience, or germinated and vegetated within us by the producing force of our virtues;—whereas, the testimony of the *record* before us is, that it is "according to his (God's) own purpose and grace, *which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.*" Such is the truth of immortality for man, *brought to light through the gospel.*

And so in the discourse of Jesus to the questioning Sadducees, to which we will now return. My opponent finds in Luke's record of it an incidental embellishment, whereby this

evangelist amplifies the sentiment of Jesus, that in the light of it he might set off the grossness of the Sadducean conception of the future life, as beneath the great Father's estimate of man. With this aim he says, virtually, that the grade of beings on whom God sets such an estimate that he has "made them *for* immortality," will not, when they shall have entered into the life immortal for which they were constituted, abide in the sensual tendencies of the animal nature, but will be free from the principles of mortality and death, so that they "cannot die any more;—and (in that state) they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." (See my Reply to Dr. Adams, before referred to.) And this beautiful embellishment which Luke adds to the record as made by Matthew and Mark, developing a thought full of comfort and hope, my opponent forces into use as a magic instrument to work a radical change in the Scripture doctrine of the resurrection. By this instrumentality he presumes to annihilate the doctrine of immortality for *man*, as a truth of God revealed in Christ, and as the subject of faith,—and to substitute the conditional promise of the resurrection of *a party*, as a reward for their canonical faith and works. In respect to this discourse of our Lord, he says, in his chapter and section last referred to,—

"The whole passage *taken alone* would not suggest the immortality of all, but of a class only; the proof that it applies to all must be derived from other passages. Hence it is simply accurate to say that the immortality of all men is not here named, or explicitly taught."

No:—The resurrection of all men to an immortal life is not only "suggested," but "explicitly taught," in this "whole passage *taken alone*." Look at the entire case as presented in the record. There came to Jesus "certain of the Sadducees, which deny that there is any resurrection." We all know what this means. They denied that man is to have an existence beyond the event called death, either by the living on, or the rising from the wreck of matter, of the spirit, or by a resur-

rection of the body. For it is said in Acts, that "the Sadducees say that there is no resurrection, neither angel, nor spirit."

Now suppose my opponent had found it necessary for the support of his cause, to expend the ingenuity upon the doctrine of the Sadducees, to throw it into doubt, which he has upon the gospel doctrine of the resurrection, to fritter that away. I speak in great personal respect for Prof. H. I know what a bad cause he has to manage, and how innocently he has backed into it out of the horrible endless miserianism of Orthodoxy. But I am bound in duty to deal justly with the theory which he espouses, and the argument which he employs. I say then, suppose he had raised the question whether the Sadducees really denied the resurrection of all men; whether it were not really the Gentiles, and the antediluvians, whose resurrection they denied,—holding that of some men, especially of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, of whom their own sacred book said, after their natural death, that the Lord was their God. After all the expenditure of words in this direction, the doctrine of the Sadducees would have remained visible to all common understandings; to wit, the denial of the resurrection, or the future life of man as a species. And so likewise, after all the learned labor to curtail and obscure the sublime doctrine of Jesus in opposition to that of the Sadducees, it stands out in its unmistakable distinctness and Divine munificence and fulness; to wit, the resurrection of the human dead, the future immortal life of man as a species. If I am not right here, I must despair of ever finding any record the most simple, of any truth the most obvious, of the least value; there is no more meaning in language, nor understanding in man—at least, not in the writer of this. The subject in question was the resurrection, not of a party, but of mankind. The doctrine of Jesus on the subject was familiarly known wherever he had preached to the people. The Sadducees especially, who were his antipodes in theory on this point, had of course been critical hearers of his revealments on this subject. They knew that he and they were full-length, broad-side opponents in this controversy. They were believers in the annihilation of, not a

party, but mankind. They were Destructionists, but more thorough and consistent than the modern ones, who have reached their position through the labyrinth and the taint of modern Orthodoxy. And they knew that Jesus was their full opponent, holding in full to what they in full denied; to wit, the resurrection of the human dead. They knew that his doctrine was not that of the resurrection of a party, and that party the little handful of his disciples. If this were all, there would not have been difference enough between him and the *other* Sadducees to be of much account. In such case, he were more than ninety-nine hundredths of a Sadducee. And, with such an understanding of his doctrine, that he taught the future existence of only his little band of disciples, they would not have presented him such a case as they did with the view to confound him. They would have calculated that he would parry their blow by the answer, that the woman and her seven husbands, being not Christians, would have no lot in the resurrection which he preached.

No; the Sadducees knew that Jesus familiarly taught the future immortal life of man as a race; they presented their case to involve him in embarrassment, in that view of his doctrine; and he answered them in accordance with his well-known theory. Matthew, who was with Jesus at the time and heard the conversation, writes it thus: "Jesus answered and said unto them, Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. For in the resurrection (that is, in the future life) they (that is, mankind) neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven. But as touching the resurrection of the dead (that is, of the human dead universally), have ye not read that which was spoken unto you by God, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? God is not the God of the dead, but of the living." (Matt. xxii. 29-32.) Mark's record is substantially the same. (xii. 23-27.) And the passage partially quoted by my opponent from Luke, is but another record, by one who had reliable information of the substance of this discourse of Jesus; and he records essentially

the same sentiment. But, as I have shown, he expands the expression somewhat in his record, not changing the sense, but making the expression more impressive. Instead of making it read with the others, "For when they shall rise from the dead,"—he has it, "But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world (*aionos*, age, or state), and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry, nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." (Luke xx. 35, 36.) I have sufficiently explained that the first clause of verse 35 relates not to moral desert, but to the estimate which God sets upon his moral creatures, made after his image, and thus harmonizes with the great subject of discourse. It has a like significance to the word *value*, in the saying, "Ye are of more value than many sparrows." This has not reference to moral worth, for in that respect there could be no comparison between men and sparrows. It has reference to God's estimate of man, in the scale of being in which he has placed him. And that such is the sense of the word *worthy*, in Luke xx. 35, and that it applies to all men as subjects of the resurrection, is certain, from the additional testimony in verse 38, "for all live unto him."

But here, too, my opponent hastens to an effort to parry the force of the testimony. He says, iii. § 6,—

"But it is said, 'For *all* live unto Him.' This expression is important in the Universalist argument. But it proves nothing; for the context naturally refers the 'all' to the subjects of discourse, either the patriarchs just mentioned, or those 'accounted worthy to obtain that world,' in verse 35. Then it will be perfectly proper to read, 'For they all live unto him.' The Greek always allows this whenever the context can suggest it."

This does not do justice to the logic of my learned friend. He thinks the "all" in this case may refer to "the patriarchs just mentioned." Here he loses the subject of the Master in his illustration. The *subject* is the general one of the resurrection of the dead. This the Sadducees denied. But Jesus referred them, for an illustration, or an evidence rather, touch-

ing this subject, to a passage in their own revered authority, which recognized Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, after physical death, as yet alive. To what point did Jesus quote this Scripture? Merely to prove that these three patriarchs yet lived? No; but to show that "the dead are raised." Yet my friend would have it that this "proves nothing" but the life from the dead, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. Thus he loses the *subject* in the *illustration*. There was one of old who "opened the Scriptures" to the willing minds of men; but this is verily *shutting up* the Scriptures.

But our friend allows us an alternative. We may apply the "all" in this case to "either the patriarchs just mentioned, or those 'accounted worthy to obtain that world.'" Yes, this affords the mind some relief. The "all" may be referred to those accounted worthy to obtain the resurrection world. And who are they, whom God loves as a father, and values as his children, insomuch that he will give them life from the dead? We have seen, and we shall see, that they are the human creation. So here I meet my friend in agreement on his general statement, that "the context naturally refers the 'all' to the subjects of discourse." And these, as we have seen, in the matter of opposition between the Sadducees and Jesus, are not Jews, barbarians, Scythians, or Christians, but the human species as subjects of the resurrection.

As it respects the supply of the pronoun *they* in this passage, whatever may be allowable when the context can suggest it, the context cannot suggest it here. The suggestion came from a different necessity. And yet it would not affect the sense in this case: it would only degrade the grammar of the composition. Speaking of mankind as subjects of the resurrection, Luke's record of the sentiment of Jesus, following the argument drawn from the Old Testament, saying "for all live unto him," is better grammar than Mr. H. will make of it by interpolating the pronoun *they*.

But my friend may find the pronoun *they*, if he likes that word, already at hand in Mark's record. "For when they shall rise from the dead, they neither marry, nor are given in

marriage; but are as the angels which are in heaven." Here the pronoun *they* follows no sentence which even seems, in an isolated position, to be "partitive." It refers either to the human species, whose resurrection was the question in-hand between Jesus and the Sadducees, or to the Jewish woman and her seven husbands, in the case presented by the latter; and it matters not which, so far as the doctrine involved is concerned.

"*For all live unto him.*" Mr. H. refers to Rom. vi. 10, 11, and Gal. ii. 19, and to some of the Christian Fathers, where the phrase *live unto God* has a partitive sense; i.e., denotes the self-dedication of one's life to God in obedience. We can see no way in which such references can aid an understanding of Luke's use of the phrase in the case before us. He will not insist that the phrase always bears the same sense. St. Paul says, "None of us liveth unto himself." He does not mean by this that no man does, in the present state of being, make self the chief object of his life-labors, but that all dedicate their service to God. He means that no man lives independently, in and of himself, or that no man owns himself; for, as he adds, "whether we live, therefore, or die, we are the Lord's." And in Luke xx. 38, "*for all live unto him,*" is explained by the nature of the subject, which is that of the resurrection of the dead, to mean, that mankind being made for immortality, having that inheritance secured to them in God's purpose and grace given us in Christ Jesus before the world began, in his estimate they all live. My friend's own explanation of this phraseology just above gives this sense substantially. "The heirs of life belong to the living God; they '*live unto him*' because his eye is upon them, and no power can pluck them out of his hands; but they shall be raised up in the last day." For what purpose, then, did he start out from this immediate connection to divert the minds of his readers to a string of quotations which use the phrase, *live unto God*, in another sense, that of self-dedication to God?

The same diversion of mind is attempted on the phrase, "*children of God,*" as used by Luke in the case before us.

He says, "it frequently occurs apparently denoting a class," and refers to a list of texts, a portion of which at least use this phrase in description of those who had become spiritually and experimentally united to God as children in filial love and communion. So far as it respects the sense of the phrase, this is all well. And it unquestionably bears this high sense in Luke's record of the resurrection. But what has this to do with the question at issue touching the extent of the resurrection? The phrase is not here used to denote a character to be acquired as one's title to the resurrection, but as that to which all shall be born through the resurrection. "And shall be the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." Verily, our esteemed friend exercises a great degree of tact and vigilance at hunting up "destruction" for his race.

For another effort, with an earnestness in this direction worthy of a better cause, he descries a difference between the prepositions *from* and *of*, which are used interchangeably as the particle between the resurrection and the dead. He assumes that the word *from* in such cases denotes a singling or raising out from among other dead persons. We give him credit in this case for a creative imagination, for there is nothing in the Scriptures, in any explanatory phraseology of the context, which could suggest such a thought. The resurrection *of* the dead, makes the term dead stand for the persons raised; and the resurrection *from* the dead, makes the term dead stand for the state of death. The resurrection *of* the dead, is the resurrection of the persons deceased, and the resurrection *from* the dead is the resurrection of the same persons from the state of death. Acts iv. 2, speaks of the priests and Sadducees as "being grieved that they (Peter and John) taught the people, and preached through Jesus the resurrection *from* the dead." Again, Acts xvii. 32, "And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked." Again, Paul (Acts xiii. 6), perceiving that there were both Pharisees and Sadducees in the council before whom he was arraigned, cried out in the midst, "Of the hope and resurrection *of* the dead I am called in question." Now it is impossible for me to conceive how

plain common sense or theologically learned sense can detect any difference in the doctrine preached by Peter and John, which offended the Sadducees, recorded as "the resurrection from the dead," and that preached in presence of the same characters by St. Paul, in the other several instances recorded as "the resurrection of the dead." I will not multiply words on this attempted criticism, lest our readers should weary of too much said on matters that nobody can misunderstand. Whether the phraseology be "the resurrection from the dead," or "the resurrection of the dead," or, which is most common in the Scriptures, "the resurrection," the same thing is signified; to wit, the rising of our race into a life immortal beyond the event of death.

Apostolic Testimonies.

We pass from the testimony of Jesus on the resurrection of the dead,—not of Jews, or of Gentiles, or of Catholics, Calvinists, Universalists, or Destructionists, but of mankind,—to the apostolic testimonies on the same subject. And here, in the lead, comes the notable chapter of St. Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians, which culminates in this invulnerable aggregation: "*For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.*"

With the view to render the sense of this passage equivocal, Prof. Hudson lays out his work as follows:—

"Two questions arise here. 1st, Does the term 'all' in each member of the verse include the entire human race? 2d, If so, does it preclude the distinction of a twofold resurrection, of the just and the unjust, one class to life and the other to condemnation?"

On this first question, whether the term *all*, in each member of the sentence, includes the whole human race, the Professor finds incidental reference to those who had "fallen asleep in Christ," and the remark that, if they had a hope in Christ for this life only, they were "of all men most miserable;" and these two incidental remarks, by expansion, he makes the whole sub-

ject of the chapter. Then, having lifted these incidentals into the position of capitals, after the manner of his effort upon the passage last discussed, and referring the word *all* in the verse before us to his newly inaugurated "subjects of discourse in the previous context," he would inaugurate the conclusion that the subjects of the resurrection, which is the theme of this chapter, are Christian believers only. Thus is he again in his former mishap, of losing the subject in an incidental side-brought argument.

"The case of believers" was *not* the "burden of the argument." It was the resurrection of the dead. St. Paul commences the chapter thus: "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you, which ye have received, and wherein ye stand; by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain. For I delivered unto you first of all, that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures."

Here is a primary principle introduced, which we will stop and settle in the outset, that we may advance in the light of it. It involves the relation of Christ to mankind as their head, and the spirit of that relation. "For I delivered (or preached) unto you first of all, how that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures." For whom did Christ die? For believers merely, as a class? Then he had no such fact to preach to the Corinthians on his first visit to them, as that Christ had died for them — for they were then not believers. Yet going to them, as they then were, in their darkness and unbelief, he preached to them *first of all*, that Christ died for their sins. He did not go to them for a magical experiment, and stultify their minds, by requiring them to create a truth by believing when there was nothing to believe. He went to them with the gospel, which is full of grace and truth as a subject of faith. And, "first of all," he gave them the assurance of the Father's love for them, and purpose of good, in the fact that Jesus Christ his Son, bearing his moral image, had died for them, and thus sealed by his blood the testimony of unfa-

ing love. But how did he show that Christ died for them? He showed this by addressing them as *men*, as members of the great rational family of whom Christ was constituted head; and he had certified them in this same letter, xi. 3, that "the head of every man is Christ;"—and his familiar teaching on this subject was, that it was the divine appointment, "that he, by the grace of God, should taste death for every man;" (Heb. ii. 9;) that he "gave himself a ransom for all." (1 Tim. ii. 6.) And the beloved John, eighteen hundred years before my opponent's day, repudiated his scheme of making Christ's mission a testimony of love to them that loved him first. "Herein is love," says this apostle, "not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." "And he is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." (1 John ii. 2; iv. 10.) And, to return to Paul, he reiterates the same;—"Peradventure for a good man some would even dare to die." And this is as much as my opponent's theory admits of Jesus Christ. But the apostle bars out this robbery from Christ of his distinguishing glory, affirming that "God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us; and that, "when we were without strength, in due time, Christ died for the ungodly." (Rom. v. 6-8.)

Such is the doctrine which Paul had preached to the Corinthians when he "declared unto them the gospel," delivering unto them, *first of all*, "how that Christ died for our sins, according to the Scriptures." The first person plural, in such cases, is a beautiful and familiar form when the expression relates to an interest of the body of which we are members. And now, with the recognition of this primary gospel doctrine, involving the death of Christ as the head of every man, attesting the love of God to all the members of his body as heirs of immortality, the apostle proceeds to reason with the half-blind Corinthians:—

"Now, if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?"

What new is the subject? My opponent drags down the great apostle from his high position, which he says he occupied *first of all*, as a minister of Christ's propitiation for the sins of the whole world, of all the members of the body of which he is the head, even "every man,"—from this high position he suddenly drags him down, and imposes upon him, as his main subject for all this splendid chapter, the resurrection of *the dead members of the Corinthian church!* How miserably un-Paul-like, and un-Christlike, the apostle would have appeared, if he could have been thus narrowed down. And how disgustingly mean does my opponent make the Corinthian Christians appear, when he charges upon them that it was only the "destiny" of the half-dozen of their friends of the Christian party who had died, or "fallen asleep in Christ," about which they were "troubled." No. We know that we are authorized to speak in their defence against this imputation. We know what were their natural affections, and what is the spirit of the religion they had received, even love to neighbor as to self. That was a recently formed church, composed of new converts to the Christian name, not yet fully understanding the Christian system. There were fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, wives, husbands, and children of these Christian converts, and thousands of kindreds and friends who had fallen into the sleep of death in their heathen unbelief. All these they loved as well as they loved the few who had just come, with them, to profess the Christian name. The new religion they had espoused would not sever those ties of love, nor blot out the fond remembrance of those loved departed ones. The spirit of this religion is the opposite of such frigid and satanic influence. No; their concern was about the destiny of man, which of course involved the destiny of themselves and kindred. Their minds were not wholly freed from the influence of the Sadducean party, which said, "there is no resurrection," or of the heathen darkness, in which Paul said they were "without hope in the world." And, addressing himself to this unhappy state of mind, the apostle says, — Now if

Christ be preached, that he rose from the dead, how say some of you that there is no resurrection of the dead?"

The subject, therefore, is the general one of the resurrection of the human dead, in relation to which some of the Corinthian church were in doubt, and even in positive disbelief. For some among them actually asserted that "there is no resurrection of the dead."

This is the matter which the apostle proceeds to argue. He shows them that the resurrection of Christ was a truth which they must have received in order to become Christian disciples at all. And, taking the advantage of this admitted fact, he argues, — "But if there be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not raised; and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins." As if he had said, the whole Christian theory, in such case, being built upon falsehood, there is no virtue in it to work the moral purpose which it propounds, and you are all as if Christ had not come, like the Gentiles at large, without God and without hope in the world.

"Then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished." This my opponent uses as evidence that the case of believers only is the burden of the apostle's argument. Thus he makes the apostle argue in a circle, and frame vacant and unmeaning sentences. He would make Paul to utter the mere truism, that *if they that are fallen asleep in Christ* are not raised from the dead, then *they that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished*. It makes the premise and the deduction all one. But Paul's argument is not of so low an order. He urges upon the consideration of the partly Christianized Corinthians the corollary, that if the great doctrine of the resurrection of mankind from the state of the dead, of which the *visible* resurrection of Christ the head of every man was presented as an evidence and pledge, was not a truth, then, with all the rest of the human dead, "they *also* who are fallen asleep in Christ (probably referring particularly to those who had died in martyrdom for the name of Christ) are perished." That is, they were martyrs to a falsehood, and they and their faith are all as

nothing. And he continues, — “If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most miserable.” The primary meaning of the word here rendered miserable, is rather, *pitiable*. As Clarke expresses it, they were most to be pitied.

It is by a “pitiable” perversion that this remark of the apostle has been used by some as a support to the position that the Christian religion does not yield an ample reward to its true servants. Paul does not say that *with* their hope in Christ for immortal life and good, they were, even in that age, of all men most pitiable. They were “*blessed*” above all men, lived a life of “joy unspeakable and full of glory,” — even “*glorying* in their tribulations.” But, *if*, *if*, *if* they had hope in Christ only for this life, as was the case with those to whom he appealed, *if* they received Christ as the Messiah, and bore the Christian name, and thus exposed themselves to all the consequent external persecutions and disadvantages, and yet had not that hope immortal which should more than counterbalance all this, they were, in such case, of all men most to be pitied. If the imagining of high worldly advantages, through a temporal kingdom to be set up by Christ, were the acme of their hope in Christ, they were doomed to reap only disappointment and shame.

Proceeding with this magnificent theme, not catering to a mean, selfish spirit, but developing the spirit of Him who is the head of every man, the apostle says, “But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits (not of dead Corinthian Christians, but) of them that slept. For since by man came death (not the death of Corinthian Christians, but death as a universal fact), by man came also the resurrection of the dead.”

But here again the eagle eye of my opponent discovers a verbal crotchet, by which he essays to take away the hope of the dying and the bereaved, by limiting the power of life in Christ to the abolishing of death. He notes the fact, that “where our translation speaks of the ‘dead,’ the article is commonly omitted in the original.” This, he says, “is a mat-

ter of some account, if the being made alive is taken as the resurrection of life." Of course, if it is taken as the resurrection of damnation, the extent of it is of no account. Nothing would be gained to the Destructionist cause by its limitation. But if we are disposed to take this resurrection, as Paul presents it, to be an introduction of all its subjects into a life immortal, spiritual, heavenly, and glorious, my opponent would deem it of some account in the Destructionist scale to note, that "where our translation speaks of 'the dead,' the article is commonly omitted in the original." He adds, "The article is found only in verses 29 (baptized for the dead), 35, 42, 52. Here the righteous dead, whether a part, or all mankind, are doubtless intended." "*Doubtless.*" This is a very complacent assumption of the main question at issue, and an assumption in favor of which there is not a hint or implication in all the chapter. They are all to become righteous, to be sure, in the resurrection life,—for they will be spiritual and glorious,—and, as Jesus said, "will be the children of God, being the children of the resurrection." But to say that "the dead," in the verses referred to, means only such as were righteous before they died, is to throw away St. Paul's testimony and his gospel running through the whole of this chapter, and palming upon him a theory which he would have resisted with as much spirit as he resisted the violence of Ananias, Acts. xxii. 3.

"The dead," is a general and unlimited expression, referring to the deceased of the human kind; and there is no circumstance to limit it, in either of the verses in this chapter, except the 29th. "Else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not at all? Why are they then baptized for the dead?" Here the human transaction referred to will restrict the term to those in substitution for whom the rite of baptism was received by a living friend. But this refers it more probably to those who died outside, than in, the Christian church. For reference is obviously made here to a custom which is acknowledged to have at one time prevailed in the

church, of baptizing a living person in the stead of one who had died unbaptized. And these unbaptized persons were most likely to have been unbelievers and non-professors.

But as it respects the want of the article in the Greek, in most of the cases where our translation speaks of "the dead," my opponent knows that the substantive, in the plural, includes the article, being a noun of multitude, meaning *the dead*. And, generally, to read it in English without the article, would present clumsy specimens of reading.

But we will accompany St. Paul to his climax: "*For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.*" Having already exposed the violence which my opponent does to the whole connection by assuming that the case of deceased Christians was the only matter of concern with the Corinthians, and the burden of this extensive apostolical argument, I need not spend time on his new version of this 22d verse, which makes it to read, "For as *they* (the deceased Corinthian believers) all die in Adam, even so in Christ shall *they* all be made alive." If St. Peter ever had such a thought as this flit through his brain, he has left no record of it, here or elsewhere.

But my opponent is not himself satisfied with the metamorphosis of the apostle, and he tries another experiment. He says, "Yet granting that the word 'all,' in the first member of the verse, applies to all the children of Adam, it may, in the second member, apply to all the 'children of God' in Christ, and to none others." Now it is sufficient for us to say, that St. Paul is guilty of no such hesitating, dodging, off-and-on testimony. He was never "corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." He presents here, in a direct and intelligible manner, the relations, respectively, of the two federal heads, to mankind, and the nature of the inheritance which we have in each. And he honors the second federal head as sustaining a relation to humanity as extensive as the first, and infinitely more interesting. "For as in Adam all die" — all what, or whom? All that die in Adam? All that believe in Christ? All Jews? all Gentiles? No, all such tampering is as silly as it is irreverent. Everybody knows that *men* is the substantive under-

stood in this case, as belonging to or involved in the term *all*. "As in Adam all men die; even so in Christ shall all men be made alive." This rich testimony stands out here, as clear and decisive in its sense as the sun in its light; and the efforts of men to blot out the sun in the heavens with a wet sponge, could not have been more futile than have been their efforts to blot out the light of this witness of Jesus. Men may be impelled by their ecclesiastical relations to give us a great, broad Adam, and a little, narrow Christ; but such men were not God's counsellors in the device of the gospel scheme.

We have seen most clearly, in our study of the general spirit and purpose of the Saviour's mission as exhibited in the Scriptures, that the bestowment of life and good upon mankind through him is to be *as* extensive, and *more* abundant, than the reign of death and evil through the Adamic or earthly nature. And, as it respects the reading of *men* as involved in the word *all* in this 22d verse, the same apostle fills out the expression, in treating the same subject of the relation to mankind sustained respectively by the two Adams as federal heads, in Rom. v. 18. "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so, by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." It would not be in place for me to detain the reader here with an exposition of the sense and manner in which the offence of one brought the judgment of condemnation upon all men, and in which the righteousness of the other federal head shall be effectual upon all men unto the justification of life. The matter now in hand is the equal extensiveness of the relation of Christ to mankind as their head, with that of Adam, — and the sufficiency of God's purpose and grace in Christ to cover and exterminate the reign of death and evil.

But my opponent loves Destructionism, and he has yet another expedient for screening it from the utterly annihilating force of the gospel word in the chapter before us. He says:—

"But admitting that the word 'all' applies, in the second clause, to the whole human race, we find in the next verse a distinction which may imply a resurrection of some 'to con-

demnation.' 'But every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterwards *they that are Christ's*, at his coming.' Here it seems to be implied that there are some who are not Christ's."

It is sufficient to remark here, that nothing is implied in the order of the harvest referred to, which denotes a distinction of character and condition in the resurrection state. On the present admission the 22d verse declares the resurrection to life in Christ of all men. Then the next verse adds, "But every man in his own order." There were two orders in the harvest conducted under the Mosaic rule, viz: the first fruits, and the general harvest. And the Divine acceptance of the first fruits signified the blessing of the whole harvest. So here, in the universal resurrection; — Christ the first fruits; then the great harvest, that is, all men, being all Christ's, — his by gift, — and in another sense his by purchase, as he gave himself a ransom for all, — and members of his mystic body, he being the head of every man, — all shall be made alive at his coming. Whether this coming is progressively to every man subsequent to mortal dissolution, through the working of the power of life, — or whether it be simultaneously at a future time, — the result is the same. They shall be made alive in Christ; so that, as they die in Adam through an inheritance of the Adamic or earthly nature, they shall live in Christ in an inheritance of the heavenly nature of which he is the representative. And the condition of that resurrection life is beautifully described in verses 42–49.

But here is another testimony of St. Paul on the subject of the resurrection, which sweeps away with a direct aim and a discriminative expression, all the mists of doubt which learned art for a bad cause has attempted to throw over the universality of the work of life in the destruction of death in victory.

"And have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust." Acts xxiv. 15.

1. Here let it be distinctly observed, that in the first place,

Paul announces the prominent and distinctive doctrine of the gospel in the usual New Testament manner; to wit, "that there shall be a resurrection of the dead." This means precisely what "the resurrection of the dead" always means, from the mouth of Jesus and the pens of his apostles. And now we will withhold the special and interpretative parts of this passage, until we have afforded the expert in human theology an opportunity to ply to it his instruments of Bible torture, and Bible contraction. And in this work he will vehemently urge the fact, that in the original of this verse the article is wanting, and it should therefore be read, *dead persons*. Nothing more, therefore, is taught in this passage, than that there shall be a resurrection of dead persons, — that is, *some* dead persons, — meaning, of course, the righteous. And thence he will quote, upon the run, a score of fragmentary texts where some distinguishing favor is spoken of as appertaining to the righteous, or to those that believe. But before we spend the day in hunting over those fragments in their connections, to ascertain the various subjects of discourse to which they belong, we will hear St. Paul's *whole* testimony in this passage before us.

2. "Both of the just and unjust." Why should St. Paul, in this instance, have taken this particular pains, seemingly performing a work of supererogation, by going so fully into detail; in the way of defining his position on the doctrine of the resurrection? Was it by the dictates of the spirit of prophecy, foreseeing what sad work the selfishness and hard-heartedness of men would in a future age strive to make, by perversion and limitation, of the fullest and richest gospel teachings? Or were there some half-converted Sadducees of his time, who, from saying "there is no resurrection," came to admit the resurrection of their party, who must always be "the just?" Whatever may have been the immediate prompter of Paul at the time, I am gratefully impressed that there is a providence in it, giving us this explicit explanation, which is an effective bar against the limitation to a party of the immortal resurrection. He distinctly explains that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection embraces all men, of all characters, right-

eous and unrighteous. And this is the doctrine which is the burden of the discussion through the whole of that glorious fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians.

But then shall not the unrighteous come up by the resurrection into a life which shall be but a protracted throes of agony, to terminate after a long time in the destruction of their being? No. Is such the "life and immortality brought to light through the gospel?" — the "grace and truth which came by Jesus Christ?" — the "good tidings of great joy which shall be to all people?" No. "Let God be true, and every man a liar." No; I challenge all the schools of biblical critics in Christendom, to produce the evidence of any other than two states of existence to man; to wit, the natural and the spiritual; the earthly and the heavenly; the corruptible and the incorruptible; the mortal and the immortal; the likeness of Adam and the likeness of Christ. Destructionists talk long and loud of the Orthodox absurdity of eternal life in death, i.e., man in immortality, suffering a living, eternal death. But to say that, when as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive, — that when all men, the just and the unjust, shall be raised from the state of death, spiritual, incorruptible, immortal, heavenly, and glorious, then the greater part shall corrupt, agonize, and die off forever, — this is the sublimation of absurdity.

3. But the apostle sets due guard against this corruption of the higher life, by another phrase in this same address to Felix. "*And have hope toward God.*" The resurrection of the dead, all the dead, even of the unjust, was a subject of grateful and joyful *hope* to the noble and warm-hearted Christian apostle.

Professor Hudson, noticing our argument from this hope in our discussion with Dr. Adams, says: —

"The Scriptures elsewhere speak of things partly good and partly evil as a matter of thanks. There is an apparent instance in Rom. vi. 17: "God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin; but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered unto you." A plainer exam-

ple occurs in the 136th Psalm: "Oh, give thanks . . . to him that smote Egypt in their first-born; . . . and slew famous kings; for his mercy endureth forever." Such thanksgiving seems at least as misanthropic as Paul's 'hope' in question."

But these references fail entirely to show any parallel of the purely fiendish spirit which is ascribed to Paul by forcing upon him the hope which both Dr. Adams and Prof. Hudson ascribe to him. We are surprised that our friend takes the words quoted from Paul to the Romans in the sense he gives them. We think the common sense of Christendom will accept the rendering of the London Improved Version, as follows: "But thanks be to God, that *though* ye were the servants of sin, yet ye have obeyed from the heart the form of doctrine to which ye were delivered over."

David's thanksgiving to God for his judgment upon Egypt, by which he foiled the purpose of her monarch to destroy Israel, is a case which bears no shade of resemblance to the hope which has been charged upon Paul. When our enemies plot our ruin, it is matter of joy if Providence averts from us the blow, even if it be by causing it to fall upon the enemies' heads. But my friend alleges that St. Paul, when voluntarily stating before his opposers the sublime doctrine of the gospel, took particular pains to designate a major portion of his fellow-men, who never injured him nor wished his injury, and many of whom never injured any one, with reference to whom he *hoped* that God would not permit them to sleep on the sleep of death, but that he would raise them up for the mere sake of tormenting them a while, more or less, and killing them off again finally and forever! What man who has a human heart, especially a Christian heart, if he could believe that Paul had such a satanic heart as that, would ever want to read his writings again?

It avails my opponent nothing to name calamities which we could not hope for, but which nevertheless do come. He knows our faith enjoys the assurance that even all those undesirable calamities and evils which God ordains he will overrule for good. Yet even with this view of the final overruling

of God, we should be taken to be madmen or fiends if we should distinguish those calamities as separate events, and say we *hope* for them. Mr. H. indeed exhibits this feeling, when he says, "I should never have hoped for the Lisbon earthquake." This is a creditable protestation. But Paul *did hope* for the resurrection of the unjust. And he signalizes the resurrection of this portion of humanity as peculiarly a subject of Christian hope, and that in and of itself. It is so. For when, unto them respectively, death is swallowed up in victory, tears shall be wiped away from off all their faces.

Mr. H., in this connection, throws in the expression, "Now Christ very strongly asserted some sort of twofold resurrection, — of well-doers to life and of evil-doers to condemnation. Does the latter sound like a thing desirable?" Again: "The resurrection of the unjust, though it be *unto* condemnation, and to the 'second death,' etc. We had not expected this sort of running together of detached fragments of different passages which relate to entirely different subjects, from a biblical scholar not utterly creed-bound. There is no such thing taught in the Bible, as the initiation of any portion of mankind into a state of condemnation, or into a "second death," by the immortal resurrection. The uniform testimony of the gospel in relation to the future life disallows such a monstrosity. But, let it be remarked, that even the *temporal* evils which were signified by the coming forth from, not *hades*, but *mne-miois*, unto condemnation, were never spoken of by Christians as subjects of Christian hope. Jesus wept in view of these calamities which he saw that some of his people would suffer; and St. Paul was in much heaviness and sorrow in consideration of them. But for the resurrection of the dead, even of the *unjust*, Paul devoutly *hoped*. It was a prominent and soul-inspiring doctrine of the gospel, for which he was called in question.

But here is a sentence which appalls us: —

"But if their resurrection be itself the overflowing of the fountain of life, if they who 'will not come to Christ that they may have life' do yet in spite of themselves get more than

they wish, so that they die by instalments and even die hard, I can rejoice in all the preternatural life they have."

I hardly know how to express the emotions of feeling excited by this remarkable sentence. (I fear lest my faithfulness with my friend's sentiments and manner of argument, should be construed into discourtesy towards him personally. But I would have my ingenuous expressions of personal regard which were given in the outset suffice on that point, and would have the reader give his attention now entirely to principles and arguments.) In respect to the last quoted expression of views and feelings, when I recall to mind the pleasant countenance and genial soul of my friend, I wonder that the expression could ever have rolled from his pen. At first I thought it was a falsification of the Scripture adage, "A sweet fountain cannot send forth bitter waters." But on reflection I perceive that the relation of cause and effect holds good even here. For the sentence under notice came from an adequate and kindred cause, which was not his own good heart, but the fiendish creed in his head.

Let us analyze the sentence. In the first place, the resurrection power is represented as "the overflowing of the fountain of life," sending down a flood of life which has no reference to individuals, but to the mass, causing to germinate and vegetate into a perfect and ever-enduring existence those whose virtues in this life left an unction in their mortal remains sufficient to absorb it in adequate fulness, — and furthermore flowing over upon the sleeping ashes of little children and adult unbelievers whose virtues had embalmed them with no such unction, and revivifying *them* too. But upon these it shall not act with an assimilating force, but with a quickening force that shall animate antagonisms and produce violent contortions, and force from their agonized bosoms, especially with reference to this "second instalment" of life, the exclamations framed for them by Dr. Young:—

"Father of mercies ! why from silent earth
Didst thou awake and curse me into birth ?
Push into being a reverse of thee,
And animate a clod with misery ?"

And so,

“Rolling in vengeance, struggling with pain,”

perhaps for ages, they will “die by instalments, and die hard;” and Prof. H. “can rejoice in all the preternatural life they have!” If the Professor himself should be so fortunate, which, according to his theory is uncertain, as to leave a sufficient unction in his bones for the assimilating process of “the overflowing of the fountain of life” to work him into a perfect and ever-enduring organism, and his dear child, who fell asleep in death with a kiss of love, and an expressed wish to meet his loved father again, falls a little short of the requisite degree of virtue, comes forth a monster, animated by this “preternatural life” with misery, rolling up his bloodshot eyes with imploring gaze upon his observant father and all the powers of heaven, for some medicinal appliance that shall give him relief, but supplicating all in vain — wearing away long years or ages in writhings of anguish and howlings of torment, and at length, worn and wasted, “dies by instalments and dies hard,” — the good Professor “can rejoice in all this preternatural life” thus forced upon his son, which was a protracted throe of agony!

Gentle reader, do not judge my friend rashly, as if an evil spirit had taken away his heart of flesh and given him a heart of stone. This is not the language of his heart. It is an echo of his creed, which has not penetrated his heart, but only his head. He has a heart which will never rest until his faith shall be enlarged and exalted.

Mr. H. puts forth this inquiry: —

“Why should Universalists dwell so much on ‘the resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust’ (Acts xxiv. 15), as *literal*, while they take as simply *moral* or *spiritual* the words in John v. 28, 29? — ‘All that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of condemnation.’”

This question was answered long before he asked it. That “the resurrection of the dead,” in the discourse of Paul referred to, is the literal resurrection, is a fact standing out in all

the language in which it is uttered, and the circumstances and surroundings. But that, not "the resurrection of the dead" from *hades*, but coming forth from *mnemiois*, the sepulchres, some to life and some to condemnation, in John v., in parallel with the awaking from the dust, in Dan. xii., which is plainly interpreted by connections as referring to the judgment which should terminate the Jewish age; — that this event, I say, is *not* the literal resurrection, is so clearly manifest by the language and character of the description, and the subject of discourse introductory to it, that some of the ablest commentators whose creed would have derived aid from the construction of it as literal, have been constrained by honest conviction to receive it as figurative, and as referring to the same event to which we apply it.

For a full and critical discussion of this passage in John v., and of "the resurrection of the just," and of the great doctrine of the immortal resurrection of the human dead, see the Adams and Cobb Discussion, chapter iii., before referred to.

In my next chapter, I will examine the Destructionists' argument for the destruction of the resurrection of life.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DESTRUCTIONISTS' DIRECT BIBLE ARGUMENT FOR ANNIHILATION.

HAVING exhibited the great gospel doctrine of the resurrection, which comprises the future immortal life of all the Adamic family, and having also exposed the futility of all efforts to corrupt, limit, or fritter away this sublime doctrine of "grace and truth," I will now devote a brief chapter to an inspection of the direct proofs which Destructionists put forward in support of their hypothesis; to wit, that there is a work of death and destruction to succeed the resurrection, and make a final prey of countless millions of the resurrectioned offspring of God for whom Christ died.

In my chapter i. of this Discussion, I reviewed so much of my opponent's argument from "the general tenor of the Scripture language," as would make *natural death* the destruction of the whole being; and in the same connection I showed how clearly the obvious sense of the passages he quotes to illustrate the Scripture usage of the verbs *to perish* and *to be destroyed*, and the substantives *perdition* and *destruction*, forbids their application to a remediless extinguishment of existence, either before or after the resurrection. But now I come to examine the direct proofs, alleged from the Scriptures, of destruction after the resurrection.

And here I lay down my pen, and reperuse what Prof. Hudson has presented us, with a direct reference to this point, —and I confess that I am at a loss to decide what he really intends to have his Scripture quotations and references signify. He gives us numerous references to Scripture texts which recognize a difference between the character and condition of the righteous and the wicked, the believer and the unbeliever,

somewhere or other ; but what distinct point in controversy he means to make those texts establish, I am at a loss to determine. This much, however, I am authorized by his own framing of the main matter of discussion between us, to conclude that he aims on the whole to maintain ; viz., "*The utter extinction of an unregenerate portion of human beings.*" And if he has any Scripture quotations at all for the proof of this affirmative position of his, we may expect to find the strongest of them in the 3d section of his chapter iii. And here is the passage which he seems to fasten on as the most decisive :—

Matt. x. 28. "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul ; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Compare Luke xi. 5.

In my discussion with Dr. Adams, chapter i., section ii., the reader will find a full exposition of the philology, and Scripture usage throughout, of *gehenna*, and a critical and exegetical explanation of the entire expression of this particular passage. It is unnecessary, therefore, that I repeat the same in this place. Indeed, I do not see that Prof. H. undertakes to fault my exposition of this passage. Referring to the view which I maintain in that exposition, which takes the word "soul" (*psuke*) in the sense of the animal life, and the phrase "soul and body" to be proverbial, and the whole phrase in hand to denote an utter destruction, temporally,—he concludes that, "in a Bible that says nothing about an immortal soul, this interpretation is quite formidable." But he adds, "Admitting the phrase to be proverbial, it remains to be shown that the destruction named spares a principle of immortality, of which the Scriptures say nothing." Again he says, "It will remain for the Universalist to show that the Jews who suffered that punishment have any resurrection, either to 'everlasting life' or to immortality."

If it were not that I had great confidence in the honor and integrity of my opponent, I should have queried here whether his purpose in such suggestions were to enlighten or to confuse. Surely, he could not have supposed that these suggestions imply any argument against the Universalist faith, or in favor of

ultimate annihilation. When it is admitted that the *psuke* is the animal life, and that the destruction of *psuke and soma in gehenna* denotes "an utter destruction, temporally," then, so far as this passage is concerned, that is all. And if there is any argument for further destruction to preclude resurrection, in the saying that "it remains to be shown that the destruction named spares a principle of immortality," or "that the Jews who suffered that punishment have any resurrection, either to everlasting life or to immortality," then the same argument is good against all recovery and all human immortality. Whenever the passage is read, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," it may be replied that "it remains to be shown that they who suffer this death have any resurrection." When the passage is read, "The righteous perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart," we may gravely urge that "it remains to be shown that, perishing, as the righteous do, the destruction spares any principle of immortality." There were no end to confusion in this line of argument.

I repeat, when it is conceded that the destruction in the scripture before us is temporal destruction, nothing further can be argued from this passage. And as it respects the resurrection of the subjects of this "punishment of gehenna," we proved in the preceding chapter "that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust." And that there shall be another and more terrible destruction beyond the resurrection, is an assumption of my opponent, of which we are looking for proof. And surely that proof cannot be found in the record of a case of destruction which precedes the resurrection.

But, for this, my friend risks yet another effort upon the passage before us. Taking our view of "gehenna punishment" as "signifying simply the severest judgment," he argues from this its reference to ultimate annihilation, because that is severer than temporal destruction. Now there is danger of stretching an argument so unnaturally as to break it. My friend runs this hazard in the present instance. If he may argue against us, that final annihilation must be denoted by the

"punishment of gehenna," because that is *severer* than temporal destruction, the Orthodox may, with the same plea, argue that endless torment is denoted by it, because this is yet *severer* than annihilation. He will hence see that there is no safety in departing from the rule of Scripture interpretation by a just exegesis. When we find that, to the Jews, by adoption and usage, gehenna became an emblem of the sorest calamity or severest punishment, this finding does not involve the concession that it was, in the usage of their prophets, an emblem of the greatest evil that an almighty and cunning fiend could possibly devise. That which was signified by it was the sorest of real judgments of which God's spirit inspired them to warn the people.

Mr. Hudson's quotations from the Targums and Talmud, for expressions some of which seem to import the doctrine of ultimate destruction to some of mankind, and which construe some passages of the prophets as indicating that doctrine, are of no value in this discussion. We were all well aware, for our divine teacher had told us so, that the Jewish rabbies, even of his time inculcated sentiments which they presumed to denominate annotations on the Scriptures, which were not only unauthorized by the law, but even perverted and falsified the law, and made it void.* But even these perverters of God's word, in our Saviour's time, had not corrupted the use of gehenna to the emblemizing of any other than temporal punishments. *The Talmud* is a general name of records made of the rabbinical traditions, which were specially and repeatedly condemned by Jesus, in such manner as I have just noticed, and against the reception of which he expressly warned his disciples. These records were made in fragments, at different times, and were not completed until the second or third century, or later. We cannot admit them as New Testament commentaries. But the Talmud does not apply *gehenna* to any after-death condition. And the earliest Targum, or rab-

* Matt. xv. 3, 6; Mark vii. 9, 13; Matt. xiii. 6, 11, 12; Mark viii. 15; Luke xii. 1.

binical' paraphrase and commentary of Scripture, which invents such a use of gehenna, that of *Jonathan Ben Uzziel*, was probably composed as late as the fourth century, or later.*

Again, speaking of Schleusner's statement, which is quoted into our exposition referred to by the note at the foot of this page, that among the Jews "any severe punishment, especially a shameful kind of death, was denominated *gehenna*," Mr. H. says, "Setting out from this view, we naturally inquire how the Jews themselves came to use the term *gehenna*. Its general import is likely to appear in their traditions, though in these traditions may be many things foolish and puerile." To this I reply that, as just remarked, the use of *gehenna* as an emblem or a descriptive name of any state of punishment beyond temporal destruction, had not crept into the Jewish traditions in our Saviour's time. And how it came to be so used by Jewish rabbies in later times, as they popularized and intensified the Tartarian machinery of partially adopted heathen fables, is a question easily answered. When any sect, holding the Scriptures, either Old Testament or New, or both, as religious authority, adopts a new dogma, they naturally hunt over their Sacred Book for phraseology which they may *make* to apply to their adopted dogma. Just so did the early gentile Christian teachers, after the age of special inspiration. They came under the Christian denomination by receiving the testimony of the Messiahship of Jesus, and the Christian Scriptures as their text-book. But they brought with them, and this of necessity, much of the Eastern philosophies in which they were educated and of which they had been teachers, and explained much of the Scriptures by those philosophies. An instructive instance of this kind is quoted by my opponent, Affirmative, c. iv. § 3. Of Justin Martyr, who was a Platonic philosopher before conversion to the Christian name, he says, "He regarded man as on probation during life, awaiting a judgment after the resurrection. 'Plato,' he says, 'held that the wicked

* For particular information on the dates of the Targums, see our Discussion with Dr. Adams, c. i. § 2, before referred to.

will stand before Minos and Rhodamanthus, to be punished by them. We hold the same event, but before Christ as judge." Here we have a specimen of the early presumption, perhaps it may have been the first instance, of perverting the testimonies of the New Testament on judgment, by applying them, not to the subjects to which the inspired teachers applied them, but to the fabulous transactions of the fabulous regions of the Platonic poesy and philosophy. And I thank my opponent for the truthful remark, that "the severe faith was a burden to Justin's own mind. Yet the opinion, being once expressed, in an hour of darkness, and in a book of philosophy to make it respectable, was able to hold its way in the church." And it is in the kindest spirit that I invite my worthy friend to re-examine himself, how far his own application of the Scripture testimonies on judgment and retribution is but *the holding its way in his mind* of the practices of half-heathenized Jews and half-Christianized heathen. But more of this when we come to the Historical Chapter.

In respect to *the destruction of soul and body in gehenna*, Prof. H. refers to the exposition of Rev. H. Ballou, 2d, D. D., as admitting that "the danger here described is annihilation." Dr. Ballou does, indeed, erroneously as we have long believed, explain the destruction of soul and body in gehenna to import annihilation, or the destruction of the very principle of existence along with the body. But he does not admit that there was any danger of the execution of such extinction of being on the disciples. He explains it as a simple reference to the Divine power, as where it is said, "God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham." He does not admit that there is any more probability of the literal occurrence of one event than of the other. But I agree with Mr. Hudson that there was real danger of the occurrence of the destruction here signified, and what that destruction is I have explained in a manner satisfactory to myself, in the chapter and section of my discussion with Dr. Adams, before repeatedly cited.

But, so far as it respects my opponent's use of this passage of Scripture in direct proof of destruction beyond the resurrec-

tion, I need have said but a word upon it. In the advocacy of a theory which denies that man has any soul that survives the dissolution of the body, and tenaciously maintains that the *psuke* is the *animal life*, it is merely farcical to talk of the destruction of the *psuke* and *soma* in gehenna, as denoting more than temporal destruction.

In respect to the figurative use of *gehenna*, Mr. Hudson says, "Universalists maintain that the special punishment of gehenna was accomplished in the destruction of Jerusalem, in fulfilment of the prophecies in Jer. vii. 31-34; xix. 6-13. It seems to me difficult to refer all the passages that contain the expression, particularly James iii. 6, to that particular event." This is (unintentional on his part) a misrepresentation. True, we find, in the destruction of the Jewish city, church, and polity, the fulfilment of the special prophecies of the punishment of gehenna, that is, of the judgment which should make that city like Tophet, in *ghe ben Hinnom*. But we do *not* maintain that gehenna, in the Jewish usage, emblemized nothing else but that particular judgment. In our discussion with Dr. Adams we adopt the statement of Schleusner above quoted; and we add, what eminent biblical critics have substantially said, that the valley of Hinnom having become a scene of loathing to the Jews, it was used as an emblem of whatever was odious and fruitful of evil. And this view of its metaphorical use makes its application by James most strikingly appropriate, describing the unruly tongue as set on fire of gehenna; and likewise its use by Jesus in his description of the converts of the Pharisees, who were twofold more the children of gehenna than their teachers.

Mr. Hudson's next and last Scripture proof direct to the present question, that of destruction after the resurrection to life from the dead, or from the state of death, is the following:

2 Pet. ii. 12: "But these, as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things they understand not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption."

I referred to this, and sufficiently commented upon it, in

chap. i., in discussing the assumption that annihilation is the penalty of sin. But this passage so naturally explains itself — that is, it so literally describes a destruction which would naturally result from the corruptions of life with the persons spoken of, that no thorough biblical student could think for a moment of inferring from it any thing else but temporal destruction.

But my opponent says: "Granting, for argument's sake, that this refers to a temporal destruction." *For argument's sake?* We don't want any such granting. We want, first of all, to know what you will insist upon *for truth's sake*. If you think this means any thing more than temporal destruction, give us at least one reason for thinking so. But we will hear you through. "Granting, for argument's sake, that this refers to temporal destruction, it will remain for the Universalist to show that the phrase 'shall utterly perish' allows a subsequent resurrection to immortality." This is virtually the same demand upon Universalists made in a case just before noticed, in relation to the destruction of soul and body in gehenna. And I repeat my answer here: The recovery from *all* temporal destructions is found in that sublime subject of Christian *hope in God*, to wit, "the resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust." It is for another and final destruction beyond this victory of life, that we are looking, and looking too, thank God, in vain! And this is the main question between me and my learned opponent, whether, after death shall be swallowed up in the victory of life, that victory of life shall be transient and shall itself be swallowed up in the victory of death, and death's second victory shall be final. I greatly and piously rejoice that I have not his affirmative side of this question upon my mind or heart.

The Second Death.

But I have passed over, for the sake of more conveniently giving it attention here, Prof. Hudson's argument from the second death. He cites the following passage.

Rev. ii. 10, 11: "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will

give thee a crown of life. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the spirit saith unto the churches. He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death."

On this he amplifies as follows:—

"The phrase 'second death,' which is here contrasted with 'a crown of life,' occurs in three other places in this book, where it is put in contrast with 'resurrection,' 'book of life,' and 'water of life.' It was also common among the Jews, and the following examples go to show that it meant extinction of being: 'Every idolater, who says that there is another God besides me, I will slay with the second death, from which no man can come to life again.' (Pirke R. Elieser, c. 34.) 'Let Reuben live, and not die the second death, by which the ungodly die in the world to come.' (Targum of Jerusalem on Deut. xxxiii. 6.) 'This hath been decreed by the Lord, that this sin shall not be forgiven them, until they die the second death.' (Targum on Isa. xxii. 14.)"

This is putting one's self to a labor for proof of the ultimate destruction of man, which is worthy of a better cause. But that better cause would require no such labor. The essential doctrines of Christianity stand out in bold relief in the New Testament. Nevertheless, we object not to a fair and scholarly reference to the language and customs of the age of Jesus and his apostles on the earth, for aid in the construction of rare and doubtful phrases in the New Testament. But we must pay due regard to the date of the writings we quote, whether contemporary with or subsequent to that of the New Testament records; and if we find a phrase in the New Testament which may possibly have been borrowed from contemporary usage, it is important that we examine whether it were borrowed for the purpose of *attesting* or *repudiating* the vulgar idea attached to it.

Let us examine the course of argument pursued in this case by my opponent.

In the first place, he goes to the book of Revelation for phraseology which is not found in any other part of the Bible, and seeks in this an explanation of other Scriptures to favor his wishes. This is reversing the general rule of biblical

critics, who agree that we may go to "Revelation" for illustration of the plain doctrines of the other Scriptures, but not for proof of a new doctrine. In accordance with this scholarly view, Mr. J. P. Blanchard, a popular theologian of the Destructionist order in this city, in his pamphlet on "The Future Life," before referred to, says, p. 7 : —

"In this investigation, no reference will be made to the book called 'Revelation of St. John,' at the close of the New Testament, as that book is expressly visionary; and, if intended as a prophecy in symbols, no certain inference can be drawn from a literal understanding of its language."

But, in the second place, Prof. Hudson, after going to the book of "Revelation" for phraseology not found elsewhere in the Bible, but very convenient for his use if it can only be made to mean in this book what he wants it should mean, hastens forthwith to certain Jewish Targums for its explanation. From the Jerusalem Targum, which is thought by the learned generally to have been written in the seventh century, but which is understood by Horne to be more probably of as late a date as the eighth or ninth century, he quotes a sentence containing the phrase, "the second death," with the view to show what was the common use of the phrase in the apostolic age. But everybody knows that the Jewish rabbies multiplied their follies at so rapid a rate within eight or nine hundred years after Christ, that the Targum of Jerusalem can afford us no aid in deciding as to the use of certain rare phrases in the beginning of the Christian era.

And by turning to the passage of Scripture, the Targum's paraphrase of which is quoted by my opponent, the reader will see that the paraphrase is a most ridiculous creation of the comparatively modern rabbi's heathenized fancy. It is this: Deut. xxxiii. 6 : "Let Reuben live, and not die; and let not his men be few." It is in the blessing of Moses, pronounced just before his death, upon the several tribes of Israel, and simply utters the prayer that the tribe of Reuben might be "perpetuated in the land, and not permitted to become extinct."

And so with the paraphrase quoted from the Targum on Isa. **xxii. 14.** This is a prophecy of the continued downward course of Israel unto a desolating calamity, thus: "And it was revealed in mine ears by the Lord of hosts; surely, this iniquity shall not be purged from you till ye die, saith the Lord of hosts." Hence it is seen that the paraphrase of the Targum, on this likewise, is a mere silly creation of a lawless visionary. And then, to quote these Targums for even the *Jewish* phraseology in the apostolic age, is like the wolf's charge of the lamb's roiling his drink, when the latter was at a good distance from him down the stream.

But there were false, very false and unscriptural doctrines held by the Jews in the apostolic age. A very respectable party of them, as we have had occasion to notice before, were Destructionists more thorough than my opponent, holding the annihilation of all men. And I know not but some of the Pharisees held to the annihilation of their enemies, who were of course the wicked. But if they held, as my opponent seems sometimes to hold, that the future life is a reward of virtue, and the wicked shall have no resurrection, then, of course, there is to them, in the fact of their annihilation, no second death, but an eternal perpetuation of the first death.

But if it were so, that some Jewish rabbi in the apostles' time had used the phrase "second death" for an extinction of being, then St. John virtually says that such sentiment, and such use of language, are utterly false. For he says (Rev. **xx. 14**), "And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death." As if he had said, "*This, and nothing else, is the second death.*"

I will illustrate the idea by an anecdote. Governor Strong, in an official document at the opening of the Madisonian war with England, condemned the act of going to war with that great Christian nation, because she is "the bulwark of our religion." Some time after I was riding, by stage, in company with Gen. Boyd, when, passing a school-house, the General exclaimed with emphasis, "*These* are the bulwark of our religion." Every fellow-passenger understood him, of course, to

repudiates Gov. Strong's assertion, that Great Britain is the bulwark of our religion. So when St. John says, "And death and hell were cast into the lake of fire; *This* is the second death,"—if there were any other usage of the phrase, he hereby repudiates it.

And "the lake of fire," here defined to be the "second death," is not the killing off of resurrectioned spirits in the future life, but the second dissolution of the Jewish church and state. The lake of fire is described, in Rev. xix. 20, as representing the condition of the beast with seven heads and ten horns, explained, chapter xvii., to signify certain kings and kingdoms in trouble on the earth. The subject of chapter xx. is not the literal resurrection to the life immortal, but the arraignment of that people, dead in sin, to judgment. The same is described in Dan. vii., and explained to be a judgment in connection with the setting up of Christ's kingdom on the earth; and also in Dan. xii. 1-3, in connection with a time of trouble which Jesus describes in Matt. xxiv. 21, and times to that generation; verse 84.

See this whole subject extensively and exegetically explained, in Adams and Cobb's Discussion, chapter i. section v. The visions of the book of Revelation are, generally, reproductions, not of contemporary Jewish traditions, and of course not of the babblings of Targums of later ages,—but of the visions of the old prophets, especially of Ezekiel and Daniel. These visions were witnessed and published by St. John, shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem, and seem to have been designed for opening, as it were, the visions of the old prophets referred to, which had been "sealed to the time of the end," and were now about to be fulfilled.

There is one other passage which my opponent refers to in argument to the point now in hand, which I will quote here for a word of remark; and the rest I will treat, as he has presented them, by the lump. This one of which I speak is 2 Thess. i. 9: "Who shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his power." By reading the whole passage with care, it will be

seen that this refers to the awards of a temporal judgment, of the near approach of which (as then at hand, upon the Jews who were the instigators of what persecution the church was suffering) their current persecutions were a manifest token. This belongs to the judgment of that age. For a full exposition of the general subject of judgment as a branch of the Divine government, and of several remarkable special judgments under the general economy, read the whole of Adams and Cobb's Discussion, chapter i.; and for the judgment of that age, see chapters vi. and vii.; and for an exposition of this passage in Thessalonians in particular, see chapter vii., under the head, "*Another Infinite Mistake.*"

And now, so far as our present discussion is concerned, I only need to present a few facts and remarks, to dispose in the whole of the other passages which Mr. H. has collected *en masse*, in chapter iii. § 3, under the terms, TO PERISH, TO BE DESTROYED, PERDITION, DESTRUCTION.

To Perish — is literally to waste away, or die; or morally to become enfeebled and corrupted. For example: — "That the land perish not through famine;" Gen. xli. 36. "He (David) shall descend into battle, and perish;" 1 Sam. xvi. 10. "If I (Esther) perish, I perish;" Esth. iv. 16. "Where there is no vision, the people perish;" Prov. xxix. 18. "Give strong drink to him that is ready to perish;" xxxv. 6. "Lord save us: we perish;" Matt. viii. 25. "I perish with hunger;" Luke xv. 17. "And ye shall perish among the heathen;" Lev. xxvi. 38. "Except ye repent ye shall all likewise perish;" i. e. like as did the eighteen on whom the tower of Siloam fell, and the Galileans whose blood Pilate mingled with their sacrifices; Luke xiii. 3, 5. "The world being overflowed with water, perished;" 2 Pet. iii. 6. "There is a just man that perisheth in his righteousness;" Eccl. vii. 15. "The righteous perisheth, and no man layeth it to heart;" Isa. lvii. 1.

From these promiscuous quotations the reader will perceive that to *perish* is to decay and fail, morally and physically, and that it usually means *to die*. In a great number of cases it

expresses a result which men bring upon themselves in a signal, painful and unseasonable manner, by their vices. But in no case does it signify a death which the resurrection of life immortal, and the reconciliation of all things to God, will not swallow up in victory, any more than in the case where it says, "The righteous perisheth." When Paul says, 1 Cor. viii. 11, "Through thy knowledge shall the weak brother perish for whom Christ died," he had no conception that the weak brother for whom Christ died might possibly be annihilated by his eating meat through greater faith. For Christ had said that none should be able to pluck them out of his hand. The danger was that the weak brother might lose his spiritual strength, and relapse for a season into his heathen state.

The word *destroy* is synonymous with *perish*, but is an active rather than a passive verb. It always involves an active agent in the work. "And ye shall destroy all this people;" Num. xxxii. 15. This had no reference to any thing farther than extermination from the earth. "The prosperity of fools shall destroy them;" Prov. i. 32. "My people are destroyed for lack of knowledge;" Hos. iv. 6. "O Israel, thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thy help;" Hos. xiii. 9. So then the word, by its own force, signifies nothing which excludes the idea of help, or deliverance. The passage from Hosea calls to mind the words of Paul; "For ye are dead; but your life is hid with Christ in God;" Col. iii. 3.

The word DESTRUCTION need not be considered separately, as it is but the substantive form of *destroy*. And PERDITION means the same. Indeed, *destruction* and *perdition* are rendered from the same word in the original. And *destroy*, and *perish*, and *lose*, and *lost*, are all from the same Greek word, *apollumi*, in its different inflections. Accordingly, when we read, "I have *lost* none but the son of *perdition* (the word *perdition* being from the substantive form of the same word as *lost*), or, "broad is the way that leadeth to destruction;" (*apoleian*, the substantive form again;) or, "if he *lose* one" sheep; or, "I have found the sheep that was *lost*;" or, "if she *lose* one piece" of money, and, "I have found the piece which

I had *lost*;" or, "I *perish* with hunger," and, "this thy brother was *lost*, and is found;" or, "I am not sent but to the *lost* sheep of the house of Israel;" or, "the Son of man is come to save that which was *lost*;" or, "If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost;" we read in every case from the same Greek root.

It is hence seen to be impossible to take the word *apollumi*, in any or all its inflections, to mean *annihilation*. The sheep that was *lost* and *restored*; the piece of money that was *lost* and *found*; the prodigal son who was *lost*, and the *lost* sheep of the house of Israel,—all these were not *annihilated*. But they all, in the popular sense of the word, were *lost*, yet subjects of recovery. The loving father called upon his murmuring son to rejoice with him, that his brother who had been lost was found. But it would have sounded strangely if he had said that his brother who had been *out of existence* was found. That selfish son would doubtless have preferred that his brother had been out of existence, for then he could not have been restored. But it was not so.

But the Destructionist will rely upon qualifying terms which in some cases are connected with perishing, destruction, etc., such as *utter*, and *utterly*, and *shall not be*. I have already shown that these qualifying terms are merely strong, perhaps hyperbolical expressions, natural to Eastern style, merely denoting the completeness or thoroughness of the judgment signified, according to its kind. And to set this matter in a perfectly clear light, I will present here the strongest case of the description suggested which is recorded in the Bible. It is in Ps. lix. 13–15. Speaking of his enemies, the Psalmist says, "Consume them in wrath; consume them, that they may not be." This is a strong expression; and if there is language in the Bible that will express the idea of an utter extinction of being, this expresses it. And yet the context shows that such is not its meaning. "Consume them in wrath; consume them, that they may not be; and let them *know* that God ruleth in Jacob unto the ends of the earth. And at evening let them *return*, and let them *make a noise like a dog*, and go round about

the city. Let them wander up and down for meat, and grudge if they be not satisfied." That is not an extinction of conscious being which "consumes them that they may not be," and yet leaves them in a state in which they may "know that God ruleth in Jacob unto the ends of the earth."

There is an interesting case of this figure of hyperbole in Zeph. iii. 8, 9. "Therefore wait ye upon me, saith the Lord, until the day that I rise up to the prey: for my determination is to gather the nations, that I may assemble the kingdoms, to pour upon them mine indignation, ~~even~~ all my fierce anger; for all the earth shall be devoured with the fire of my jealousy. For then will I turn to the people a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve him with one consent."

But to return to the general Scripture use and meaning of the terms *perish*, *lost*, etc. — in the present light of the subject we are affected with strange surprise when we read from our learned and critical opponent such a sentence as the following. Speaking of Rom. v. 18, he says:—

"This apparently denotes all mankind, and their salvation. It seems to me the strongest passage that is or can be adduced in support of that view. And if this interpretation at all agreed with the general *tone* of Scriptural language,—if it were not an apparent exception from the usual style of the Bible,—I should joyfully and without hesitation accept it as proving the final holiness and blessedness of all.

"But the very frequent distinction made between the 'saved' and the 'lost' compels me to hesitate and examine the passage more narrowly."

How is it that so able a Christian scholar, in view of the familiar use of the term *lost* in the Scriptures, as describing the former state of those that *are* saved by *faith*, and the present condition of the others whom it is the purpose of Christ's mission to save,—how is it that "the frequent distinction made between the 'saved' and the 'lost,'" should compel him to hesitate, and set himself at work to torture and fritter away the free, full, and flowing apostolic testimony, to the fulness and sufficiency of Christ to do that very work of his mission, which

is to *save the lost*? "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks."

To conclude this chapter, I will remark to the reader, that we have now seen the Destructionists' strong Bible proof of destruction beyond the resurrection, and yet it appears to me to be utterly wanting. I think I state the case fairly when I say, that the advocates of Destructionism have adopted *no de novo* exegesis of the sacred writings, to correct the popular Orthodox misapplication of the Scripture teachings on the grand principles and purposes of the divine government, and on judgment, retribution, etc. They abide in the same mechanical application of the passages in relation to judgment and retribution to a simultaneous arraignment of all men at the end of the mundane system, to mete unto them all respectively according to the characters they formed in their earth-life. Only there is this difference; the Destructionist construes the punishment that shall be awarded at that fabulous judgment, to be, or result in, an eternal extinction of existence, instead of an eternal continuance of being in misery. Having become wearied of contemplating the great Father as employing himself to all eternity in torturing his dependent children, they feel that it will be some relief to have him kill them off a second time, and finally (those whom he cannot govern) put them forever out of the way. And to acquire this relief, they have assiduously applied themselves to the work of construing the everlasting punishment into everlasting extinction.

It will be seen that, in the main, our answer to the Orthodox Bible argument is equally good against the Destructionist Bible argument; and if our expositions of the Scriptures in reply to the "Scriptural Argument" of Dr. Adams are good — if they exhibit truly the principles and purposes of the Divine government, and judgment as a co-operative branch of the government, designed to aid the great gospel scheme which is to eventuate in the subjection and reconciliation of all things to God through Jesus Christ — then the Destructionist theory is shown to be unscriptural.

Nevertheless, this discussion of the latter theory, to follow that of the former, is deeply interesting and important. Led by a man of so extensive education and research as Mr. Hudson, we are conducted to a more thorough investigation of the doctrine of human immortality, and into a more critical examination of some of the same subjects in some of their bearings which were introduced by Dr. Adams, thus bringing out what an able rejoinder to our reply by that opponent would have elicited. We are also called upon by the arguments of our present opponent, who is Arminian on the question of Free Will, to present, as we shall in a future chapter,* an argument on the tenure of the gospel purpose and promises, to which we were not conducted by our former opponent, who is Calvinistic. And furthermore, the Historical Argument introduced by Prof. H., which we are shortly to attend to, will be found of pleasing interest and signal value.

The next chapter will treat the subject of *life*, and *eternal life*, as the fruit of faith ; and the Scripture doctrine of reward in general.

* See chap. vi. sec. ii

CHAPTER V.

LIFE, AND AIONION LIFE, AS THE FRUIT OF FAITH; AND
THE SUBJECT OF REWARD IN GENERAL.

PROF. H., in the third chapter of his Affirmative Argument, has the following propositions, in the form of inquiries:—

“§ 5. *Do the phrases zoe aionios (rendered in our version ‘eternal’ or ‘everlasting life,’ by Universalists, ‘age-lasting’ or ‘aionion life,’) and its equivalent zoe eis ton aiona, imply immortal life?*”

“§ 6. *If ‘aionion life’ does not imply immortal life, then do any who fail of it finally attain immortal life?*”

I set these two inquiries together, because the arguments which are presented under them intermingle, and I must group them somewhat in my review.

On the word *aionios*, rendered everlasting and eternal in the Scriptures, I have no occasion for any extended criticism, as for this, the reader may refer to Adams' and Cobb's Discussion, chapter vi. Furthermore, there does not appear to be any essential difference between me and my present opponent, on the primitive meaning and Scriptural use of this word in its different forms. He has a few remarks, however, which I will briefly notice as I pass.

1. Speaking of the practice of Universalists in the use of the word *aionion*, the Greek adjective, in preference to the translation by everlasting or eternal, he says, “But this is not to *translate* the words of life; and we should not be content with a mere *transfer*, when a translation involves or betrays no difficulty.” This fails to present fairly the state of the case. The translation does involve a difficulty, which the use of the original word Anglicized obviates. That difficulty is in the fact, that there is a meaning, in the common mind, attached to the

English terms everlasting and eternal, and which these words are understood to express by their own force, which the original, by its own force, does not bear. I would like to have our dictionaries amended in this particular; but it cannot be; for dictionaries must follow, and not create usage. The word *eternal*, from the substantive *eternity*, should be taken of its own force to signify infinite duration; and *everlasting*, from *ever* or *continual* and *lasting*, to signify of *long continuance*, *continual* or *time indefinite*. This would make everlasting a synonym of *aionios*, from *aion*, which is compounded of *aei*, *always*, and *on*, *being*. In every instance in which *aei*, as a separate word, is used in the New Testament, it is translated by *always* and *ever*, and refers to the perpetuity of the matters spoken of in the present time; as, "Cornelius prayed to God always;" "Rejoice in the Lord always;" "To have these things always in remembrance;" "Ye do always resist the Holy Ghost." Hence everlasting, long or continually enduring, that is, continually in its time or sphere, if it could be made to occupy such a place in the common mind, would be a good translation of *aionios*. But my opponent knows that it is infinitely more difficult to change the popular usage of an old word, than to gain acceptance to a new word in its true meaning. And *aionios*, Anglicized and truly defined, is made to be a better expression "of the words of life" than a mistranslation.

2. Mr. Hudson finds an objection to receiving the substantive *aion* as meaning an age or periodical dispensation of providence, in the awkwardness which it would sometimes make to appear in the translation. He presents the following examples: "Shall not thirst (*eis ton aiona*) during the Christian dispensation." "Shall not perish (*eis ton aiona*) during the Christian era." "Shall live (*eis ton aiona*) during the future age."

These examples he extends farther. But he perfectly well knows that it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to express in English words the precise idea of the original in some of these cases. King James' translators did not undertake a translation in these cases, but, for the phrase, *eis ton aiona*,

substituted such a single English word as they *theologically* preferred. Now let my opponent place himself at my side, and we will accompany each other in our attempt at a literal translation. "Shall not thirst," *eis*, unto, *ton*, the, *aiona*—what now, friend Hudson? What English word will you adopt as the translation of *aiona*? It is a noun, and you must take some one English noun for a translation. You will say, *eternity*. So we have it,—“Shall not thirst *unto the eternity*.” Yet you do not believe that there was any such stiffness, or any design on the part of Jesus to strain the Samaritan woman’s mind to any such vast conception of duration, in the original remark. He simply meant to assure her that the principles of his truth received into the understanding and heart, would yield an *abiding*, a *lasting* satisfaction. It was merely to intensify this idea that the phrase *eis ton aiona* was added to the negative adverb, *not*, which also occurs in this sentence.

I grant that, in some such cases, the word *age* does not well express the original idea, because that word would seem to measure or limit the time more definitely than the original word, which denotes continuance *indefinite*. But the idea is obvious; viz., that the refreshment of soul, the satisfaction of mind, from the principles of Christian truth, is not, like that from the water which the woman sought, failing every hour, but is permanent and abiding. This idea of its durability, rather than that of endlessness, will be conceded, I think, by my opponent. For he, being a “Free-Willer,” admits that persons may once receive Christ’s word, and subsequently become drawn away and blinded for a season. Nevertheless, spiritual riches are abiding in their nature, and the true believer finds them so.

But as it respects the question between Universalism and Partialism, on the meaning of *aion*, my friend will not side against us; for he knows that this word does not, of its own force, signify *eternity*, for then we should have presented in the New Testament the anomaly of “the end of eternity.”

Now that I am upon a series of preliminary criticisms and observations, I will have one thing definitely and *aionically* un-

derstood between myself and opponent ; to wit, that he is not to presume to have gained any advantage in this controversy, or to have thrown any position of mine into the least doubt, by selecting a word which the common version never ventures to translate literally, and, fastening upon my leading and general definition, then essaying to exhibit a difficulty by carrying it through with literal and unbending exactitude in all cases. I demand of him, that he take some position, himself, on the literal definition of *aion*, and I will take mine, and we will see who can go through with the least annoyance from difficulties. Let him adopt for his definition of this word, *infinite duration, eternity*, — and he cannot go through the Scripture readings with it, without utter discomfiture. I will take Parkhurst's lexicographical definition, "Duration, or continuance of time, but with great variety ; an age, or periodical dispensation of divine providence," etc. ; and with this I will go through the whole Bible without a case of serious difficulty. For, as I take the word to denote duration indefinite, I can construe it in all cases according to the nature of the subjects respectively. And if my opponent shows me a case where it would appear awkward to render it *age*, I will put it back to him whether he will make it more philologically symphonious to render it in that and all cases *eternity*. And if he will suffer the accepted translators, on account of the difficulty in the way, to refuse to translate *eis ton aiona* at all, and to give it a free reading as per their theological judgment, I will translate it literally where it will make good sense to do so, and in other cases give it a free reading also, according to *my* judgment of the sense of the passage. For instance : if they will make the words of Jesus to the Samaritan woman, "shall not thirst *eis ton aiona*," to read, "shall *never* thirst," I will read it, "shall not be subject to perpetually recurring thirst." If they make the Master's words to the Jews, "But he that shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost hath not forgiveness *eis ton aiona*, but is in danger of *aionion kriseos*," to read, "hath never forgiveness, but is in danger of *eternal damnation*," I will read it literally, "hath not forgiveness *to the age*, but is in danger of *age*—

lasting condemnation." This will harmonize the passage with itself, making the aionion condemnation of that people, who denounced as demoniacal the Holy Spirit by which Jesus wrought miracles, to be condemnation for the same aion during which they should remain unforgiven, or disenthralled from their darkness and unbelief. And by this reading the passage is harmonized also with Matthew's record of the same remark of Jesus, "It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this nor the coming *aionos*." For our views and arguments more at length upon this passage, we must again refer to our other discussion, pp. 463-5. I will, however, add a few words in this place, with reference to my opponent's ingenious and off-hand disposal of *aionos* as applied to a then future age, as if the Universalist definition involved the idea that it is definitively and exclusively appropriated by the Scripture writers to the gospel age in its wholeness, to one and the same extent. It is thus that he creates an occasion to query as to the fate of those who are not forgiven, even in the gospel or Messianic age. But no inspired writer has given us any table of definitions, restricting the phrase, *aionos to come*, to an application to the Messianic age in its wholeness only. This phrase occurs in the New Testament but in four instances, twice in the Gospels and twice in the Epistle to the Hebrews, and in connection with different topics. And we are left to inquire of the subject of discourse in each case as to the periodical dispensation referred to. As there was a plurality of *aions** before the Christian era, so there may be a plurality of *aions* under the general gospel dispensation. The New Testament does indeed, not by terming them *aions*, but by descriptions of facts, present to us successive divisions and periods of the gospel work. 1. Near the close of the Mosaic economy, when that and the Messianic dispensations lapped, there was a dispensation of the gospel to the Jews exclusively. Jesus said, "I am not sent but to the lost sheep of the house of Israel." (Matt. xv. 24.) And he

* In respect to the plurality of past *aions*, in 1 Cor. x. 11, "on whom the ends of the world are come," the word *aion*, mistranslated *world*, is in the plural, and should read, "on whom the ends of the ages are come."

commanded his disciples, saying, "Go not in the way of the Gentiles, but go rather to the lost sheep of the house of Israel" (Matt. x. 5, 6.) 2. The next period or *aion* of the general Messianic mission, is the gospel to the Gentiles exclusively. This is the current dispensation; and it commenced with the fulfilment of what Jesus said to the Jews, weeping over their city, "If thou hadst known, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace; but now they are hid from thine eyes." (Luke xix. 42.) Again, "The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof." (Matt. xxi. 43.) And direct reference is made to it when Paul and Barnabas, waxing bold in the contest with the Jews who "contradicted and blasphemed," said unto them, "It was necessary that the word of God should first have been spoken to you; but seeing ye put it from you, and judge yourself unworthy of *aionion* life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles." (Acts xiii. 46.)

This segmentary *aion* of the Messianic mission is very definitely treated by St. Paul, in Rom. xi. "What then? Israel hath not obtained that which he seeketh for; but the election hath obtained it, and the rest were blinded. According as it is written, God hath given them the spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see; . . . and bow down their back alway. I say then, have they stumbled that they should fall (that is, finally)? God forbid! But rather through their fall salvation is come to the Gentiles. Now if the fall of them be the riches of the world, and the diminishing of them the riches of the Gentiles, how much more their fulness? . . . What shall the receiving of them be, but life from the dead? . . . For I would not, brethren, that ye should be ignorant of this mystery, lest ye should be wise in your own conceits, that blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And so all Israel shall be saved; as it is written, There shall come out of Sion the Deliverer, and shall turn away ungodliness from Jacob; for this is my covenant unto them when I shall take away their sins."

Jesus had signified the same order in the work of his mis-

sion. Speaking of the relation to it of Jews and Gentiles, he said, "The last shall be first, and the first last." (Matt. xx. 16.) Again, "Behold, your house is left unto you desolate. For I say unto you, ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord." (Matt. xxiii. 38, 39.)

3. So then there is another sub-division, another *aion*, of the general gospel mission, beyond that of Israel's excision, and the particular dispensation of the gospel to the Gentiles; viz., a peculiar dispensation of favor to Israel; — so that we shall see fulfilled the Scripture which saith that, "as ye in times past have not believed God, yet have now obtained mercy through their unbelief, even so have these also now not believed, that through your mercy they also may obtain mercy. For God hath concluded them all in unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all."

Now as the Greek *aionos* means not, of its own force, any one particular period, but any period to which the subject in a given case applies it, we are led by the subject as expounded by the Scriptures, to understand the *aionos* then to come, during which the blasphemers against the Holy Spirit should not have forgiveness, of the particular dispensation of the gospel to the Gentiles. There can be no mistake here, because the blasphemy against the Holy Spirit is defined, (Matt. xii. 24; Mark iii. 30) to be the sin peculiar to the Jews in charging the miracles of Christ to Beelzebub; and the succeeding age of darkness and condemnation to that people as resulting from such extreme perversity, is clearly defined, as we have seen, to be the periodical dispensation of Providence for the bringing in of the Gentiles. And, to the question whether there is to be, after this, a dispensation of favor, and forgiveness of sins, to the condemned Jews, the Scripture answer is YES; — "Blindness in part is happened to Israel, until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in. And so all Israel shall be saved. . . . For this is my covenant unto them when I shall take away their sin." The taking away of sin is the forgiveness of sin; for forgiveness is *deliverance from*, and of course the forgiveness

of sin is deliverance from the love and power and condemnation of sin.

If the question be urged here, whether these testimonies of forgiveness of sins and salvation at length to lost Israel, relate to individuals, or to the people in their national capacity, I answer, you may have it in your own way. Just as far as you take the fall and condemnation to refer to the individuals, just so far you must admit the salvation to refer to individuals, being in very deed "life from the dead;" and in any extent to which the fall and punishment is taken to refer to that people collectively as a nation, the restoration must be in like manner applied to them collectively.

I regard the following question of my opponent now fully and decisively answered — "Is there a *third* dispensation, of forgiveness of sins unpardonable in the *second*?" There is a third period of the general Messianic kingdom, in which that people who were to "bow down their back alway" during the second period, shall be brought into the light of the kingdom, and forgiveness of sins.

But Mr. H. thinks to cut off this hope with the following quotation from Hebrews; "For it is impossible for those who were once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good word of God, and the powers of the aionos to come, if they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance, seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and put him to open shame." (vi. 4-6.)

In relation to this quotation, I will first remind my opponent that it has no reference to the blasphemy against the holy Ghost, or to the fate of those who committed it. It describes apostate Christians. And then, as to its application to these, he forces it into an extreme which is a sorer "asthmatic exegesis" * than that which receives as positive the 28th verse of Mark iii., refusing to qualify it by verse 29. By looking into the preceding context it will be seen that the apostle was ad-

* See Affirmative, p. 90.

vising against the effort, as unavailing, to recover their erring brethren who had fallen from their profession of faith, by a repetition of the *rudiments* of the doctrine of Christ, or a laying again of the *foundation* of repentance. They were to "go on to perfection." They would find it extremely difficult, by a recurrence to the former means, "to renew them again unto repentance." Even this was not a natural impossibility; but it was extremely difficult. Even when Jesus described the difficulty in the way of inducing a rich man to enter the Christian profession, by saying that it was "easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle," he did not mean that it was a natural impossibility; for when the disciples asked in amazement, "Who then can be saved?" he said unto them, "With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible." This was as if he had said, "I am speaking of the ordinary forces of human instrumentalities; but there is a work in the hand of God which shall not fail." So in the case cited from St. Paul; though in the ordinary course of the Christian ministry on earth, it was extremely difficult to renew to repentance one who had fallen from the Christian faith, — yet the unbelief of men shall not make the truth of God without effect (Rom. iii. 3); nor does the language of the apostle imply any difficulty in the way of God's performing his promised work of the "resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust."

Nor is there any more advantage to my opponent from his other quotation to this point, and interrogatory argument; to wit, "For if we sin wilfully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth, there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins, but a certain fearful looking for of judgment, and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries." (Heb. x. 26-27.) This refers to Hebrew Christians who, not from honest doubt, but "wilfully," with a view to temporal advantages, renounced the Christian name, and banded with the hostile Jews. They could not forget the information they had received from the Christian teachers, of the approaching judgment upon their nation — they knew that the Mosaic code of rituals terminated in the offering of Christ and was then void,

so that there was to them no more ritual sacrifice for sins to yield them peace with God,—nothing to mitigate their fearful apprehensions of the approaching fiery indignation upon their people.

But my opponent puts in an interrogatory argument against our hope here, in these words: "Granting this 'judgment and fiery indignation' to signify the destruction of Jerusalem,* where is the 'sacrifice for sins' thereafter?" I answer, *there was none*. For the sacrifices for sins here meant, which no longer "remained" to a Christianized Jew, were the ritual sacrifices which were done away.

What then? Has Christ failed? No. Neither by the blood of goats and calves, but by his own blood, he entered in once into the holy place, having obtained eternal redemption for us." (Heb. ix. 12.) And he hath "obtained a more excellent ministry, by how much also he is the mediator of a better covenant, which was established upon better promises." (viii. 6.) The distinguishing excellence of this better covenant, and of its better promises, will be elucidated in chapter vi. Suffice it to say now that my opponent has given us no proof of a species of sin from which there is never deliverance in time or eternity.

• *Zoe Aionios.*

And now we come directly to the question, whether the phrase *zoe aionios*, rendered in our version "eternal life," and "everlasting life," implies immortal life. I have found the amount of labor which I have here expended preparatory to a direct treatment of the main question of this chapter, to be

* It is commendably respectful towards the apostle for my opponent to "grant this 'judgment and fiery indignation' to signify the destruction of Jerusalem," for so the apostle explains it himself. For he said to the brethren whom he exhorted to steadfastness in the profession of their faith, that *they saw the day approaching* (in the fulfilment of the *signs* designated by the Master), when the "judgment and fiery indignation" should become a verity (verse 25). And he informed them that the visible approach of those fiery trials was the particular occasion of his earnestness in the special exhortations which he then gave them.

called for, by my opponent's manner of grouping cases of the use of *aionos* and *aionios*, in connection with various subjects, as if they must have a uniform meaning. It was needful that the mist, in which such indiscriminate grouping is calculated to envelop the mind, should be cleared away, that the reader might be placed in a position to read those indefinite and accommodating terms with an enlightened and independent judgment of their meaning in each case, according to the nature of the subject.

The word "imply," employed by my opponent in his question, is rather indefinite for a close and discriminative discussion. A phrase may be used as a direct *expression* of one thing, and at the same time *imply* another thing which bears a relation to it, as a cause, or an effect, or a reciprocal and correlative fact. For instance, St. Paul's words, "For we which have believed do enter into rest," *imply* the existence and revealment to them of a truth which was the subject of faith, and the nature of which was such as to impart rest and satisfaction to the mind that receives it. But the thing directly affirmed is only this, that they who believed *did enter* into rest. So with regard to the matter before us. If my friend had asked me whether the phrase *zoe aionios*, or *everlasting life*, *directly expresses* the fact of an immortal existence through the resurrection of the dead, I should have promptly answered in the negative, by an emphatic NO. But I am supremely happy to say, that the phrase in question *implies* immortal life, as the subject of that gospel revelation the *belief* of which is *aionion life*. It is because faith imbibes the color and quality of its subject, that belief in the gospel which brings life and immortality to light for the dying family of man, is unto us life, and *aionion life*. So then, when *aionion life* is used for the fruit or reward of faith in the gospel, it does not directly mean the immortal existence, because that is the truth revealed and the subject of faith, which of course our faith does not produce.

We will permit our Master and his apostles to define their own use of the phrase *everlasting life*, and of the single word *life* in the same relation.

Jesus saith, "And every one that hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for my name's sake, shall receive an hundred-fold, and shall inherit everlasting life." (Matt. xix. 29.) When should he inherit everlasting life? He should possess it in the possession of so true and practical a faith. For he says again, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come unto condemnation, but is passed from death unto life." (John v. 24.) Again, (vi. 47,) "He that believeth on me hath everlasting life."

The words of Christ in answer to Peter's question about their reward for relinquishing earthly advantages for his sake, Matthew's record of which we have quoted above, Luke records thus: "Shall receive manifold more in this present time, and in the *aionos* to come life everlasting." Luke, of course, had reference to the Messianic age, which, though he spoke of it in its wholeness as an age to come, had already come with its power to give *aionion* life. But viewing both as present, the mention of the Messianic *aion* as the source of spiritual good, in distinction from this world as the source of temporal good, is just and usual. In like manner Jesus discriminates in the following case: "These things I have spoken unto you, that in me ye might have peace. In the world ye shall have tribulation." Here Jesus presents two opposite contemporary sources of life-condition — himself or his kingdom yielding life and peace, while the world was yielding tribulation.

In respect to *aionion* life, when Jesus commended to his disciples little children as representing the spirit of his kingdom, "One came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?" The answer of Jesus was, "If thou wilt *enter into life*, keep the commandments." Here the single word *life* is used synonymously with the phrase *aionion* life. The young man professed to have kept the commandments from his youth up. Jesus answered him further, "If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven;

and come and follow me." And as the young man went away sorrowful, because he had great possessions, Jesus said unto his disciples, "A rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of Heaven. And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God." (Matt. xix. 13-26.)

Here are several things demanding scholarly consideration.

1. It is not probable that the young man who asked how he could become possessor of the aionion life of the Messiah's kingdom, had any conception of its being an immortal existence of blessedness beyond death. If he had so understood it, he would hardly have relinquished it for his great possessions. He had doubtless understood that there was a signal privilege and blessedness to be enjoyed in the Messiah's kingdom, which was emphasized by the appellation *aionion zoe*. But he did not conceive that this blessing was of sufficient worth to be procured at such a cost.

2. Jesus expresses the thing which the young man had in view, by the single term *life*. In another instance, with reference to the keeping of the commandments, Jesus said, "This do, and thou shalt live." Again, with respect to the influences of his religion, he says, "I am come that they might have life, and that they might have it more abundantly." (Luke x. 10.) In the eye of Christian truth and light, a man cannot be said really to *live*, in his higher nature, *as a man*, or as a rational child of God, upon mere animal good. It is only in the light of Christ, and in possession of the spiritual riches, that man can truly be said to *live*.

3. The having of *aionion life*, Jesus in this case describes as the same as entering into the kingdom of heaven. As the young man who asked what good thing he should do that he might have eternal life, went away sorrowful because he had great possessions, Jesus improved the occasion for impressing upon the minds of his disciples the extreme difficulty in the way of rich men entering into the kingdom of God. And nothing is more conclusively settled than that the phrase *kingdom of God* in the New Testament signifies the spiritual reign

of Christ. "Now is the kingdom of God come unto you." "Behold, the kingdom of God is within you." "The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened." "The kingdom of heaven is at hand." "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit." Matt. xii. 28; Luke xvii. 21; Matt. xiii. 33; Matt. iii. 1, 2; Rom. xiv. 17, 18. Here, then, in Jesus' use of the phrase *kingdom of God*, as defining the *eternal life* inquired after by the young man, we have irrefragable proof that the latter phrase denotes the possession of the Christian religion, or the power in the soul of Christ's spiritual reign. The difficulty in the way of the rich man's entering into the espousal of this religion in that age, was in the sacrifice required, and the want of an appreciation of the adequate compensative value of the Christian life.

Again, "Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, *hath eternal life*; and I will raise him up at the last day." (John vi. 54.) It is obvious that the eternal life in this case is not the immortal existence beyond the resurrection, for then there would be no sense in saying to those who already had such life, that he would subsequently raise them up. Nor from this assurance to his disciples for their support under trials, that he would raise them up into life immortal, is it inferable that the resurrection is "partitive;"—for it was common with Christ and his apostles, and it was just as it must needs have been, to make repeated application to them for their special encouragement, of principles and truths which are general and belong to the race.

"But now, being made free from sin, and become servants to God, ye have your fruit unto holiness, and the end *everlasting life*." (Rom. vi. 22.) "For he that soweth to the flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption; but he that soweth to the spirit, shall of the spirit reap *life everlasting*." (Gal. vi. 8.) "And this is *life eternal*, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent." (John xvii. 3.) From the foregoing quotations it is seen that the phrase

aionion life is familiarly used in the New Testament, and in some cases *defined*, to mean a spiritual and moral condition, produced by a knowledge of God, and a living faith in his word of truth through Jesus Christ. And in this sense we are of course to receive it in all other cases where it is conditioned upon, or describes the fruits of faith in the gospel. This, I say, *of course*. It seems that no subject could be more simple in itself; and yet no subject could be more complicated and confused than this is made to be by the partialist theologians. They positively stultify themselves and all their disciples upon it. By making the immortal existence of life and good to be conditioned upon present belief, they task human belief to create the very fundamental truth which is the subject of belief. Thus they keep themselves, and the minds of their people, perpetually in a labyrinth of confusion. In the gospel, all is clear. The life immortal is there revealed as "grace and truth," not according to our works, but according to the purpose of God which he hath *purposed in himself*, and which human unbelief cannot make void. Consequently whenever *aionion life*, or *life*, or *salvation*, is spoken of as the fruit or reward of faith, it does not directly signify the immortal existence, that being the truth revealed and the subject of faith,—but it expresses the spiritual and moral condition which is the concomitant of faith.

But my opponent thinks there are "matters of contrast, which do not favor a reference of *aionion life* alone to the gospel dispensation," i.e., to the experience of life in gospel faith. To save the space for reprinting his whole list of references to this point, the reader is referred to his whole paragraph numbered 1, in c. iii. § 5. I will notice two or three of his passages as specimens; and two or three others of the same class, but of more marked expression of contrast.

His first reference is to John iii. 15. "That whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have *aionion life*." But surely this word *perish* in contrast with *aionion life*, so far from weighing against the application of the phrase to the life of Christian faith, does, especially, when viewed in comparison with other passages of the same class, naturally suggest it. The

perishing in this case denotes the same thing as *abiding in death*, in 1 John iii. 14; to which Mr. H. also refers in immediate connection as a collateral passage. And what does the latter phrase signify? What is the *death* spoken of? and what is meant by abiding in it? Is the death here mentioned *non-existence*? Let the whole passage explain it. "We know that we have passed from death unto life, because we love the brethren." Think ye that we should express the apostle's meaning by paraphrasing it,—“We know that we have passed from non-existence into the immortal resurrection state, because we love the brethren?” My opponent himself would laugh at the schoolboy who should explain it by such a paraphrase. Neither do the next words, “He that loveth not his brother *abideth in death*,” mean that he abideth in non-existence. He that loveth not, abideth in the same death out of which they have passed who love the brethren. And he who cannot understand what this death is, either has never known the want of faith and love, or else knows not now the possession of these graces.

Here I will turn aside from my opponent again, just to impart to the Universalist public a glimpse of the issue of the mountain in labor. They have seen the Orthodox professors, overcome by the Bible argument for Annihilation, having been predisposed that way by disgust of endless torments, rushing into the Destructionist ranks;—and they have seen long columns of references, affecting to exhibit the general tenor of the Scriptures in its favor; and they have imagined that there is, somehow and somewhere in the commotion, an overwhelming proof of the gloomy hypothesis. Well, what I have stepped aside here to do is, to show you what, in the judgment of one of the distinguished teachers of the sect, is the *crowning* proof of Destructionism. It is none other than this very text which we have just examined. Mr. J. P. Blanchard, an estimable and talented man, whom I have before quoted, in his pamphlet on “The Future Life,” after parading a long list of promiscuous references to Scripture language in relation to death, perishing, being lost, destroyed, etc., comes upon us thus with his two reserved and crushing forces:—

“Two passages are reserved to this place, which not only declare the loss or extinction of the wicked, but that it shall be eternal; signifying, plainly, that there shall never be an ultimate revival of them. These passages are direct and clear, and it is not conceivable how the destruction of the wicked could be asserted in more explicit terms; from this import of which, there appears no escape.” P. 25.

And which does the reader imagine these two reserved passages are? The first is 2 Thess. i. 7-9, — in relation to the “everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord,” the signs of the approach of which were seen in the persecutions which the Christians were suffering at the hands of the Jews. This I have already considered in part in this discussion, and referred in part to my exposition in the Adams discussion.

But Mr. Blanchard’s last and most conclusive proof of his theory is this, which we have been referred to by Prof. H. — 1 John iii. 14, 15. On this Mr. Blanchard has the following confident expression: —

“In the second passage, St. John declares the doctrine of the destruction of the wicked in terms not liable even to the absurd misinterpretation given above” (referring to the Orthodox construction of the other passage). But Mr. B. judiciously adds, — “but it is doubtless noticed, that in this, as in all the other passages for this doctrine, the validity of the proof rests partly on the literal understanding of the word ‘life.’”

There you have the strongest proof of the annihilation of an unregenerate class, in the testimony that he who loveth not abideth in the death out of which the believing and loving souls had passed. We have seen that this is *not non-existence*; for those who loved had not by the power of love passed out of non-existence into the immortal state of being; nor could they who were abiding in non-existence be sustaining the moral character here put down as the synonym of this death. The abiding in death is given as the concomitant of abiding in the destitution of love.

The same idea is carried out in the next verse; — “Whosoever hateth his brother is a murderer; and ye know that no murderer hath *aionion* life abiding in him.” All who hate

their fellow-men are here denominated murderers, that is, in spirit; because hatred is the spirit of murder, seeking the destruction of its objects. And this is one of the clearest cases of the use of *aionion life* in the sense of spiritual and moral qualities actually possessed in Christian faith and love. "Ye know that no murderer," i.e., no hater of his fellow-men, "hath *aionion life abiding in him*." This implies that they who love their fellow-men *have eternal life abiding in them*. The absence of this life is the same thing as the abiding in death, and of course is not non-existence; for a state of personal non-existence is not a moral state of personal hatred.

With regard to the "matter of contrast," which my opponent deems unfavorable to our reception of *aionion life* as the fruit of faith, in the gospel age, we find thus far, by examination, this very "matter" to be beautifully confirmative of our so receiving it; i.e., when the Scriptures seem to so employ it. There is another, and a strong case, of this "matter of contrast," in John iii. 36. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him."

Here is the positive affirmation, that the believer *hath aionion life*, — that it is a concomitant of his faith. But there follows the "matter of contrast." How does this affect the leading affirmation? Does it annul or confirm it? It confirms it. "And he that believeth not shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." "*Shall not see life*." The future tense is usually employed to express a uniform operation or result of a standing principle; as, "The willing and obedient shall eat the good of the land." "The righteous shall be recompensed in the earth; much more (or especially) the wicked and the sinner." The phrase in contrast, "he that believeth not the Son shall not see life," expresses the standing truth, that a destitution of life, i.e., death, is the fruit or concomitant of unbelief, while *aionion life* is the fruit of faith. And the contemporary existence of this side of the contrast with the other, the having of life in faith, is even more definitively expressed in the next clause of the sentence: "but the wrath of

God *abideth* on him." It distinctly affirms the co-existence of wrath or condemnation with unbelief.

And here is another fact which I desire my opponent to notice, in its bearing upon his peculiar belief; to wit, that the endurance or abiding of wrath or condemnation on the unbeliever, is co-existent and co-extensive with the destitution of life, or condition of death. "Shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." Consequently the saying, "shall not see life," in contrast with "hath aionion life," does not mean, shall be annihilated, or shall be or abide in non-existence; for the wrath of God, which denotes living and active condemnation, can not be said to *abide*, as an actual experience, on literal nonentities. Consequently, if this passage were taken as an expression of *final* human destiny, it would favor endless punishment rather than annihilation, because it implies the suffering of divine wrath while they shall not see life. But this does not declare the final destiny of men, but the fruits of belief and unbelief. These are not final conditions; for faith shall be lost in sight, and unbelief shall be destroyed by the fruition of the fact.

I need not quote farther to make clear and decisive the position that, whatever else the phrase *aionion life* may be used to signify, it is familiarly employed in the New Testament for the spiritual and moral condition produced by a living faith in Christ; and reason must decide that it must always be taken in this sense when it expresses the fruit or reward of faith and virtue. And the "matters of contrast" do in all cases confirm this view.

In the same relation to time and character we find the words saved and salvation, blessed, joy, and the like, whenever they express the rewards of faith, or of any of the Christian graces. "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." This salvation of faith is described by St. Paul to the Corinthians thus: "Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel, which I preached unto you, by which also ye are saved, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain." Jesus said to Zaccheus, when his presence and his

word were received by him and his family, "This day is salvation come to this house." Peter says, "In him (Christ) believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory, receiving the end (or fruit) of your faith, even the salvation of your souls."

Nevertheless, I do not assume that these words are never used in the Scriptures for the final condition of man through the grace of God in Christ. On the contrary, I believe they are so used. Universalists have no occasion for fastening themselves to an iron rule for the construction of Scripture words and phrases, bending them always to a fixed measure of meaning, regardless of the connection and subject of discourse; nor need we ever, for the sake of our theory, adopt an "asthmatic exegesis." Our theory of faith is strong and at ease, with the most simple reading and natural construction of the Scriptures throughout. Though we receive the words *life*, and *aionion life*, in the cases in which my opponent has referred to them as denoting a condition that is "partitive," to signify a present Christian experience, we so receive them in these cases for the plain reason that they are made by their connections to express such present experience. When we take the same terms as applying to the immortal resurrection life, it is because the subject of discourse in such cases so applies them.

To illustrate this sound, natural, philological and exegetical rule of Scripture reading, we will try the "asthmatic," or rather the *mechanical* method, upon the following passage:—"Awake, thou that sleepest, and arise from the dead, and Christ shall give thee light." (Eph. v. 14.) We will stand back now, and witness the operation of the iron-bedstead commentator with the application of his mechanical rule to this passage. He quotes from Jesus to the Sadducees, where the literal and immortal resurrection is obviously the subject of discussion, these words: "For when they shall *rise from the dead*, they neither marry, nor are given in marriage; but are as the angels which are in heaven." "Here," he says, "rising from the dead means rising into the immortal life by the resurrection. Of course, it means the same in the apostle's call

upon us to 'arise from the dead.' This proves that the resurrection is our work,—and that, unless we so discipline our powers in this life, that when we are dead we can and will wake ourselves up and arise into existence again, death will be to us an eternal sleep." And then, finding the verb *awake* in the imperative mood, to be in this case synonymous with arising from the dead, our mechanical expounder hunts the Bible through for the number of cases in which the verb *awake* occurs in this mood, and assumes that he has thus proved it to be the common doctrine of the Bible that the dead are to awake themselves to life immortal, or else lie in eternal non-existence! But soon would his credulous readers be found, with him, if found at all,

"In wandering mazes lost."

No, we must read the Bible, as all other books, in the exercise of plain common sense. We must not put the expressions of the Scriptures into theological stays and compressors, but let them speak out their free and natural sentiments. Then will all the essential doctrines of the Bible be easily and familiarly understood, in their beauty and harmony. When we hear the apostle calling upon stupid, unfaithful, and inactive professors, as sleeping and dead, to awake and arise, we know that he uses the terms *sleep* and *dead* in a figurative and moral sense, in which they are as familiarly and intelligibly used as in the literal and physical.

So when we read the apostolical testimonies of the happy experience of believing and loving Christians, as *having passed from death unto life*, and *having aionion life*; and when we hear the Master explain, that "this is *life eternal*, that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent," we know that life, and eternal life, in such cases, mean the spiritual and moral condition of true faith and love.

Nevertheless, these are very proper terms to apply, if the inspired teachers were pleased so to apply them, to express the purposed immortal condition of man in the resurrection state

of being. And I understand that these teachers do in some cases use these terms with such an application. But in such cases there is nothing "partitive" in their application. And the sense of the terms is in such cases, as in the others, perfectly obvious from the subject of discourse.

For instance, when Paul says, of the work of Christ, through his appearing and death and resurrection, that he "hath abolished death, and brought life and immortality to light through the gospel," the word *life* obviously refers to the future existence. It is not here described as the reward or fruit of faith, but as the truth revealed, and the *subject* of faith. As I have said before, light does not create objects; it only brings to our view the things that are. When the revelation of the gospel, a great light from heaven, brings to our discovery the "grace and truth" of life and immortality given us in Christ Jesus by the purpose of God before the world began, we have an eternal truth to believe, and an unfailing foundation for faith to rest upon. Take away this eternal truth, and leave nothing to believe or hope for but hypothetical possibilities all conditioned upon our faith, then human faith is placed at the bottom of all; all is as uncertain as our own views and experiences are uncertain, and we have no resting-place.

I remember my juvenile experiment at lifting myself by a hoop beneath my feet. Why could I not? I philosophized that I could; I put the base of the hoop beneath my feet, seized the sides with my hands, and lifted with all my might—but in vain. I could have lifted myself with ease with a strong hold upon a beam above me; but by the hoop beneath my feet I could not do it. Archimedes declared that he could lift the world if you would give him a fulcrum to rest his lever on. Our faith is powerless if it must rest upon itself; but it is strong, and mightily sustaining to our whole being, when it rests upon the eternal truth of God.

Aionion life as the ultimate inheritance, and also the relation of faith to this truth, are most instructively presented by St. John, in his First Epistle, v. 10, 11. "He that believeth on the Son of God, hath the witness in himself: he that believeth

not God hath made him a liar, because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son. And this is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life; and this life is in his Son." Here eternal life is set down as our final inheritance, secured by gift of God's purpose in Christ, and brought to light through the gospel as the subject of faith. And he that believeth not in his heirship of eternal life by God's purpose in Christ, hath made God a liar. Now if this heirship, even for the unbeliever, were not true, and declared by the word of God, he would not make God a liar by not believing himself an heir to such inheritance.

To illustrate this point, I will say to my respected opponent, you do not believe yourself an heir to, and, either by the foretaste of faith, or the figure of *prolepsis*, possessor of ten thousand dollars, by a legally attested will of your poor brother and humble servant, Sylvanus Cobb. Nor are you, in a proper sense, by the absence of such belief, an unbeliever. Unbelief, properly speaking, is the rejection of a truth, or at least, of a statement or proposition. Neither do you make me a liar by your non-belief of such an heirship through my gift. That is, your non-belief of such heirship does not accuse me of falsehood. For I have never bequeathed to you any such riches, and have never pretended nor promised any such thing. So it is all, between you and me, in this particular, precisely as it should be. I have never testified having made you such a gift; you do not believe in me, as such a benefactor; neither do you make me a liar by such non-belief. If I had asserted my having made for you a bequest, and you disbelieved it, then your disbelief of my word would make me a liar, or accuse me of falsehood.

So in respect to God's gift of eternal life in Christ for us. If there are any for whom God has not, by his purpose of grace, given aionion life in Christ, and for whom, of course, there is no such record, they are not, in respect to any matter of truth, disbelievers by not receiving Christ as their life; nor do they make God a liar by not believing, for themselves, in such a record of life, there being none such for them. But the be-

loved John assures us, that if we believe not in Christ as our life, our life beyond all death, we make God a liar, because we believe not the record that God gave of his Son. "And this is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son." And the next words are, "He that hath the Son hath life: and he that hath not the Son of God, hath not life." So, in this one passage, we have *life*, and *aionion life*, in both senses. First—It expresses the truth of God's purpose of grace in Christ, which is the *subject* of faith. Secondly—It expresses the spiritual state or condition which is the *fruit* of faith. And this is all natural. Faith, as we have seen, imbibes the color and quality of its subject. Hence our faith in the gospel which reveals life and immortality for man, is life itself, *aionion life*. It is perfectly natural, also, just as it should be, that Jesus and his ministering disciples, taking with them this gospel of life immortal as the ultimate destiny of our race, and with it entering into familiar and sympathetic intercourse with the believers of their word, should dwell much and often upon the influences and experiences which this word brings to their believing and loving souls, and upon the means and methods by which they should develop in themselves the benign principles of this word of life, and do their mission in the world as Christ's co-workers. But he who loses the fundamental truth of the gospel revelation, the ground-principles of the word of life, the subject of faith, in these familiar discussions of the living and progressive influences of the gospel work, and the means and benefits of Christian culture, is himself lost to the sublime hopes and consolations of the gospel.

Into this error my opponent seems to slide, when he refers, as he does extensively, to the passages of Scripture which treat of the difference between the righteous and the wicked, and of the experience of life and blessedness which alone appertains to the believing and the good, as proof that the primary purpose of life and salvation in Christ, in all its wholeness, is conditional and "partitive."

There is a mass of religionists in this confusion, who suppose that they effectually nonplus our faith in the perfect work of

Him whom the Father ordained "to be the Saviour of the world," and "to destroy the works of the Devil," by the stale remark, that "The Bible throughout speaks of two characters, believers and unbelievers, saints and sinners, the righteous and the wicked." True; and we recognize this distinction, and make it a great deal more real and important than that class of saints do, who cannot see that the righteous are recompensed in the earth, especially the wicked and the sinner, * — and who, backing towards heaven, keep their longing eyes on the strain for "the pleasures of sin."

We know that there are two characters in the world; and that "life and good" are the current inheritance of the righteous, and "death and evil" of the wicked. But going back of this, we have a view presented us of all men in one character. The description may, in its form, partake of the Eastern hyperbole. But it furnishes us with a general view of mankind as subjects of the reforming process. "God looked down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if there were any that did understand, that did seek God. Every one of them is gone back; they are altogether become filthy; there is none that doeth good; no, not one." (Ps. liii. 2, 3.)

Yet it was just such a world as this that Jesus was ordained of God to save; and just such an accumulation of the works of the Devil that he was purposed to destroy. † And now, as this work progresses, there are two classes of men, or two characters, more visibly distinguished. St. Paul presents the two classes thus: "All things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ." Here is a class, differing from the mass above described. They are the believers, the reconciled. But does this blessedness, which is "partitive," appertaining to the believing, the reformed, the reconciled ones, comprise the whole of God's work through Jesus Christ? Does Paul's mention of their present reconciliation signify that the rest of mankind, the unreconciled world, are to perish and be blotted out of existence finally? No, nothing like it. This reconciled class are presented

* Prov. xi. 21, 31.

† 1 John iv. 14; iii. 8.

here as the "first fruits of his creatures" (James i. 18); the beginning of the progressive work, which shall gather in the whole harvest. This great work of salvation in its wholeness belonged to the very ministry of grace of which the reconciled ones were first-fruits. So we are informed by the apostle in the same passage. "And all things are of God, who hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ; and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation; to wit, that God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them; and hath committed unto us the word of reconciliation." (2 Cor. v. 18, 19.) When the truth of this ministry of reconciliation shall be fully and practically verified, there will no longer be two opposing classes; for then, too, will be fulfilled what God "according to his own good pleasure hath purposed in himself, that in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in him" (Eph. i. 9, 10.)

In respect to the New Testament uses of *life*, and *aionion life*, though I am lengthening my chapter upon it beyond my original calculation, I will notice one of the other cases of its application to the ultimate destiny of mankind. It is in Rom. v. 18-21. "Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. . . . But where sin abounded grace did much more abound; that as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord."

This is the passage of which Prof. Hudson says:—

"This apparently denotes all mankind, and their salvation. It seems to me the strongest passage that is or can be adduced in support of that view. And if this interpretation at all agreed with the general *tone* of Scriptural language,—if it were not an apparent exception from the usual style of the Bible,—I should joyfully and without hesitation accept it as proving the final holiness and blessedness of all."

And he adds, —

“But the very frequent distinction made between the ‘saved’ and the ‘lost’ compels me to hesitate.”

But we have most clearly seen, by a *de novo* study of the record, that the distinction made between the lost that *are saved*, and the lost that *are to be saved*, need not cause my brother longer “to hesitate” “joyfully accepting” the hope that he who came “to seek and to save that which was lost” “will see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied.” (Luke xix. 10; Isa. liii. 11.)

I will add here that the terms *zoe* (*life*), and *zoe aionios* (*eternal life*), when applied to the immortal and final state of being, seem to express more in respect to the moral and spiritual character and condition of that state of being, than the terms *immortal* and *immortality*. For though the latter terms would jumble strangely with the idea even of *moral* defilement and corruption, yet they more directly relate to the indissolubility of the personal being. But the term *life*, as rendered from the Greek *zoe* (not *psuke*), and the phrase *aionion life*, more directly express the mental, spiritual, and affectional communion, sympathy, and oneness with God. Hence it is expressed, in the last quotation from Romans, as “justification of life;” and the reign of grace, “through righteousness, unto aionion life.”

How God’s institution and maintenance of a purpose and government in relation to the future and ultimate *moral* character and condition, of free, moral, accountable beings, can consist with the appropriate laws of his moral kingdom, we will discuss in the next chapter, when we attend to our brother’s doctrine of “Free Agency.” We shall see, then, whether he is successful in his effort to make human Free Agency a scapegoat, upon which to shift off the responsibility of the alleged failure of God’s purpose of grace in Christ, through an “abortive resurrection.”

And there is another thing to which I will devote a passing notice here, having reserved it to the conclusion of my treatise

on *aionion* life, that the force of my remarks may be more clearly perceived. Professor Hudson, preliminary to his references of the Scripture use of this phrase, puts in the following in the way of defining for us our own position :—

“As already remarked, the phrase *zoe aionios* is used forty-five times in the Bible, and in most instances partitively, or with reference to a class. It is therefore important for the Universalist argument to show, if possible, that the phrase does not signify ‘eternal life,’ in the strict sense of the expression. Either the adjective *aionios* does not refer to duration at all, but signifies the *nature* or *kind* of life spoken of, or it refers simply to the future age or dispensation as distinct from the expiring Jewish economy. The latter view, I think, is that preferred by Universalists. The phrase *eis ton aiona* would of course be taken in a similar sense.”

This is an attempt to shut us up to a definite and mechanical use of a word which spurns all such restriction. The word which, in the Septuagint, of which all the writers of the New Testament were familiar readers, is associated with the duration of the mountains, of the term of bond-service, of the Aaronic covenant and priesthood, of the imprisonment of Jonah in the whale’s belly, of the shame and contempt of Israel in their dispersion, and of the praise, the being, and the attributes of God,—this word, I say, on being taken into use by the New Testament writers, does not, all without notice, come to mean solely the *nature* or *quality* of a thing, with no reference to duration at all,—or else just the whole (no more and no less) of the gospel age. Undoubtedly the word, from its familiar contact with the spiritual life of the gospel dispensation, has become somewhat spiritualized. But I apprehend that its meaning in the New Testament is very nearly the same as in the Old Testament. The “*aionion* punishment” and “*aionion* destruction” of the New Testament is probably the same thing, on the same people, as the “shame and *aionion* contempt” of the prophet. And the “*aionion* life” of the New Testament, when applied to the experience of faith, has the adjective of duration in the same sense as the “*aionion* light,” the “*aionion*

remembrance of the righteous," the "aionion way," the "aionion foundation," the dwelling "in the house of the Lord *forever*," "praising God *forever*," etc., etc., in the Old Testament. And if this adjective may, both in the Old Testament and the New, be associated with the being and attributes of God, it may also, with great appropriateness, be associated with the life of man's immortal being. It doubtless involves, in many cases, durability or permanence as a quality, especially when used to denote a contrast to what is transient and fleeting, as in the saying, "For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal;" that is, they are abiding. But even here the word does not throw off its primary meaning, of *long continuance*.

Neither is it true, as Mr. Hudson says, that "it is important to the Universalist argument to show that the phrase (*zoe aionion*) does not signify 'eternal life,' in the strict (popular, he should have said) sense of that expression." We have no occasion to show, or to try to show, that the phrase *aionion life* does not sometimes refer to the condition of the endless life of immortality. I have shown that it is, obviously, so applied in some cases. As I have remarked, Universalists have no occasion for an "asthmatic exegesis" in any case. We have no occasion to put Scripture words and phrases into stays and clamps, or to chain them to a mechanical rule, regardless of subject and sense. Our faith is in no danger of discomfiture from a straightforward, natural, philological, exegetical, and common-sense reading of the Scriptures throughout. With regard to the phrase *aionion life*, when it is made to express the experience of faith and Christian virtue, the fact of such use speaks for itself; and then, though it has the *light* of the life immortal, which is the fact of the gospel revelation and the subject of faith, yet it does not directly signify that life. But again, it is, in some cases, applied directly to that life; and then, too, the sense is rendered obvious by the subject, — and there is no embarrassment to our faith, or our theory of Scripture reading.

The Subject of Reward in General.

I know of no better place than this, at the close of my review of Mr. Hudson's argument from the "partitive" application (in some cases) of the phrase *aionion life*, to put in a few Scripture readings and brief expositions of the doctrine of reward in general, under the government of God.

I have shown that the life, and everlasting life, which is the reward of faith in Christ, is a concomitant of faith, and contemporary with it. And so we shall find, by searching the Scriptures through and through, that usually, the life, peace, joy, blessedness, and all the good which is the reward of obedience, and of any and all of the moral virtues, is associated with the possession and practice of those virtues. True, there are benefits, both physical and moral, in subsequent periods of life, resulting from the present culture and practice of the moral graces. But this fact does not invalidate the rule. It does but exhibit the natural result of the expansion and perpetuation of the said virtues of life.

A few specimens of the Scripture readings on this subject must suffice. When Israel had degenerated into a mere religion of formalism, to cover a corrupt life, and they complained that their life was miserable though they were so punctual in their religious observances, the Lord answered them by his prophet thus:—

"Is it such a fast that I have chosen? a day for a man to afflict his soul? . . . Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, and to let the oppressed go free, and that ye break every yoke? . . . Then shall thy light break forth as the morning, and thine health shall spring forth speedily. And thou shalt be like a watered garden, and like a spring of water, whose waters fail not." (Isa. lviii.) "Great peace have they that love thy law, and nothing shall offend them." "In keeping thereof there is great reward." "Happy is the man that findeth wisdom;—her ways are ways of pleasantness and all her paths are peace;—she is a tree of life to them that lay hold

upon her." "My delight is in the law of the Lord." Jesus, our model, says, "My meat is to do the will of God." And to us he says, "Seek and ye shall find." Shall find what? The spiritual riches which you seek, of course. And this is the motive, the reward, which Jesus offers to induce us to seek the spiritual good; viz., the assurance that we shall find the good sought. And to say that this is not ample pay for seeking, is to betray great spiritual blindness. But it is a satisfactory reward.

This subject of reward is indeed a plain and simple subject, which babes may understand. What prospect of reward is it that induces all your daily labors? It is the prospect of obtaining those good things for the comfort and convenience of life to yourselves and those you love, for which you labor. It is the general rule of life that the reward of labor is found in the acquisition of the objects of labor. The rule holds good if you seek things worthless, and worse than worthless. "He that soweth the wind shall reap the whirlwind."

As in our ordinary pursuits, so in our attention to moral and religious culture. The acquisition of the Christian graces of living faith and abiding love, is the highest possible good of life. He who seeks these successfully cannot act with reference to any other and foreign reward; for if the latter is his motive he cannot find, because he seeks in no spirit which can achieve the blessing. He who successfully seeks the true riches must seek for the love of them, and then he shall find.

But mark this:—The acquisition of the Christian graces does not create within the casement of our bodies any new personal being that was not there before, to live on in another world when the body dies, and when others who had not created such a new person within a person by their virtues, will die as the brute dieth, to be no more. If there were an anatomist capable of dissecting and analyzing the whole man, body, soul, and spirit, and he should subject to his threefold chemical analysis my neighbor B to-day, who is an unbeliever, and go through with the same inspection to-morrow, after he has become a believer in Christ, he will find no new-created person within

him, and no new faculty. He will find the same personal identity there, in all the functions that belong to man ; but some of those functions he will find in a better and happier condition, and better employment. The same faculties of love and reverence will be there ; but in his new light he will devote these faculties to higher and holier objects. The *condition* of the man's life will be changed, but no new personal entity will be produced. All his acquaintances will testify that he is the same person ; and he will testify that he is the same man that was blind, *but now he sees.*

CHAPTER VI.

RADICAL BADNESS ; AND FREE WILL.

SECTION I. "*Are there Radically Bad Men?*"

THIS is the heading of Mr. Hudson's second chapter. But he does not leave his discussion of the question in a shape to require much said upon it on my part in the way of controversy. For when he has defined his use of the phrase, *radically bad*, he makes it to express an idea which we admit ; and when he shows at what point he designs the subject to bear in the present discussion, it is seen that he aims to contest an idea that is not in the Universalist theory.

1. In respect to *radical badness*, my friend explains :—

"By radically bad men I do not mean persons who are born of badness and unto badness, as if character were a thing of parentage or race. But, are there human beings in whom evil feelings, purposes, and habits so predominate that they mark and determine the character?"

That there are persons in whom the evil comes at length practically to predominate, I never saw reason to deny. But if this badness is not radical in men with their conception and birth, so as to be constitutional and natural,—if it is acquired by a misuse of their faculties and means, which is the only hypothesis on which can be predicated that moral accountability which my opponent earnestly contends for in this same chapter, then his choice of the term *radical* in definition of it, is a misnomer. The term *radical* denotes that which is "original, fundamental, native, constitutional, underived, uncompounded." If badness in mankind, or in any class of men, is after this manner, they are no more accountable for it than for having been born with black or blue eyes, or with a Roman or an

Asiatic nose. In such case sin is a spontaneous outgrowth of man's mind, uninduced, without lurement or temptation. God save us from the *necessary* drift of the *free will* of such a demon as man is upon this hypothesis!

But it is not so. And my opponent discards the dogma, though he persists in the use of an adjective which involves it. He only means, by *radically bad men*, men in whom "evil feelings, purposes, and habits predominate." We hesitate not to concede that there are such men. They are not radically bad, but they are *very* bad men.

But there is no more difficulty in accounting for the fact of there being very bad men, than of there being bad men at all, in any degree. All sin is explainable on the same principle. Sin, as sin, is not the uninduced and spontaneous outgrowth of the soul. It is induced by appetite, or passion, or supposed interest, the forces of which become strengthened through habit. True, there are predispositions to certain practices or indulgences which are wrong, not because they are wrong, but because they are expected to gratify a natural desire. When these objects lie in a forbidden field, the grasping of them is sin, being in violation of law. But all the human appetites and passions are in themselves good, and are, in their proper and lawful use, good,—the evil only obtaining when they are permitted to rule and run riot, instead of being governed and employed by reason and moral sense.

Now it does not appear to me that it is very difficult to understand the origin of sin, and how it is that some men at length become *very bad*. Man is a compound being, possessed of two natures—animal and spiritual. By the spiritual, I mean in this instance to include the whole superior nature, comprising also the intellectual and moral. The first-named and lower nature possesses all the appetites and passions of the animal kingdom. These appetites and passions, though natural, are blind, and clamor for indulgence without regard to law. But the higher nature, the mind made after the image of God, and which constitutes *the man*, is subject to law, and has committed to it the use and government of all these powers and propensi-

ties of the animal nature. When, therefore, the mind, which is the accountable man, yields itself servant to the blind earthly passions which it is bound to govern by law, there is sin. St. James so explains it, ascribing the forces which induce to sin, to the lusts of the animal nature. (Jas. i. 14, 15.) This was explained in my first chapter, and I only recur to it here because my opponent has, in his second chapter, brought up again the same subject in new relations.

In respect to what Mr. H. says for himself, and quotes from Neander, of "the mystery of sin," it runs back again into the dogma of innate total depravity. We grant that it is "an act of unreason," in that it is unreasonable, or has no good reason. But to say that it is not induced (*compelled* is the word thrown in here by my opponent; but I do not choose to follow him in the use of a word which belongs not to our moral philosophy, and the thrusting in of which can only tend to divert the mind from the plain, practical subject before us, to a disputation on the mechanics of morals, of which there is no end)—but to say that sin is not induced "by any motive, or passion, or any cause out of the free will itself," is to place sin entirely outside of the arena of the Christian warfare. It isolates sin from the whole sphere of sequences which are subject to the relations of cause and effect, and of course places it beyond the reach of moral means—beyond the influence of argument, or truth, or any of the agencies of a moral and Christian ministry. It makes sin either the regular Calvinistic exhalation of an originally inherited corrupt nature, or the super-Calvinistic impulse from the direct interposition of the Deity, as put forth in the quotation from Dr. Emmons in our first chapter. Indeed, Br. Hudson, you have "misjudged the literature of Universalism on this point," if you think "Calvinistic views of the human will prevail among Universalists." We neither admit any hereditary corrupt moral nature to necessitate sin, nor any "immediate interposition of the Deity to compel it." But we do believe that sin has its motives, and such motives as moral teachers may grapple with, by the appeals of truth and argument.

Again, Mr. Hudson says of sin, that it is "an act which the person knows to be equally wrong and imprudent." That he knows it to be wrong, we admit; but, though he knows that sin, as a general rule, is imprudent, yet, taking the word in the sense of policy or profitableness, we do not believe that the person either knows or believes that the particular act he is consenting to commit is imprudent. He is lured by the promise of some advantage or pleasure in the way of the wrong. This fact appears in the history of the first sin of the first pair, and of the transgressions of all nations. It proceeds from an excess of selfishness, which always has its motives. Hence the servants of God were always laboring to counteract its workings by the presentation of the stronger motives for a life of goodness and truth.

To this general rule there is a class of exceptions. These are the cases where the man has become enslaved to a vile habit, which has installed into the mastery an animal appetite or passion. Then the poor slave, although he knows he is harming himself, grasps at the present indulgence, almost as mechanically and unmeaningly, as he gasps for breath when he feels a sense of suffocation. This tendency of a vicious habit makes it the more sinful, in the outset, to contract it.

It would seem, sometimes, when we look upon this class of cases, knowing that the clamors of strong and pampered physical passions are the most actually present and imperious, while higher motives are more distant and slow of action,—that the proper balance could not be regained, and the regular dominion of the mind as the real man be restored, but by the making over of the organism through the resurrection. Nevertheless, the cases are of frequent occurrence, especially since the genuine spirit of the gospel has been shaping and directing the means of reform, that even in the hardest cases of enslavement to vice, the true man has been aroused from his torpor, achieved the mastery over brutish passion, and shone again in his own beauty as the child of God. These cases demonstrate that, in the lowest specimens of enslavement to vice, the spirit, though in bondage, is not annihilated; the re-

tional child of God, though defiled and marred, is not irrecoverably lost ; the gem, though alloyed, has not become all dross. There, O servant of God, is thy Master's child ; there, O Christian man, is thy brother ; in whom is the kindred germ with thine of immortality, and in whom are all the faculties of the intellectual and moral nature ! And though by estrangement and insubordination, jarring discord has come out of the deranged action of these powers, there is a moral force in the light and spirit of truth and love, when brought fairly home to the understanding, to work in the action of all these powers the beauty of harmony, and the life of blessedness.

The cases which my opponent adduces in support of the hypothesis that some men are fixed, knowingly, in an unconquerable hatred of duty, even knowing the ground and nature of the duty, and that they have not souls to save, do not, in our view, bear any such weight. The fact that Alcibiades disliked the presence of Socrates, because the latter sought to dissuade him from that demagoguism which was a fashionable trade, only evinced that love of one's own interest and reputation which is a common frailty, but not incurable. The man who ostracized "Aristides the Just," out of sheer envy, acted upon the miserable principle and policy of self-love, which is not uncommon nor unconquerable. Circumstances might have occurred immediately after the act referred to, that should have brought Aristides to his persecutor in an office of love, which would have made him ashamed of himself, and have melted his heart, and won from him the most warm and sincere friendship during life. Neither does the saying of Jesus to the Scribes and Pharisees, "Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father," prove that these people hated either the Father or the Son with a true knowledge of their character and purpose and government.

With love and reverence for the Scriptures, we will not unnecessarily and hastily construe one part in a manner to make it contradict another and most important part, in letter and spirit. Though there is a sense in which the Pharisees had known God, or known of him, by the witnesses of his word

and his works; and though they had also seen and known much of Jesus, in his works of divine power and love, rendering the manner of their resistance of these testimonies and treatment of him both wilful and sinful;—yet they did not understand the full import of those testimonies either of the Father or the Son. Jesus said of the Jews as a people, “For this people’s heart is waxed gross, and their ears are dull of hearing, and their eyes they have closed; lest at any time they should see with their eyes, and hear with their ears, and should understand with their heart, and should be converted, and I should heal them.” (Matt. xiii. 15.) This is a very carefully drawn description of the mental condition of that people, which clearly involves the sentiment that, notwithstanding the perversity of their wills, such was their moral nature, and such the character of Christian truth in relation thereto, that if they had really heard, seen, and understood his gospel, they would have loved it, been converted by its heavenly power, and healed by its purifying and healthful influence.

No; they had seen Jesus, and known so much of him as should reasonably have persuaded them to give his word a very different hearing. But they were looking for their promised Messiah to come in an entirely different manner, and to sustain an essentially different character, and they did not know him as the Messiah, nor did they understand his doctrines. In his dying prayer Jesus openly recognized the fact that they knew not what they did in crucifying the promised One; of which fact Peter bears testimony in these definite terms:—“Because they knew him not, nor yet the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath-day, they have fulfilled them in condemning him.” (Acts xiii. 27.) And St. Paul says, “For had they known it, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory.” (1 Cor. ii. 8.)

So, then, though there is a sense, and a degree, in which the persecutors of Jesus had seen and known him, yet this is no sense nor degree which nullifies the word of Christ, which affirms that it is life eternal to know the Father, and Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. My opponent fails by this effort

to extirpate from the gospel the great doctrine on which is founded all hope from the Christian ministry; viz., that such is the real relation between man's rational and moral nature and the Christian principles, that he will naturally love and cherish those principles when they are fairly apprehended by the understanding. No fact or testimony has yet been given us, to prove that man can despise infinite excellence, and hate infinite loveliness, when he sees it to be such.

I will remark here as I pass, that I am a little surprised at my opponent's frequently reiterating the phrase, "there is a sin unto death," in different connections, just as if it naturally meant that there is a sin unto ultimate annihilation, when he himself has brought forward the fact, without dissent, that it is the general opinion of commentators that the language refers to a sin incurring the death penalty by the law of the land. He seems to seek the same advantage from the sound of a mis-translation in the falsely educated ear, by the repeated reproduction, on different occasions, of our translators' phrase, "hath never forgiveness," substituted for the gospel record, "hath not forgiveness *eis ton aiona*," for a long time, or unto the age. And in this connection he introduces the sin against the Holy Spirit in a manner to misinterpret the sin itself. He seems to have it in purpose to make it believed that this sin consists in hating what is known to be lovely. But the evangelist defines it, as we have before seen, to be the act of the Jews in refusing to consider the evidence of his Messiahship in his miraculous works, and ascribing those works of the Holy Spirit to demoniacal agency. But even this wilful blindness, as we have seen, shall be removed. "For, if the casting away of them be the reconciling of the world, what shall the receiving of them be but life from the dead?" (Rom. xi. 15.)

But Prof. Hudson gives us some historical cases of great debauchery of character, in support of his theory that some men are radically bad, and have in them no remains of the germ of immortality — or of a spirit, or rational and moral nature, made after the image of God, and susceptible of good impressions, and of a loving and lovely impulse from the contact of truth and goodness.

On this course of argument I will remark :—

First — That it is not a sound position, to select strong and rare exceptions for either proof or illustration of a general principle. If man, as a species, has a rational and moral nature and constitution, “made for immortality,” and constituting them children of God and heirs of immortality, with all the individuals of which species the passions of the lower nature have achieved some degree of dominion, the fact that some have fallen lower into the bondage of those animal passions does not prove that the higher nature, the distinctive man, is annihilated, or thrown beyond the compass of His mission, who “is able even to subdue all things unto himself” (Phil. iii. 21); and who, in “the kingdom, dominion, and glory” that God hath given him, will be “able” to achieve all this moral victory, without an infraction of the laws of the moral kingdom, or of human moral agency.

Second — The historical cases selected by my opponent, taken as he has presented them, do not demonstrate the extinguishment of the moral nature, or of the conscience. As all men have an animal nature, and as the animal organism differs, in different individuals, in respect to the relative forces of different passions and propensities, it is what might be expected that, in some, the lower animal functions, such as sensuality, destructiveness, and combativeness, should be predominantly developed. And a few are, by their physical organism, idiotic, — and others insane, who, though circumstances may have placed them upon thrones, should have been in medical asylums.

But in the extreme historical cases quoted by my opponent, there is no reason for believing that their moral nature or their conscience has become extinct. There are abundant facts which warrant the inference that they are not extinct. History gives us the public acts of public men; and the private acts, which are startling and notorious, of notorious individuals. The zealous love of power and pelf, in association with large destructiveness, and, perhaps, with other strongly developed animal propensities, may have rioted in blood which has flowed in the

veins of those standing in relations to be feared ; but there is the whole background and subsoil of life to them, in their relations to their higher nature, to the world, and to the moral government of God, which history does not record, and the historic eye of my opponent does not penetrate. Though in some of these cases the abiding struggle of a living conscience does not appear on record, the fact is proved by analogy from the many cases in which individuals of the same mysterious class have come to a pass which has revealed the moral nature, and the living conscience, and also the history of those secret though unequal struggles. It seems to have been for this wretched class that St. Paul spoke, more than for himself, when he penned the sentence, which, to be sure, describes a general truth differing in degree with different individuals,—“ But I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me *into captivity* to the law of sin which is in my members.” (Rom. vii. 23.)

For one of these deeper historic revealments, in the condition of depravity in high life, look at the life of Tiberius, by Tacitus. Tiberius was a barbarous and corrupt prince, commanding the means of every physical gratification, and abusing them. To the theologian who should seek, by examples of history part kept back, to refute the Bible doctrine that Jehovah “ is a God that judgeth in the earth,” no case can better answer his purpose than that of Tiberius. He sent the following letter to the Roman Senate :—

“ What to write, conscript fathers, in what terms to express myself, or what to refrain from writing, is a matter of such perplexity, that if I know how to decide, may the just gods, and the goddesses of vengeance, doom me to die in pangs worse than those under which I linger every day !”

On this, Tacitus, the heathen historian, makes the following pertinent remarks :—

“ We have here the features of the inward man. His crimes retaliated upon him with the keenest retribution ; so true is the saying of the ancient philosopher, the oracle of ancient wis-

dom, that if the minds of tyrants were laid open to our view, we should see them gashed and mangled with the whips and stings of horror and remorse. By blows and stripes the flesh is made to quiver; and, in like manner, cruelty and inordinate passions, malice and evil deeds, become internal executioners, and with unceasing torture goad and lacerate the heart. Of this truth Tiberius is a melancholy instance. Neither the imperial dignity, nor the gloom of solitude, nor the rocks of Capreæ, could shield him from himself. He lived on the rack of guilt, and his wounded spirit groaned in agony."

There, this faithful historian, who gives us the philosophy as well as the shell of history, lays open the inner man of that royal debauchee, and reveals there the moral nature, the rational soul, and the living conscience, all alive, all in the struggle, but meanly and criminally yielding to the domineering of the animal.

The case left on record by the late Dr. Joseph Tuckerman evinces the same fact in the nature even of the worst of men, and the power of Christian truth to save them (without a miracle), when it is brought home to the understanding. I refer to the case of one of the two pirates who were executed in Boston a few years ago. Dr. Tuckerman was present at their trial and conviction. When the jury brought in the verdict of *guilty*, and the judge asked the culprits whether they had any reason to offer why judgment should not then be pronounced, he of whom the doctor reports, broke out in a violent strain of horrid and blasphemous cursing against the court and all concerned. Dr. Tuckerman followed him to his cell, went in with him, requested the jailor to turn the key upon them, and call for him in an hour. He spent the hour in kind conversation and prayer with the felon, but to no visible effect. He seemed as impervious to moral influence as a stone. Surely, looking at this stage of the proceeding, my opponent would say, "Here is a case of the utter extinguishment of the higher nature. There is nothing here to save."

The doctor called and spent an hour with his (radically?) depraved pupil the next day; and he spent an hour with him

each day consecutively for more than twenty days, up to the time of his execution. The second and third visits elicited nothing more hopeful than the first. When about to retire the third or fourth time, Tuckerman said to the pirate, "I will call and see you again to-morrow." "*I care nothing about it,*" responded he with vehemence; "*all I want is to be in hell, where it's hot!*"

What a horrid state of soul this reveals! My opponent will say, "There is no soul there worth saving. Or, if there were, nothing short of an almighty miracle could save it." But, hark ye! On the next day's visit, when the doctor was engaged in prayer, to a supplication he offered the pirate responded, "AMEN." Then the servant of Jesus knew that a chord was touched in his soul.

On the next subsequent visit, when Tuckerman had conversed a while, and knelt to pray, the pirate dropped upon his knees with him. And when he had proceeded a little way in his prayer, that lost wretch broke out in an impassioned strain of earnest supplication and entreaty to the Father of mercies. "I never," says Tuckerman, "had witnessed such a case of childlike, heart-broken penitence as this. He seemed a little child. His heart was all broken to pieces; and my own heart came well nigh breaking from the force of my sympathy in the scene. And all," continues the doctor, "which effected this, was the discovery, on the part of this poor lost wretch, of a Father in God. I know not what other means might have effected, for I tried no other. My aim in all my labors with him, in conversation and prayer, was to enable him to see that he had a Father in heaven who loved him; that there was goodness on the throne of eternity. And the moment this conviction reached his understanding, it broke his heart." "And if all men," continues Tuckerman, "were brought to really see this single truth, *God the Father of all*, I will answer for it that their conduct towards each other would be as that of brethren."

There, gentle reader, in that professional robber and murderer, in whom the animal nature of the bloody lion grade was

predominant, was a "lost" child of God to be "found;"—a soul which the magnet of truth and love could draw up to the bosom of the Father, there to weep and lament, and trust and love as a child.

Ah, this is the *rod of the Saviour's mouth*, and the *breath of his lips*, wherewith the spirit of prophecy proclaims that he will *slay the wicked*, so that the most stubborn and lion-like spirit of rebellion shall be subdued into the sweet loveliness of the peaceful lamb! (Isa. xi. 1-6.)

Numerous are the cases in which the miserable drunkard of years, the tormentor of his family and pest of society, who, in the view of men was a hopeless case, has had a ray of truth from a temperance lecture penetrate his mind and reach his heart, and has risen up in his manhood, come forward and put his name upon the pledge, and gone home with his wife and children with the higher nature in the ascendant, and given that long-sorrowing companion to know, and ever after to experience, that she had the devotion of as warm and pure a heart as once pledged itself at Hymen's altar.

I refer to these facts, not in proof of what God will do for his moral creation;—this we have learned and shall learn from his word;—but I refer to these facts in proof of moral *possibilities*, to dissipate the dream of *impossibles* by which my brother dubiously presumes to throw into doubt the purpose of God in Christ. And it is meet that we should reflect, that, if such is the legitimate force of truth and love in restoring lost souls to their proper dominion, even in this rudimental, animal organism, and when such organism is deranged and degenerated by vile habits, how perfectly natural and easy will it be for truth and love, more clearly shining, when the soul is built over in a spiritual and heavenly body, to win and secure its whole and never-failing devotion to the Eternal Good! I speak of the *possibility*. God's word is the *assurance*.

2. I remarked in the beginning of this chapter, that when my opponent comes to show at what point he designs the subject of his second chapter to bear in this discussion, it is seen

that he aims to contest an idea that is not in the Universalist theory. He says:—

“I will here remark that while I am glad to hear my Universalist friends speak of charity and forgiveness, and doubt not they cherish a real feeling of good-will toward all, yet a very common theory pressed to its consistent results would destroy the very idea of charity and forgiveness. If no man acts against known duty or interest, if all are doing precisely according to their best light and knowledge, then what place for charity or pardon?”

I only need say to this paragraph, that I never heard of such an idea among Universalists, as that “no man acts against known duty. — that “all are doing precisely according to their best light and knowledge.” Does my learned friend infer this from the fact that we believe men sin under temptation, that even evil-doers act from motive? His inference is singularly at fault, having no shadow of relation to the premise. If no man acts against known duty, then no man is a sinner, and our discussion of the salvation of sinners should have closed before it began. True, in a loose sense of the word sin, we speak of men’s sinning ignorantly. But by sin, in this case, we mean a violation of some law of physical nature, or of the social relations, inwrought with the constitution of things, which, though it be violated ignorantly, and without criminal intent, will avenge itself, if I may so speak, that is, will administer retribution. But sin, in its proper sense, as moral culpability, pertaining to the conscience, is the transgression of a known law of right.

And now, does the fact that this transgression of the known law of duty is induced by temptation, make it to be not sin? No; for the mind, installed by the Creator and Lawgiver as lord of inferior nature, has no right to subject itself to servitude under that nature, against known law. Such subjection of the mind is sin, *because* it is the act of a moral agent, of choice, and of course with motive, against moral law, against known right and duty.

And here is another sentence which seems to us at least equivocal in its meaning. Mr. II. says :—

“The real question will be, Is there ‘good in all,’ upon which the Universalist so much relies, a genuine goodness, a real virtue, a moral principle?”

Now, if by the “good in all,” the “real virtue,” the “moral principle,” my friend means that active principle of love and moral rectitude, which forms moral character, he entirely misapprehends again the Universalist belief. We not only do not *much rely*, but we do not rely *at all*, in respect to the ultimate destiny of man, on the present predominance of such virtue. When we speak of that in man, in *all* men, which is precious, which as Christians we dearly prize, which is infinitely valuable to the God of the spirits of all flesh, and which is the object of that love which God commendeth towards us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us, we mean the rational and moral man, the superior nature, the personality which God has made in his own image, with all its capabilities and wants and relations to God and to us. This is what we prize, and even reverence in all. So the Holy Spirit would have us do. “Honor all men” is its bidding. (1 Pet. ii. 17.) I reverence even the little child; not for his cultivated and developed practical virtues, but for his manhood, his *being*, as God’s rational offspring, and an heir of immortality.

When you hear the report that a little child is lost in the woods, and you meet the frantic mother in eager pursuit, will you detain her with the inquiry whether her child has “real goodness” enough in his character to constitute a ground of “reliance” that her love will abide to the persistent search for his recovery? Ah, she would gaze wildly upon you as a nondescript, if you had no truer notion of the object of a parent’s love!

Is there not such a beauty involved in some of the Christian graces, as *sympathy*? What is sympathy? Is it a judgment of character? No; it is a kindly fellow-feeling for the person.

And all Christian prayer and Christian labor is for fellow-beings. And though we do not now see enough of the practical "good" in the existing characters of all men to constitute a ground of hope for their infinite blessedness, yet we see that all "are made after the similitude of God." (James iii. 9.) "But now we see not yet all things put under him; but we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, crowned with glory and honor; that he by the grace of God should taste death for every man." (Heb. ii. 8, 9.)

SECTION II. *Free Will.*

The phrase *Free Will*, without definition, in utter vagueness, seemingly without any conception in their own minds of the sense in which they themselves design to use it, is made by not a few theologians a great central whirlpool, an all-embracing maelstrom, in which to ingulph all theological difficulties. To provide for the possibility and even probability and certainty of radical and irreclaimable badness in men, resort is made to "free will." To involve in uncertainty all the promises of the gospel, and undermine our hope in a happy issue of the divine government in respect to the final destiny of man, resort is made to "free will." To silence the clamor of reason and the moral sense against the hypothesis that the creation and government of God will result in final and infinite evil to a moiety of the universe, the difficulty is all disposed of by a masterly heave into the profound abyss of "free will."

This resort is the convenient device of Prof. Hudson, preparatory to the assumption that some men are radically and irreclaimably bad, which, in the preceding section, I showed to be an assumption without proof, and against all known facts in the moral system. He speaks to this point as follows:—

"The first point to be insisted on is the essential and responsible freedom of the human will. I believe—it is almost a proverb—that the common consciousness of man asserts his freedom. Without this there can be no merit, either good or ill. Without this, whatever right or wrong there might be in

the nature of things, there could be neither in actions, or in men. There could be neither praise nor blame, there could be no character, worthy of the name."

All this sounds very well; but we don't know what it means. We can form no conception, from the reading of this paragraph, of what definite idea our brother intended to convey by his language. What does he mean by the "freedom of the human will?" Does he mean that the mind, in respect to its preferences, volitions, and determinations, is independent of all considerations, motives, and objects? Is it outside of the outermost verge of the sphere of the divine government? Then it is not a subject that we can discuss, for we can bring it to the test of no rule or law of interpretation. Then, too, our Christian and moral labors may as well stop here; for it is of no avail that we go on an educational and reformatory mission to a species of beings that are susceptible to no moral influences, and subject to no motives. This result my opponent seems to concede; and yet I cannot discover that he clearly disavows the premises. He says:—

"Now I admit that the freedom of the human will, as uncontrolled by any necessitating power of motives, makes the actions of men no more traceable by any philosophy of cause and effect."

This is a candid and honorable concession. But the thing which would involve the consequence thus ingenuously conceded is not the moral freedom which is taught or admitted in the Scriptures. Set up before you the image of that "free will," which "makes the actions of men no more traceable by any philosophy of cause and effect," and, keeping it in view, go into the reading of the Scriptures, and how utterly and uniformly it is seen to be the opposite of the Scripture doctrine!

1. The Bible methods with mankind recognize and treat them as reasonable beings, teachable, reformable, and improvable by the lessons of truth, as legitimate means to the end in view. The whole system of religious culture is based on this idea of the relation between means and ends.

2. All the Bible descriptions, literal and figurative, of the Saviour's work of grace and salvation, represent it as a work involving a legitimate and effective relation of means and ends, cause and effect. The prophetic description of the mission of Messiah in its purifying operations in and upon the human mind, represent it to be as the refiner's fire and the fuller's soap. (Mal. iii. 2.) Now there is such a known relation, as of cause and effect, between the natural action of the refiner's fire and its purifying effect upon the ore in the crucible, that this effect can be with certainty calculated from the adaptation of the means.

This relation of things in the moral as well as physical system, is very beautifully and instructively signified in the parable of the leaven. The kingdom of heaven is like unto leaven, which a woman took and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened." (Matt. xiii. 33.) There is a philosophy of cause and effect in this leavening operation, though the woman does not understand it. She knows, however, to calculate on the result when she uses the means. She puts the leaven in the meal at night, expecting to find the whole lump permeated and flavored in the morning. And though she may not understand the use of such chemical and philosophical terms as *affinities*, and *sequents*, yet she knows the existence of the *facts* which these terms describe. She knows that there is, somehow, a relation, in respect to quality, between the leaven and the meal, which is the basis of the mutual embrace and assimilation when they come in contact. She knows that if she were to put her leaven into so much sand, she would obtain no quickening operation.

Now if there is any wisdom in the Master's teachings, if there is any adaptation of them to the human understanding, if there is any analogy between the facts employed in his parables and the subjects to which he applies them, then the parable of the leaven teaches the relation of cause and effect in the moral system. It signifies that it is the power and the mission of the gospel of Christ, not to destroy the freedom of

the human will, but to rectify and guide it, to the glory of God and the praise of his grace.

And so with all the parables of Christ. There is a relation between the action of the shepherd and the bringing in of the lost sheep,—and between the fructifying influences of the sun and rains, in combination with the properties of the soil, and the germination and growth of the seed deposited in the earth,—and between the experience of the prodigal in his lost estate, together with his knowledge of the plenty in his father's house, and his determination to arise and return to his father. All these things are employed to represent the "philosophy of cause and effect" in the moral system, which is the sphere of the gospel mission.

How beautifully and magnificently is this great principle exhibited by the evangelical prophet!—"For as the rain cometh down, and the snow, from heaven, and returneth not thither, but watereth the earth, and maketh it to bring forth and bud, that it may give seed to the sower and bread to the eater; so shall my word be that goeth forth out of my mouth: it shall not return unto me void; but it shall accomplish that which I please, and it shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it." (Isa. lv. 10, 11.) This testimony of the Holy Spirit promulgates both the great fact that God has a determined purpose in the moral system, and that he will carry forward and consummate that purpose in such a manner, and by such instrumentalities, that all the work shall be in as beautiful accordance with the laws of the moral kingdom, as the growth of the grass and herbs by the influence of the sun and rains, is in accordance with the laws of physical nature.

To set forth all the Bible testimony in this direction, I should be under the necessity of reprinting in my columns the whole Bible; for it all points this way. But I will make one other selection, which is definite and explanatory in relation to that which constitutes the superior excellence of the gospel over the Mosaic covenant, involving the very question which we now have before us, on the nature and extent of "free will," and its relation to the operations of God. And our exegesis

of the passage now to be quoted will be a performance of what we promised in a preceding chapter, viz., that we would, when we should come to Mr. Hudson's doctrine of "free will," show wherein the *new*, in contrast with the old, is a "better covenant," and "established upon better promises." See Heb. viii. 6-12 :—

"But now hath he obtained a more excellent ministry, by how much also he is the mediator of a better covenant, which was established upon better promises. For if that first covenant had been faultless, then should no place have been sought for the second. For, finding fault with them, he saith, Behold the days come, saith the Lord; when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah; not according to the covenant that I made with their fathers in the day when I took them by the hand to lead them out of the land of Egypt; because they continued not in my covenant, and I regarded them not, saith the Lord."

Here we will suspend the Bible reading a while, for inquiry and reflection. What is the reason which Jehovah here offers, why he would vouchsafe to the people a new covenant, and one differing from the former? The reason is, that the people, on their part, did not walk in that covenant. And as it was a covenant the promises of which depended upon the people's first performing certain conditions, the blessings of the covenant failed to reach them, on account of *their* failure. And this is the fault of the first covenant denoted by the apostle in the words above, "If that first covenant had been faultless, then should no place have been sought for the second." It did not fail to answer the purpose unto which God designed it. But it came short of doing all that for men which God designed by some means to accomplish for them. Through the fallibility of the creature it failed to make the creature blessed. This circumstance being named as a reason for a new and better covenant, implies that it is the design of God in the new covenant to guard against any such failure through creature fallibility. And now, we will read the succeeding description of the new covenant, and mark with critical attention whether it answers

the expectation which the reason above given for its provision inspires. The apostle proceeds:—

“For this is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel, after those days, saith the Lord;—I will put my laws into their mind, and write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people: and they shall no more teach every man his neighbor and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord; for all shall know me, from the least to the greatest. For I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and iniquities will I remember no more.”

What now is seen to be the difference between the two covenants, in the point of contrast here presented? It is this: that while the former covenant, in this point of view, was just as liable to fail as the creature is liable to fail, the latter is just as liable to fail as God is liable to fail;—and no more. For here God declares what he will do, or what he will bring the people to be and to do. But here is an important fact to be noted. Though the new covenant is a purpose, and a system of operation, which God has pledged his veracity and his power to prosecute and consummate, yet it gives no more latitude to the thought of happiness in sin, than does the old covenant. While the law commands men to be holy, and forbids the hope of happiness without holiness, so does the gospel.

But you will say that now the writer has involved himself in inconsistency. He discards the theory which makes the promises of the gospel as conditional and uncertain as those of the law, and yet he now says that the gospel gives no more hope of happiness without holiness than the law. What does he mean?

I mean this: that both covenants reckon holiness indispensably requisite for happiness. But while the law *commands* holiness, and administers chastisements for disobedience, the gospel *promises* holiness itself—that very needed blessing. So, in a moral respect, the commandments of the law are by the gospel turned into promises. (And this is no other than the

sentiment which we have kept in sight from the beginning ; "The *law* was given by Moses, but *grace and truth* came by Jesus Christ.")

This idea may strike the minds of many on their first reading it, as odd in its conception, and wanting the element of truth. But you will all, by recalling to mind your familiar Scripture readings, perceive that this is the work everywhere ascribed to the Saviour's mission ; viz., to bring mankind into a state of obedience to the moral law, the law of moral purity and love. He was to be a teacher and a guide to the people ; to open the blind eyes, and bring out the prisoners from the prison, and them that sit in darkness out of the prison-house. He was to destroy the works of the Devil,* and subdue and reconcile all things to God, — that is, elevate, harmonize, assimilate, all created minds with the spirit of the Eternal.

And the Father knew that this great work of reconciliation is a moral work, upon free moral beings, when he purposed it. He knows what is in man, and by what means and agencies his moral volitions may be controlled. And in this perfect knowledge of the nature of the work, he pledges his unerring veracity and his infinite power, to its performance. "I will put my laws in their mind and write them in their hearts ; I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people ;" and "all shall know me, from the least unto the greatest ; for I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and their sins and iniquities will I remember no more."

The idea is not that they may sin with impunity, and God will not hold them accountable for their unlawful conduct. As long as they are sinners they abide in condemnation ; the wrath of God, or condemnatory operation of the divine law, "abideth on them." But the reason why their sins, on this blessed consummation of the gospel work, shall be remembered no more, is, that they will no more have sin inhering in or adhering to them, to be remembered. This, in the practical, gospel sense, is the forgiveness of sins. It is not giving impunity to sin. It is not remitting punishment because of the substitution of punishment inflicted on a hostage or vicar, which, as far as the account

with the law is concerned, would be no forgiveness at all. But it is the blotting of the sins of the penitent out of remembrance, and receiving him in his reformed character, his hatred of sin and love of holiness, as if he had never sinned. It is a verification of the words of St. Paul;—"There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit. For the law of the spirit of life in Christ Jesus, hath made me free from the law of sin and death." (Rom. viii. 12.) This subject of forgiveness will be more fully treated in our next chapter, in review of Mr. Hudson's remarks on the same topic.

It is my object in this present labor to show from the Scriptures that the gospel reveals a divine purpose in the moral system, which purpose provides for nothing less than the ultimate perfect and universal victory of light over darkness, truth over error, knowledge and faith over ignorance and unbelief, love over hatred, holiness over sin, and life over death. And this purpose is sure and reliable, because it shall be developed and consummated by instrumentalities and agencies which derive their appointment and efficiency from the will of God. And the freedom of the human will means nothing, and can mean nothing, opposed to this great and reliable purpose of God in the moral system.

In respect to the "better covenant, established on better promises," this superiority obtains in several particulars. In the first place, the gospel promises are promises of better things than those of the law. The promises of the Mosaic covenant were promises of temporal blessings, while those of the gospel are promises of spiritual and final and immortal good. In the second place, the promises of the gospel constitute a ground of stronger faith and more steadfast hope, because they are based upon more positive terms and a higher agency. To a great extent the promises of the law, while inferior in their nature, were based upon an *if*, and that *if* upon feeble human agency.

When theologians have rested the ultimate and immortal destiny of man upon an *if*, and that *if* upon the present achieve-

ments of feeble human agencies, our Universalist brethren have sometimes alleged that they are ministers of the law of Moses instead of the gospel of Christ. But this is giving their theory too much honor. The law of Moses never proposed to mankind the disposal of their immortal destiny by their own doings of a day. It was never designed to fill the place unto which the gospel was appointed. It was a transition economy, designed to redeem a chosen people from idolatry, and to open the way for the mission of Christ. It "made nothing perfect." (Heb. vii. 19.) Its chief sanctions were in the consideration of rewards and punishments; but it never proposed immortal life as the payment of the poor services of the present fleeting moments; nor was Sinai ever dishonored by the thunder of endless torments or extinguishment of being for to-day's delinquencies. Although Moses and the prophets were not eminently ministers of "life and immortality," yet whenever the spirit of prophecy in them inspired breathings of that great ultimatum of universal good, it rested it in the same Divine "I WILL," which sounds long and loud in the Christian revelation.

Another circumstance in relation to the passage quoted from the Hebrews, should be noted here. The prophecy of Jeremiah which is quoted and applied by the apostle, mentions Israel and Judah as the parties with whom the new and better covenant should be made. But it will be borne in mind that the prophets were ministers only to Israel, and as the Mosaic covenant was specially for them, it was natural that the prophets, when designing to foreshow the superiority of the new covenant in contrast with the old, should sometimes speak of it as a covenant with the same people to whom was committed the former. But the nature and design of the gospel covenant, as distinguished from the law, is the subject to which I was directing my argument in the use of this Scripture. And now, as the middle wall of partition between Jews and Gentiles is broken down, and the ministers of the new covenant are ordained ambassadors of the gospel unto "all people," it is of course our mission to proclaim unto all people, in the name

of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, this same sublimely glorious "I WILL."

What then is the freedom of the human will? We have seen that it is not such a kind and degree of independence of motives, as "makes the actions of men no more traceable by any philosophy of cause and effect." We have seen that the whole Bible economy of laboring to improve mankind by the presentation of reasons and motives, repudiates such a definition of human free will. So does our own consciousness. For just so surely and so much as we are conscious of acting voluntarily, we are conscious of acting from the influence of motives. So also is such theory ignored by the whole system of moral training by the use of instruction. It metamorphoses the Christian ministry into mere jugglery; for it recognizes no more of the philosophy of relation as of means to ends, in the words uttered by the preacher in their bearing upon any reformatory effect, than there is between the mutterings of the juggler, and the feats which he performs.

What, then, is the true meaning of freedom, ascribed to the human will? It is, *that man chooses voluntarily, according to his own preferences, and that he acts voluntarily, according to the influence of motives which operate within his own mind.* This is the only free agency which man possesses in fact; and it is the only light in which we can conceive of the dignity of responsible moral freedom. If the action of the human will is a mere motiveless impulse, induced by nothing, but coming of a spasmodic affection of the will alone, I can conceive of no more moral freedom in it, no more of the responsibility of a deliberating and purposing moral being, than there is in the effluvia of the carrion or the fragrance of the rose. But take the term freedom, as applied to the will, as a synonym of *voluntary*, and we have a rational view of the proper moral responsibility of man, as a being of motives; and we can understandingly recognize him as he is in fact, and as he is described and appealed to in the Scriptures throughout, the subject of a moral government, and a being susceptible of culture by appropriate means.

As an illustrative specimen, exhibiting this true moral freedom of man in harmonious connection with the fact of the purposes and operations of God in the moral system, I will introduce to your attention the case of Saul of Tarsus. He was journeying on the way in the spirit of war and madness against the Christian cause, determined to exterminate from earth the Christian church. At length, a supernatural light shone about him, and a voice addressed him, "Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me?" "Who art thou, Lord?" "I am Jesus, whom thou persecutest." "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" How is this? Is he forced against his will? — compelled to be saved whether he will or not? No. It is as if he had said, "Lord Jesus, whose cause I have striven in my darkness to destroy, in this new light I see thee to be God's own Messiah, the Saviour of the world, my everlasting friend, my life, my all. It is now my soul's desire to devote all my being to thy service. What wilt thou have me to do?" And Jesus said to him there upon the spot, "I have appeared unto thee for this purpose." What! A *purpose* upon a free, accountable, moral agent? So Jesus said. And if we have a theology which does not admit of a divine purpose in the moral system, our theology is not truly Christian. But what was that purpose? "To make thee a minister, and a witness of me." What an implement that was for Jesus to select, of which to make a Christian minister. Could he do it? Yes; with all the ease with which the rising beams of the morning dispel the dark shades of night, did the sweet light of Jesus' truth dispel the darkness of that madman's soul, and enlist all his affections, and his will, and his agency, into co-operation with itself. And, when that shall be fulfilled which God hath spoken by the mouths of all his holy prophets since the world began, that the veil of darkness shall be removed from all minds, and the same light of heavenly truth and love shall shine into every soul, then, because men are free moral agents, and will love that which appears to them supremely lovely, they will all love and adore their Father and Saviour. And then, if you will hold any in continued and eternal opposition to Christ, you must take away

their free agency, and pickle them down into eternal moral mummies, and restrain them from loving what fills their whole souls with its loveliness. You cannot do it.

Oh, this free moral agency, which so many have thought to be a torpedo that has happened into the moral system to make of it final wreck and ruin! — this wheel within a wheel, placed there by the Author, not to defeat his own purpose in the whole, but to aid that purpose! — under God I revere it, and love to dwell upon it, for its destined importance as God's instrumentality for the regeneration and ultimate glory of the moral universe.

But some men will say that the case of Saul is an exception to the general rule of the divine government with moral beings. I reply, that, in *principle*, it is *not* an exception. To be sure the extraordinary and supernatural manner of presenting the *evidence* to Saul's mind, is an exception to the general method. But there was no more interference with the natural and legitimate action of Saul's intellect, and his will, in respect to the appreciation of truth, and its operation upon the mind, than there is in any and all cases of conversion and culture by instruction. The *truth* of Christ would have operated upon the will of Saul in precisely the same way, when it had fairly come into his understanding, if it had come through the *ordinary* presentation of evidence. But the Lord, for a sufficient reason, interposed in this case by extraordinary means, to present to the persecutor's mind the *evidence* of Christ's Messiahship. And if the evidence to Saul's mind, from the fact then and there displayed, of Jesus' life from the dead as the Messiah that should come, legitimately wrought so entire a change in his sentiments and moral affections, *how much more* shall the actual *experience*, to all men, of the resurrection from the dead into life immortal, banish all unbelief, affect the whole mind and fill the whole soul with wonder, admiration, and love. The scene, extraneous to himself, which was made to pass before the mind of Saul on the way to Damascus, though effectual to his enlightenment and change of love and of will, was but a trifle compared with the experience of the whole being with

every man, together with the entire scene presented to his vision, when he shall pass through death and rise into immortal life. Men being free moral agents, you cannot prohibit their love and admiration, in the light of such evidence. We wonder not that the Scriptures associate the idea of spiritual subjection to Christ, and an inheritance of glory, with the resurrection life.

Why, in that immortal state, there must needs be a pure æthereal pleasure in the very fact of personal conscious existence. Even in this frail mortal constitution, there is, in the healthy physical system, enjoyment in the very fact of being. The healthy infant, for instance, when it knows nothing of the higher pleasures of reason and moral affections, manifests that there is living pleasure coursing through its veins. And surely, when we shall be born into eternity, with bodies incorruptible, and in every way so infinitely superior to these clayey tenements, our very bodies will be sensoriums of pleasant sensations,—and our spirits, incorporated with heavenly bodies, will be in a condition more clearly to perceive the being and presence, and to reciprocate the love, of the great and good Father of spirits.

Say not that this is mere speculation. It is the natural and legitimate philosophy of the subject.

In concluding this chapter on “free will,” let it be remarked that if my opponent will settle down upon the definition which makes it a thing independent of the influence of means and motives, and makes its actions “no more traceable by the philosophy of cause and effect,” he must, to carry out his theory, throw up the entire system of reforming and cultivating society by the use of a moral and Christian ministry, ignore all prophecy, and all faith in a Divine purpose in the moral system, and leave the world in the power of a lawless whirlwind. But if he will recede from this appalling definition, so far as to admit that the freedom of the human will is, just what we see and know it to be in fact, the power and privilege of voluntary action, and that from the influence of motives which operate within our own minds, — then he can raise from it no argument

against the Universalist faith in the perfect purpose and government of God in the moral system, and the issue of that government in the consummation of that purpose, without a case of collision with the principles and laws of the moral system. He may ascribe as much power to human agency as he pleases, and as much freedom, and keep as far out of what theological disputants call "fatalism," only let him stop short of turning it outside of the sphere of the Divine government, let him leave it a place in the moral system among the relations of "cause and effect," and he and I will have no occasion of controversy upon this point, but we will together expect the accomplishment of the Father's "good pleasure which he hath *purposed in himself*," and will have fellowship with old father Abraham, who "believed God, and it was accounted unto him for righteousness."

CHAPTER VII.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL ARGUMENT.

THE time was when the most absurd and wicked dogmas, having been voted Orthodox by a council, were propounded to the people with as arbitrary tone of authority as that in which the naval commander pronounces his orders, in a gale, or in a battle. The teachers of such Orthodoxy felt no necessity for an effort to harmonize their dogmas with reason or the moral sense, decrying these as carnal and depraved. The authority by which their creeds were enforced upon the people was, when they possessed power to wield them—the prison, rack, gibbet, and stake; and, when wanting this power, the sanction was an endless hell. But now the time has come when every theorist feels the desire and perceives the necessity of giving his theory the show of reason, commending it to the moral sense of man, and harmonizing it with the principles of honor and right in God. This work our brother undertakes in his Fifth chapter, for his system of Destructionism. He heads his fifth and concluding chapter with this inquiry:—

“Does the Doctrine of the Immortality of a Class accord with a just Philosophy, and with the Sentiments of Humanity?”

He then lays out the work of the chapter in the following manner:—

“The present and concluding chapter of my prolonged argument must be somewhat miscellaneous. I must touch briefly the supposed metaphysical proofs of man’s immortality; a theological argument, or the doctrine of salvation; the supposed reformatory design of all punishment; and the questions, What is benevolent to man? and, What is worthy of God?”

The first topic here proposed, embracing the “metaphysical proofs of man’s immortality,” is substantially the same as that

discussed in his third chapter, and in my first. Therefore, I will not tax the reader with any thing farther upon it here, than to briefly notice one or two new phases of the subject here presented. Prof. H. notes :—

“ § 1. *The Ontological Proof of a Future Life.*”

To save the mass of readers the labor of turning to the dictionary to learn the meaning of a word not in very common use, I will tell them here, that *Ontology* signifies “The science of the necessary constituents and relations of all beings.”

I have no occasion to follow my opponent in his renewed effort to entangle the great question of human immortality, as it stands between him and me, with the mystical definitions and metaphysics of the Gentile philosophers, who argued from the immateriality and indivisibility of the soul. Nor does it matter to me from what school of philosophers the doctrine of immortality first came as a deduction from reason, or from the philosophical study of man. I showed in my third chapter of this discussion, that there was manifest in all the unenlightened ages of heathendom the want of a revelation from God, a revelation which this want itself did not supply; yet this want, belonging to the constitution of man who is made *for* immortality, naturally enough excited to thought and inquiry on the subject, and to the framing of various hypotheses in respect to another life. And the fact that these hypotheses were measurably faulty, places no hinderance in the way of our studying man in the light of the gospel which is given us, and proving all things, to “hold fast that which is good.”

Neither am I to be startled back from the use of any just metaphysical argument for human immortality, by the notification that some philosophers have strained such argument so far as to make it prove the immortality of all the brute species. The citation of the fact, that *some* brutes appear to develop mental faculties equal, or superior, to *some* men, throws no embarrassment in the way of enlightened reason. Between one and another of all the orders of nature there is somewhere a boundary, where the lower extremes of one and

the higher extremes of the other come near together, and even seem to pass each other transversely. On or near this line, between the animal and vegetable, and between the vegetable and mineral kingdoms, there are subjects of conflicting claim between the zoölogist and botanist, and the botanist and mineralogist. Yet the existence of the animal, vegetable, and mineral departments of nature, as three distinct and strongly marked species, is known to all. And even those individuals of each species which, on the outermost verge, are not easily classified by human perception, are, in their predominant character, members of one or the other. So with the human species. Having, in this compound constitution, an animal nature, this nature develops itself in different individuals, just as should have been expected, in all varieties of degrees, till, in the lowest cases of human kind, the sagacity of some animal instincts seems to outdo their reason. What then? They are members of the human family; and in that family circle they constitute a link which cannot be spared. Their Creator and Father, down amidst the surroundings of earth and dust sees his child, and his wisdom and love will some time raise, inform, and refine it.

Mr. Hudson says that "Bishop Butler and Isaac Taylor have remarked that the metaphysical arguments for our immortality are about as good for the immortal life of our four-footed and footless neighbors." If by "metaphysical arguments" they meant *chemical analyses of the soul*, their remark may be accredited as sensible. But, taking the word *metaphysical* in its free and practical sense, as "relating to the science of the mind," in its capacities of thought and knowledge, Butler and Taylor are inexcusably at fault in the above-quoted remark. As I showed in my third chapter of this discussion, in relation to all the brute creation, as far as we can know, there is ample opportunity for the full development and use of all their powers, and ample provision for the full satisfaction of all their wants, in the scenes and productions of the earth. Not so with man. The most advanced mind in this life does but just begin to develop its capacities and aspirations for illimitable advancement in discovery, and knowledge, and

wisdom, and love, and happiness. And there are wants common to all men which earth can never satisfy. This universal fact in the constitution of our race is that which is recognized by St. Paul, in form of "the earnest expectation of the creation," "the whole creation groaning and travailing together in pain," and the making of the human creation subject to vanity, "*in hope.*" All these functions and motions of the human mind are rationally accounted for by my opponent himself. in the concession that "man is made *for* immortality." Does there exist any such philosophical reason for assuming that the brute species are made *for* immortality? None at all.

There follows, in the section of the Affirmative Argument under review, a somewhat protracted strain of query and cogitation about the soul (using the word soul in the sense of spirit, or man's superior and immortal nature), concerning its substance, its composition, its measure and weight, its how and wherefore, etc., etc. My answer to all this I will comprise in the following anecdote:—

"A philosopher, more curious than wise, desired to ascertain the properties of the sun. He concluded that the sun's rays were emissions of parts of itself, and, consequently, if he could analyze a ray, and ascertain its substance, he would have determined the substance of the sun itself. At work he went on his chemical experiment. He held up an open phial in an inclination to receive a ray of the sun, and clapped in the stopple to hold the ray fast, with the view to subject it to a chemical analysis. But he found nothing there to analyze; and so he inferred, and announced the grave conclusion, that the ray was nothing, and the sun was naught. But notwithstanding this sage conclusion of the baffled philosopher, the common sense of mankind is experimental and undoubting in its assurance, that the sun is a fact, and that its beams are a shining, glowing, and vivifying reality.

So with regard to human immortality, as a subject of Christian hope, and an inheritance belonging to man in the design of God from his (man's) original constitution. Though the spiritual chemist may not be able to hold it in his crucible, to

prove its substance by chemical analysis, it is, nevertheless, a fact, the light and glow of which we meet in all our study of ourselves and our kindred. And all this, in the only form in which it lies in our mind as important, and in which we urge it upon the consideration of our fellow-men, my opponent fully concedes, in the following expressions of sentiment:—First; —“I grant the immaterial nature of the soul. For I do not make the mind out of the brain, however dependent it may be, in the present economy, on cerebral action; rather, I regard the brain and all organism, as produced by vital forces.” Second; —“Because man was made *for* immortality, there had ever been, both among Jews and Gentiles, many thoughts about it.” (Affirmative, c. iv. § 1.)

This is all that is essential to the philosophical argument. As I showed in my main argument on this subject, the chief and ultimate use and destiny of all created existences, is drawn as a design in their original constitution, and begins to be developed in their incipient stages. The seed that contains the principle of the vine which shall need the support of sturdier trees or walls, has in it the principle of the requisite tendril, just as really as it has the principle of the body of the vine. The worm which is designed to become a butterfly, has the principle in itself which is to be developed into that superior life. The butterfly life belongs to the constitution of the caterpillar. No worms ever become butterflies who were not made *for* the butterfly life. So, likewise, no order of beings will ever pass into the immortal life, but such as were “made *for* immortality.” And they who are made *for* immortality, with the whole design in their embryo state, as the complete temple of the scientific builder is in his original draft upon the trestle-board, — their relation to the purposed immortal life being so originally constitutional as to be perpetually inspiring “many thoughts about it,” they, of course, have in them the germ of that life immortal, a spirit which constitutes the *me*, the *myself*, which shall pass into the new and higher organism, and constitute their personal identity there. And such being the high and glorious destiny the principle of which is incorporated

with our present being, and correspondingly such the wants, aspirations, and "earnest expectation" of the soul, the gospel which brings out this great truth in a full and lucid light, is indeed to the believing mind the nourishing bread and water of life. There is in it, by the law of relations and affinities, the same adaptedness to the constitutional wants of the soul, that there is in bread and water, to the constitutional wants of the body. From this blessed gospel we have the positive assurance, as shown in our chapter iii., that God's beneficent and wise design in making man *for* immortality, shall in no case prove a failure.

Prof. Hudson proceeds in this miscellaneous chapter to treat,

"§ 2. *The Theology of Salvation.*"

In his treatment of this subject he involves it in the same difficulty in which he has involved other phases of the divine purpose and work through the mission of Christ. (See our correction of this mistake, on the phrase *aionion life*, in our chapter v.) He takes here the idea of salvation, as it stands in a broad and comprehensive expression of the complete purpose of God in Christ involving the regeneration and glory of the human creation, and then he finds the *word* salvation familiarly used in connection with the current experiences of men under the progressive operations of the gospel work, and seeing that its realization involves the faith and obedience of the gospel, he denominates the whole purpose of salvation "partitive," thus losing the broad promissory statements of the Divine purpose, in the diversified narratives of Christian progress and experience. Instead of merging the less into the greater, and the parts into the whole, he merges the greater into the less, and the whole into the parts. We have shown, in respect to *eternal life*, that the testimony that "God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son," in whom is the free gift for all men "unto justification of life," is not falsified by the saying, that "he who believeth on the Son *hath* everlasting life." In relation to the work of *reconciliation*, we have shown that St. Paul's saying, "All things are of God who *hath* recon

ciled us to himself by Jesus Christ," does not falsify the testimony which he immediately adds, and which was the core of the gospel ministry committed unto him, "To wit, that God was in Christ *reconciling the world* unto himself." And so here, the saying of Jesus, in relation to the connection between means and ends in the progressive gospel work, "He that believeth shall be *saved*"—and that of St. Paul, explanatory of the foregoing—"Moreover, brethren, I declare unto you the gospel which I preached unto you,—and by which also ye *are saved*," do not falsify, nor in any manner conflict with, or throw into doubt, the broad testimony of the Saviour's mission in its wholeness, that "The Father sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." The revelation of the fact, and the nature, and the purpose of God's covenant of grace given us in Christ Jesus, is one thing, and presents us with an infinitely rich and glorious subject of sure and elevating hope. Then the familiar converse of Jesus and his apostles with mankind, instructing and training them into the culture and enjoyment of the principles of that covenant and the blessedness of that hope, is quite another thing—making, however, no disharmony with the great central truth of the gospel.

This is the diversified manner of ministerial labor with Universalist teachers. We exhibit and elucidate the great central truths of the gospel, as the ground of Christian faith and hope, just as we judge that the circumstances of the times and the wants of the common mind require. And then our most common and familiar labor is devoted to the education of our people into an understanding and application of those central truths, and all the moral principles clustering in them, to the duties and relations and interests of life. And if any, hearing us in these practical teachings, should report us as making the whole gospel scheme of salvation, the entire system of Christian faith and hope, conditional, uncertain, and "partitive," we should be thus treated with the same injustice with which Jesus and his apostles are in like manner treated.

With respect to the term *salvation*, with the corresponding verb *save*, or *saved*, it does not of itself signify any thing in re-

spect to final destiny. If at any time it refers to a moral deliverance, rescue, or advancement, which shall never be succeeded by a relapse, or a return of the evil, it can only be so understood from the nature of the subject as developed through other testimonies. The word means deliverance, preservation, and the like. It may be applied to things; and to persons, both physically and morally. You may save money; you may save meat from corruption; you may save a ship; you may save life. In a moral respect you may save a young man from vice and ruin, either by preserving his integrity and virtue, or by restoring him when he has fallen by temptation. With all these varieties of application the word is used in the Scriptures. When the sailors were about to abandon the ship in a gale on the Mediterranean, which was conveying St. Paul to Rome, that apostle said, "Except these abide in the ship ye cannot be *saved*." "And the soldiers' counsel was to kill the prisoners, lest any of them should swim out and escape. But the centurion, willing to *save* Paul, kept them from their purpose." In both these cases the salvation spoken of was preservation of life.

In the twenty-fourth chapter of Matthew, it is recorded of Jesus, that in answer to the question of the disciples in relation to the dissolution of the temple and the end of the Jewish age, *when these things should be*, and what should be the *signs* of their approach—he predicted such a time of trouble, such severity of calamities, as never had been, but assured his disciples that he that should endure faithful to the end, should be *saved*,—that is, from perishing in those calamities which should effect so sweeping a destruction upon the corrupt people who were to be particularly the subjects of the predicted judgment. This is probably one of my opponent's cases of the use of the word *saved* for man's "final destiny," showing final salvation to be "partitive;" but how erroneously, all who are familiar with the twenty-fourth of Matthew will know.

It is recorded in the sixteenth of Acts, that when Paul and Silas had been thrust into prison in Philippi, for the gospel's sake, and there was a miraculous throwing open of the prison

doors, and casting off of the prisoners' bands, the jailer in charge, after an attempt to commit suicide, cried out in confusion and terror, "Sirs, what must I do to be *saved*?"

This is probably another text on my opponent's list which he has counted upon as using the word *saved* for *final human destiny*, and that to be determined by what we may "do" in the present time. But a careful examination of the whole narrative will expose the unquestionable mistake of such a classification. Look carefully at the circumstances of the case. The inquirer in the scene was a prison-keeper in a Gentile city, and cannot be supposed to have possessed any correct and enlarged views of the spiritual salvation of the gospel. It was the law of the reigning government that if prisoners were suffered to escape through the jailer's neglect, he must, as far as in the nature of the case was practicable, bear the punishment to which the prisoners were liable. It was this circumstance that caused the jailer to attempt to fall upon his sword when he awaked and saw the prison doors open, and supposed the prisoners had escaped. And though the announcement of Paul that they were all there, stayed his hand from the act of suicide, yet he could not in a moment recover from his extreme agitation, and the immediate impression would naturally be, that as the men he had severely treated by unnecessarily thrusting them into the inner prison or dungeon, were favorites of God, or of the gods, he was in imminent danger of the Divine vengeance; and it was in this state of mind, when there had been no time for deliberation, that "he called for a light, and sprang in, and came trembling, and fell down before Paul and Silas; and brought them out, and said, Sirs, what must I do to be saved?" There is no reason to suppose that he had any reference to a rescue from either the Orthodox or Destructionist hell; but it is easy to perceive how naturally he was impressed with the presence of some imminent danger. But I cannot find here the most distant reason for the feeblest conjecture, that the jailer had reference to having his soul saved from being annihilated after death. If he believed he had no soul to survive the death of the body, he could have no concern about its being annihilated;

and if he thought he had such a soul, his mind does not appear to have been on any abstract speculations about the fate of that, but on an immediate personal danger of some sort or other. But however vague may have been his conceptions of the danger from which he needed a rescue, St. Paul seized upon the opportunity to prescribe to him the means of his rescue from the greatest evils he had occasion to dread. "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house." And from the record that follows, it appears that Paul and Silas instructed the whole household in the truths of the gospel, and they believed and were baptized, and of course realized what Jesus had said, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved;" and what Paul afterwards wrote to the Corinthian Christians, "I declare unto you the gospel, which I preached unto you, and which ye have received, and by which also ye *are saved*, if ye keep in memory what I preached unto you, unless ye have believed in vain." By this faith the jailer and his family enjoyed a spiritual salvation, which involved a freedom from the horrible darkness of ignorance and unbelief, and from the terrible servitude of sin.

And this is the most familiar use of the terms under consideration, in the New Testament:—"Thou shalt call his name Jesus, for he shall *save* his people from their sins." (Matt. i. 21.)

"For the Son of man is come to seek and to *save* that which was lost." (Luke xix. 10.) This is repeated, in substance, several times. And the careful student will clearly see that what he was to save the lost *from*, as denoted by these testimonies, is, *not* any extraneous and foreign infliction which the very Saviour himself was legally bound to execute upon them, but the estate they were in, by virtue of being lost. This is the only sense of the language. As the saving of the lost sheep is its recovery from its wanderings, so the saving of lost men, by the forces of the gospel, is the recovery of them from that moral condition which constitutes their lost estate.

"For after that, in the wisdom of God, the world by wisdom knew not God, it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to *save* them that believe." This is the same salvation as that

spoken of by Paul, in address to those who *were saved*, by faith in the gospel which he preached. (1 Cor. xv. 2.)

“For we *are saved* by hope. But hope that is seen is not hope; for what a man seeth why doth he yet hope for. But if we hope for that we see not, then do we with patience wait for it.” (Rom. viii. 24, 25.) Here is a distinction made between the salvation which is the fruit or concomitant of hope, and that which is yet unseen, but is the subject of hope. That is the great salvation which is the thing revealed in the gospel, and the event hoped for, as declared in the preceding verses, even the deliverance of the creation from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. (Verse 21.) My opponent may call this salvation of hope “partitive,” inasmuch as it can only be enjoyed on condition of the exercise of hope, but it would not have been a satisfactory hope to the apostle had not the hope which comprised it embraced that great and universal emancipation, or ultimate salvation.

“For the preaching of the cross is to them that perish (or abide in unbelief) foolishness; but unto us which *are saved* it is the power of God.” (1 Cor. i. 18.) “For I am not ashamed of the gospel of Christ; for it is the power of God unto *salvation* to every one that believeth.” (Rom. i. 16.)

“Through their fall (the Jews) *salvation is come* unto the Gentiles.” (Rom. xi. 11.)

“Be it known unto you that the *salvation* of God (that is, gospel) is sent unto the Gentiles, and that they will hear it.” (Acts xxviii. 28.)

“For, whether we be afflicted, . . . or whether we be comforted, it is for your consolation and *salvation*.” (2 Cor. i. 6.)

“For godly sorrow worketh repentance *to salvation*.” (2 Cor. vii. 10.)

“But beloved, we are persuaded better things of you, and things that *accompany salvation*, though thus we speak.” (Heb. vi. 9.) This was of course a salvation then being enjoyed, as it was *accompanied* by the good fruits which are always its concomitants.

“Whom having not seen, ye love; in whom, though now ye

see him not, yet believing, ye rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory; receiving the end of your faith, even the salvation of your souls." (1 Peter i. 8, 9.)

But I need not multiply my quotations. All these which I have now quoted are of my opponent's list of cases which "apply the salvation to a class of men." To be sure it is spoken of as being only in the practical possession or enjoyment of the believing and obedient. To talk of this Christian salvation, this spiritual joy unspeakable and full of glory, being enjoyed in a state of unbelief and sin, would be a more senseless jargon of words and ideas than was ever heard in a mad-house. But the fact and testimony of this "partitive" salvation, does not restrict to themselves, or to ourselves, if I may so speak, the hope of the great and ultimate salvation. It *involves*, instead of forbidding, this great hope. For we who have known, and believed, and loved, and felt the truth and spirit of the gospel, know that its grace and power is a leaven which will stop not at us. We see by its light the ultimate end of sin and death, and the reconciliation of all things to God. This is our *salvation*.

Mr. Hudson says he has counted the instances of the occurrence of the words save, saved, and salvation, in the New Testament, and finds them one hundred, in which they are used "with apparent reference to man's final destiny." He says, "I may over-count a little; but I may safely say if the word does not apply to man's final destiny in *most* of these instances, it does in *none* of them, and it assures the eternal life of no man." In reply to this, we again assure our worthy friend that we have no occasion to huddle detached passages of Scripture together, and hurl them *en masse* into a given and mechanical application, lest we should come short of proving our theory. We follow where the record leads, without the least anxiety as to the issue. If we were to take up, in succession, all the passages in the New Testament in which the word *salvation*, in its different forms, occurs, and note them as we have the dozen or more foregoing instances, we should find the whole in this circle of thought: to wit, that the principles and purposes of the gospel, and of Christ, who is the imperson-

ation of its spirit and the executor of its purposes, are spiritual truth, purity, love, and life, — or, in other words, spiritual *salvation*: that the salvation wrought by those principles is a preservation, or rescue, as the case may be, from all the opposite moral qualities and principles, from spiritual darkness, unbelief, defilement, corruption, sin, condemnation, or death: — that Christ, in the fulness of this saving grace and truth, has come, and set up his spiritual kingdom among men, and his work is going on, and as fast as men are brought, by faith which works by love, to receive Christ, they become saved, or partakers of his salvation. And then, though my learned opponent grasps the fact that it is only through such living faith that this salvation can be enjoyed, as proof that the whole purpose is “partitive,” and the ultimate salvation shall be limited to a few, — the great circle of thought in which the uses of the terms *saved* and *salvation* revolve cannot thus be broken; — for the testimony of the same “grace and truth” in Christ is, that he is ordained “to be the Saviour of the world:” that through him God “will have all men to be saved and come unto the knowledge of the truth;” and that this will is a will of purpose, for he hath “made known unto us the mystery of his will, according to his good pleasure which he hath *purposed* (not in any fallible agency, but) *in himself*”; that in the dispensation of the fulness of times he might gather together in one all things in Christ, both which are in heaven and which are on earth, even in him.” This purpose of God which *he hath purposed in himself* being consummated, as it will be, not at once, but in the dispensation of the fulness of times, all men will be saved, in accordance with the same conditions which my friend unwittingly perverts into an argument for making the ultimate of the gospel mission of salvation “partitive;” that is, by bringing them into that union and oneness with Christ, which *is salvation*.

Perhaps I ought to devote a moment’s particular attention to my opponent’s strong and leading text, adduced by him as applying salvation, in the sense of a final destiny, “to a class of men.” It is Luke xiii. 23, 24. “Are there few that be saved?

Strive to enter in at the strait gate; for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, but shall not be able."

It is important to observe here, that the question, "Are there few that be saved?" appears to have been proposed by an unknown person in the crowd; and for what purpose, whether for information, or by way of a sneer on account of the fewness of Christ's disciples, is not known, nor are Orthodox commentators agreed upon it. This much, however, we may regard as indisputable; that even the disciples of Jesus did not at that time understand fully and clearly the nature of Christ's kingdom, or of his salvation in its spirituality and wholeness. They were looking for a temporal kingdom. See Mark x. 35-37; Luke xxiv. 21; Acts i. 6. Yet they understood all that it was necessary they should know at that stage of the work, and all that they were sent to teach. They were witnesses of Christ's life, miracles, and words, to attest his Messiahship; and they had a general understanding of the purity and hopefulness of his doctrines. But it was not until after his resurrection that the spirit was given them which should lead them into all truth, and bring to their remembrance, in a manner to be understood, those things which he had said to them before, but which they had not then attained to a standpoint fully to comprehend.

In this view of the circumstances of that time, even with the disciples, it is not to be supposed that the stranger Jew in the crowd made use of the word *saved*, in the question before us, with any definite understanding of the nature of Christian salvation. The Endless-miserian has the word *saved* canonized in his mind, as meaning, naturally and *straight* off, an escape from endless torments in hell. The Destructionist has it canonized in his mind as meaning a rescue from utter annihilation, at death or beyond the resurrection. To the former the above question reads, "Are there few that shall escape endless torments?" To the latter it reads, "Are there few that shall escape utter annihilation?" But there is no more reason to suppose that the Jewish querist had either of these thoughts in his mind, than there is for conjuring up the supposition that he had

in his mind the thought of being saved from an imprisonment in Etna, as one of Vulcan's journeymen at forging thunderbolts.

The Jews expected that their Messiah would work a great deliverance and exaltation to their people. And of Jesus, who was understood to claim to be the promised One, it was of course reputed that he was the Sent of God for some great work of good. But as he promised the security and blessing of his kingdom only to those who entered into it by faith in him, or who became his disciples, while the Jews expected that their whole nation, by virtue of their being Abraham's children, would share the benefits of his kingdom, including salvation from the oppression of the Roman yoke, and from the greater calamities which were understood to be impending, it is natural that the Jew in the crowd should ask of Jesus, "Are there few that be saved?"

And that this temporal salvation was the drift of the querist, is obvious from the Master's answer. He proceeded to urge upon the querist and his company, the importance of a sincere attention to his teachings and warnings, that they might enter into the way of safety, and enjoy his salvation spiritually, and share divine protection through the unequalled tribulations and distresses that should come upon their city and people. And he notified them that, under the circumstances of the time, there were difficulties in the way; it was a strait, that is, difficult gate; and many who would at length seek, or call for divine protection, would not be able to avail themselves of it, not having in due time received that instruction and cultivated those principles which should guide them in the way of safety. See Matt. xxiv., Mark xiii., and Luke xxi.

It is to me a wonder that any should quote this question, "Are there few that be saved?" and the answer made by Jesus, as having any thing to do with the theological controversy between Universalists and their opponents. It is not supposable, as we have seen, that the Jewish querist had any thought in his mind of the subject now in such controversy. And to suppose that Jesus, under the circumstances as they

were, when his own disciples were not able to receive his sublime doctrines of salvation in all their nature and extent, would have entered into a full exposition of those matters in answer to this question from the crowd which had no such reference. — to suppose this, I say, of Jesus, would be to attribute to him an incongruity entirely incompatible with his wisdom, adaptedness and dignity as a teacher.

The other two passages which my opponent quotes in connection with this, will be naturally understood by all our readers in harmony with my general exposition of the gospel salvation.

In respect to the comprehensiveness of the expressions, "all men," and "the world," as the subjects of Christ's work of grace and salvation, Mr. Hudson's attempt to reduce them to vagueness is not what I should have expected from a Biblical scholar of his erudition and culture. He thinks that such language applied to God's covenant of grace for man, and his purpose of salvation through Christ, no more proves that this covenant and this purpose embrace every human being, than the saying, "all men come to him" to be baptized; and, "if we let him alone all men will believe on him;" and, "Behold, all the world is gone after him," — mean that every Jew was baptized of Jesus, and that every individual in the world had gone after him.

This is a sort of device for throwing the provisions of the new covenant into vagueness and uncertainty, which used to be popular with our Orthodox opposers; but they have generally at least the best informed among them, left it in disuse. They see that it leaves the Christian ministry without a definite truth to preach to the individual. The rule of language is this. — that when speaking historically, of a matter which is general to the mass and not particular to the individuals, the terms "all," "the world," etc., are often used vaguely, relating to what is general, and not individual. But when such terms are used in a will, a deed, or any grant, or promise, or covenant, which refers to the whole as composed of individuals, and specially concerns them individually, such terms must be taken in

their particular and unlimited sense. For instance, I might speak of a family on which I had called, and say, "they were all in disorder;" and no man would understand me necessarily to mean that every individual of the family was disorderly. I speak of the appearance of the family historically and generally, and not of all the members individually. But suppose a father should provide in his will, that his estate shall be divided equally among *all* his children,—no judge on earth could explain the will, by quoting the account of *all men* coming to Christ for baptism, to refer only to the children generally, or to many of them, excluding this or that individual of the family. This is a matter in which all the children have an interest and a claim as individuals, and the language cannot be limited.

So with the new covenant, the purpose of "grace and truth" by Jesus Christ. It contains an inheritance for all men as individuals. The gospel minister is required to proclaim it to "every creature," as a matter of truth for *him*,—a subject of personal faith and hope and thankfulness and love. You cannot limit it; you cannot generalize it. You must renounce the ministry of Christ, or else preach the gospel news of salvation in Christ to every man, as a matter of truth for *him*. In obedience to the Master's behest, you must show to every man that by the recorded will of the Father he is heir to the inheritance of eternal life; and if he disbelieves it, he "makes God a liar, because he believes not the record that God gave of his Son. And this is the record, that God hath given unto us eternal life, and this life is in his Son."

From what does the Gospel save ?

Objecting to the Orthodox theory of salvation from punishment in the abstract, as of pernicious tendency, and seeming to acquiesce partially in the Universalist theory of salvation from sin, Mr. Hudson nevertheless ruminates as follows:—

"Yet a great question remains respecting the doctrine of salvation. Are we saved by grace, or by justice? Is there strictly any remission of the penalty of sin, or is there none?"

The state of mind with my learned friend on this and some other theological questions, is somewhat like that of the yet warm animal body from which the breath of life has just fled, continuing its muscular motions. His well-instructed intellect has discarded the old barbarian ideas of divine justice, as being a species of satanic vengeance; and yet the motions of his mind evince the lingering there of the spirit of the old error. So here he asks, as "a great question" respecting the doctrine of salvation, "Are we saved by grace, or by justice?" What can he mean? He knows that, in the original of the Scriptures, justice is righteousness. So then he asks whether we are saved by *grace* or by *righteousness*. Does he think it possible that grace can be unrighteous, or righteousness opposed to grace? Different terms are employed to designate different departments, or modes of operation, of a great and beneficent principle and work, without implying opposition or disharmony.

See there a family of children, in the enjoyment of pleasant homes, and independent estates—the gift of their father. That father has nourished and trained them up from infancy. He gave them laws adapted to their capacities and relations, and chastised them in cases of transgression, for their correction. These chastisements were not the chief reformatory and progressive instrumentalities; they were only checks and corrections. The principal moral influences to their reformation when erring, and their elevation and happiness, were the living, glowing, planning and working love of the father, manifested in his care and providence for them, and all his kind and varied instructions. And now that they have attained to an age, and he has educated them into capacities and qualifications, to improve and enjoy the inheritance which he had purposed for them from the beginning, a stranger, being informed of the wisdom and excellence of that family government, and parental purpose and providence, which have conduced to so happy an issue, asks these children whether all these blessings from their father, of discipline, education, and wealth, are of *grace*, or of *righteousness*. The puzzled children look upon the querist with amazement, wondering what he can mean. No

mortal, not the querist himself, can tell what such a question means. It is a theological jumble.

The fact is, gospel salvation is of grace, or favor, purely so, because all those provisions, means, and influences, which conduce to it, are of God's unpurchased and uninduced love. And it is just and righteous in God, also, that he should do for his children this work of grace. But we are aware that, distinguishing between different operations of the divine wisdom and love in relation to their administrative action upon mankind, the term *justice* is commonly applied to the dispensing of awards to human deserts. In this technical sense the essential gospel salvation, as held by Universalists, is not by justice, i.e., it is not by way of recompense for our deserts. But my opponent's theory makes what he understands to be the 'gospel salvation, to be "by justice." For he understands this salvation to be a rescue from being annihilated, which is to be awarded to those who shall receive it as a recompense for their *acquitting themselves like men*. (See Affirmative, c. v. § 1.)

Mr. Hudson proceeds:—

"But here we come at the gist of our question: If a bad condition of the soul, that is, sickness and disease, be the punishment of sin, how long must it last?—what is its natural termination? and, may recovery be retarded by unforgiveness, or hastened and even secured by a work of pardon?"

I do not perceive that there is much difficulty in the way of answering these questions. If moral disease be the punishment of sin, it must last until it is cured, or salvation from sin effected. Its "natural termination" is very instructively represented in the case of the prodigal; viz., to make one sick of sin. And, in respect to the question whether recovery may be "hastened by a work of pardon," taking the word in its broadest sense, the work of pardon is substantially the whole mission of the gospel of grace. Of course recovery from moral disease is the legitimate work of grace through Jesus Christ, in which the work of pardon, even in its popular sense, is necessarily included. But I will devote particular attention to the subject of pardon or forgiveness as a distinct operation, when I come

to that other effort of my opponent on the subject, which is near at hand.*

He says farther, on the subject in hand :—

“And here I think I find the common objection to Universalism well founded, viz., that in respect to penalty it has no doctrine of salvation. One can not be saved from what he was never exposed to; nor can one be saved from what he actually suffers. The Universalist, denying both the Orthodox and Destructionist view of penalty, finds no salvation in that direction. And the only penalty in which he does believe is always suffered in full tale.”

So then my opponent regards it as a “well-founded objection to Universalism,” that it holds a salvation which “came not to destroy (or make void) the law, but to fulfil it.” It is the pride of Universalism that it believes and promulgates “all the counsel of God.” We hold it to be as true now as ever it was, that “though hand join in hand the wicked shall not be unpunished;” that “there is no peace to the wicked;” that sin is the curse of human life; that it is moral disease and death. And we believe, too, in the salvation of the gospel, and the forgiveness of sin, and that without contradiction of the other truth. In a word, *we believe the Scriptures.*

St. Paul gives us very decisive instruction on this subject. To the Hebrews (ii. 2, 3), he says, — “For if the word spoken by angels (that is, the law ‘given by the disposition of angels,’ Acts vii. 53), was steadfast, and every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward, how shall we escape if we neglect so great salvation?” Here the apostle recognizes it as an established truth that, under the legal dispensation, every transgression and disobedience (all sins, both of commission and omission), *received a just* (i.e., an adequate) recompense of reward. If, as my opponent’s theory must have it, the just and lawful penalty of every transgression and disobedience is annihilation, those people got pretty thoroughly annihilated, who were annihilated for *every* transgression and

* For the farther exposition of Christian forgiveness, see pp. 365-368.

disobedience! And there is no abrogation of this law of recompense in the gospel dispensation. We have the apostle's interrogatory assertion, that there is no way of escape from the like "just recompense of reward," if we dishonor and abuse the principles of the gospel, or of this "great salvation." "How can we escape" a just recompense of reward, "if we neglect so great salvation?" "Escape by repentance and pardon," answers my opponent. But Paul's interrogatory assertion denies all ways of escape from "a just recompense of reward," such as was actually "*received*" under the other dispensation, for "*every* transgression and disobedience."

"Nor can one be saved from what he actually suffers," says the Professor. Yes, he can, in a broad and practical sense of the language. True, from the identical and abstract pang which is past, he cannot be saved. But this is narrowing the point too contractedly for a discussion of moral philosophy. One can be saved from what he actually suffers, as a condition, or circumstance, either physical or moral. A man may be actually suffering a painful disease, and he may be saved from it. A lost sheep may be saved from a wandering condition actually suffered. The prodigal, who was dead and alive again, was saved from a death which he was actually suffering. So the sinner may be saved from the ignorance, moral obliquity and perversity, and enslavement to vile principles and passions, which constitute his sinful estate, in which he is actually suffering. And when he is saved from all these things, and baptized, and purified, in the light of love and of God, tell me, ye who know, what else does he need to be saved from? Where is there any principle of law or gospel that condemns him then? He is saved, to be sure, from the protracted and multiplied evils which a continued course of sin would have brought him; but he is saved from such protracted evils only by being kept from incurring them.

Speaking of the Universalist view of punishment as a corrective or remedial instrumentality, Mr. H. says:—

"But this view formally rejects the notion of '*remission of sins that are past*' (Rom. iii. 25), and involves another serious

difficulty. Punishment is no longer a thing of justice in any sense; it is not even just, but becomes a sheer experiment of discipline."

I did not expect to find my learned and liberal-minded friend so extensively held in durance to the old middle age type of Orthodox perversion of words. But it is natural. Orthodoxy is his spiritual mother, and he has only revolutionized her theory of government in one particular, that of substituting annihilation for endless misery as the inevitable sacrifice to *justice*. But he, like her, takes *justice* to be merciless revenge. "Punishment," if it is remedial, "is no longer a thing of justice in any sense." If punishment is corrective, it is no longer righteous! David committed a blunder. In an ascription of praise to Heaven, he said (Ps. lxii. 12), "Also unto thee, O Lord, belongeth mercy; for thou renderest unto every man according to his work." But it is now discovered that, if the judgment of God which renders unto every man according to his work, is *merciful*, it is not *righteous*. My friend is a lover of the poets, and he believes in Young:—

"A God all mercy is a God unjust."

But the spirit of truth inspires the enlightened worshipper to sing:—

"Justice and judgment are the habitation of thy throne;
Mercy and truth shall go before thy face.
Blessed is the people that know the joyful sound;
They shall walk, O Lord, in the light of thy countenance.
In thy name shall they rejoice all the day;
And in thy righteousness shall they be exalted."

—(Ps. lxxxix. 14–16.)

Mr. H. seeks countenance in his statement above, in the following quotation:—

"This result is expressly admitted by Dr. T. S. Smith, in his 'Illustrations of the Divine Government.' He says: 'The advocates for the corrective nature of punishment do not believe that all men will be saved, but that, sinners having been reclaimed by the discipline through which they will be made to pass, all men will ultimately be rendered pure and happy.'"

But this quotation from T. Southwood Smith is of no more service to his positions than the quotations of my former opponent, Dr. Adams, from John Foster, were to his. Smith had thrown off the false theory of revengeful punishment, but he had not corrected the perversion of words, by which salvation had been applied to a hypothetical deliverance from such punishment. It is in this partially unenlightened state, admitting the word *saved* to mean a deliverance from an impending future endless punishment, that he says "the advocates for the corrective nature of punishment do not believe that all men will be saved." In the light of the Christian salvation, which consists in deliverance from darkness and purification from sin, to say that when all men are reclaimed and made pure and happy, they are not saved, would be idiotic.

To Dr. Smith's definition of punishment as not retributive (at all), but "prospective" (altogether), that "you are to be punished, not because you have yielded to an evil volition, but that you may yield to an evil volition no more," we do not subscribe. We maintain that it is firstly and necessarily retributive, and in its purpose and tendency corrective. The laws of right, of physical and moral and social health and happiness, inwrought with the physical and moral natures, and the relations of society, all inherit a self-avenging power, so that they repel, condemn, and avenge, in self-vindication, whenever they are infracted. But the all-wise Legislator has so provided in the constitution of things, that this vengeance of the law shall also be both corrective and preventive. But when men cease to violate the law, and come to love and honor it, it owes them no grudge, it calls for no farther vengeance.

"But this view," says my opponent, "formally rejects the notion of remission of sins that are past." This allegation I will remove, together with his implication, all along through this section, of a general opposition between punishment and forgiveness, by a brief exposition of this branch of the gospel work.

The Greek word for forgiveness, in the Scriptures, signifies *deliverance from, liberation as of captives*. The question then

is, *from what* is the gospel forgiveness a *deliverance*? There is never such a combination of words in the Scriptures as *forgiveness of punishment*. The gospel doctrine is that of *forgiveness of sin*. In the highest sense, then, the forgiveness of sin is deliverance from sin. And this is the great gospel work. "He shall save his people from their sins." He is exalted "to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance (a change of mind and character) to Israel, and forgiveness of sins," — "deliverance from sin." But the word *forgiveness* generally refers to that particular and interesting department of the gospel work, which involves a blotting from remembrance of the sins that are past, and receiving the penitent, and making him to feel that he is received, the same as if he had never sinned.

In this light the word of God places the subject, when, in other terms it expresses the same thing as giving repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins, by saying, "I will put my laws into their minds, and they shall be to me a people, — for I will be merciful to their unrighteousness, and *their sins and iniquities will I remember no more.*" The same idea is expressed by the *blotting out* of transgressions and sins.

In this light of the subject it is seen how the *punished* can be *forgiven*. Let me illustrate. A man who has committed a crime against the peace of society, is apprehended, tried, and condemned to imprisonment for a term of months and years, according to law. At length the term of his imprisonment has expired, and he is out again in the community, a reformed man. Will you say that his restoration to the confidence of the community is now a claim of justice, in consideration of his punishment? No; that has nothing to do with the matter. His having been punished is no merit to him, and has earned him nothing. Whatever benefit he receives is of *grace*. But he is a reformed man; and we will see if there is any place for forgiveness to the punished man, of the same sins for which he has been punished. How is it? His punishment does not change the odious nature of the sins he had committed. But he is reformed. Here he calls on a family of his former ac-

quaintance, and they remember against him his old transgressions, and repel him accordingly. *There* is no "forgiveness of the sins that are past." But here is another family on whom the punished and reformed man calls, and they blot out of mind his past offences, and receive him to their hearts as if he had never sinned. *There* is forgiveness of sins that are past, and which have been punished.

So with regard to Divine forgiveness. True, the whole spirit and purpose of the gospel, infinite love, is that of forgiveness. That is, it deals not with us according to our deserts, but according to our need, and according to the great Father's desire in planning and conducting a moral scheme of operation for our enlightenment, regeneration, elevation, and glory. But this great work in its wholeness is called salvation, reconciliation, and the like. The word *forgiveness* is, as I have said, most commonly applied to that part of the great work of grace, which consists in our conscious enjoyment of the Divine love and complacency, as if we had never sinned. The Father receives the penitent to the communion of his spiritual presence, in a practical sense remembering his sins no more. Thus there is a "remission of sins that are past."

This is a plain subject; and it has only been mystified by the necessities of creed-mongers, who, having invented false fundamentals, have been obliged to work every thing out of shape to procure a match of the parts. In the present light of the subject the whole course of Scripture doctrine in relation to punishment, forgiveness, etc., is easy of comprehension. We can see the truth and beauty of such passages as these:— "The Lord God, merciful and gracious, . . . forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty." (Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7.) "Thou wast a God that forgavest them, though thou tookest vengeance of their inventions." (Ps. xcix. 8.)

Mr. Hudson goes on to say,—

"We come round again to the question, Is the disease of sin in the soul healed by forgiveness? I think the affirmative

answer avoids all the difficulties I have alluded to. But this supposes that the moral disease, unhealed, is mortal."

This sentence evinces on his part a good understanding, in this instance, of Divine forgiveness being a remission of or deliverance from *sin*, instead of punishment. The healing of disease is a good figure by which to represent the forgiveness of sin. But that "this supposes that the moral disease, unhealed, is mortal," appears to us to be unsafe logic. It assumes the very thing in dispute; viz., that the spirit is constitutionally mortal. If it be so, it will die out of itself in due time, whether it becomes morally diseased or not. In whatever of a sentient being is mortal, disease will render its life painful, and may hasten dissolution. But, without disease, it will die out in due time by the natural exhaustion of its powers. So if the spirit of man is mortal, it will die by the natural operation of the laws of its being. To all mortal things, animal and vegetable, the law of decay and dissolution is just as natural as the law of growth.

But when the word *disease* is applied to the spiritual nature of man, it is used figuratively. And my learned friend knows that figures are not designed to go on all fours. They are not like a plane on a plane, bearing on all points, but like a globe on a plane, bearing on a prominent point. Sin is called the disease of the soul, because, as disease afflicts and harms the body, disturbing the pleasurable course of life, so does sin affect the spiritual nature. But to infer hence that the spirit, like the body, is mortal, is to crush the figure down upon all fours quite unlawfully.

By the same free use of figure, representing, in some prominent point, spiritual conditions by natural, sin is denominated *death* to the spiritual nature. But this death does not mean extinction of being to the spirit, because men were living in it, are *abiding* in it, and again passing out from it. My opponent may, with reference to this being in spiritual death while personally living, recur to his figure of *prolepsis*; but this figure is never used but in prophetic exclamations of an inevitable

fate, as, when the Egyptians arose in the morning, and, in all their families, found a member slain by the plague, they exclaimed, "We be all dead men!" It is not employed in deliberate descriptions of current experiences and the relations between cause and effect. To say that St. Paul's language,— "You hath he quickened who *were dead* in trespasses and sins;" and St. John's, "we know that we have passed from death unto life because we love the brethren,—he that loveth not his brother *abideth in death*;"—to say that this language is all *prolepsis*, referring only to an *exposure* to death not yet experienced, is tantamount to saying that the whole Bible is *prolepsis*, making it entirely a record of anticipations.

But we prefer the apostles' knowledge to our worthy friend's hypothesis under difficulties. When the Christian believer had been quickened from death in sin, and he knew he had passed from death unto life, he knew that he had been in the state of spiritual death. But that death was not annihilation; for if it had been he could have had no subsequent recollection of the death, nor experience of life from it. So then, the description of sin as a spiritual disease, does not mean that the spiritual is mortal, nor does its designation as spiritual death, mean that the spirit, in the bondage of sin, is annihilated. The spirit lives on; but it is in pain, and in darkness.

My opponent, to the saying above criticised, that the healing of the disease of sin by forgiveness "supposes that the disease, unhealed, is mortal," adds:—

"For if a personal immortality remains, that implies a continuance of all the faculties of personal and responsible being, including free agency, and involving the power of self-recovery; and then forgiveness is not needed."

Yes, indeed; my friend has here, perhaps unwittingly, struck upon the vein of sound spiritual philosophy, which I have often brought to bear against the doctrine of endless damnation; to wit, that if mankind in the future life are not moral beings, they will share no moral responsibility, and cannot be subjects of condemnation. But if they shall have moral

natures there, so as to be susceptible of guilt and self-condemnation for wrong, they will be susceptible of moral influences and discipline, and capable of hating and repudiating the wrong which they condemn. Hence there is not, in the nature of things, any basis for the doctrine of endless sin and suffering. This argument has taken the keen perceptions of my friend Hudson.

But what now? Does this glorious prospect appall my benevolent friend, so that he would have sinners annihilated in order to bar this pleasant possibility? It would seem so from the manner in which he puts in this possibility as an objection to the continuance of personal immortality to the yet unbelieving. But we do not think the fault is in his heart.

But he adds: "and then forgiveness is not needed." When is forgiveness not needed? Why, when free moral beings shall have successfully exercised their "power of self-recovery." What does this mean? What other recovery does my friend believe will be ever attained by any man? His whole theory of salvation is that of self-recovery by sinners, complying with what he calls the conditions of the gospel, and *acquitting themselves like men*. He speaks of Divine helps; but he does not come up with us in giving the Divine agency the lead in the work of salvation, so that our assurance of its achievement shall correspond with our confidence in God; but he gives to human agency the lead, insomuch that eternal destiny is suspended on the human decision of the moment. Accordingly, all the salvation he believes in is self-salvation, all the recovery self-recovery, in a sense far beyond what we admit, and in the same sense in which he concedes that the same recovery may be achieved by all, if all are permitted to live on in immortal personality.

What then? Does this preclude all forgiveness? If it would in the cases he hypothetically refers to for the future, it does in all cases of recovery, on his theory, and he has no doctrine of forgiveness at all. But in the light in which we have presented the subject of forgiveness, there is call for it and the ~~experience~~ of it in all cases of recovery from sin. The soul is

healed of sin's virus, and a spiritual union and communion with God gives the mind to feel that past ingratitude and disobedience is both purged out of himself and blotted out of the Divine remembrance.

With regard to Mr. Hudson's admonition to his Endless-miserian brethren, that if all become sharers of personal immortality, as moral agents, it may result in universal holiness, it brings to mind in magnified consequence what I have often remarked in substance in private conversation since the commencement of this discussion. The idea is this: that, though it is a common remark, made without deliberation, that Destructionism is a more comfortable belief than "Orthodoxy," yet in the modified character in which the latter is most popular at the present time, it is not so. In the current Orthodox free-willism, perpetuating that free will, and asserting for all men the right of choice to suit themselves to all eternity, which involves the possibility of universal holiness suggested by my opponent, I would infinitely prefer, in the yearnings of universal love, the universal resurrection to immortality, rather than the blotting of countless millions of my fellow-men out of existence. But more of this when I come to another section of my opponent's argument, presenting more particularly its moral aspects.*

In closing this branch of the argument, I will remark of Mr. Hudson's supposition in respect to the result of moral disease "unhealed," that the Scriptures do not leave us to speculate as to any such result. There is no such thing in the Book as a moral disease finally "unhealed." It is the purpose of the Saviour's mission to destroy the works of the Devil; that is, to exterminate moral as well as physical evil from the universe; and to reconcile, that is, harmonize and assimilate, all moral beings to God. And "he shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hand."

* See Negative, chap. vii. § 4.

“§ 3. *The Nature and Design of Punishment.*”

Mr. Hudson's section on this proposition I have no occasion to review, as his statements and illustrations in respect to the nature, methods, and instrumentalities of punishment in general, precisely meet my own views. I dissent, of course, from his assumption that, in *any* case of punishment which seems to have failed to correct the subject in this life, he has seen the ultimate result of the punishment; and from his sentiment for which he makes a renewed effort here, viz., that the punitive consequences of sin may work the literal dissolution of the spirit, even of the resurrection man, as they sometimes do of the physical body. But I have just commented sufficiently upon these points in my preceding section, and in other parts of this discussion, and need not repeat the criticisms. And, furthermore, for an extensive exposition of the whole system of judgment and retribution, as a co-operative branch of the Divine government, argued philosophically and scripturally, see the first chapter of my Reply to Dr. Adams' Argument for Future, Endless Punishment, in the Adams and Cobb Discussion.

“§ 4. *Is the Immortality of a Class unkind to Man?*”

It is hard to kick against the goads. The gospel of Jesus presents to our enlightened faith a system of Divine government which, in its wholeness, taking into view all the results, commends itself to free, untrammelled reason, and to the Christianized moral sense, and fully answers, in spirit, our highest wishes, our most compendious and expansive prayers, and makes us feel incapable of conceiving to ask a higher or more extensive good. In such faith it is that we can join in holy sympathy with the singing-choir of heaven, and exclaim in the spirit and understanding, “*Glory to God in the HIGHEST.*” In the light of this gospel the mind realizes no occasion to ham-string reason, to hush the pleadings of benevolence, to choke off the mother's aspirations by quenching her love, or in any case to intrude special pleading, not to vindicate, but to excuse “the ways of God to man.” But the necessity for

effort in all these directions is imposed upon theologians by unscriptural theologies.

Turn to this fourth section of my opponent's fifth chapter, and re-peruse it. See what violence that learned and good man is, throughout, doing all his better principles and feelings, in the way of labored apology for his theory; and what violence he is forced to do the richest affections of the human soul, in its most sacred relations. After a few words on the assumption that "it is not a hardship that one should fail to be a parent of immortality," which has no bearing on the subject, he proceeds with an effort to reconcile those who *are* parents, to the thought of an eternal bereavement of their children. And he commences this work with an allegation against parental affection as being "a modification of self-love." Why so? Because the love of the child seems to be identified with the love of self. Its life seems to be a part of the parent's own life. What affects the child, favorably or injuriously, in like manner affects the parent. But so it is with all true love. It attaches soul to soul. It identifies the interest of others with our own interest. Such is the very form in which the law of Christian love is enjoyed — "Thou shalt love thy neighbor *as thyself*." Show me a man who has no self-love, and I will show you one, in him, who is incapable of loving his neighbor. This requisite love to neighbor identifies his well-being with our own. Hence it is said of this love, that "she seeketh not her own," meaning that it measurably forgets self in a prevailing desire and effort for others' good. What more can parental affection do? It is granted that there is a *peculiar* feeling, as there is a peculiar responsibility, in the parental relation. But in so far as my opponent belittles parental love as selfish, he degrades all true Christian love by the same effort. But to deny social love its proper name and credit, because it embraces its objects in one general interest and care with ourselves, and makes us feel to be not complete in ourselves without them, is to rob us of the means of expressing, by proper discrimination, the most interesting realities.

But what will my opponent do, at length, about this self-

love, which he assails as if it were demoniac? What? He will exalt it to supremacy in the Christian life. He will subordinate to his theory the social, even the parental love, so that we may be capable of entire and joyful satisfaction in the belief of a finally broken moral creation, and even broken families, having no hope of immortality for our own children. But he will not seek to give us quiet without hope for ourselves. Consequently he gives the supremacy to self-love. He does indeed, as if this difficulty flitted across his mind, in paragraph third of section fifth of this chapter, speak of the possibility of his being required of right to yield his place in existence to one who may fill it better; yet he will not directly advocate that we should be satisfied without the hope of immortality for ourselves; for this would be annihilating the principal motive which his own theory proposes for a Christian life. The chief motive presented by his theory is the achievement of self-immortality. But this is no longer a practical motive for *acquitting ourselves like men*, if we are indifferent about it.

Indeed, to train ourselves to an indifference in respect to the hope of a future immortal-life, in which yet more and ever to know, and adore, and love, the Lord our God in all his glorious perfections and works, and to love our fellow-beings, and with them enjoy the blessedness of existence in God's light and love, — to train ourselves, I say, to such indifference, would be mean, shameful, and brutifying. The genius of the gospel does not school us to such unmanly puerility, and retrograde affinities for nothingness.

As to the supposition that the light of truth and of the fitness of things may inspire in me *the wish, in propriety and benevolence, to yield my place in existence to another who may fill it better*, "for the general good," it is an imaginative conception of an impossibility. Every one has his own place to fill, and to fill his own proper place is the best that he can do. He cannot fill mine. Suppose some one of our muscles, perhaps the smallest in the body, should say, I am willing to be extracted and cast away, that I may give my place to some other muscle

of the body that may fill it better, — who could not see that it was talking nonsense? Its place is its own, for a special use, which cannot be served by any other part of the same or another body. And if that muscle be removed, the body will be, and forever remain, maimed and incomplete.

So with the great body of humanity. It requires all the members to compose the whole body, and if one is exterminated no other can fill his place, but the body is maimed, and a wrong is done to all.

If then it were mean and unmanly for me to be willing to exchange my own existence for eternal nonentity, it were positively unchristian and wicked that I should be willing that others should be raised and tormented, and blotted from the roll of being. It is repudiating the Christian law, that I love my neighbor as myself.

The more this subject is canvassed, the more clearly it is seen that Destructionism fails to answer the purpose to which the gospel is ordained and adapted, that of satisfying bread and water to the human mind, and of “an anchor to the soul both sure and steadfast.”

1. To exemplify the last-mentioned defect first, Destructionism has no groundwork for a sure and steadfast hope for any one's self. It suspends every man's final destiny upon present character, the exact measure of which that shall entitle him to immortal life, is to be decided by the all-seeing and scrutinizing Mind, which discerns and adds and subtracts, by a thousand modifying circumstances and motives, the complicated bearings of which poor, ignorant, erring, self-palliating, and self-deceiving mortals do not understand. While we complacently locate ourselves upon the upper side of the line of demarcation between the righteous and the wicked, many whose rougher exterior leads us to place them upon the roll of the wicked, do really, besides all the temptations to which they yield, manfully encounter and overcome more numerous and severe temptations than we, and exercise some higher virtues. Many whose education, good fortune, and surrounding influences and examples, have habituated them to a respectable

deportment, insomuch that their self-esteem and pride of reputation accord to them a very high rank in the moral scale, are nevertheless very selfish and very mean, in the eye of Him who looks into all the recesses of the soul, and discerns all the secret springs and complicated motives of our actions.

Truth is, the man who rests his final destiny upon his own present moral status, or upon his moral status self-accumulated as it shall be judged once and finally at a grand assize by the Discerner of the secrets of all hearts, can have no rational assurance of hope. To his own apprehension his *eternal all* is undetermined and uncertain as himself is fallible. In the doleful cadence of suspense between feeble hope and black despair, he can feelingly sing the doubting poet's wail:—

“Great God, on what a slender thread
Hang everlasting things!”

But this is not the “more excellent ministry” of the “better covenant, established on better promises.” In the light of this more excellent ministry, we stand upon the Rock of Ages, lean upon the bosom of the Father's love with childlike trust, our faith resting upon the purpose of the Eternal, “which he hath purposed in himself.”

2. But we stand not alone. Our fathers—where are they? Our mothers; and some of our sisters, and brothers, and children? Gone,

“To share no more in all that's done,
Beneath the circuit of the sun.”

But we cannot forget them. The fond remembrances of love cling to them. And our laboring spirits ask, “Shall we not greet them again, in life and love eternal?” And there are those around us, bound to our hearts by ten thousand tender strings entwined around, whose interest is dear to us as our own. Where is there a gospel whose doctrines of faith and hope will correspond with this love, and fill and satisfy all these wants of the soul which love inspires?

Will you say that when we get to heaven, the spirit of im-

mortality, the atmosphere of the eternal world, and the perfect oneness with God into which we shall be wrought, will freeze our sympathies, and petrify our warm hearts, so that we shall forget our friends, and care not that our brother men, even our own children, shall be aroused from the quiet slumber of death, to suffer torments that shall extinguish the life principle, and blot them forever from being? Alas, for you! That God of yours, whose embrace shall thus demonize the human spirit, is my Pluto; and that heaven of yours, whose atmosphere shall thus petrify the human heart, is my Tartarus — nay, worse than the heathen Tartarus. For the parabolic story, the imagery of which our Saviour drew, for an instructive use, from the heathen fables of the under worlds, represents that the inhabitants even of the Tartarean prison had the grace of sympathy and well-wishing for their fellow-beings.

But let us away from those theological hypotheses, the contact of the spirit of which is the cold touch of death. The spirit of Christianity is universal love. And this is not to be extinguished by our baptism into heaven; for it is itself a ray of heaven. True religion here below is a transcript of heaven above. And that warm glowing Christian love to neighbor as to self, which makes us desire our neighbor's welfare as we desire our own, is not to be killed out, but is to be made more fervid and expansive by a more perfect assimilation to the moral likeness of God. For this is the very spirit of God in our souls. So says the Divine word. "Love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love." "And he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him." (1 John iv. 7, 8, 16.)

How clear is the painful reality that all the labor which, in this age of the more general culture of the moral sense, theologians devote to the effort to reconcile the moral sentiments and feelings to the principles of Partialism in either form, that of Endless miserianism or Destructionism, is in contravention of the spirit of the gospel! They find it a necessity to lower the standard of social sympathy and moral sensibility, in order that the mind may receive, without utterly resistant retching, the

spiritual drug. From this painful necessity my kind-hearted and amiable friend, who has no heart to see even an insect harmed, tries to lull even the mother's soul into such a stupor, that she shall care not if her own darling child shall be killed off from the resurrection life, and his eyes closed from the beauties of God's works forever. While the apostle would comfort the bereaved who mourns without hope, by giving him hope, my friend tries the vain endeavor to give him comfort by making him contented to *continue without* hope. But I would refuse all consolation which is conditioned on the extinguishment of my manhood. When I look upon my children with a tender solicitude, a solicitude which can never, to all eternity, be satisfied, but in their being and blessedness, I feel that the greatest curse that could befall me would be such a moral metamorphosis as should extinguish this solicitude. It would be an operation upon the soul, like as it would be upon the body to swallow a drug which should destroy physical sensibility in order to tread thorns without the sense of pain.

Yielding to the same everlasting clamor of this theoretic necessity for removing the moral obstructions to his favorite theory, my friend adventures the expedient of turning the point of the Saviour's dying prayer. He says:—

“Here it may be urged that Christ extended his charity to all classes. ‘Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do,’ was his dying prayer. But it may fairly be questioned whether the prime instigators and contrivers of his death were included in this petition of mercy. . . . This consideration may apply only to the Romans, who were the *instruments* employed by those who plotted his death, and to others who might fairly plead some excuse of ignorance.”

This singular effort of my opponent would obliterate that trait in the Saviour's attitude at his death, which forms the most brilliant passage of his history, and the chief glory of his character. In the light in which it fairly stands in the record, and in which the Christian world, and the infidel band too, have always understood it, this transaction exemplified his prominent and distinguishing principle of practical doctrine, *persistently*

urged upon his disciples, that of discarding the law of retaliation, and loving enemies and overcoming evil with good. In his inimitable sermon on the mount, he says, "Ye have heard that it hath been said, Thou shalt love thy neighbor (thy friend), and hate thine enemy. But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good unto them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you and persecute you ; that ye may be the children of your Father which is in heaven ; for he maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust."

The whole connection here goes to show that the spirit and prayer of love should be cherished and exhibited for all men, including our most "despiteful" enemies. It follows hence that my opponent misconstrues, to the discredit of Christianity, the language of St. John which he quotes here, and repeatedly elsewhere, relating to the sin unto death for which he would not enjoin prayer, and makes that contradict this essential principle of universal love and well-wishing. I have noted the fact before, that many commentators are of opinion that this sin unto death was an offence subjecting the culprit to capital punishment by the law of the land. It was not deemed expedient that prayer should be offered in the Christian congregations, for the interception of the regular administration of the law.

I will add here the remark, that it is very clear from the nature of the case, that the apostle had no such meaning in his use of the language referred to, as my opponent has in his application of it. The latter would have it mean a sin incurring annihilation. But he makes all sin to incur annihilation, and surely he would not refuse to pray for all sinners. And, in another, a moral and Scriptural sense, all sin is unto death. "In the day thou sinnest thou shalt surely die." "The wages of sin is death." "To be carnally minded is death." "He that loveth not his brother abideth in death." "Sin hath reigned unto death." It would make shockingly bad sense to substitute the word annihilation for death in all these and other like cases. But there is sober truth in these testimonies in their proper meaning. But they do not preclude prayer for

sinner. Nor does the language of John which has been adduced discountenance the prayer of faith for the spiritual good of any man. It does not *forbid* prayer even for the release of culprits from legal capital punishment. But St. John would not *recommend* such prayer in the churches. "I do not say that ye shall pray for it."

But to return to the dying prayer of Jesus ; my opponent's construction of it, as I have said, ignores its essential spirit, obliterates its glory, and withdraws from the dying scene the Christ of the New Testament, the practical model of that unconquerable love which overcomes evil with good, and prays for despiteful, persecuting enemies. Who, in this case, were the despiteful enemies and persecutors of Jesus? Were they the Roman soldiers? No. These were probably as innocent of cruel designs against him as were their own swords and spears. Some of them — all of them for aught we know — may have been exercised by friendly feelings towards him personally, regretting the part they were compelled to act in this sad drama. His only despiteful enemies and persecutors were the hostile Jews whom my opponent excludes from the embrace of his prayer. Thus he sinks down the principle attested by the death of Christ, to that mean-spiritedness which Christ himself refuses to recognize as characteristic of his religion, when he says, "If ye love them which love you, what reward have ye? Do not even the publicans the same?"

No; we will not pierce the side of Jesus with another ragged spear, by impugning his dying prayer as fallacious. That prayer expresses what his flowing blood attests and seals; to wit, the unconquerable energy and indissoluble verity of Jesus' love, whose mission it is to overcome all evil with universal good. The closing words of the prayer, "for they know not what they do," is a beautiful expression of sympathetic and kind consideration of the short-sightedness of poor humanity, and their want, especially in their worst estate, of a clear comprehension of the reason and nature of their doings, in all their relations and bearings. It exemplifies the spirit of the ministry of reconciliation committed to the apostles; "to wit, that God

was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, *not imputing their trespasses unto them.*" The same magnanimous consideration is evinced in the dying prayer of Stephen. No innocent Roman soldiers were concerned in this case, but the very people whom Stephen charged with the murder of the "Just One," rushed upon him and stoned him; and he prayed, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." Surely, the disciple is not greater than his Master.

The words of Jesus in another place, "Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father," as we have shown in a former chapter, though they mean that the Jews had known so much of his works as to render culpable their treatment of him and his teachings, do not mean that they knew him as the Messiah, for then, as St. Paul says, "they would not have crucified the Lord of life and glory." Accordingly, the saying, "for they know not what they do," applied literally and truly to the Jewish instigators of his crucifixion, and does not, as my opponent would have it, restrict the prayer of forgiveness to those mere military instruments, who had, in this instance, no evil intent to be forgiven.

Finally, I rejoice, and I glory, that the record of the Saviour's dying prayer yet spans the heavens in letters of glowing, burning light, attesting that love which no force of human ingratitude and sin can ever vanquish, but which shall itself vanquish death and hell, and sin and sorrow, and inspire the universe of created spirits with the song of "blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, unto him that sitteth on the throne, and to the Lamb, forever and ever."

3. My opponent continues to reiterate the quotation of Rom. ii. 7, "To them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor, and immortality, eternal life,"—just as if it were unquestionable that it meant the seeking of an immortal existence, and the bestowment of such immortal existence, as the reward of such seeking.* And he applies the condition to

* In the Adams and Cobb Discussion, chapter i. of the Reply, I show, as I think, clearly, that this passage refers to the rule of the operative

all little children as well as adults. Indeed, the Destructionist theory does necessarily involve the annihilation of all who die in infancy and childhood, before they have wrought out their immortality. Mr. Hudson charitably holds out to the parent a glimmer of hope for the child, just enough to tantalize the parental soul; to wit, that "if the feelings which lead to parentage are subordinate to the sentiments of piety," he *does not know* but the parent may hope that the child may have in him the seed of immortality! But this is a mere *I don't know* of my learned friend, founded on no hint of Scripture nor principle of physiology or philosophy, and it leaves the fate of childhood universally what the French infidels labelled the death of all men (the better theory of the two) eternal sleep. Is this the gospel of Him who took little children in his arms, and blessed them, saying, "of such is the kingdom of heaven"? Is this the gospel by which the minister of Jesus is to bind up the broken-hearted, and comfort them, all them, who mourn? Will you go with this doctrine, which sweeps deceased childhood with the besom of inevitable destruction, and preach it to the bereaved mother, who has watched the last fluttering pulse and faltering breath of her lovely babe, and now bears the sacred casket to the tomb? Give me such a gospel to bear to such a mother, and I will tear it to shreds, and trample it under foot. Will you go at work to prepare the mother to receive such theology without a pang, by teaching her to expunge from her heart her solicitude for her child by denouncing it as selfish? As well may you teach the victim of idolatry not to writhe, when the executioner cuts open his bosom, and tears out his heart for the altar.

(4.) Mr. Hudson in his argument (2) of the section before us, says,—

"I have used the phrase 'parent of immortality,' but only

judgment of Christ under the gospel dispensation, awarding the blessedness of the gospel life to them who seek for incorruptness of moral principle: and I should not have expected that my present opponent would repeatedly quote the passage in the usual partialist sense without an attempt to convict my exposition of error.

for argument's sake. The Scriptures, I think, teach a higher parentage than human, for the immortal life. They who have 'the power to become the sons of God' are 'born not of flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man, but of God.' God is the 'Father of spirits.'"

What have we here? Does my friend mean that *all* which is of earthly parentage is the animal nature, which is all dissolved at death, — and that the resurrection person is of Divine parentage, in such a sense that there is just as real a relation of natural offshoot and likeness between the person and God as between the parent and child? Very well. And then he admits what is so distinctly taught in the gospel, the resurrection of all men from the dead. And yet he will have God destroy millions of his own children, who are partakers of his nature by the resurrection, just as they were partakers of the nature of their earthly parents in the physical life. Our Destructionist friends denounce as absurd the Orthodox dogma of the endless suffering of a being in the likeness of God's spiritual nature. But to me it appears more absurd to suppose that God will annihilate his children who are the offspring of his own spiritual nature. For, bad as it is, we can conceive of a being with an immortal nature having an unhappy frame of mind. But that such a child of God should be annihilated, is inconceivable.

But I suppose my friend introduces this idea of the immortal life being not of human parentage, but directly of Divine parentage, in order to relieve the parents who have lost children by death from the idea that they shall have any particular interest in them in another world, by the hypothesis that they will not know them there, even what brief space of time they may live in "that world." The future existence will be a new creation of God, and not the rising into a higher life, and organization with more glorious bodies, of the spirits which are born with us, and constitute the superior part of our present being. Then, of course, we shall not know ourselves, any more than we shall know one another. Nor can we either be justified or condemned in the future life for good or evil conduct here, nor

experience any sense of forgiveness, or gratitude for salvation from past evils, for we shall have no recollection of having before existed. It will not be *our* future life, it will be the creation of another race of beings. The doctrine of the resurrection is, upon this hypothesis, of no more consequence to us, than the fact which atheism recognizes, of an eternal succession of being, by one generation succeeding another. We need not, in such case, dispute any more whether *some* men will be annihilated ; — *all* men living on the earth will be annihilated, at death, for they shall never more be conscious of being.

But the Scripture from which Prof. H. extracts the phrase, "Father of spirits," has reference to the parentage of our own spirits, which are in us, and constitute the essential *me*, the responsible *person*. That passage reads:—"We have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?" (Heb. xii. 9.) The apostle here speaks of our present relation, in our higher nature, to God as our spiritual Father, to whom we owe due reverence as children. Again, the Lord is called the "God of the spirits of all flesh." Accordingly, all men, even now, have spirits which bear an essential relation to God, who "is a spirit," and upon which relation is founded their obligation to render unto him true and spiritual worship.

In respect to my friend's quotation of the saying, that they who have the "power to become the sons of God," are "born, not of flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God," as referring to the parentage of a new personal existence, I cannot think that, on review, he will insist upon it. It would make the being born of God, in the gospel sense, to be, not the acquisition of new governing principles by the influence of God's spirit, but the miraculously begetting within us of a newly created personal being, by the power of the Holy Ghost. And if, by faith in Christ, a separate immortal person is created within the believer, then when he falls away again into unbelief, that appended immortal person is annihilated. And, of course, if he recovers his faith again, another immortal spirit or person is

created in him;—not the old one revived, for that which is annihilated cannot be revived. In this way one man may have in him, in the course of his lifetime, several different immortal personal spiritual beings, each of whom, created by his faith, is destroyed again by his unbelief, except, perhaps, the last, which may continue in personal immortality if the last exercise of faith holds out unto death. But this is a backward march of theological lore. The being *born of God* in the Christian sense is a moral change of character. “He that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God, — for God is love.” His mind is emancipated from the gloom of spiritual darkness and the bondage or death of sin, by the power of divine truth and love.

In respect to *parentage*, it involves the relation to the whole being of the child; and when the higher nature of the child is developed, the most interesting kindred is found to be that of soul to soul. The higher parental relation is experimental in the affections of the *mind*, and not in animal instincts; and these high affections are eternal. There will be a perfected fraternal affection for all mankind, as children of one Creator and Father,—and, at the same time, peculiar relations of circles within circles, not detracting from, but adding to, the beauty and blessedness of the great whole.

5. Mr. Hudson’s third and fourth paragraphs of the section before us (c. v. § 5), simply embody suppositions which require but little labor on my part. In favor of the kindness of the annihilation of a portion of our race, he says, “*The power of evil habit and of memory may render immortality burdensome.*” This supposition ignores the doctrine of forgiveness, which blots out all the difficulty here conjured up. He thinks some injurious persons will prefer to be blotted out of being rather than meet in the immortal life those they have injured. On the contrary, the fact is, that when one who has committed great wrongs becomes a true penitent and hates the wrong, receiving the Divine forgiveness, the very first persons he wishes most ardently and speedily to see, are those he has injured. Oh, how sweet is the communion of the penitent and the forgiv-

ing soul! Wonder if my opponent thinks that Paul chose to be annihilated, rather than meet the blessed Jesus whom he had cruelly persecuted.

In respect to the soul's having its own laws, which it may bear with it into the future life, it does not trouble our theory, though it grates harshly with Destructionism, which recognizes no soul of the present man to live in immortality. We religiously, and philosophically, and Scripturally believe, that the laws of our moral nature are eternal, and that by those laws the free moral agency of all men will secure their love and praise of God, when the veil of darkness shall be removed from all minds, and the sweet light of heavenly truth and love shall fill every soul.

Lastly, under this head, Mr. H. says, by way of argument for the kindness of Destructionism to men, "*Many persons, not the worst of men, have no desire for immortality.*" And to this point he argues: "This desire has been called natural and instinctive; and we hear of the inextinguishable love of being. But, granting that this is the rule, and that it proves the actual immortality of those who rightly cherish it, there are exceptions so marked as to claim attention, if not to limit the argument."

But here my friend sheers the argument — not meets it. It is *not* argued that God will mete out immortality to *factitious desires*, here and there, just as the indulgent mother gives dainties to her capricious child to pacify its clamors. The philosophical argument for human immortality, from the reason and fitness of things — I mean the particular argument which Mr. H. here essays to annul, or at least to limit — is, that the common desire and conception of a future existence, throughout the human race, being natural, indicates that they possess immortal natures, or natures which have a relation to another life; — or, as Mr. H. himself is pleased to word it, natures made *for* immortality. Whatever is good in this argument, is not touched by the cases referred to by my opponent, such as Strauss of Germany, and Barker of America, who have professed that they desire not another life. If man is constitutionally designed for another state of being, his mental speculations cannot change

that constitution. But with regard to Strauss and Barker, from the absurdities of prevailing theologies their minds have sought relief in atheism, and they have compelled their pens to utter words which should appear consistent with their theories. They may have trained themselves, by long effort, to *think* that they express themselves honestly when they disclaim the desire for immortal life. But I have no more confidence that their words are indices to the inward wants of their souls, than I have that the words of my two kind-hearted opponents, Adams and Hudson, are transcripts of the spirit of their minds, when they would make it appear that their moral feelings are in harmony with their theories. I have no doubt that Strauss and Barker, could they catch a glimpse of the heavenly sphere, would stretch forth their arms, and in eager frenzy exclaim, "LORD, GOD, RAISE US! DRAW US THITHER!" Their understandings are darkened, and pride of consistency in a false theory leads them to utter strange words; but the image of God in which they are created is not extinguished, and, through faith in "the Scriptures and the power of God," I have hope that they will some time join with me in trying to express our inexpressible wonder, admiration, gratitude, and praise, for the beauty, richness, glory, and blessedness of "that world."

I have no doubt that many poor wretches, falsely educated, would prefer annihilation to the chance of immortal life, because of the horrid views which false theology has given them of that life. But this does not invalidate the truth that the "life and immortality" "given us in Christ Jesus before the world began," is substantially "*the desire of all nations.*"

As to the *benevolence* of Destructionism, predicated by my opponent on the ground that a few artificially nondescript humans do not desire immortality, it is entirely unsatisfactory. It would be utterly unkind in a self-existent almighty Being, to call into existence dependent creatures, with the capabilities, relations, affections, and wants of man, and, throwing them off from his own care, subject their eternal destiny to the caprices of some of their infantile moments. If the father of a numerous family goes into a distant territory, and there provides magnifi-

cent homes and exhaustless life-estates for all his children, and then comes and invites them home to their inheritance, and one of the children should express a disinclination to go, not believing the father's word,—the kind father would not, for that present unbelief, disinherit him, and doom him to life-long poverty and wretchedness. If he should, the loving brothers and sisters would be life-long mourners, embittering the cup of life with tears of anguish. No; the father, with the affectionate brothers and sisters, would find ways and means, in due time, to undeceive their unhappy brother, and win him home.

SECTION V. *The Divine Character Vindicated.*

Prof. Hudson heads the last section of his fifth and last chapter, as follows:—

“§ 4. *Is the selection of a Class to Immortality worthy of God?*”

The real question at issue would be more intelligibly expressed in these words: *Is the annihilation of a class of mankind worthy of God?* To this point Mr. H. proceeds to say:—

“I have freely admitted that God would not be just to himself, if he were simply just to his creatures. True to his nature as love, he must bestow upon men more and better than they deserve. And because God is not only love, but *infinite* love, my opponent may think the conclusion direct and inevitable that God must bestow upon each moral creature the infinite boon of immortal life, for which his moral constitution adapts him.”

Yes; I *do* regard “the conclusion direct and inevitable,” that *infinite* love in God, the Creator and Father, must determine him to bestow upon each of his children, made in his own image, the boon of immortal life and good “for which his moral constitution adapts him.” It appears to my judgment that to deny this is to deny to love its appropriate and distinguishing quality, and divorce all sense from the word. It would be just as intelligible to common sense to say that the moral nature of God is *infinite nothingness* as that it is *infinite love*, if it is not his will and purpose to bestow upon his moral creation the

superior good for which he has constituted their superior natures.

Rev. Dr. Edward Beecher sets this matter forth in terms which bear in themselves the force of indubitable truth. After showing that increase of power is accompanied with an increase of obligation to dependents, he says:—

“How is it in the parental relation? Do not all feel that the superior powers of parents create an obligation of the most touching and imperative kind towards a weak, defenceless, new-born infant? Do not such superior powers, and the fact that their example will exert a controlling influence, sacredly bind them in all things so to use their powers, and regulate their example, as to promote the highest good of the young heir of immortality, who lies helpless in their arms? Would it not seem unspeakably horrible to allege their superior powers as a reason for doing otherwise?

“If, therefore, God gives existence to inferior and dependent minds, is he, the Infinite Father, can he be, under any other or different obligations than those of the father? Does he desire us to think of him as not tenderly affected, and not bound by the appeal made to him by a new created mind, in view of the fearful eternity that spreads out before him, so to exert his infinite powers, and so to order his infinite example, as shall most entirely tend to promote his eternal good? Does not every intuitive conviction, every honorable impulse of a benevolent mind, call for such an assurance concerning God, in order to be satisfied with his character? Is not this the dividing line between the divine and the satanic spirit?”

But Prof. Hudson rejects the above conclusions from the infinite goodness of God, for several reasons. Of these reasons he says:—

“1. All analogy favors the idea of a sifting of the human species, and a conservation of the best, or of the individuals that mature.”

He refers here to the events in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, of the failure of a large portion of the individual plants and animals of the various species, to come to a state of maturity. Of the wheat crop, for instance,—some kernels

perish in the ground; others sprout, and die in the tender blade; other stocks are blasted in the head; and others mature into good ripe grain. But if the farmer can gather enough for his own sustenance and enriching trade, he cares not for the withered blades and blighted heads.

Really, does my friend presume that he finds here, in the relation between the husbandman and the individual stocks and kernels of grain, an "analogy" of the relation between God and his children, whom he made for immortality? The spirit and doctrine of Christianity are the antipodes of this.

(1.) The husbandman raises wheat not at all for the benefit of the wheat, but for his own selfish good alone. And even the good wheat fares no better than the blighted kernels; for it is all doomed to destruction in the craving human or animal maw. But the creation and government of God in relation to his moral children, has reference to their good, not his. It is God's purpose in all this to *impart*, not to *receive* good. Even as Jesus, the moral image of God, says of his mission, "The Son of man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister."

(2.) The husbandman, in his labor and care for his crops, has no interest in nor reference to the individual kernels as such; he estimates only the mass, for the table or the market. But the love of God, and his design in the purposes of his government revealed in Christ Jesus, relate to the individual. All this concern, involving our relation to God, our faith, our hope, our love, our gratitude, our obligations and responsibilities, is a concern between God and mankind as individuals. And the gospel ministry, though it addresses congregations of men, addresses them, not as masses, but as congregations of individuals. It speaks to each individual, even the weakest and humblest, with a truth from God directly for him. It says to each man, and woman, and child, "The very hairs of your head are all numbered." This relates not to the literal counting of hairs, but to God's particular as well as general providence, his care for the individual, and not for the mass alone. It represents the affectionate regard and the impartial economy of God in his plan of grace for mankind, by the care of the

shepherd, who, if *one* sheep were lost, would go after it till he should find it, and bring it home rejoicing. With this essentially characteristic principle of the gospel, the Christian minister will go to any child of Adam ("who was the son of God; Luke iii. 38), even to the most ragged child, or the most wretched outcast whom men pass by as insignificant, and bear to him a message from God as his Father, in whose sight his soul is infinitely precious, whose grace has provided for him an immortal inheritance, and whose love will never leave him nor forsake him.

Would I exchange this gospel, for a doctrine which would send me into the Sunday school, and the family of loving brothers and sisters, to teach the children that God cares no more for them individually, than the laborer cares for the grains of sand individually which he shovels into his cart and dumps into his fillings? I could not be the bearer of such tidings to the little ones whom Jesus blessed. I would not thus forbid their personal confidence and personal love.

The parables, of the tares which were burned, and the useless product of the fisher's net, which my opponent brings in here to favor his theory, have no reference to the final destiny of man. As I have remarked, figures do not go on all fours. They are designed to illustrate some prominent point of a *subject in hand*. The subject then in hand by our Lord was the dissimilar condition, for the time being, of the faithful Christian Jews, and the corrupt and unbelieving Jews, in a judgment which should distinguish the end of *that age*. "So shall it be at the end of *this aionos*." (Matt. xii. 50.) (See Adams and Cobb's Discussion, pp. 193-201.)

But Mr. H., with reference to the blotting from existence of a great portion of the human family, says: —

"Yet the design of the species is accomplished in those who are perfected, and who shall never perish, because moral perfectness is an end in itself."

I utterly repudiate the sentiment involved in this sentence. It means that if God, by turning over, and shaking, and sift-

ing, the countless millions of his rational children whom he has made *for immortality*, and placed in dear relations, which in their interest are eternal, should perfect in immortal life any number, even one, "the design of the species is (in the few, or in that one) accomplished, because moral perfectness is an end in itself." I deny that moral perfectness is an end in itself as a mere show, or in any sense only as it is a quality of a moral being; and only then, as it is the supreme good. Moral perfectness, therefore, is the end of the Divine government, as the supreme good of moral beings; and is consequently just as important to one of those beings as to another. Each man, though he is one of a great family of beings in kindred ties and sympathies, is not a fragment of a compound mass; but he is one in himself, a world in his own organism, with capabilities and aspirations which can never mature but in immortal life and good. And his failure to rise up into that life and mature into that perfection, were just as really and as great an abortion of God's work and design, as would be the like failure of any other and all other moral beings. Hence it is not true that "the design of the species will be accomplished" by the perfection of one, or a few individuals, making it God's design just to exhibit to himself and the angels a specimen of human moral perfectness, irrespective of human good. It is love to the creature—to this, that, and every creature—which moves God to plan and effectuate ultimate moral perfectness for his moral creation. And it was love to all human creatures in the bosoms of all heaven's denizens, that, when the advent of the Saviour was announced as good tidings of great joy which shall be to all people, inspired the multitude of the heavenly host to sing in rapture, "Glory to God in the highest!—good will to men!"

No; my opponent's first reason for "dissent" from the Universalist inference from the infinite love of God, is invalid in this respect: that, in order to subvert our faith, it must subvert the entire spirit and purpose of the gospel. But here is another reason for his "dissent:"—

"2. While God is bound, in justice or equity, not to make existence a curse, he is *not* bound to make it a blessing. That

there *is* such an obligation is very strongly asserted by Mr. Ballou, in his 'Divine Character Vindicated,' where he thinks that 'human existence, if enforced at all, should be, to each and every individual, when taken as a whole, a good, and not an evil, — a blessing, and not a curse.'—(P. 122.)

"This would be true if man had no moral freedom, and were not capable of deserving evil as well as good. But this fact seems to me entirely overlooked in Mr. B.'s statement."

No; Mr. Ballou has committed no such oversight. His capacious and discerning mind had cognizance of the fact, that man's moral agency, the highest property of his being, is just as much the bestowment of God as any other faculty of his being; and the fact that God has thus placed man upon the highest scale of being, instead of diminishing his obligation to care for the ultimate blessedness of his being, increases it. Mr. H. says the position that God is bound in honor and right to make human existence, in every case in which he enforces it, a good as a whole, "would be true if man had no moral freedom." Then he supposes that God has given to man moral freedom, not as an instrumentality to work a superior good under the Divine training, but as a power throwing man utterly at eternal chance and hazard, outside of the influence of the Divine government. Consequently, he can have no hope in God for any good result, in the least degree, of the moral system, since God has nothing to do about it. I think it will be difficult for my friend to show that this is a doctrine of Christianity.

But this effort fails to harmonize the fatal result which my friend ascribes to the moral system, with the principle of honor and right in the Creator. Our Divine Master would be ashamed of us if we should so stultify ourselves as to admit, that his Father and our Father, his God and our God, has a right to throw millions of intellectual beings out into existence by a sport of power, and give them an agency which may more likely than not work them infinite harm, and which casts them entirely off from the control of his government, and the disposal of his care. If the pyrotechnist were to create a powerful and dangerous torpedo, and cast it, charged and lit, into a

congregation of men, women, and children, reckless of the result, he would be held accountable for the slaughter which might ensue. Were he to plead ignorance of the result, his cruel and heartless temerity in flinging forth such danger regardless of the consequences, would involve all the guilt.

No, Br. Hudson, God who made the world and all things in it, the God of the Bible, the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, requires no labored special pleading from you or me, in the way of apology for any of the principles and purposes of his creation and government. We may not be able to explain the adaptedness of all the events under his providence as incidental ways and means, but his ultimate designs he has propounded to us in his revealed word, all of which command the approbation of the most scrutinizing moral judgment, and redound to his infinite honor and glory. Yes; he has given man a moral agency, an agency to act freely or voluntarily under superior motives and high responsibilities, and that for a noble and beneficent purpose. Man were not man, he could never become the holy, happy being intended, without this moral agency. And the high purpose for which this agency was bestowed shall be signally consummated, when every rational creature in the universe shall "glorify God and enjoy him forever." (Eph. i. 9, 10; Phil. ii. 9, 10, 11; Rev. v. 13.)

My opponent quotes in this connection the words of Jesus spoken of Judas: "better were it for that man if he had never been born;" for my full exposition of which, and that of Dr. A. Clarke, see my Discussion with Dr. Adams, pp. 250-259.

3. Mr. Hudson's third reason for his "dissent" from the Universalist conclusion from the infinite love of God, I noticed sufficiently where it came in by affinity, in the preliminary subdivision of my preceding section. It relates to our hypothetical willingness to yield our place in existence to somebody else who may fill it better. I showed the utter impossibility of any other person filling my place, as each man has as much as he can do to fill his own place; and also that it would be mean and idiotic in us to be willing to be blotted out of conscious being, and thus cut off forever from the privilege of

knowing more of the infinite Father and his works, and loving better and enjoying further that Father and his other children.

But here is the concluding reason of my opponent in this direction :—

“ 4. Virtue is heroic. And it may be worthy of God to select, and to elect, those who are morally heroic for the inheritance of immortality.”

Indeed! But true heroism is not the principle of demagoguism, and self-aggrandizement. It is the self-sacrificing spirit of love and labor for mankind. In the political vocabulary it is braving dangers for the good of one's country. But to the Christian, his country is the world, and his countrymen all mankind. It will be no reward, therefore, to the Christian patriot, to kill off his fellow-beings forever. If the Father shall ask them, “What shall I give thee?” their answer will be in the spirit of Esther, when the king put the like question to her. She asked the lives of all her people. So we (for I think my opponent and I are among the Christian patriots), when the great Father shall ask us, “What shall I give thee?” will lift up our hearts with our voices, and say, “Great Father of all! of the fulness of thy love and grace, who art ‘able even to subdue all things unto thyself,’ give us the life immortal of all our great family whom thou hast made.” And, ah! we can see the answer of this prayer in the promise of the Father to the Son, who, having tasted death, as a seal of love, for every man, “shall see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied.” This was the joy set before him. “For the joy that was set before him he endured the cross, despising the shame, and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God.” (Heb. xii. 2.)

From all these considerations, and infinitely more, it will be seen that God, who knows our hearts, will not propose to pay us off for our heroism by annihilating our children, and friends, and fellow-beings. Every member has its place in the human family, and each member is immediately and essentially connected with some other. Not a member can be finally torn out and cast away, but that the whole body will bleed eternally.

But the whole body, however it may seem dissevered and scattered for a time, is, in Prof. Hudson's figure of *prolepsis*, complete in Him who is the head of every man, and of whom it shall be seen in the consummation of his mission, that "a bone of his shall not be broken."

I have one other remark of my opponent to notice, offered in this concluding section of his last chapter. It is this:—

"With all their differences, a close resemblance has been observed between the Stoic and the Christian systems of morals. And the Stoics held the immortality of a class."

However the details of the practical virtues in common life may be similar in Stoicism and Christianity, there is one principle which Stoicism makes its prominent virtue, from which the corresponding Christian virtue is at world-wide difference. I refer to the principle of submission, or reconciliation, to the ways of providence. In the Stoic it is the hardening of the soul, by severe discipline, to a bravado indifference; a foolhardy defiance; the submission of despair; or uncomplaining subjection to inevitable fate. To the Christian, it presents a lively sensibility, a warm and tender heart to feel bereavements, to shrink from pain, and to deplore wrong; but at the same time it takes comfort, and rejoices in hope, from faith in the wisdom and goodness of God, in which is the assurance that he doeth all things well, and only admits these seeming evils as means, which he is able to control, for the greater ultimate good. While the former must involve a cold and frigid state of mind and feeling, the latter is naturally associated with childlike simplicity, and ardent affections, and gushing sympathies, and a keen susceptibility of the evils of life to ourselves and others.

And the theories of the two systems on the last point mentioned by my opponent, are as unlike as they are on the virtue of reconciliation. He says, "the Stoics held the immortality of a class." Likely as not they did. The idea of the annihilation of a class would n't much trouble the Stoical philosopher, even if himself were to be of the doomed party. As George Henry Lewes says, "in their dread of becoming effeminate, they

became marble." But Jesus did not borrow of Stoicism either its stolid indifference or final destructionism. His heart was full of tenderness, and he was not ashamed to weep with the sorrowing. His reconciliation was that of a feeling, trusting child. And as it respects his doctrine of a future life, he was everywhere known to preach the resurrection of *the dead*, without limitation or reserve. And his apostle, it may be with reference to the Stoical falsehood, makes his testimony both general and discriminative, affirming the fact of immortal life for all, "both the just and unjust."

In respect to the question which my opponent makes the subject of the concluding section of his fifth and last chapter, whether the annihilation of a class *is worthy of God*, I have clearly, I think, shown the insufficiency of all his reasons for the affirmative of this question, and will conclude this chapter with some general elucidations, in addition to what I have given, of the utter incompatibility of the Destructionist theory with any just conception of the divine perfections, or of the majesty of the Saviour's mission.

Concerning the wisdom and perfection of the divine government, it is difficult for us to choose between Destructionism and technical Orthodoxy as it respects their impeachment of it. Endless-miserianism does, indeed, at a glance, appear to be more persistently and relentlessly satanic and cruel; but then it claims to assign some reason for the diabolical infliction, such as the eternal expression of God's hatred of sin, his making the horrible scene of suffering an eternal admonition and restraint upon other immortals that they may fear to sin, and making them realize, by contrast, how happy they are! But Destructionism, though not so relentlessly fiendish, is more pitifully spiteful and reasonlessly barbarous, than even that other scheme. It represents that the Deity will raise up countless millions of his children from the deep unconscious sleep of death, just to torment them a while and kill them off again, and that forever.

And in regard to the majesty and perfectness of the Christian scheme, the glory of the Saviour's mission, this theory has

the writing upon it, "*Mene, mene, tekel, upharsin.*" The Scriptures represent the mission of Christ, in its fidelity and efficiency, by the shepherd who seeks his lost sheep, and goes not back, until he finds even the last one astray, and brings it home rejoicing. But Destructionism represents the Saviour's mission to be as that of a shepherd, who, having sheep astray, goes in pursuit, and having caught those that he can conveniently, shoots down the rest, and gives their carcasses to the vultures.

The Scriptures teach us that God is in Christ reconciling the world unto himself; and that Christ will not resign the mediatorial kingdom until he shall have subdued and reconciled all things to himself. But Destructionism takes all this work out of the hand of Christ, representing that he will smile upon those that reconcile themselves to him, and kill off the rest, so that none shall remain rebellious.

Suppose a father and his oldest son are absent from home on a long business tour, having left twelve of the family on the homestead in the mean time. The father hears that there is disorder among his children, through insubordination to the code of rules which he left for their government. He sends his oldest son to them on a mission of reconciliation, with tokens of his love, and explanations of his wise and beneficent rules, that he may subject them all to good and wholesome order. In due time the father returns. He meets his first born at the gate, and on being seated in his parlor, he inquires of him concerning his success in the work of reconciliation and harmony in the family, and their subjection to his laws. "Perfect success," answers the son; "they are all in perfect subjection." "Bring them in," says the father. The son retires, and shortly re-appears, leading up three or four bereaved, lonesome, sorrowing, dejected children. "Where are the rest?" inquires the waiting father. "Dead," says the son; "I killed them off. I desired to present you a united family on your coming, and the unreconciled ones I killed off."

This is Destructionism. When the apostle said of Christ, that he "is able even to subdue all things unto himself," did

he mean that he was able to destroy them? Verily, this theory of faith is infinitely unworthy of God, as it is unkind to man. We rejoice with thanksgiving that, in the gospel plan, the subjection of all things to Christ is the gathering of them together in one in him, who is the resurrection and the life. What rapturous joy will run through the universal whole, when Jesus, on the consummation of his Heaven-appointed mission, shall present the great family redeemed, to his Father and our Father and his God and our God, saying, "Behold, I, and the children which God hath given me." (Heb. ii. 13.)

CHAPTER VIII.

THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT.

THIS is the subject of Prof. Hudson's fourth chapter. We do not find much in this chapter of his to controvert. It collates much valuable historical information in respect to the doctrines of the Christian Fathers, of some of which I shall make a most important improvement. But he has committed two or three essential errors in the early part of this chapter, which I will briefly correct as I pass. Before this, however, I will notice an interesting quotation which he makes from the elder Pliny, which brings out in bold relief the great fact in the constitution of man that I have made one of my philosophical arguments for human immortality. He gives us from Pliny this remarkable passage :—

“The vanity of man, and his insatiable longing after existence, have led him to dream of a life after death. A being full of contradictions he is the most wretched of creatures, since the other creatures have no wants transcending the bounds of their nature. Man is full of desires and wants that reach to infinity, and can never be satisfied. His nature is a lie, — uniting the greatest poverty with the greatest pride.”

So then, that searching student of human nature saw that man, viewed as he regarded him, a being whose whole sphere of existence is this earthly life, is a being full of contradictions, and his nature is a lie. It is therefore an impeachment of the Author of the human constitution, to assert that this is man's whole sphere of being ; for nothing could be said more disreputable of any workman, than to affirm, especially of his masterpiece of workmanship, that it is, as a whole, a contradiction and a lie. But when we recognize this life to man as a rudimental and infantile state, to be succeeded by a higher and an

endless life, Pliny's "contradiction" becomes harmony, and his "lie" becomes an instructive lesson in the chapter of eternal truth. I never came across a more forcible expression than this of Pliny, of that fact in the higher nature of man which has extorted from my opponent the concession that "man is made *for* immortality." And the argument applies not to this or that man or class of men, but to the species.

But I will pass to the *errors* of which I have spoken.

1. Mr. H. says : —

"Such were the doubts and despair of men, waiting in the gloom of the shadow of death for the true life and light. And when the Life-giver came, how natural, if all mankind were the appointed subjects of immortal life, that this should appear in the ordinary speech of him who 'had the words of eternal life.' How strange that he and the Apostles who heralded all through the Roman Empire what they called a Gospel, should only speak of a certain 'aionion' life, and even of that ambiguous duration as if it were the prerogative of a special class, to be had by striving for it; leaving the great and long-debated question of immortality in as great obscurity as it was before."

The error which characterizes this paragraph my learned friend has fallen into unwittingly; yet I cannot imagine how a sentence could be framed involving a more utter misstatement of fact in respect to the teachings of Jesus and his apostles. He is led into this serious error by having received the phrase *aionion life* as primarily and uniformly meaning the fact of the future personal being, instead of taking it, as it is in truth, as generally denoting a spiritual and moral condition of the soul through a living faith in Christ. Indeed, he has kept his eyes so long and steadily fixed upon the phrase in that light, as to blind him almost totally to the abundant Scripture testimony of the personal resurrection to immortal existence.

"How natural, if all mankind were the appointed subjects of immortal life, that this should appear in the ordinary speech of him who 'had the words of eternal life.'"

It *did* so appear, — not out of place, as if he had no instruc-

tion on any other subject to those whom he was purifying from a thousand life-errors and corruptions, and training, as subjects of his moral kingdom, for their important mission in the world of mind and matter. It is an error which a learned biblical critic should not commit, to measure the importance which Jesus attached to a given doctrine, and the amount of labor he devoted to it, by the space which his historians have devoted to their record of it. We are thankful that the essential doctrines of the gospel are not so diluted in the authentic record designed as the manual of Christian faith, as to run through a series of volumes which "the world could not contain." In respect to the universal resurrection to immortal life, as a distinct and separate doctrine, if Christ's utterance of it is recorded in the Christian chart of faith, as given in one or more strong cases, when called out controversially with signal emphasis, and this record involves the testimony that such was his familiar manner of teaching everywhere, that this was reputed as the signal doctrine of his ministry, it is sufficient. And this is the joyful fact in the case as it is. The conversation between Jesus and the Sadducees is not given us as the only instance of his teaching the doctrine of the resurrection, but it is presented as the record of his successful defence against the attack by his opposers, of a doctrine for which he was famous as far as his name was known; to wit, that of the resurrection of the dead; i.e., of the human species.

"Truly, if man is at all immortal, his immortality was not then at all brought to light. It was not revealed in that phrase, 'the resurrection, both of the just and unjust;' for this was a tenet of the Pharisees, to which Paul made appeal on a certain occasion of self-defence."

Does my opponent mean to deny that the doctrine of the universal resurrection as a subject of enlightened hope, was a distinguishing doctrine of St. Paul as a Christian apostle? Then he will make Paul's defence before the council at Jerusalem, and before Felix the Roman governor, to be all a farce, and give him to us shorn of all distinguishing doctrine. To

the council he said, "Of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question." (Acts xxiii. 6.) And to Felix he said, "But this I confess unto thee, that after the way which they call heresy, so worship I the God of my fathers; . . . and have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust." (Acts xxiv. 14, 15.) Here are two things mentioned by the apostle which were made the occasion of the violent opposition which he had to encounter; one being his way of worship, and the other the prominent doctrine which he preached. And that doctrine was the universal resurrection. And so it was everywhere, that "he preached Jesus and the resurrection." But my opponent will have it that this was nothing new; that this gospel ministry of the resurrection by Jesus and his apostles was not bringing life and immortality to light, because a portion of the Jews, and even of the heathen, held to some sort and manner of future life. Does he really mean to deny the truth of the direct affirmation of the apostle, that Jesus hath "brought life and immortality to light through the gospel"? If there is any argument in this effort of his against Universalism, this is its result.

But my opponent says the immortality of man, or the destiny of "all mankind as the subjects of immortal life," "was not revealed in the phrase, 'the resurrection, both of the just and unjust;' for this was a tenet of the Pharisees, to which Paul made appeal on a certain occasion of self-defence." It is granted that Paul, before his accusers, took advantage of an opinion *allowed* by them, to expose the inconsistency of their conduct. But it does *not* follow that he meant to accord to them a faith and hope of a future life for man, in the face of which the Christian doctrine of immortality was no revelation. The theories, if they can be called theories, of Jews and Gentiles, in respect to the condition of man beyond death, were *hadean* and *shadowy* affairs, insomuch that over and above all, the Christian ministry of the universal resurrection of the human race, to a personal, conscious, loved and loving, angelic, heavenly, and glorious life, subject to death never more, was

truly a *revelation* of "grace and truth," a *bringing to light* of an infinitely rich and blessed inheritance for man in the purpose of Jehovah.

2. Mr. H. says further :—

"Does the objecter anticipate the varying opinions of the second century, and say that *nothing* was settled by Christ's revelation? I answer, one thing was settled, so as to be never since disputed as a Christian truth. And that is, *Whoever shall have Life*,—whatever the word means,—has it through Christ; and by *Faith*,—whatever the word means,—does he accept and receive the life."

No; the idea stated in the last clause of this sentence was *not* settled in the second century, nor has it ever since been undisputed, by an infinity of odds. The term "*Life*," though my opponent throws in the qualifying phrase, "whatever the word means," *he* uses, throughout his argument, for the future personal existence. And, taken in this sense, in which sense all admit that it is sometimes used in the Scriptures, no class of Christians in any century, except Destructionists, have believed that it is to be conferred upon mankind *through their faith*. All Christians, of the second and all other centuries, except the few Destructionists, have believed that, whatever else under the name of life and good, *faith* may bring to man, and whatever may be the condition of the future life after it is bestowed, there shall be a passing into that life, a "resurrection of the dead," of believers and unbelievers, "the just and unjust." But in this much all Christians are agreed, especially Universalists; viz., that the *promise* of life immortal, which is given us in Christ, is joyfully accepted by faith with the believer in the present world, and its foretaste enjoyed; and that in the resurrection world, that which is called life and aionion life morally, will only be enjoyed, be it with a part or all, by a spiritual union and communion with God in childlike confidence and love.

3. Another mistake of my opponent is as follows :—

"The phrase *eis ton aiona* is rendered in the Latin *in aeter-*

num and *in perpetuum*, by Cotelierius. It was undoubtedly used by the early Christians to denote an eternal duration, and we shall therefore accept the common rendering, 'forever.' "

I do not object to the acceptance of the common rendering of *eis ton aiona*, which is "forever;" but the *reason* here given for its acceptance, viz., that "it was undoubtedly used by the early Christians to denote an eternal (endless) duration," is not a truth. The early Christians "undoubtedly" used *aion* and its derivatives in their philological and Scriptural sense, denoting long time, time indefinite and unknown, continual; and, when treating on a subject unlimited in its nature, infinite duration. What I here assume is evident from the fact, that the acknowledged Universalist Fathers, holding, of course, to the limited nature and duration of all punishment, familiarly used the word *aionion* in connection with punishment, without any qualification by way of synonym or comment.

Having disposed of these few mistakes, I find no occasion for more than a few general remarks on Prof. Hudson's historical quotations. As I said before, they furnish our readers with valuable information. I will offer, however, the prudential caution, that very much be not assumed from the silence of the five "Apostolical Fathers," in what little of their writing has come down to us, in respect to the ultimate universal victory of life and good. It was not a matter of much controversy in their time; and though the objects they had in view in writing what is preserved of their theological compositions did not call out any distinct expressions of that hope, it does not follow that it was not cherished and preached by them. Nor do the quotations which my friend has made from their writings, in respect to "aionion death with punishment," "wholly perishing," living forever by hearing the voice of God's Son, and being raised up to reign together with him in the world to come if we walk worthy of him in this world, etc., etc.,—neither do these quotations, I say, prove that they had not a hope of the final restoration of all moral beings to life and holiness. This I say, because the acknowledged Universalists, of near the same time, abounded in very similar language in

respect to the judgments of God against the wicked, and the instrumentalities by which life and blessedness should be secured. True, unqualified and unguarded expressions were employed in the strong language of the times, on those subjects which were not matters of controversy.

It appears that many of the early Christians, in their trials and deprivations, not understanding, any better than some of Christ's contemporaries did his saying of John, "If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee?"—not any better understanding, I say, the teachings of Jesus in respect to the presence of the kingdom of heaven to the believer, incorporated into their code of motives a kingdom specially allotted to themselves in the future world; yet there seems to have been a prevailing belief that the ultimate of Christ's mission should be universal life and harmony.

I do not, however, prefer a direct claim of any of the five "Apostolical Fathers" as Universalists. I only say that the assurance with which they have been claimed by the opposition is unauthorized. And, when I consider how quietly, and as a matter of course, the Universalism of the master spirits and ornaments of the Church was promulgated about A. D. 200, and after,—and also the facts which have prompted my ingenuous opponent, as the discovery of his masterly historical research, to utter this significant testimony, "I need not trace its history farther: Some of my Orthodox friends may need to know that more than half the fathers of the eastern church were Restorationists; Gieseler tells us that 'the belief in the unalienable power of amendment in all intelligent beings, and in the limited duration of future punishment, was so general even in the West and among the opponents of Origen, that it seemed entirely independent of his system, to which, doubtless, its origin must be traced:'"—I say, in consideration of these things, I am impressed to regard the early Christians throughout as innocent of making the great Father either the eternal tormentor or final destroyer of his children created in his image, until they are proved guilty. .

Knowledge Progressive.

But in respect to this whole matter of the doctrines held by the early Christians, I call the reader's critical attention to these general remarks.

Knowledge with man, though he have the whole lesson before him, is, and must in the nature of things be, progressive. The human mind cannot at once comprehend all the fulness and all the ramifications of any important truth, on its first presentation. This fact in relation to the progressive developments of the gospel, both in respect to its progressive advancement in the moral creation as a whole, and in each individual mind receiving it, is truthfully represented in the parables of the leaven and the mustard seed.

Even the apostles of Christ, while he was personally with them, though they were qualified to be witnesses of his works which attested his mission from God, and reporters of his teachings, did not yet understand all those teachings. They did not understand him, though he spoke so plainly, in respect to his death and resurrection; nor did they understand the spiritual nature of his kingdom. But in due time the Holy Spirit was given to lead them into all truth.

And it was necessary, in order that we should have the true religion in its completeness, established in the world, that the founders of it, Jesus and his apostles, should be specially endowed, and accompanied and guided by the Spirit of God, to the finishing and perfecting of its revelation and establishment in the earth. Then it was committed to the world to work its own way and do its mission, by ordinary means under God's general providence.

Then, the Christian scheme, in the hands of an uninspired ministry, made its way rapidly in the world, until, early in the fourth century, it was made the established religion of the Roman empire. But, running thus rapidly among the nations, it was impossible, by the very law of finite mind in the line of education, that it should have been understood in all its principles and purposes. The historical evidences were received, of the divine mission and Messiahship of Jesus, — his crucifixion and

resurrection, and the authority of his teachings. But the full import of all his teachings *could not* have been comprehended. The heathen philosophers, when, by the force of the historical evidence, they accepted the Christian name, accepted it from the heathen standpoint, retaining much of their old philosophies, which formed a constituent part of themselves.

The idea which I desire to express on this subject, is beautifully illustrated by Ezekiel's vision of the river which flowed from the temple into the Dead Sea, ultimately healing the bitter and fetid waters. (Ezek. xlvii.) When you look upon the pure river from the house of God flowing down into the fetid sea of the wilderness, it appears to your view to be lost and corrupted in the mass of impurity. But it mingles with those bitter waters, and gradually heals them.

And this illustrates the true philosophy of what is commonly called "*The Corruption of Christianity.*" Many learned historians and wise theologians have given us the dark side of this picture—the gradual corruption of the Christian religion—in ages succeeding that of the apostles; but none that I have read have given us the rainbow in this cloud, the wisdom of God above these human errors and corruptions, in these events. They have informed us that as the Christian church was mostly supplied with teachers from among the Gentiles, many of them gentile or heathen philosophers, they mixed the gospel with and explained the Scriptures by the Oriental philosophies. It must needs have been so, full of moral blindness and religious error as the nations were. If the story of the gospel could not have been told from one to another, until the former had conformed his understanding, and spirit, and life, to all its principles entire, it must have made but slow progress in the world as it then was. And if no one could have espoused the Christian name, until he was thus conformed in faith and practice to all the Christian principles, no one could have espoused it at all; for none could have grasped at once, from that state of heathen darkness, the Christian system, in all its sublime principles and purposes. But the continuance of a portion of the errors which pre-occupied the common mind, is not really the corruption of

Christianity. The real process is rather the running of Christianity, and the diffusion of it, among the errors and superstitions of the world, gradually to purge them away. It is the flowing of the river of truth into the Dead Sea, whereof the result shall be that "the waters shall be healed."

I have presented these facts in relation to the circumstances under which the gospel was early circulated among the nations, that my readers may clearly see that the historical facts presented by my present opponent, have not the least weight in his favor, or in favor of my former opponent, Dr. Adams, against the truth and divinity of the Universalist faith. For, when we consider, as we have noted above, the sources whence the Christian converts were drawn, it *must needs have been*, as Prof. Hudson's history finds it, that both Destructionism and Endless-miserianism should early have been propounded by some of the Christian teachers, seeing that these doctrines were comprised in the philosophies in which they had been nursed and cradled. It is rather a wonder that the pure and sublime faith of the universal Fatherhood of God, the parental character of his judgments, and the final success of his truth and grace to the reconciliation of all men to himself in love and blessedness, should have obtained so generally in those early ages as it did. A grateful circumstance indeed it is, that the untiring historical researches of my learned opponent should constrain him to advise his Orthodox brethren, "that more than half the fathers of the eastern church were Restorationists;" and that this faith was also "general in the west."

Manner of the Perversion of New-Testament Passages in relation to Judgment.

Prof. Hudson has brought out one historical quotation which I had not before seen, which enables us to place our finger upon the manner of the early transfer of the New Testament descriptions of judgment by Jesus Christ to the future immortal world. Take, for instance, the discourse of Jesus recorded in Matt. xxiv. and xxv., ending with the words, "And these shall go away into aionion punishment (correction), but the righteous

into aionion life." Those who have applied the latter portion of this discourse to a *post mortem* judgment, have asked,—Dr. Adams, in our late controversy, asked with emphasis,—how it can be accounted for, if this passage does not refer to such a judgment, that such an application of it came into use and held its place in the Christian church. Prof. H. gives us a fact which exposes all. Speaking of Justin Martyr, who presented the first Orthodox discourse known to have been uttered, in his Apology for Christianity before the Emperor Antoninus, about the year 138, when the fires of persecution precisely fitted him to organize the materials which his old heathen philosophy abundantly furnished him for an infinitely malicious and revengeful theology, and he improved the occasion, and menaced his persecutors with endless torments,—Mr. H. proceeds:—

"He (Justin) regarded man as on probation during life, awaiting a judgment after the resurrection. 'Plato,' he says, 'held that the wicked will stand before Minos and Rhadamanthus, to be punished by them. We hold the same event, but before Christ as judge; that they may be punished in their re-embodied souls, not a thousand years, as Plato said, but eternally. If any one thinks this incredible or impossible, the error is of little account so long as we are not convicted of any evil conduct.'" (c. 8.)

Here we have it; and the Universalist public will thank my friend for this piece of history. Justin was, before conversion to the Christian name, a Platonic philosopher. And now he affirms that he holds the same event of judgment in the future world which Plato held, and which of course he (Justin) had ever held as Plato's disciple, only, now that he had accepted the Christian name, he substituted *Christ* for *Minos* as Judge. So, having made this exchange, he must take the discourses of Christ and the apostles on the subject of judgment, and couple them with his Platonic theory. In no case does the New Testament so apply them. Take for instance the two chapters of Matthew just referred to. Jesus commences to answer questions of his disciples concerning the judgment which should terminate that aionos or age, and raze with the ground the

temple of Jerusalem, and he carries through his discourse to the end, in continuous reference and close connection on the same subject, the judgment of that age, insomuch that hardly any two of the Orthodox commentators can agree upon the point at which they shall change the subject. Nor has any one of them even attempted to give a reason for changing it at all. They cannot. There is no change of the main subject in those two chapters. Jesus described the time and nature of that judgment clearly and unmistakably, as belonging to the compass of that generation.* How then did the usage get into the Christian church, of applying it to the infernal world? The historical reference just noted explains it all. Justin, in fiery heat, at home in the Platonic theory, unhesitatingly puts Christ in the place of Minos, and his judgment ditto.

But long after this, Universalism was extensively prevalent. And when Endless-miserianism became established, it was not by the force of argument, but by the power of the civil arm wielded by Western tyrants, enlisted by the chicanery of cruel theological demagogues.†

Sources of the Universalist Views.

In his historical chapter now before us, Mr. Hudson heads one section as follows:—

“§ 3. *Whence did Universalist views take their rise?*”

And he adds,—

“And I propose to show that not the Scriptures alone, but Platonic additions to Scriptural doctrine, were the occasion, first of Orthodoxy, and then of Universalism.”

But he does not *show* that Universalism came of “Platonic additions to the Scriptures.” He gives us full proof that the doctrine of a final judgment beyond the resurrection, the doc-

* See Adams' and Cobb's Discussion, chapter vi.

† See our historical quotation from Catharine Beecher's "Bible a Common Sense," in Adams' and Cobb's Discussion, pp. 87, 88, 89, 408, 409.

trine on which both annihilation and endless punishment are based, was imported entire from the heathen philosophies, particularly the Platonic, and in a paragraph noted in our preceding chapter he expressly claims the Stoic school as of his sentiment, "holding the immortality of a class." So he has thoroughly heathenized the pedigree of both the popular forms of *opposition* to Universalism. But he presents no evidence that Universalism originated in Platonic additions to the Scriptural doctrine. He finds some of the Universalist Fathers arguing the final salvation of all men from the moral nature of man, who, as immortal, will never, with such a moral nature as all possess, be out of the reach of moral influence for good. But then he knows that others, and the earliest Universalists, supported their faith by ample Scripture quotations. Neither has it been shown that the immortality of the soul as held by the early Universalist Christians was an *addition* to the Scriptural doctrine. On the contrary, as I think, it has been shown that it is the essential doctrine of the gospel. To be sure, the gospel treats immortality as an inheritance which we possess in our relation to Christ, "the Head of every man." But in this view it exhibits the immortal principle not as an after-thought, or an extraneous bestowment, but as incorporated in a relation in which we were all originally constituted. The life and immortality brought to light through the gospel, is "according to the purpose and grace of God, *given us in Christ Jesus before the world began.*" (2 Tim. i. 9.) God did not throw off the crowning work of his creation—man, at loose hazard. "Known unto him are all his works from the beginning." The blessing which he pronounced upon man when he created him, male and female, in his own image, included the provisions and arrangements of his whole sphere of being, especially that of his superior nature. The inheritance of his immortal life is not spoken of in the Scriptures as an extraneous gift to be at some future time bestowed, and for which man was not originally constituted. It is given us in the constitution of our higher natures, in which we are constituted as members of *His* body who is the Head of every man. When spoken of in its whole-

ness, it is uniformly described as an existing fact. So John the apostle: "And this is the record, that God *hath given* to us eternal life, and this life is in his Son." "These things have I written unto you that believe on the name of the Son of God; that ye may know that ye have eternal life, and that ye may believe on the name of the Son of God." "That which was from the beginning, which we have heard, which we have seen with our eyes, which we have looked upon, and our hands have handled, of the Word of life: (for the life was manifested, and we have seen it, and bear witness, and show unto you that eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested unto us:) that which we have seen and heard declare we unto you, that ye also may have fellowship with us: and truly our fellowship is with the Father, and with his Son Jesus Christ." (1 John v. 11, 13; i. 1-3.)

To be sure the New Testament employs a different style in the expression of this great truth from that employed by the philosophers. *That* speaks of it as an inheritance which we have in our relation to Jesus Christ, and which is revealed in the gospel, — while *these* describe it as a fact which they infer from the study of man. So that, instead of the Universalist Christian Fathers adding the Scriptural doctrine from Platonism, they added to the deductions of the Platonic philosophy the revelation of the Scriptures. Those philosophizings from the constitution of man gendered flickerings of feeble hope for immortality; but the gospel of Jesus *brings it to light*, in a tangible and glorious form, and in demonstration of truth.

But, though immortality for man is a truth, the principles of which belong to the constitution of his higher nature, which is represented in Jesus Christ, its actual development as a personal entity must come through a new organism by the resurrection of the dead. So that our hope is not in self, but in Him "who only (as its original source) hath immortality."

"What are the Prominent Occasions of the Universalist Faith?"

This question makes the subject of the first chapter of my opponent's Affirmative Argument. I did not find occasion to devote a chapter to the review of it as I passed, because, though our faith has a higher source than any of these which he enumerates, yet most of them are realities, and good in their respective spheres. As it comes in fitly here, I will briefly note them. They are as follows:—

1. "The reaction from the doctrine of eternal misery." It is granted that the rebellion of the moral sense against this doctrine has turned the attention of many who were educated in it to that study which has resulted in the light of Universalism. But that revulsion alone never made a Universalist. It has made anti-orthodox; it has made nothingarians; it has made infidels; but it never made Universalists but by driving them into the study of positive truth. Just so, hunger forces men to seek food. But hunger does not feed them.

2. "Certain views of the sovereignty and supremacy of God." Yes, of course, no man can be a Universalist, nor any thing else in the light of faith and hope, without certain views of the supremacy of God. But the speculations which my opponent proceeds to notice, in respect to the direct agency of God in all minute affairs, have nothing to do with Universalism more than any other ism. In these speculations curious minds in all ages and various theories have delighted to give themselves airings; but we have no occasion for them here.

3. A certain estimate of the "highest good." I do not doubt that, in a spiritual sense, many of us may sometimes be obnoxious to the charge preferred by Jesus, in a physical regard, against the people who followed him to Capernaum; "Ye seek me, not because ye saw the miracles, but because ye did eat of the loaves and were filled." But, against the mere "happiness principle," Universalism presents the highest theory of living, of all *isms*. Endless-miserianism makes the leading motive of a good life to be the shirking of endless torments. Destructionism makes the highest motive to be the avoidance of a final destruction by a painful process, and the working out of a title to a future immortal existence. But

Universalism presents, as the supreme motive, the existing relation we bear to the great Father, and to the life immortal; our corresponding obligations; and the adaptedness, and beauty, and richness, and glory of truth and holiness. Thus we find the great good in the knowledge, and service, and enjoyment of God.

"Ah! but you love happiness." Yes, indeed we do. And we have no hope of ever getting rid of this infirmity (?) to all eternity. Jesus loves happiness. "*For the joy that was set before him* he endured the cross, despising the shame, and is now set down at the right hand of the throne of God." He must be a nondescript, indeed, and unfit for all companionship, who does not love happiness. But Universalism urges us to seek this love in that which is truly the "highest good."

4. "Various modern reforms."

5. "Philanthropic efforts in behalf of the slave."

Very true, the principles involved in these benevolent enterprises are practical principles of Universalism, and tend to lead men into this faith, just as the tracing up of a good stream conducts to the fountain, and the looking up through a beam of sunlight discovers the sun. It is one of Jesus' rules for testing the divinity of his doctrine. "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." (John viii. 17.)

6. "Modern Spiritualism." Mr. Hudson may be right in his estimate that most Spiritualists are Universalists, as it respects ultimate human destiny; but they consult a sort of teachings from which we do not expect any direct aid to Universalist Christianity.

7. An under estimate of the "infinite of the blessing implied in eternal life." True, we do not choose to pervert the Scriptures in order to make the phrase *eternal life* in all cases apply directly to the immortal existence. But in the cases where we find it to describe a present spiritual quality and experience, we regard it as a reflection and foretaste of the life immortal. And, in regard to that life immortal, I do not believe that our estimate of it can be exceeded. And surely it

is bad logic for my learned friend to argue that a low estimate of the value of immortality would tend to enlarge our faith with regard to the extent of its bestowment. In another place he ventures the idea that a conception of the profound *depth* of the riches of divine grace, tends to contract one's assurance of its extent. I think the reverse of this will strike most men's reason, as it is attested by my experience to be the truth.

It is creditable to my friend, that he estimates the best and loveliest traits of human character and life as tending to Universalism. This is the common conviction even of our opposers. Rev. Mr. Buckminster, late Orthodox clergyman of Portsmouth, N. H., in a funeral discourse on his colleague, Rev. Mr. Haven, spoke of his tendency to Universalism in the latter part of his life, and ascribed it to the great benevolence of his heart. The eminent John Foster's Universalism is ascribed to the same cause. Nevertheless, I think I have shown that the Bible ascribes this doctrine itself to the same great source whence proceeds the love of those benevolent Christian hearts, which source is God. "For love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God and knoweth God. He that loveth not knoweth not God; for God is love." (1 John iv. 7, 8.)

In drawing to a close this chapter on the Historical Evidences in relation to the origin of doctrines, I will remark, that while the sources, even outside of the Scriptures, from which have proceeded the Universalist theory, are amiable and lovable, I am not permitted to say so much of the opposite theologies. Their source is rather truthfully described by the philosophical poet:—

"Force first made conquest, and that conquest law,
Till superstition taught the tyrant awe;—
Then shared the tyranny, then lent it aid,
And gods of conquerors, slaves of subjects made.
Here fixed the dreadful, there the blest abodes,
Fear made her devils, and weak hope her gods;
Gods partial, changeful, passionate, unjust,
Whose attributes were rage, revenge, or lust;

Such as the soul of cowards might conceive,
And, formed like tyrants, tyrants would believe."

But, with thousands, there has been a well-meant, though mistaken, economy, in the perpetuation of the dogma of future revengeful punishment, in one form or the other, even in the Christian church, into which we have seen it was transferred from the heathen philosophies. The same economy has exerted its influence thus far to perpetuate the dogma, which stimulated the heathen themselves to the invention of it. The best heathen writers admit that this doctrine was INVENTED to frighten those who could not be restrained from vice by the punishments of this life! It was regarded by the heathen, as it now is by some professing Christians, as the most efficient motive to deter men from sin.

Cicero, in his seventh oration, p. 207, says that "it was on this account that the ancients INVENTED those *infernal punishments* of the dead, to keep the wicked under some awe in this life, who, without them, would have no dread of death itself."

Polybius, who was a celebrated Greek historian, speaking upon this subject, says, that "Since the multitude is ever fickle and capricious, full of lawless passions and irrational and violent resentments, there is no way left to keep them in order, but the *terrors of future punishment*, and all the pompous circumstances that attend such kind of FICTION! On which account the ancients acted, in my opinion, with great judgment and penetration, when they *contrived* to bring in those *notions of the gods and a future state*, into the popular belief."

Strabo, who was a Greek geographer and eminent philosopher, says, that "It is impossible to govern women and the gross body of the people, and to keep them pious, holy, and virtuous, by the precepts of philosophy. This can only be done by the *fear of the gods*, which is raised and supported by ancient *fictions* and modern prodigies." And again, he says, that "The apparatus of the ancient mythologies was an engine which the legislators employed as *bugbears* to strike a terror into the childish imagination of the multitude."

The policy, I say, of the heathen rulers in the invention of

an infernal general assize and infernal punishments, has had much to do in the way of holding it up in the Christian church. It is so this very day. There is no heart, in tolerably well cultivated society, to gainsay Universalism as a theory of faith. There is seen to be in it so much of beauty and harmony in itself, and of harmony with the acknowledged perfections of God, and with the revealed purpose of the Saviour's mission, and with the desires of the inhabitants of heaven, who are said by Jesus to rejoice at every step the work of human salvation advances, and with the prayers of all good men, — that there is no heart to gainsay it as an abstract system of faith. But, after all, may not its general dissemination be of unfavorable moral tendency? And here is the misgiving.

But Christians are fast emerging from this terrible falsehood in respect to the true principles for the formation of character and government of life. Even the most cultivated and refined of the ministers of the popular theologies, have nearly dropped the use of that barbarous heathen dogma as a moral motive. They feel its oppugnance to the spirit of Christ in their hearts, and perceive its tendency to sour the mind, and to harden and degrade, rather than refine and elevate the human soul.

I assure my respected friend that it is to me a grateful observation, that the energies of what I understand to be Christian truth are working their way, against the power of insidiously nurtured and guarded prejudice, and of numbers, and of a learned aristocracy, and of wealth, and of popular favor,—and that multiplying thousands are coming to see, that faith in God as the Father of all, and in one's self as the brother of all—and in that love Divine which will finally swallow up all evil in the victory of good,—and in virtue as our richest treasure, while sin is our greatest and most hateful curse,—is conducive to the highest happiness, and the highest, the strongest, and purest morality.

"The Two Theodores. Change for Authorities."

Under this head, which is the seventh section of his chap. iii., Mr. Hudson offsets the reference of my former opponent, Rev.

Dr. Adams, to Theodore Parker, and my more than balance of that account with reference to Theodore Clapp, with the testimonies of Prof. Tholuck of Germany, and Prof. Noyes of Cambridge Divinity School. The reader will please turn back to the section of the Affirmative Argument above mentioned.

The reference to the dubious state of mind exposed by some strange expressions of those learned professors is well enough for historical record. But though my friend makes his point in this case out of the fact of their being professed Restorationists, I regard their judgment of no sort of weight in the matter presented; that is, the teachings of the Scriptures on the question between us and our doctrinal opponents. Professor Tholuck is a minister of the Orthodox German church, and has never undertaken any reform of the creed. Like a great many other good men in like circumstances, he entertains the hope, *on moral grounds*, of the final salvation of all men. But he has never given his attention at all to a critical *de novo* study of the Scriptures on the subject of judgment. He is a man of great talent, and extensive learning; and is wise on those subjects which he has thoroughly studied. But he has never questioned the application of Matt. xxv. to a transaction of the future world. He takes that for granted with just as unquestioning simplicity as does the obscurest member of Dr. Adams' church; and taking up the phrase *aionion punishment* at that standpoint, he is in no position to understand its meaning. I say this, knowing how superior to myself in general learning and talent is the man of whom I speak; and I risk my reputation for common sense on the statement, that if an intelligent American Universalist were to enter with him into free and searching conversation on this point, he would find that Professor Tholuck has never investigated the Scripture teachings on the subject of judgment and retribution, nor critically studied the subject and bearings throughout, of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth chapters of Matthew. And his opinion on the sense of a class of Scripture passages which he never independently studied, cannot begin to compare in weight with that of a man of equal talent, such as Dr. Clapp, before the penetration of whose mind the doctrine

of endless punishment vanished from the Bible, while he was in earnest research to find it there. In short, Tholuck's case, in this respect, is precisely that of Theodore Parker. He is a Universalist as a kind-hearted philosopher, but not as a biblical student.

The same may be said of Prof. Noyes. The class of theologians to which he belongs, the Unitarian, or rather those of them who have believed in a favorable result of the creation and government of God, have made up their minds to rest their faith in it on philosophical, and not on Scriptural grounds. They are generally so well satisfied with their philosophy that they have no pressing motive to *search* the Scriptures on this point. To hit upon this and that isolated passage, which seems to refer to the purpose of the Saviour's mission, and say it may mean this or it may not, caring but little about it, is a very different matter from a search of the Scriptures as for hidden treasure, tracing and weighing their testimonies of the Messiah's mission, from Genesis to Revelation, in all their shades, and relations, and bearings, with a soul to drink in their rich and luminous teachings, in wonder, love, and praise.

So may we read the Word.

“Oh, may these heavenly pages be
Our study and delight,
And still new beauties may we see,
And still increasing light!”

DISCUSSION OF HUMAN DESTINY.

QUESTION.

Do reason and the Scriptures teach the utter extinction of an unregenerate portion of human beings, instead of the final salvation of all?

REJOINDER TO MR. COBB'S NEGATIVE ARGUMENT.

BY C. F. HUDSON.

OUR six months' discussion seems likely to go to the public as a book. I am to indicate briefly, if I can, that the book is not Universalist in the quality of its argument, though it appear such in the quantity thereof, and by its imprint. I shall accordingly, trying to observe the limits desired, make a few points of criticism. The reader will consider the fact that in a brief reply to a long argument I have little space for citation, and none at all for rhetoric.

As the expressions, "worthy of a better cause," and others similar, which have been bestowed upon my effort, do not pertain to the courtesies of debate, nor will be claimed by my opponent as containing any argument, I let them pass. Nor will I quarrel with the very confident tone in which he writes. An editor whose paper has come to be "of age" must have learned to speak either with great authority or with great modesty. Besides, the announcement of "Another Discussion; Annihilationism in the field," so much in the style of proclamation of tilts and tournaments, committed him to at least the show of victory. This was excusable in a knight just returned from gallant encounter with the doctrine of eternal woe. Yet the question lay at the threshold whether it might not be one thing to disprove the endless misery of any man, and quite another thing to establish the infinite blessedness of every child of Adam.

Mr. C. says that "Destructionism, though not so relentlessly fiendish, is more pitifully spiteful and reasonlessly barbarous, than even that other scheme. It represents that the Deity will raise up countless millions of his children from the deep unconscious sleep of death, just to torment them a while and kill them off again, and that for ever." (P. 397.)

If this "represents" my views, their defence should have ended ere it began; and it was hardly truthful in me to "disclaim," as I did at the outset, "all opinion of a special or violent interposition on the part of God, in the final perishing of the wicked. My view is that the unrepenting sinner *destroys himself*; and though this self-destruction may not be complete in the death of the body, but in a second instalment of death, I shall still regard it not as miracle, but the natural process of the life divorced from an unloved God, languishing back to naught." (P. 23.)

But if the above representation and many similar expressions are caricature, then it will be comparatively both easy and needless to say what occurs to me by way of rejoinder.

1. I am surprised that Mr. C. should impute to me materialist views, as he has done, in one or two instances very strongly. (Pp. 153, 384, 386.) For the discussion was even announced as growing out of my deprecation of such views, and I think my settled belief of the separate subsistence of the human soul is sufficiently apparent to the reader. If my views of an intermediate state, and of the distinction between soul and spirit, have given any occasion for his imputations, then I am not so acute as he regards me.

2. Mr. C. speaks of my view, under certain conditions, as "a device of recent date;" making the least account of my early history of it; and he proceeds to claim that it is not a natural form of thought,—"men do not walk into it, but they back into it from the repulsive force of the theory of endless punishment." (Pp. 150, 151.)

But, aside from the argument from the Scriptures and the writings of the apostolical fathers, I think I have shown that my view appears among the early Christians long before Mr. C.'s; and that *his* view, not mine, was the reaction from the orthodox view;—men "backed into" it. And he will find in my book on "The Future Life" a fourfold history of the doctrine of the immortality of a class, before the time in which the orthodox view was strong enough to get much repulsive force. Three forms of the doctrine I regard as counterfeits of the true; but the four together certainly show it to be not very unnatural.

"Here we have it!" exclaims Mr. C., citing my quotation from Justin Martyr respecting a judgment after the resurrection. (P. 310.) And he very generously thanks me for having traced this "corruption of Christianity" to a heathen source. But why does he not thank me for an equivalent quotation from the epistle ascribed to Barnabas, fifty years earlier? — "He that chooses the other part shall be destroyed, together with his works. For this cause there will be both a resurrection and a retribution." (P. 112.)

And yet my argument has been conducted almost independently of the "corruption" which Mr. C. supposes. And even some Spiritualists, Unitarians, and others who deny a general judgment scene, hold that wicked men will die out.

3. Mr. C. very often and fondly quotes my expression that man was made *for* immortality, taken not from the canonical Scriptures but from an apocryphal book, the context very fully stating the idea of conditional immortality which I designed by it. (See pp. 63, 64.) If Mr. C. had quoted the context half as often as the expression, though his argument would not have run so smooth, he might have understood that which he fails to comprehend, as meaning "nothing at all," and which he regards as a figment of "the philosophies of heathenism." (P. 159.)

He seems to me here singularly forgetful of my citations from early christian writers, who present this view of man's intermediate nature as a "Hebrew" doctrine, against the opinion of the Greeks. See Tatian and Nemesius, pp. 116, 119, above. This view was first ignored among the Fathers by Athenagoras, of whom I have spoken as the first virtual Universalist. Last week I met the following statement by Olshausen: "Athenagoras, *following the Greek philosophers*, more than once professes that souls are immortal in their own nature, which is wholly foreign (abhorret) from the opinion of Justin and others." (Opuscula, p. 170.) And my pugnacious friend Mr. Landis speaks of him as holding not only the immortality but the eternity of the soul. This may satisfy both Mr. C. and Prof. Hovey.

The question is, Can one's life to-morrow, or his existence a million years hence, depend on his character or conduct meanwhile. Mr. C. admits the former. The latter, which he denies, is like unto it. A man naturally long-lived, whose constitution contains three score years and ten, may die next year of vice. His "natural" life depends on God's support and his own observance of its laws. Does the immortal life of the soul any less depend on God's support? How, then, does God sup-

port its life? By a continuous miracle? or by laws analogous to those of other life? or by an absolute gift of immortality at the outset, — so that it might live on if God should die, as I have heard an orthodox man suppose? How God avoids the continuous miracle, or what method he observes, I am not called upon to know. But that there may be a conditional life of seventy years, and not also a conditional life of seventy million or of endless years, is more than Mr. Cobb knows.

In the sense I intended, every acorn is made *for* an oak, i.e., capable of producing an oak; yet there are more acorns than oaks. And the world is full of such analogies, a divine affluence producing more germs than are matured; which though they perish are yet not lost, nor God impoverished, not creature wronged, and needless and sinful evil is yet ruled for good.

4. In his second and third chapters, Mr. C. endeavors to show a metaphorical sense of the term *death* as used in the garden of Eden. Certainly a very early use of metaphor; in the infancy of the race, when no death but that of brutes was known, and the metaphor especially out of place in laying down a law, which, as John Locke remarks, requires the plainest terms. But to the argument offered, I reply: 1. Allegory and metaphor are different things. The former is a species of dramatic writing in which one or more attributes or agencies are *personified*. Hence, even granting the alleged allegory, the events predicted may be literal enough. 2. The expressions which indicate to Mr. C.'s mind a certain *natural* period of life, do not indicate this to my own mind. The expression, "*For* dust thou art," etc., denotes simply that man had no absolute exemption from death; not that death was natural and a matter of course, for then it would be no penalty. But if Adam might *penally* suffer because his earthly nature admitted it, he might *penally* die because he had no absolute immortality; and this might be well told in the words: "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." Adam was not *told* of such a dissolution, that we know, before he sinned. Why is he told of it now? 3. Finally, the passage of which Mr. C. has forgotten to give "more particular" explanation, viz., Gen. iii. 27, (p. 165,) may be that which explains the sentence, if it needs explaining.

Again, Adam was long-lived, at the shortest. Old age then was not known until near a thousand years. Three score years and ten belonged to the days of youth. Do we know that innocence might not have avoided dissolution and decay altogether, the earthly body being "clothed upon" and "swallowed up" in the spiritual, in a process natural originally, but now of grace and supernatural, as described by Paul in 1. Cor. xv 2-

Mr. Cobb offers an argument for natural physical mortality from the occurrence of death by accident and violence. (P. 156.) Granting that a sinless state would not have been without these, — though the instances would have been very few, — the exceptions would not make void the rule. Violence is unnatural, whether the nature is regarded as mortal or otherwise.

5. Mr. C. objects to the *prolepsis* which I allege as explaining many expressions, and insists very strongly that John iii. 36, denotes what is actually present. "Here is a positive affirmation, that the believer *hath* aionion life, — that it is a concomitant of his faith." (P. 300.)

The reader will say whether my arguments for a *prolepsis* are met; for example, the phrase, "Ye are yet in your sins." (1 Cor. xv. 17, see above, p. 76.) I will here add a few words from Winer, who is among the most moderate in the use of the figure in question. He speaks of "an action still future mentioned as already present, either because it is unalterably determined, or is about to take place by some unchanging arrangement," as Matt. xxvi. 2; John xiv. 3; vii. 42; Heb. iv. 3 ("We which have believed *do enter* into rest"); 1 Cor. iii. 13; xv. 2; Eph. v. 5. "Hence the expression, 'the hour cometh,' used by Jesus, John iv. 21; xiv. 2; and the Jewish designation 'He that cometh' (*habbā*) for the Messiah." "The expression 'hath everlasting life' (John iii. 36) might accordingly be appropriately applied to one who is not as yet in the enjoyment of eternal life, but who, in the certain hope of attaining it, is already as it were in possession of it. In what immediately follows, the apostle very accurately distinguishes the future from the present." (Grammar of N. T. Diction, pp. 280, 281, Phil. Ed. The work is standard.)

The metaphorical sense of *zōē aiōnios* is emphatically forbidden by some expressions of Christ. Think of a person entering into spiritual life "halt, or maimed"! The image itself is incongruous; whereas the imperfection supposed by Christ, though impossible in fact, is conceivable in thought.

In Rom. vi. 23, Mr. C. insists on the fact that the soldier's wages (*opsōnion*) consisted partly in provisions, or in his *fare*; whence he argues that death is the daily fare of the sinner. (P. 178.) But the real contrast is between "wages" as *payment*, or stipulated due, and "free-gift" (*charisma*) as *gratuity*, or donative, which was occasionally granted by the general.

6. Near the close of his second chapter, my friend, just after saying that my "cause is a doomed one," catches at a word quite noticeably. I had compared sin to a "fatal" disease. (P. 77.) Mr. C. thereupon says I challenge the proof "that sin

is not an *incurable* disease to the soul, which shall terminate its being beyond recovery," though I had the proof in my mouth and on my pen. (Pp. 179, 180.) Thank God, I had. He who can raise the dead can heal mortal disease, whether of body or soul. Yet "who can forgive sins but God only?"

And here a word will answer what Mr. C. says of the term *to destroy* (*apollumi*) often meaning *to lose*. Certainly it does. And suppose the lost sheep or the lost piece of money were not found; were they not the same as out of the world? Or, if the "son that was lost" were never returned; was he not practically dead and gone? Or, if one "lose his life" and never find it; is it not annihilated? Does a rescue from the doom change the meaning of the word?

7. My friend regards my comparison of the scriptural treatment of God's assumed *existence* and man's supposed *immortality* as ill-founded. He thinks that like stature and complexion these are not comparable terms, and that I should have taken *immortality in each subject* for comparison. He convicts me of a "slight confusion," and proposes to clear the case by comparing the Scripture recognition of the being or immortality of each subject. (Pp. 198, 194.)

But there was no confusion in my comparison, which was of the *scriptural treatment* of two doctrines, both alleged to be taken for granted in the Scriptures. Now the *matter* of such doctrines might be as different as stature and color; yet when they are put on the same footing as primary truths, said to be assumed in the Bible as too plain for express assertion, they come at once into comparison as respects the scriptural treatment of them. This was just the comparison I made, and every man of reading knows how much occasion there was for it. I challenged the discovery of any mention in the Scriptures, not of the technical immortality of the soul (which was Prof. Barrows' mistake), but of any immortality of mankind, in proper, natural, and general terms. The reader will say whether the passage has been found.

Mr. C. says that the immortality of God "is only asserted incidentally in a single case" (1 Tim. vi. 16); and he names another "incidental expression" of it. (Pp. 194, 195.) The reader will recollect that my comparison included all mention in proper terms, however incidental, of the ideas in question. If I accept this new member of comparison offered, God's immortality or eternity, I find it explicitly mentioned eighteen or twenty times, besides thirty instances in which God is called "the living God;" the phrase, "As I live," and the like, sixty times; and scores of instances in which God's glory or the like is called eternal.

To my statement that God's existence and man's supposed immortality are of equal importance to man, Mr. C. objects that "these two truths as subjects of revelation to man, especially in the infancy of the race, bear no comparison." For some *knowledge* of God as a moral governor is more essential to man's present condition as an accountable subject. (Pp. 215-217.) This may be in some sense true; though some atheists have been very moral men. Still, aside from our *knowledge* of the supposed truths, they are in fact equally important, and must in "their times and seasons" be equally revealed. Accordingly, Mr. C. speaks of "the crowning subject of this revelation, immortal life and good as the hereafter inheritance of man." Yet I submit that for this last clause he can find no proper equivalent in the New Testament, though specially designed to "show the path of life" and bring life and immortality to light.

To the "*mirabile dictu!*" which Mr. C. presently adds (p. 218), the expression in Rom. ii. 7, may answer. One who loves virtue can certainly cherish it with all joy if it leads to immortality. Noble minds have thought immortality too high a bribe. I trust it is not a prevalent feeling among Universalists that they can not do any thing or be any thing unless they are absolutely immortal. Such a feeling must certainly produce serious evils in practical theology.

For speaking as if I connected "*opinion*" with conduct as a test of salvation (p. 218), I have given Mr. C. no occasion whatever.

8. Mr. C. guesses that Matt. xxiv. 13, and Acts xvi. 30, are among my hundred examples in which the terms *to save* and *salvation* apply to a final destiny. (P. 350.) He reckons at a venture, since the verb, which he hits upon, occurs over a hundred times; and the noun, almost uniformly denoting eternal life, about fifty times. I am quite indifferent to those he has guessed; the latter, certainly, was not in my mind. But when Paul answered the jailer, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved," he surely preached the good news, and very likely said something about the resurrection, as he was wont to do. I may still say the term *salvation* generally covered the whole effect of Christ's work, whether Jewish or gentile hearer apprehended more or less of the unsearchable riches of its import. Whether it is commonly applied to a class the reader will say.

9. To the large number of passages which I offered as suggesting the "general tone" of the Scriptures, I did not expect Mr. C. to reply in detail. It proves nothing against his case that he has not done so. But I did expect he would offer some-

thing of the kind on his side. For there is certainly some general tenor of Scripture; and if I have failed to discover it, Mr. C. has also failed to present it. And if it is on his side, it is remarkable that the two earliest explicit Universalists did not appear until about A.D. 200, and the most explicit of these was such an interpreter as Origen.

Upon the positive proof texts adduced by Mr. C., I can not remark at length. Of Matt. xviii. 11 ("to seek and save that which is lost") I have spoken already, and may here add as parallel passages, Luke xviii. 10-16; 2 Cor. iv. 3; ii. 15, 16. With Phil. ii. 9-11, should be compared Rom. xiv. 10-12, and 1 Cor. xv. 25-28, and the remarks of Dr. Noyes, cited by me, (p. 106.) With 1 Cor. xi. 3 ("The head of every man is Christ") compare John xv. 2: "Every branch in me that beareth not fruit," etc., and ver. 6. All the passages cited by Mr. C. have, I think, a legitimate sense and glorious import, as signifying a final unbroken reign of Christ, in the eternal life of all who take up any cross for love to him.

My friend tells his readers that "St. Paul says, '*No man liveth unto himself.*'" (Corrected without notice on p. 246.) He quotes inaccurately. Paul's words are, "For none (*oudeis*) of us liveth unto himself, and none (*oudeis*) dieth unto himself." (Rom. xiv. 7.) See context and compare 1 Pet. iv. 1, 2: "He that hath suffered in the flesh hath ceased from sin; that he should no longer live the rest of his time in the flesh to the lusts of men, but to the will of God."

10. Mr. C. has put several points of his argument into the following supposed reply to one inquiring for a sister in the future life: "Where is she?" "Dead," answers the Master; "she was a very good girl, but she did not afford me quite help enough to save her. I desired and intended it, but my mission was to a great extent a failure. Death will hold her for ever." (P. 224.)

The exegetical argument here designed is that on my theory death will never be destroyed, but is eternal in the case of those who fail of eternal life. This is true only in a negative sense. But the sense I offered—"there is no more death when all who live are immortal"—is certainly admissible in itself. In Rev. xxi. 4, the term *death* is plainly used in the sense of *dying*. And ch. xx. 15, speaks of those who "were not found written in the book of life;" and that too "from the foundation of the world." (xvii. 18.) Mr. C. offers a column against my definition; the reader will judge of my exegesis.

The expression, "My mission was to a great extent a failure" brings up the passage in Rev. vii. 9-17, which reads so

like a dramatic picture of the final consummation, with its "Amen: Blessing, and glory, and wisdom, and power, unto God." Yet I do not think that Mr. C. would offer it as describing the salvation of all mankind. We are also reminded of that strong expression in Gen. vi. 6: "It repented the Lord that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved him at his heart." Have not millions of things been done which God sincerely forbade and deplotes? or will Mr. C. say that "whatever is, is right"? As to "failure," every wickedness implies that in some sense; certainly a failure to "afford the help" which God requires for salvation. And failure as a finality and on the part of God doubtless follows from the orthodox scheme, of an eternal evil. But it can be no finality in a universe of holy and blessed beings, which we believe in. The question is, Who shall constitute that?

My friend's appeal to my fraternal affection strikes me as quite in the Universalist vein; but it is not well put. I have never said that "very good girls" will be annihilated. But if my sister were a Lady Macbeth, a murderess, or a procuress, — and there have been such sisters, — even more than if she were a harlot, I might fear that the "image of God" scarcely remained in her, and that she was not of the "children of God," or of the "peculiar people." I should grieve her loss, most certainly. But it would be arrogance to say that in the resources of a higher life, a human grief should not be outgrown; or to say that a frail or worse than frail life is utterly lost, to God and the universe, though itself should fully end.

11. Mr. C. is "appalled" at my style of hope respecting the resurrection of the just and the unjust. (P. 261.) He is easily horrified; and as he gives me credit for a genial face I am a little tempted to smile at further expense of his horror. For instance, I am very glad that a horse dies harder than a hare; and even that a man dies harder than a brute. It's terrible to think of; and yet it means simply this, — that where there can be more pain, there is more life. Geologists tell of strata miles in depth of fossil remains; yes, whole cubic leagues of recorded death. I am wicked enough to rejoice in it all — for the same reason that geologists call these, "monuments of the felicity of ages." And if my friend will read again he will see that my horrible "hope" is precisely in keeping with what I said of the economy of Pain, which he has himself indorsed. Will he tell us how many degrees of pain in death should be followed by immortal life?

12. "How disgustingly mean," exclaims Mr. C., "does my opponent make the Corinthian Christians appear!" (P. 251.)

This might mean something if the writer, catching at my word "partitive," had not represented me as holding the salvation of a "party." I hardly need reply that if I have pictured the Corinthians as caring only for some "half-dozen" of their friends and not for all God's people, or even as "loving the brethren" all the world over and not caring for every vicious, scoffing, and persecuting heathen, I plead guilty and ask forgiveness. I submit the case to the reader.

Has my "eagle eye" found any thing in 1 Cor. xv., which is not there? The "truism" my friend charges me with (p. 252) comes of his ignoring the very facts I state. Let us give Paul's argument omitting the article as he did: "If there is no resurrection of dead ones, i.e., if there is no resurrection at all, then they that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished." Is that a truism? It is precisely the formula implied in every syllogism, about which I know, indeed, logicians are now disputing. It will be soon enough for me to confess when they agree to condemn.

Has Mr. C. told us how those deceased would have "perished" in the case supposed?

13. Besides argument to show that Matt. x. 28 does describe annihilation, I supposed "for argument's sake" that it should contain no allusion to a punishment after death, challenging the proof that it would not still describe annihilation. (P. 83.) Mr. C. says, No; for there is certainly to be a resurrection of all, just and unjust. (P. 267.) Indeed! but that is no explanation of the passage in question, and I should continue the "argument's sake" by asking how the two passages would be reconciled. Mr. C. may dissent from those Universalists who say Matt. x. 28 describes an unreal punishment, but he must expect to make it very plain, how God can destroy "both soul (*psuche*) and body" in some gehenna in which man can not destroy—and yet not annihilate. The reader will say whether the argument referred to does this.

Mr. C. does not fear majorities; so I add to the names of Balfour and Ballou that of Mr. Forbes, who *supposing* the punishment described in Matt. x. 28 were inflicted, says "it proves annihilation if it proves any thing." (Universalist Assistant, p. 221.) And of T. B. Thayer: "If it teaches what is certain and not what is possible only, it necessitates the doctrine of annihilation." (History of the Doctrine of Endless Punishment, pp. 135, 136.)

14. For exposition of John v. 29, Mr. C. refers to his reply to Dr. Adams. The metaphorical sense of the whole passage (vs. 21-29) was once defended by several German exegetes.

But since Lücke, "an intermediate interpretation has prevailed, vs. 21, 22, being taken in a twofold sense; vs. 24-27, in a metaphorical sense; and vs. 28, 29, in a literal sense. Thus Lücke, Tholuck, and Olshausen." The literal sense of the whole passage is defended by Storr; Morus, Tittmann, Schott, Kuinoel, Klee, and Meyer. Paulus, who takes the first of these three views in the main, says the expression "all those in the graves" "is pertinent only with the view to distinguish these dead ones from those called spiritually dead in vs. 24, 25." Olshausen paraphrases thus: "The less shall be outdone by the greater. Yea, even the *general* resurrection of the dead is the work of the Son of God! That the discourse is here of a *physical* resurrection appears from the expressions 'in the graves, and 'they shall go forth;' and from the remark that the evil as well as the good shall rise." De Wette takes vs. 28, 29, literally. Crusius, remarking that "'in the graves' can not be allegorized a spiritual way," refers to the Gnostics of Tertullian's day, as explaining it of "the natural man." Several of the above writers are Restorationists.

Mr. C. insists upon the fact that John v. 28, 29, and Dan. xii. 2, are generally regarded as parallel. Be it so; but Dan. xii. 2, is referred to the final resurrection, I think by more writers than Job xix. 25, 26, which is one of Mr. C.'s proofs of man's immortality. Even Albert Barnes very reluctantly refers this passage to Job's subsequent vindication (ch. xlii. 6-8).

In support of his view of John v. 29, Mr. C. thinks that Luke xiv. 14—"thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just"—does not refer to the immortal resurrection. This view tends, he thinks, to "belittle the great Teacher, and to degrade his religion by making its highest motives to be rattles and rock-horses." He refers the passage to the blessed remembrance of the commended hospitality, at the "*rising* of the poor and oppressed into power;" or, perhaps, to "an approaching revolution, when there should be a special and extensive *rising up* of those who practised the charities of his religion." The caricature and the comment may suit Mr. C.'s views of John v. 29, and please those already persuaded—and convince whom they will. Restorationist commentators almost unanimously understand Luke xiv. 14, of a literal resurrection. Mr. Paige makes the only exception so far as I know.

15. "With an earnestness worthy of a better cause" Mr. C. tells his readers I have "descried a difference between the prepositions *from* and *of*"—with reference to the resurrection. (P. 247.) This concerns the sense of *exanastasis* in Phil. iii.

11, and other argument for a twofold resurrection. I am free to say that the more critical editions of the New Testament omit the preposition *from* (ek) after the word in question, while the received text contains it. Chrysostom and Theophylact, who should know Greek, took the word in the sense I gave. Modern critics do not find the same distinction between *exanastasis* and *anastasis*, though some think the former emphatic, denoting the blessed resurrection; and most critics find the sense I claim in the passage, though not in the word. Thus Meyer (a Restorationist, I think): "*What resurrection Paul means can not be doubtful to the reader; viz., the first, in which 'they that are Christ's' (1 Cor. xv. 23) shall rise. Compare 1 Thes. iv. 16.*" And De Wette, the "impartial and sharp-sighted" Restorationist, remarks on the passage: "*The physical resurrection is morally conditioned, at least as a resurrection for the kingdom of God.*"

16. Mr. C. thinks I commit a "sorer 'asthmatic exegesis'" than that which I imputed to Mr. Paige, in failing to qualify Heb. vi. 4-6, by the previous context. (P. 290). I confess myself too dull for conviction. Nor am I enlightened by Mr. C. saying that "the rudiments of the doctrine of Christ, or a laying again of the *foundation* of repentance" would be unavailing for "renewing again unto repentance." For "rudiments" and "the foundation" strike my mind as being the *first principles* and *fundamentals* of the Christian faith. Does Mr. C. mean that when these are denied, the secondary principles and superstructure, which complete and "perfect" the Christian scheme, may still accomplish the "impossible" or difficult work? Will the strong meat, which only those of full age can digest, renew unto life in the third *aiōn* those who loathed and rejected pure milk in the second *aiōn*? My friend certainly does not intend to invert the natural order of building, or to ascribe to the more recondite principles of Christian truth a power which has been exhausted by apostasy from its first and obvious principles. Yet this is what he seems to do; and his mistake is probably the frequent one of taking the expressions "leaving the principles" and "going on to perfection," as referring to the Christian life, and not to the division and discussion of the subject. His mistake may be corrected by consulting any good commentary.

17. My friend says "it is commendably respectful towards the apostle for my opponent to '*grant* this judgment (Heb. x. 26, 27) to signify the destruction of Jerusalem.'" (P. 292, note.) A doubtful style of compliment, this, which I fear I do not de-

serve. I have granted so many things "for argument's sake" that Mr. C. should have suspected me even here; especially as I used the participle, "granting."

Much might be said here. Mr. C. thinks ver. 25 confirms all that I was "granting." Let him compare that verse with all the parallel passages, and ask whether Paul expected a future resurrection as the beginning of an eternal state; and if so, when? That discussion would make another book, as it has made many already. I can only suggest that what I may call the Unitarian view will only change the outward form and complexion of Christian Eschatology, leaving the vital force and substance of the disputed passages intact. Hence many interpreters who think Paul was mistaken in his hope of a future resurrection and a personal appearing of Christ, still regard these expressions as describing the introduction of a final state. For this reason, "granting" as I did, I asked what "sacrifice for sins" after the judgment named. The whole tone of Paul's argument implies that if there is no other sacrifice than the despised blood of Christ, there is no hope. The reader will say whether Mr. C.'s explanation saves the apostate.

18. Mr. C. is surprised that I reiterate the phrase "there is a sin unto death" (1 John v. 16) as I do, when I have myself "brought forward the fact, without dissent, that it is the general opinion of commentators that the language refers to a sin incurring the death penalty by the law of the land." (P. 321.) I have both forgotten doing any such thing, and I greatly mistook the facts if I did. Of the six orthodox concessions quoted by Mr. Paige on the passage, *five* refer it to cases of divine visitations of sickness upon professed believers. One explains it from the Mosaic code. To the five names I could add others. Mr. C.'s explanation was proposed by Rosenmüller as a "conjecture," and was adopted by Morus, Chr. Schmidt, and I care not by what few others. There is a strong Universalist objection against it. If the gospel was designed to abolish capital punishment, — of which, by the bye, I am no advocate, — why did John "not say that we shall pray" for the life of capital offenders? Again, the reference to temporal death hardly agrees with the context, which speaks of "eternal life," being "born of God," and the like. Finally, the orthodox sense — "spiritual death" — is adopted by Wetstein, Meyer, De Wette, Lücke, and Neander; whom I name because none of them are specially orthodox, and two of them (De Wette and Lücke) take pains to regard the "sin unto death" as hypothetical only, never actually occurring.

19. Mr. C. wonders why I "continue to reiterate the quota-

tion of Rom. ii. 7," and refers me to his discussion with Dr. Adams, where he thinks "he clearly shows that the term rendered 'immortality' (*aphtharsia*) denotes incorruptness of moral principle." The reader will see that I have not ignored this interpretation (p. 69), and I thank Mr. C. for asking more particular notice of it. I find he cites the authority of Parkhurst, and the same word as occurring in Eph. vi. 24, and Titus ii. 7. My friend, also, must mend his Greek. The word rendered "incorruptness" in Titus is not *aphtharsia* but *adiaphthoria*. It doubtless means what Mr. C. says, though the secondary sense of the adjective, *adiaphthoros*, is *imperishable*. *Aphtharsia*, rendered "sincerity," also occurs in the received text of Tit. ii. 7, but the word is omitted by later editors, as an interpolation. It never means moral incorruptness, according to Passow, Schleusner, Bretschneider, Wahl, and Robinson. Even in Eph. vi. 24, the four last-named lexicographers, all on the New Testament, give the sense of undecayingness, constancy, perpetuity.* Love in *aphtharsia* is undying love. Likewise some of the commentators. And of all the commentators I have found on Rom. ii. 7, —two or three dozen,—not one supports Mr. C., except Mr. Paige, whose note may convince whom it will. They all sustain the common rendering, though several avoid my conclusion by supposing the whole phrase means, by hendyadis, "a glorious and honorable immortality." One of them alludes to another, Chr. Schmidt, who interprets with Mr. C. "incorrectly."

But perhaps Mr. C. does not rely upon commentators. Neither do I. And I add my own reasons for employing the passage as I do. "Glory, honor, and moral purity," would be an anti-climax, unworthy of Paul. The former terms certainly refer to the final destination of the believer, and *aphtharsia* naturally denotes the unwasting permanence of the possession. See 1 Pet. i. 4, 5, 23. Again, the term is used not only in 1 Cor. xx. 42, 50, 53, 54, (compare the adjective in Rom. i. 23; 1 Cor. iv. 25; 1 Tim. i. 17,) but in 2 Tim. i. 10; where if it does not mean "immortality," then immortality has not been brought to light. And its ever-recurring use among the early Christians was in this sense. The authorities, plenty of them Universalist, and the reasons, make this important passage a strong citadel; and if Mr. C. wants it he must "come and take it."

But let us grant, "for argument's sake," that the passage

* I had consulted the second edition of Dr. Robinson's *Lexicon*, in which he renders the term as occurring in Eph. vi. 24, "perpetuity." I find that in his later edition he has rendered as cited by Mr. C. in his *Review*.

means what Mr. C. claims. Then the promise "to those who patiently continue in well-doing" makes the conditions of "aionian life" quite as hard as I have made the conditions of "eternal life." Why, then, should my view be caricatured, as offering salvation to those who "prove themselves sufficiently expert and mighty" to "free themselves from the toils of the serpent's folds"? (P. 220.)

20. Mr. C. criticises my use of the Apocalypse, and of the phrase "second death." (Pp. 273, 274.) I have endeavored to use the *book* according to the milder rule, and "not for proof of a new doctrine." For the sense of the *phrase* I cited several Jewish books, *one* of which, the Jerusalem Targum, from which I quote a single expression, was written, likely, in the seventh century, and as much later as my friend pleases. Of the others he says nothing, but probably relies for their late date on the authorities collected by Mr. Balfour, and referred to in the discussion with Dr. Adams. I quoted mostly the "Targum" of Jonathan. He is generally regarded as of the school of Hillel, living a short time before Christ. "The grounds assigned by Eichhorn and others," says Dr. Davidson, "in favor of a more recent date, are unsatisfactory." (Art. in Kitto's Cyclopædia.) The early date is supported by Walton (Polyglott, Prolegomena, c. 12, § 9), De Wette (Introd. to O. T.) and Gesenius, author of the standard Hebrew Lexicon (Jesaia, Einl. § 11). The Targum of *Onkelos* dates still earlier, and he supports the paraphrase of Deut. xxxiii. 6, which I cited, thus: "Let Reuben live in eternal life (*chajē 'olām*), and not die the second death." Buxtorf defines *chajē 'olām* as the life of the world to come (*'olām habbā*). Will Mr. C. tell us when that *aiōn* was expected to end?

So it appears, to adapt my friend's metaphor, that the stream of Jewish thought was roiled with this wolfish doctrine about a hundred years before John wrote, and he drank of it thus. Besides, it behoved Mr. C., if he thought I had hit upon a late and corrupted sense of the phrase, to seek whether and how the Jews used it before. Could they have borrowed it from John's book of woes upon their city? Finally, Is there no reference in all the Apocalypse to the final state?

Speaking of *aiōn* — Mr. C. thinks that Tholuck would be found ignorant of the Universalist exegesis of Matt. xxv. I suspect he would ignore the Universalist exegesis of *zōē aiōnios*.

21. To Mr. C.'s remarks on the question, "Are there radically bad men?" I need not reply particularly. He urges *possibilities* of reform which I have not denied. The rest of the question lies in other parts of the argument. Upon the two

instances he adduces to show a *probability*, — Tiberius and the two pirates, — I should say that I certainly would not have selected the latter for my purpose. I do not know against what light or advantage the pirates had sinned, or by what class of temptations they were entered upon their career. The reader of my argument will see that it allows just such cases, — the light of truth and love breaking in for the first time, apparently, upon hearts calloused by evil associations and habits. The remorse of Tiberius is less easily interpreted. Did his reflections incline him to amendment? Or did he resist his convictions when he might have yielded to them? Was his anguish a process of life, or of death? This question is often raised when Providence has left us no answer. Do the Scriptures remove all fear that the sin may be strictly unto death?

22. To my argument on Free Will Mr. C. has replied at some length. I think he might have said less if he had noticed two or three words in a sentence he quotes. I admitted "that the freedom of the human will, as uncontrolled by any *necessitating* power of motives, makes the actions of men no more traceable by any philosophy of *cause and effect*." (Pp. 37, 38.) This is just what Dr. Ballou has said in the last number of the *Universalist Quarterly*: "It is we ourselves who give to every motive all the *efficient* power it has. This is a point worthy of our notice; for it seems to be commonly taken for granted that motives have of themselves a fixed and rateable power, of which we are the passive subjects instead of being the producing agents. Hence the notion of 'strongest motives and weakest motives,' as of strongest and weakest forces coming in upon as from without." (Oct. 1859, p. 340.) This last view I think is that which Mr. C. opposes to my own, and represents as the scriptural view; and he quotes several passages showing God's *purposes* in the ruling and blessing of his creatures. He might quote such passages by the hundred; but does it follow that motives are efficient causes? or that God does by moral means or otherwise strictly compel or "necessitate" any created will? Certainly Mr. C. has mistaken the popular language of the Bible for scientific language; he has taken the general result of God's dealing as implying his absolute efficiency. But I might bring an equal array of passages on another side, in which God entreats, expostulates, and deplores — as if man were quite as free, wayward, and exposed to ruin, as I view him to be. I do not think the two classes of passages, or the truths of God's sovereignty and man's strictest freedom, at all clash. But I think Mr. C. has neither reconciled them, nor saved them both.

Mr. C.'s italicized definition of free agency (p. 388) seems to me obscure, if it is not a truism.

23. Mr. C. says: "Yielding to the same everlasting clamor of this theoretic necessity for removing the moral obstructions to his favorite theory, my friend adventures the expedient of turning the point of the Savior's dying prayer." (P. 378.) Here is a heavy charge, preferred in no gentle tone, by one who is to show that the point of his argument is not turned. Mr. C. will not say that I derogate from the strength of Christ's forgiving love; for he knows that my view of human guilt is severer than his. This is the real point between us. I have averred a feature and aggravation of sin which my opponent denies. I accuse the guilt of man at a point at which he excuses or palliates it. He reduces the *degree* of the guilt, and with it the merit of its forgiveness, to meet his view of the *extent* of the pardon in question. Thus he extenuates a certain crime, as I think he is not warranted in doing, and then accuses me of detracting from Christ's forgiving virtue. For that crime I took pains to say that "Christ felt no resentment or revenge." I did not represent Jesus as unforgiving, even toward those who, confessing his miraculous beneficence, derided thus his present sufferings: "He saved others, himself he can not save." But when the divine prayer is offered to show that theirs was a sin of ignorance, if not to sustain "a favorite theory," I may properly ask "a strict interpretation of the passage." Let us examine:—

(1.) Mr. C. thinks the dying supplication could not be specially in behalf of the Roman soldiers, for they were quite "innocent of cruel designs." "Some of them," he says, "all of them for aught we know, may have been exercised by friendly feeling towards him personally, regretting the part they were compelled to act in this sad drama." But they certainly were not compelled to "mock him, coming to him and offering to him vinegar, and saying, If thou be the King of the Jews, save thyself." (Luke xxiii. 36, 37. Comp. Matt. xxvii. 27-34.)

(2.) Mr. C. cites as a similar passage the dying prayer of the martyr Stephen: "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge." But there are two points of difference. Stephen does not call the sin of his murderers one of ignorance. And then, while this disciple was not "above his Master," yet just because he was not the Messiah his prayer had less prophetic import. Even Christ's prayer on the cross should be remembered in connection with his unanswered prayer in the garden. Yet if it be

claimed as containing an act or prestige of pardon, we may ask, who was forgiven?

(3.) We are told that the Jews did not know Jesus, "as the Messiah; for then, as St. Paul says, 'they would not have crucified the Lord of life and glory.' Accordingly the saying, 'for they know not what they do,' applied literally and truly to the Jewish instigators of his crucifixion." Mr. C. here speaks too positively. Paul says this of "the princes of this world." (1 Cor. ii. 6-8.) If these were human potentates and leaders, the expression certainly *includes* the Roman power, that slaughtered the innocents to crush one born King of the Jews, and at length put him to a traitor's death; and some think that power specially intended. But a few modern writers and many of the ancient, including Origen, have referred it to superhuman agencies, Satan and "the power (or host) of the air." See Eph. ii. 2; vi. 12; John xii. 31; xiv. 30; xv. 11. It favors this view that the "wisdom" of which Paul speaks (1 Cor. ii. 8; i. 32) was gentile rather than Jewish; this wisdom was largely ascribed to the heathen oracles, inspired, it was thought, by *dæmons*—the "Spiritualism" of the day. In this view, the "coming to naught" of these agencies found a partial fulfilment in the "Defect of the Oracles" of which Plutarch wrote and Milton sung. Be all this as it may, the notion of diabolic agency in the death of Christ was perfectly familiar to the minds of the early Christians. And if Mr. C. shall infer that (supposing him a personal being) Satan's guilt was of ignorance and pardonable, I reply; the whole view was that the Adversary simply found himself over-matched; he would have respected the divine *power* of Christ—not his character nor his cause;

"Willing to wound, but yet afraid to strike."

Hence, if Mr. C. insist on the expression, "For if they had known," etc., his inference will not follow. The movers of Christ's death might have desisted from crucifying an indubitable Son of God from mere awe of his power, with no love for his meekness and his truth. Herein is the great trial of man; this is the difference of faith from overwhelming sight,—to yield to a *moral* force. The life of Jesus was such a force, and omnipotence could not add to it in its proper kind. Paul was not converted by the lightning, nor by the miracle, but by the mild suggestion that he was a persecutor.

(4.) Again, as already suggested, the prayer on the cross might express a feeling rather than contain a prophecy, and

might be, like that in the garden, unanswered. There is no inconsistency in this view ; for the same Jesus had spoken of a denial of those who denied him, apparently final,—“before the Father which is in heaven.” (Matt. x. 32 ; comp. Luke xii. 8.)

24. Citing the expression that God is “the Father of spirits,” I alluded to the distinction between soul and spirit. I will leave all the remarks suggested thereby (pp. 383–385) to those more familiar with this distinction and the large history of opinions in connection with it than my friend seems to be.

25. Mr. C. thinks I do not fairly represent Mr. Ballou in saying that he overlooks an important point, in his “Divine Character Vindicated,” p. 122. (See above, p. 393.) I would not do him injustice ; and I find on recurring to his work that on p. 128 he *recognizes* the question I raise and promises to treat it ; yet plainly assuming that it can not affect the principle he lays down. And in his proposed discussion of it (pp. 185–195) it seems to me involved and lost in the treatment of the orthodox view.

26. The reader will say whether I have given any occasion for the representation that I regard eternal life as strictly the merited reward of virtue ; or that I “take justice to be merciless revenge ;” or that I deem “a God all mercy as a God unjust.” (P. 364 ; compare pp. 136, 137.)

Mr. C.’s culminating text in his argument on forgiveness, “Thou wast a God that forgavest them, though thou tookest vengeance of their inventions” (Ps. xcix. 8, see p. 367), contains a doctrine familiar to the Jews, of temporary and ultimate penalty, either of which might be remitted without the other. That this was a view recognized by Christ in Mark iii. 29, I think I have shown elsewhere. (Debt and Grace, pp. 195–197).

27. Comparing my view with that which the French Infidels labelled the death of all men, “eternal sleep,” Mr. C. calls the latter “the better theory of the two.” (P. 382.) This expression loses none of its significance by being put in a parenthesis. “Better no eternal life for man than that any child of Adam should fall short of it.” Or, as I should state it, “if bad men will die, good men might as well prefer to die too.”

Mr. C., and Universalists generally, are ever appealing to certain sympathies, and are apt to select their cases accordingly. I will select a case or two.

A child of profligacy and vice dies as soon as it is born. Is there any unkindness to man, or dishonor to God, if it does not become a seraph ? But at what point above the unblest

wedlock which gave it a sheer birth, does parental affection assume the sacred character that warrants the child's immortality? Again: Mr. C. has said (Reply to Dr. Adams, p. 214) he would thank God for the arrest of a cannibal in pursuit of his child. Very well; but he virtually tells us now that he would vote for a general annihilation if the same cannibal should not finally inherit the eternal weight of glory. Perhaps he would. We may be convinced of such devoted philanthropy, when he adds to his picture of distress over darling infants, death-bed scenes of dear sons, and fraternal anxiety respecting "a very good girl," another scene of anguish over the last moments of this cannibal.

But even such a case does not represent my views or my argument. The cannibal does not belong to either sort of bad men of which I offered specimens. My chief difficulty with him is the same as with the supposed offspring of vice; his properly human nature is yet unborn, and therefore I can not say what will become—or come—of it. To count the unhatched is not wise. But suppose, instead of a Fijian, that a Colonel Chartres, or a Count Cenci, had come to the death in the attempt to ravish or seduce one's daughter—should we *then* have a general annihilation proposed, in case the culprit should finally die out?

28. "Ah, but you love happiness." (P. 415.) To this odd version of my impeachment Mr. C. replies, "Jesus loves happiness. *'For the joy that was set before him* he endured the cross,' etc. But he ought to prove his sense of this passage, lest he italicize on my side. The Greek *anti*, "for," is ambiguous, meaning not only *for the sake of*, but even more frequently *instead of*. And in the latter sense it is taken in the Peschito Syriac, Arabic, and Coptic versions, by Chrysostom, Theophylact, and other Greek interpreters, Erasmus, Luther, Calvin, Œcumenius, Wetstein, Wolff, Bretschneider, Wahl, Parkhurst, and others. They are opposed by the Ethiopic and Itala versions, by Grotius, Limbroch, Bengel, Kuinoel, Tholuck, De Wette, and others. The arguments of Wetstein and Wolff I think are not answered. Wetstein remarks that Paul never uses the word *chara* (joy) of heavenly felicity. Even Tholuck says that on doctrinal and grammatical grounds there is no objection to the view; and Phil. ii. 5-8, and John xvii. 4, would be strong parallel passages. But he, with De Wette, finds an objection in the word *prokeimenēs* ("set before") compared with its use in ver. 1; mistaking, I think, the point of comparison. Christians are exhorted to a "proposed" difficult race by the example of him who declined a "proposed" easy course.

(Matt. iv. 1-10.) Christ was certainly happy in the way he chose (John iv. 34); but no "love of happiness" made him so.

But I am already past my limits, and, leaving much unsaid to the judgment of the reader, must conclude.

29. I know that Universalists will say that if one may perish, so may another; the round number is broken, and we are left to tremble in uncertainty and apprehension. It might be so if human destiny were a game of chance, or if love to God and love to man were a lottery. The Scriptures do not so represent our case. But they do represent our duty to lay hold upon eternal life, to seek for glory and honor and immortality, to work out our own salvation with fear and trembling; not because all our names are written in the book of life and faith simply realizes the fact, but because God is our helper, working in us to will and to do of His merciful goodness, and all things working together for good to them that love Him. I can ask no more than this. If this does not move me to holy love and christian work, why should I ask to be among those who share God's own future eternity, and the heavenly offices that it brings? And I think just such a combination of glorious hope and salutary fear has ever mainly inspired the church militant, and will do so until it is triumphant. Has not Paul said as much (2 Tim. iv. 7, 8)?

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CLOSING REVIEW.

BY REV. S. COBB.

PROFESSOR HUDSON has given a brief, but sufficiently full and critical Rejoinder, to my Negative Argument on the Question of the "Utter Extinction of a Portion of Human Beings." I am glad that he has done this service, for it tests the strength of my positions, and furnishes an occasion for a succinct review of the main points in the Discussion. In this labor I will endeavor to be brief.

INTRODUCTION.

I AM pleased with the good nature in which Prof. H. takes the words in my introductory remarks, "worthy of a better cause." True, they do not pertain, necessarily, to the courtesies of debate; but when I saw before me the faithful labor which I must bestow upon a religious theory which is repugnant to my rational and moral nature, and, as I believed, and proposed to show, equally repugnant to the letter and spirit of the gospel, I was impelled to announce, repeatedly, that I made a broad distinction between the genius and spirit of my noble opponent, and the cause which he espoused.

In respect to my being "committed to a show of victory," if I have perpetrated any such feat I have done signal injustice to myself and my cause. The triumph of truth can never be achieved by false show, but only by the legitimate development of its principles. If I have, in any instance, employed a trick of words, or a sleight of hand, or a flourish of trumpets, let my opponent, or any other friend, point me out the instance by private letter, and I will make public correction, and expunge it from the book.

However, Prof. H. good-naturedly apologizes for my "confident tone," and commitment to "the show of victory," by the plea that these things were "excusable in a knight just returned from gallant encounter with the doctrine of eternal woe." I thank my friend for his kindly conceived apology; but I assure

him that I came out from the encounter with my learned and esteemed friend, Rev. Dr. Adams, with no flush of self-victory, but only with an exalted estimate of the force of truth, and a deepened consciousness of my own inability to do it justice. And in case of the discussion which is now being concluded, I desire the reader to overlook my own imperfections and give due attention to the force of the argument.

To my representation of Destructionism as being peculiarly "spiteful and barbarous," in that "it represents that the Deity will raise up countless millions of his children from the deep, unconscious sleep of death, just to torment them a while and kill them off again, and that forever," Mr. H. rejoins, that he had disclaimed the idea of a special or violent interposition on the part of God, in the final perishing of the wicked," holding that "the unrepenting sinner *destroys himself*." To this it is sufficient that I should answer, as I explained in my Preface,* and reiterated in the course of my Argument, that I did not go into this labor with the sole intent to reply to Mr. Hudson's peculiar views, wherein he differs from his school. I designed to review his own positions, and also to "overhaul," as I had expressed it and as I had been requested by numerous correspondents to do, the Destructionist theory in its popular form, in which it is met in all parts of our country. And the theory in this form I distinguished by the denominational epithet "Destructionism;" and Mr. Hudson's personal opinions offered in this discussion, when I criticised them, I ascribed directly to him.

Nevertheless, I believe that my opponent's own sentiments are obnoxious, without "caricature," to the charge which I preferred against the popular theory of Destructionism. It is often that a theorist is impelled by his high-toned moral sense to make verbal disclaimers of what his theory essentially involves. The same expedient by which he essays to soften the dogma of final destruction in its reflection upon the character of the great Father, is now in vogue with the advocates of endless punishment, for the same purpose. They say that sinners will be eternally tormented by the evil that is in themselves. But this apologetic manner of expressing that dogma does not hide from Prof. Hudson's view its moral deformity. The instrumentalities which do and shall execute punishments upon transgressors are such as God has constituted for that purpose; they are forces in the employment of his government; and it requires the same argument of utility to harmonize the execu-

* See Preface, p. iv., and Negative Argument, p. 185.

tion of any punishments, present or future, with the divine wisdom and goodness, whether administered by the legitimate action of those divinely constituted instrumentalities, or by the immediate hand of God.

But the passages of Scripture which Prof. H. himself adduces as declaring the judgment of final destruction, ascribe the execution of the threatened punishments to the agency of God. Our Father takes the responsibility of the superintendence of his creation, and the administration of his own government. He holds us responsible for our conduct, and he challenges our understanding to judge reasonably of his. (Isa. i. 8.)

True, Prof. H., as if wary of the horror which must be excited in the bosoms of God's loving children by the theory of Destructionism proper — respecting the Divine judgment in connection with the resurrection of the unjust, strives to avert that horror by verbal disclaimers. He says (p. 103), "The resurrection of the unjust, though it be *unto* condemnation, — yet may not be *for* that purpose, as if God were vindictive." But this verbal "*may not be*," has no weight against the force of the positive theory which it is designed to modify. We believe in what the Scriptures mean by the resurrection unto condemnation, and we understand it to be a clear case that the specific allotment *unto* which they are raised, is that *for* which they are raised. And, in respect to the condemnation which Prof. H. takes to be the doom of annihilation, he has not even attempted to show us any other purpose *for* which its victims shall be raised, than the doom *unto* which they are brought forth from the state of death. And, whatever may be the instrumentalities employed, they are executors of God's judgment; and whatever the judgment, it is of God; and if it be annihilation after the resurrection, my painting of it (p. 294) stands the test.

From this review of responses to my Preliminary Observations, I proceed to note Prof. Hudson's criticisms, in the numerical order in which he has arranged them, requesting the reader, in the spirit of fairness, to turn back to his numbers respectively, and read them in connection with my reviews.

1. I do not impute to my opponent the *avowal* of materialist views. I have expressly given him credit for a caste of mind which revolts from the bald materialism of the Destructionist school; but at the same time I have registered the opinion that in his demurrer to that heresy he has emphasized principles which will explode the Destructionist theory itself. But what of materialism I have ascribed to him, I have ascribed to some of his positions and arguments, not to his professions. For instance, his entire argument for Destructionism from Gen. ii. 17,

makes physical death to be the penalty announced, and this to involve utter extinction of being, beyond which there could be no more life, no more conscious being, but by the new covenant gift of grace on condition of faith and godly living. This, in relation to the whole man in his present being, I take to be materialism. True, this materialism is ignored by the "settled belief of the separate subsistence of the human soul" in all men, surviving the dissolution of the body in a conscious personal existence. And so does this "settled belief," as it appears to my understanding, ignore also that entire argument for Destructionism, long and labored, from the death penalty of sin. Let the reader turn back to the Affirmative Argument, c. iii. § 4, and he will see that the entire labor of that section is directed to the position, that physical dissolution is the penalty of the law, and that such dissolution involves the death of the whole being.

2. My remark on the substitution of annihilation for endless misery as being "a device of recent date," is explained by its connections as referring to its controversial and organized form and position. It stands in its place (see p. 150), as rather an echo of Mr. Hudson's remark preceding it, of the entrance of his theory upon the stage "lately, more than for several centuries." I do not ignore his early history of it, for I proceed in the immediate connection to give him credit for these scraps of history. And in my review of his Historical Argument, in chap. viii. of the Negative, I show how worthless, as guides to Christian truth, are those semi-Pharisaic, semi-Sadducean, and semi-heathen dogmas, propounded by converts from parties previously imbued with them.

Mr. H. claims to have shown that Destructionism appears among the early Christians before Universalism, and hence that *my* view, not *his*, is a reaction from Orthodoxy. What I have said of Destructionism being "a backing down" from Orthodoxy by the force of repulsion, was spoken with reference to its present position and relations in Christendom. Looking back into the early ages of the church, when Sadduceeism, partial Destructionism, and Endless-miserianism, prevailed outside, and were brought in with converts to contribute to the shaping of their theories under the Christian name, it is difficult to tell what was reaction and what was of independent choice. But in our time and country, Orthodoxy is the popular theory. Universalism is not a reaction from it, because it begins and ends with the opposite principles. It finds a fatherly spirit and purpose in the relations of God to man, in all the dispensations of his government, even the judicial and punitive. But

Destructionism embodies no new principle in its secession from Orthodoxy; it makes a like application of the Scriptures throughout on the subject of judgment, making punishment alike a final ruin, only grasping relief to the mind from the contemplation of the great Father as torturing his feeble children endlessly, in the thought of his killing off at last the portion that he cannot so govern as to bless. It is in this view of it that we have defined it as a backing down from Orthodoxy; and also from our general observation of the source whence come most of the members of the new sect, and the usual manner of their theological warfare. And it is to the credit of their hearts that it is so.

To the remark of Prof. H. that he thinks he has shown that *his* view appears among the early Christians long before mine, I have only to say, that though, in the little that remains of the Christian *writings* of the second century, there are found scraps bearing the belief of annihilation of earlier date than any directly stating the Universalist view, yet the ordinary expression of the principles of the gospel involved Universalism; and the fact attested by my friend himself, that, all quietly and without uproar, at an early age of the church, "more than half the Fathers of the Eastern church were Restorationists;" and that this faith was also "general in the West," — this fact, I say, seems to present a wide margin for the inference, that, all along, though circumstances did not call the explicit statement of it out upon the preserved record, this was the prevailing sentiment. I believe it was.

Speaking of my improvement of his quotation from Justin Martyr (p. 110), and my thanks for it, Mr. H. says, "But why does he not thank me for an equivalent quotation from the epistle ascribed to Barnabas fifty years earlier?" My friend fails to perceive the point I made in this case. I was aware that the doctrine of a *post mortem* judgment and retribution had entered the Christian church from its hotbeds around, before the time of Justin. But I found in the extract from Justin the first instance I had seen of a direct statement by an early Christian teacher that he had brought with him from Platonism the philosophy of its founder affirming a retributive judgment in the future world, and of substituting Christ for Minos as judge. It is reasonably, perhaps necessarily, inferrible, from the putting of Christ into the place of Minos as the after-death judge, that the New Testament descriptions of the special retributive judgments of Christ were at the same time also transferred from the events of that age to which they apply themselves, to the Platonic after-death judgment. And this is

the point that I made in the case under notice, and announced in the caption of the section,—not the origin of after-death punishment, but the “Origin of the perversion of *New Testament passages* in relation to judgment.” This quotation from Justin, more clearly than any other expressions of the early Christians I have seen, exposes the manner in which such portions of the New Testament as Matt. 25th, came first to be dragged into use in support of an after-death judgment by Jesus Christ. There may be other and earlier scraps alike direct to this point; but I have not seen them, nor would they change the fact at all, with respect to *the origin of such Scripture perversion*.

8. What Prof. H. says of his phrase fondly quoted by me, that “man was made *for immortality*,” I do not comprehend. He says it was taken from an apocryphal book, and that—

“If Mr. C. had quoted the context half as often as the expression, though his argument would not have run so smooth, he might have understood that which he fails to comprehend, as meaning ‘nothing at all,’ and which he regards as a figment of ‘the philosophies of heathenism.’”

Taken from an apocryphal book? It is from his own original expression that I quoted it. Here it is, Affirmative, chap. iv. § 1.

“Because man was made *for immortality*, there had ever been, both among Jews and Gentiles, many thoughts about it. There could have been no welcome of the coming light, if there had been no thoughts—even anxious thoughts—on the subject.”

“If he had quoted the context, his argument would not have run so smooth”? Turn back and read that section through. There is nothing there that affects the sense of the expression I have so frequently quoted, in the relation in which I used it.

“He might have understood what he fails to comprehend, ‘as meaning nothing at all’”? Is it his desire that I should now regard him as meaning “nothing at all” by his saying, that “Because man was made *for immortality*, there had ever been many thoughts about it”? And what of “the citations from the early Christian writers,” of which he deems me “singularly forgetful”? I can see no relation of those citations to his concisely stated opinion of fact under notice. I have allowed him all the liberty which he has taken or might wish to take, in respect to the question as to the conditions in the way of man’s attaining to the purpose of his creation. But I have drawn my own deduction, in argument, from the fact in the consti-

tution of man, which he recognized in his expression above. But if he wishes to withdraw that statement, and to be understood as recognizing nothing in man which indicates a design for him, by the Creator, of a higher than this earthly destiny, I pledge him the privilege,

But stay — a little further down my friend comes to acknowledge the expression above as his own, and as having a meaning. He says, "In the sense I intended, every acorn is made *for an oak*." Well, so I had understood and treated it. As the acorn contains the germ of an oak, so man, as a species, has in him the germ of the immortal being. And Mr. Hudson's opinion that the love and care of God for his intellectual and moral children, relate only to the mass, and not to the individual, as is the case with the farmer in regard to his potatoes, or his oaks, I have already shown to be utterly the opposite of the principles of the gospel. Pp. 386-7.

My friend has other speculations in this section, which I will notice, but not argue. He queries whether the immortal life shall be supported "by a continuous miracle, or by laws analogous to other life, or by an absolute gift of immortality in the outset, — so it might live if God should die." The latter clause expresses a thought not worth thinking. Nor do any of these queries about the subsistence of the immortal life appear to me any more pertinent than would be the question as to the manner of the subsistence of God. And the statement that it "is more than Mr. Cobb knows" "that there may not be a conditional life of endless years," is just as true as it is that it is more than Mr. Cobb knows that the Deity may not commit suicide. He whose office it is to teach faith in God, and to "strengthen the weak hands and confirm the feeble knees," should be careful how he weaves sophisms which tend to general doubt. Mortality and immortality are terms which, by the common consent of mankind, are used to express infinitely different facts. Mortality is that which is subject to dissolution by the action of natural laws. Immortality is that which, in its nature and constitution, is exempt from death. To define immortality as a mere stretching out of a life which may, by natural causes, be dissolved at any time, is to make it a synonym of the mortal. When God constitutes a creature immortal, he, of course, gives him a spiritual organism, comprising no self-destroying principle, and not subject to dissolution by external contacts. Then the question whether God himself has not power to destroy that immortal creature of his creation, is one of the sort which the apostle counsels us to avoid. (See 2 Tim. ii. 23.) My feeble spirit rests, satisfied, upon the assur-

ance that "neither can they (who are raised from the dead, immortal and incorruptible) die any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection."

4. This section Prof. H. devotes to my exposition of the death of which the first human pair were admonished as the penalty of transgression, as consisting in the evils which should result to their lives from this cause. (Pp. 161-6.) The reader will remember that I appeal to the subsequent judicial decision upon the law and facts, for my exposition of the penalty. And as to the criticism of my friend, that that was an early use of metaphor, it is sufficient to reply, that metaphors are much more common in rude than in lettered ages. The record of this piece of the divine administration was produced by Moses; that there is much of figure about it all allow; and he familiarly uses the terms *life*, and *good*, and *blessing*, as synonymous, — and also the terms *death*, and *evil*, and *cursing*.

Mr. H. says that if death was natural and a matter of course, "then it would be no penalty." To be sure it would not; and we have shown that it is not, as a general fact. But, man being mortal, death may be executed in a violent and unnatural manner, as a penalty for evil doing.

With regard to the announcement, "*for* dust thou art," etc., if my opponent should strike out the *for*, and the *and*, the sense would remain the same; the event of physical dissolution is predicated on the fact of the earthly constitution. Whether the first pair were informed of their mortality, before this recorded announcement, Mr. Hudson "does not know." This may have been the first occasion for its announcement. It was called for here for the purpose of defining the extent of the evil of sin. "In sorrow shalt thou eat of it *all the days of thy life*, (thus, if there is any meaning in language, describing the period of life as a natural period limited by a fixed constitution of things,)—till thou return unto the ground."

I desire the reader to reperuse my second and third chapters referred to, together with chapter one.

In respect to this deduction of man's subjection to physical dissolution from the fact of his being of earthly mould, my friend very pleasantly jogs my memory thus:—

"Finally, the passage of which Mr. C. has forgotten to give 'more particular' explanation, viz., Gen. ii. 24, may be that which explains the sentence, if it needs explaining."

The promise referred to is in these words, p. 165:—"In relation to the saying in this connection, that God drove the

man out of Eden lest he should put forth his hand, and take and eat of the tree of life and live forever, I will notice it more particularly hereafter."

This early promise of mine I did, indeed, in the absorption of my mind in the succeeding subjects of investigation, and my care to restrict the growing length of the discussion, forget to fulfil. But I can say all that needs be said in a few words here. My suggestions, however, on the passage referred to, can have nothing to do with clearing up any difficulty in the way of understanding Gen. iii. 19, above considered, for it needs no explanation. It speaks for itself; and all that I have attempted is to call attention to its own expressions.

But to the forgotten passage — Gen. iii. 24: "So he drove out the man; and he placed at the east of the garden of Eden cherubims, and a flaming sword which turned every way, to keep the way of the tree of life."

To save repetition here, I refer the reader to pp. 171–3, for a reperusal of my hieroglyphical theory of the original record of the first sin and its compensative treatment. And it will be seen that I there fulfil in part my promise to elucidate the language of Gen. iii. 24. But I intended to say, and will now say, this much more: Viewing the record as presented in hieroglyphics, how should the judgment of God against sin, as expelling the transgressor from the sweet enjoyment of innocence and virtue, be represented in such record, but by the delineation of God's angel in the act of driving him out of the garden of Eden? And how should the impracticability of a man's availing himself of the sublime enjoyment of life everlasting, or of the delicious fruit of the tree of life, while abiding in the sinful character, be strongly represented, but by the presence of the same divine messenger at his sentinel post, with a flaming sword guarding from profane intrusion the sacred tree? All this, as a hieroglyphic representation, is a beautiful expression of spiritual truth. The translation of it into words by God's inspired servant Moses makes it a divine allegory; and all the principles and facts represented in it are, in our time as well as they were in the day of Adam, living realities. There is the tree of knowledge of good and evil now; there is the serpent now; there is the yielding to delusive temptation now; there is the cherubim with his flaming sword, expelling the sinner from the delights of the garden of innocence; there are thorns and briars in the sinner's path; there is the tree of life now "in the midst of the garden of God" (Rev. ii. 7; xxii. 21), from the taste of which the dark, ungodly soul is excluded by the

flaming sword ; but to which there is free access by "faith that works by love." (Ib., and Rev. xii. 14.) This tree of life is the Christ of the gospel. "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is passed from death unto life." (John v. 24.)

Now in contrast with the harmonious truth and living reality which is exhibited and perpetuated to us in the story of the garden of Eden as a hieroglyphical record, look at the literal theory, and it is seen to merely raise, and break again forever, a bubble on the sea of matter. For, literally, there is no such garden on the earth now, — no such tree of knowledge of good and evil, — no such serpent, — no such tree of life, — no cherubim with a flaming sword. Nay, Christian reader, let that literal theory of interpretation, in the case of this garden and its incidents, go with the bubble which it raises, and take hold of living, abiding truth.

5. Prof. H. makes surprising advances with his figure of *prolepsis*. This figure is a beautiful and forcible form of expressing the inevitable result, as if it were present, of a fixed, and as yet undeveloped cause. But to resolve into *prolepsis* the common expressions of the most natural and familiar relations of living causes and concurrent experiences, is to abuse the figure and cheat ourselves. So when Prof. H., with the sanction of Mr. Winer, converts into the *prolepsis* such passages as these: "He that believeth on the Son *hath* everlasting life;" "By which also ye *are saved*;" "We which have believed *do enter* into rest;" "In whom, believing, ye *rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory*;" "We know that we *have passed* from death unto life because we love the brethren;" "You *hath he quickened* who were dead in trespasses and sins;" "Wisdom's ways *are* ways of pleasantness, and all her paths *are* peace;" — to convert, I say, all these and countless other like rich and beautiful descriptions of the living concomitants of faith and the Christian virtues, into *proleptic figures*, divorcing all this life, joy, rest, and peace, from the possession of the graces with which they are associated, is both to render unmeaning the simplest testimonies of the record, and to ignore as a lie the most rich and positive experience of the enlightened Christian. I am aware that belief in false doctrines does not give living "rest," nor "joy," nor "life," nor "salvation," nor "peace." All of the good which the devotees to such faith can contemplate is *proleptic*. But the believer in the gospel which is "full of grace and truth," *knows* the Bible descriptions above quoted of the living concomitants of faith and love, to be living, glowing truth.

I regret the haste with which my learned friend must have penned the following paragraph:—

“The metaphorical sense of *zoe aionios* is emphatically forbidden by some expressions of Christ. Think of a person entering into spiritual life ‘halt or maimed!’ The image itself is incongruous; whereas the imperfection supposed by Christ, though impossible in fact, is conceivable in thought.”

By what authority is the most familiar use of the phrase *zoe aionios*, designating the spiritual life of Christian faith and virtue, assumed to be *metaphorical*? It is a literal expression of a spiritual fact. That spiritual condition is really and truly *life*, not physical, to be sure, but spiritual,—and it is *aionion* life.

And how is the use of this phrase as descriptive of such spiritual life, “forbidden” by the words of Christ, saying that it is better to enter into that life maimed, than having two hands to be cast into Gehenna? How easy to conceive, and how real the fact, that one, in order to enter into the profession and practice of the gospel, may be obliged sometimes to sacrifice some friendship, or darling custom, or worldly advantage for the time being, which will constitute a conscious maimedness, though he enters thus into that gospel life and blessedness which is great gain. It is often so now; and it was especially so in the time of Christ’s earthly ministry. But the idea that one may enter into the immortal resurrection life, and feel there maimed in consequence of having done so worthily in this life as to cut off cherished friendships which would have caused offence, is preposterous. Mr. H. concedes that it is “impossible in fact.” Why should he force upon Christ the implication of a consequence attached to a given act which is *impossible*, when his obvious meaning involves nothing but what is possible and *true*? In relation to Christ’s declaration of “Him who is able to destroy both soul and body in Gehenna,” my friend insisted on an interpretation which should make the exposure real, and clear Christ from the charge of a false implication. So did I. Let him be consistent here.

I see nothing in my friend’s remarks on my reference to the soldier’s daily fare, in exposition of the wages (*opsonion*) of sin, in Rom. vi. 23, which calls for comment here. (See Negative, p. 178.)

6. For Mr. Hudson’s reference, under this number, to my comment on his query respecting the *incurable* nature of sin as a disease, see that comment itself, (pp. 179, 180.)

I showed (p. 277), that the term *to destroy* (*apollumi*) often

means *to lose*; and I made reference to numerous cases of the *lost* being *found, restored, etc.*, thus demonstrating that they were not annihilated, and of course that the term does not mean annihilation. Prof. H. here says, "a word will answer" this. What is that "word"? He says, "suppose the lost sheep or the lost piece of money were not found; were they not the same as out of the world?" I am disappointed to find my friend raising new issues. We are on the meaning of the word *lost*. That its familiar use in the Scriptures does not denote annihilation, nor a condition of evil from which there can be no recovery, is shown from the numerous testimonies of the *lost* being *found*. If they were not found, they would have remained in their lost estate as they were; but that would not be *annihilation*, until another event had happened, viz., irrecoverable decomposition. I see not how this can be misunderstood. Mr. H. asks, "Does a rescue from a doom change the meaning of the word?" I answer, if by "doom" he means again to divert the mind from the subject in hand by changing the issue, and substituting a provisional danger for an actual state or condition, he and our readers may settle that matter. But as it respects the real issue, the fact of a recovery from a lost condition *does* demonstrate that such lost condition was *not annihilation*. And as to the question which seems to be shadowed by queries which are put by my friend here, what of morally *lost souls* who shall never be recovered? we will duly attend to that when it shall be shown that the Saviour's mission shall fail.

7. Mr. H. had counted the Scripture expressions of the *being* of God with those of the *immortality* of man. I called attention to the fact that the *being* of man was more often recognized in the Scriptures than the *being* of God, and that too as bearing a relation to God and his moral government, which seems to *involve* the conception of his bearing the image of God's immortality. He alleges here that "Mr. C. says that the immortality of God 'is only asserted incidentally in a single case' (1 Tim. vi. 16); and he names another 'incidental expression' of it." What I said was this (p. 194), "As it respects the word itself, it occurs but once in its adjective form, and is applied to God (1 Tim. i. 17): 'Now to the King eternal, *immortal*, invisible, the only wise God.'" My friend should not have so garbled my sentence, as to make what I so explicitly said of a *word* in its *adjective form*, refer to the whole fact of immortality appertaining to the Deity.

Mr. Hudson's eighteen or twenty explicit statements of God's immortality or eternity, include, I suppose, the cases of the

application to him of the word *aion* in its different forms, which does not of its own force signify immortality or eternity, and consequently does not belong to the category of *direct expressions* to the point in hand. All his *inferential* arguments for God's immortality, from implications of much Scripture phraseology and Scripture doctrine, I admit; and I classify therewith my arguments of the same character for even the present inheritance by man of an immortal nature or principle. But my capital argument for human immortality, and interest in it, is the great gospel doctrine of the resurrection. I submit to our readers my whole "Argument for Immortality," Negative, chap. iii., for the orthodoxy of my views on this subject.

Mr. H. submits to our readers, that I "can find no equivalent in the New Testament" for my estimate of "immortal life and good as the hereafter inheritance of man," as the crowning subject of the gospel revelation. I am pleased with the court of appeal to which he has chosen to refer this matter; for a recollection, or a reperusal of the New Testament will satisfactorily evince to them that "Jesus and the resurrection" was the burden of the apostolic ministry; and that the ministry of the "hope of the resurrection of the dead" was the prominent occasion for the apostles being "called in question." I am aware, however, that the rank which different minds accord to the hope of immortality will be in the ratio of their estimate of that inheritance. Joseph Barker, for instance, to whom my friend refers in his advance Argument (p. 143), as preferring not to live again, must be far from estimating the revealments of "immortal life and good" as the *crowning* glory of the gospel. But I do not think that our readers generally are of his taste, especially those who, in what progress they have made in their explorations of the riches of the knowledge and love of God, have come to feel as Newton felt in relation to scientific research, to be as a little child picking up pebbles on the shore of the boundless ocean of knowledge.

Mr. H. says my "*mirabile dictu*" has an answer in Rom. ii. 7. The blessedness which, under the reign or judgment of Christ, is made to be the portion of those who seek for incorruptness of faith and moral principle, does not wipe out the *mirabile dictu* of the hypothesis, which represents that God suspended infinite consequences upon the present conduct of the generations of men, "and withheld from them the information of the tremendous hazard." As to my friend's connecting *opinion* with conduct as a condition of immortal life, I have understood him to make the true *faith* a condition, as it is of the spiritual life much accounted of in the Bible, — and *faith* involves *opinion*.

Relating to the comparative Scripture treatment of the immortality of God and the immortality of man, Prof. H. now says :—

“I challenged the discovery of any mention in the Scriptures, not of the technical immortality of the soul (which was Prof. Barrows’ mistake,) but of any immortality of mankind, in proper, natural, and general terms. The reader will say whether the passage has been found.”

Does my friend suppose that his ingenious device of words can blind the reader to the real issue in this discussion? I was perfectly well read in the Destructionists’ familiar fort in their warfare with Orthodoxy. They have challenged direct Scripture proof of the Orthodox theory of man’s possessing an immortal soul in the technical sense. Dr. Litch wore away nearly all the four evenings’ debate with Elder Grant in this vain effort. And I perceived that Prof. Hudson was laying his train to draw me into the same effort, and make this the main issue in our discussion. Accordingly, to prevent misunderstanding, and place our affairs in a proper attitude, I said in the opening of the discussion, p. 169 :—

“One thing more we may as well say at this stage of the discussion, that is, that Prof. Hudson has devoted considerable space to the controversy on the immortality of the soul as a distinct entity or separate person in man, and on the silence of the Bible in respect to the proper immortality of man as at present constituted, which would be in place in a discussion with a representative of Orthodoxy, but has no use in a discussion between him and us. There is no principle of Universalism which is suspended on a metaphysical determination of this question. We have no occasion for subjecting the soul to any chemical analysis to test its constituent properties; nor have we a dissecting knife by which to separate, for distinct inspection, soul from body, and spirit from soul. We shall, after the manner of the Scriptures, treat man *as man*, possessed of a compound nature, in his higher nature made after the image of God, now in a mortal state and constitution, and to be raised in an immortal state and constitution. Mr. Hudson’s concession that “man is made *for* immortality,” is sufficient for us; for out of it we can show all the present immortality in our race that is essential to our faith, and he and I will differ only on the question whether man will prove to be that for which he was made, or whether creation will prove a failure.”

The reader perceives hence that the main question at issue

in this controversy, is the heirship or destiny of mankind as a race, to a resurrection life, immortal and glorious. And all my argument from the philosophy of mind, and from the Scriptures, by way of inference, for man's present possession of an immortal nature, or of a spirit which shall survive physical dissolution and rise into the higher life through a spiritual organism, was designed to stay the reader's mind from a plunge into the slough of materialism, and to exhibit the proper dignity of man as God's child, bearing his image, and a proper subject of the gospel covenant of life immortal. So then, all the proof which I have adduced, of the heirship of mankind to a future immortal life by a resurrection from the dead, is to the point, and goes to establish my position on the subject in question. And now let the reader turn back and reperuse my argument on this subject, running through my entire third chapter above referred to, particularly pp. 234-264,—and then judge whether the following words of my opponent's rejoinder are not decidedly cool; to wit, "The reader will say whether the passage has been found;"—that is, the passage which testifies to the doctrine of human immortality in the light of Jesus and the resurrection. For this is the main point, definitively stated, at issue between us.

But you will say that he penned those closing words of the above sentence, in connection with language by which he intended to involve the reader's mind in the idea of man's present possession of personal immortality, as the thing not proved, and the point at issue. Then of course he intended by a sleight of words, to mislead the reader by changing the issue. But he is above the intentional practice of duplicity. His own mind appears to be in a transition state on the subject of man's spiritual and immortal nature. As I remarked, pp. 169-170, he is alternating between the theory that the whole man dies like the brute, at physical death, and that of his possession of a soul or spirit which survives the death of the body, in a conscious personal being. And this latter view, which he more distinctly asserts in his "Rejoinder," most fully concedes all that I have argued in respect to man's higher nature, in which consists God's image, and which shall be clothed upon with a spiritual body in the resurrection. And even by the philosophical argument, when it is admitted that there is a spirit in man, which, as a conscious being, survives the death of the body, such spirit being of a nature not subject to any known law of decay, the presumption is that it is immortal. If any one assumes that it is not immortal, the burden of proof is with him. But this philosophical presumption is established as a doctrine of enlight-

ened faith and steadfast hope, by the gospel assurance of the universal resurrection. This I have made, all along, my main position, my strong fortress, my ultimate appeal. And the reader will not suffer his mind, by any feat of words, to be diverted from this essential position, in which culminates the whole negative argument of this discussion. And furthermore, as it respects any further "death" or "destruction," beyond the destruction of death in the universal victory of the resurrection life, "the reader will say whether the proof has been found."

8. My *guess* that Mr. H. included Matt. xxiv. 13, and Acts xvi. 30, in a class of texts referred to but not designated, proves to be incorrect. Very well.

9. In respect to Mr. Hudson's numerous references, by figures, to passages showing the "general tone" of the Scriptures on *zoe aionios*, he did expect that I should offer something of the kind on my side. I had no occasion for it. His references were as good for me as a reprint would have been. I presented our readers with the just rule for judging of the sense of the phrase by its use in each case, and showed that its most familiar use, and its use in all cases where it is explained, applies it to the spiritual life of faith and love. (See Negative, chap. v.)

My friend couples my quotations which signalize Christ as the "head of every man," with his saying, "Every branch in me that beareth not fruit," etc. The design of this coupling is to annihilate whatever argument I have drawn or might draw from the proper "Headship" of Jesus, for the universality of his love and mission of grace, and the ultimate perfection of his body in the perfection and glory of all its members. But the two passages relate to different subjects, and are uttered with different bearings in point of doctrine. When Paul speaks of Christ as the "head of every man," he treats of the constituted relation in the gospel economy, between Christ and the whole humanity, unto which he likens the relation of the man to his wife. And with regard to the ultimate and practical development of this relation, in the harmonious subordination and sympathetic action of all the body, the same apostle says of our Head: "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name that is above every name, that at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, . . . and every tongue confess that Jesus Christ is Lord to the glory of God the Father." (Phil. ii. 10.) But the other passage quoted by Mr. H., has reference to the exclusion from the life of his gospel kingdom of false professors among his disciples.

I perceive that I unwittingly, quoting in haste from memory, substituted, in my newspaper copy, the word *man* for *us*, in the first clause of Rom. xiv. 7. The whole verse reads, "For none of us liveth to himself, and no man dieth to himself." It is true that the original is more literally rendered, by reading the last clause of the verse, "and none dieth unto himself." But the sense is general of mankind, as our translators understood it. For the apostle proceeds to say, "For to this end Christ both died, and rose, and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and the living." And this universal Lordship, or ownership and authority, shall be universally acknowledged, when that shall be fulfilled above quoted from Phil. ii. 10.

10. Here Mr. H. adds a few words on the idea of his, which I reviewed in the Negative, chap. iii., sec. ii., No. 4; viz., that the promised destruction of death will be fulfilled in the fact of millions of our race remaining eternally in the state of death. It was my business to show that all death will be destroyed, not by eternally abiding, but by the "victory" of the opposite principle of life. I cheerfully join my friend in submitting the exegesis to the judgment of the reader.

What does Mr. H. mean by the unexplained reference in this place to Rev. xx. 15, and xvii. 8? Is it his opinion that all who, in his sense of the word, are to be saved, were elected, and recorded in the Lamb's book of life, literally, before the foundation of the world, so that "the number cannot be increased or diminished," and that for the rest, whose names were not there written, there was and is no chance, no possibility of salvation? If he means this, there is need of his writing a large volume in explanation of its harmony with his theory of human independent free will, and the universal provision, and offer, and opportunity of salvation. When he shall have done this, I may see cause to adopt his theory. But I can see no adaptedness of this quotation to the question in hand, relating to the sense in which death shall be destroyed. As this is the introduction of a new matter, and I am cramped for space, I will only say here by way of explaining what it devolved upon my opponent to explain, that the being written in the book of life from the foundation of the world does not in this case refer to the original purpose of God's love in Christ Jesus for the ultimate reconciliation, for this purpose embraces all rational beings. (See Negative, pp. 227-231.) And the language of this very verse forbids its application to that original purpose of Messiah's mission. For here it is said that "They that dwell on the earth shall wonder, whose names are not written," etc. And Rev. xiii. 8: "*And all that dwell on the earth shall wor-*

ship him, whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world." From this language it is made evident that the being written in the Lamb's book of life denotes merely an enrolment among his then present disciples. For all that dwelt on the earth besides these, are represented as participating in the worship of the beast. But surely my opponent will not assume, that of all who dwelt on the earth besides those who *then* worshipped the Lamb, none could be subsequently brought in and saved. Then this unexplained quotation has no application to any matter of controversy between him and me. The reference is probably to the roll of an army, containing the names of contestants in war. As far as I have had opportunity to examine, the commentators, except the rigid Calvinists, pass over the phrase, "before the foundation of the world," without particular comment. It is symbolical, and *may* have reference to the antiquity and Divine original of the cause in which they were enlisted. But my Arminian friend may explain it for himself.

Rev. vii. 9-17, to which he makes reference as ignoring my view that Christ's mission will not be a failure, as it describes St. John's vision under the sixth seal, is not a description of the final consummation of the Saviour's reign, and hence fails of answering his purpose. The same may be said of his reference to the popular description of changes in God's visible providence, by the ascription of *repentance* to the Deity,—and to God's dealing with men as moral beings. Will Professor H. distinctly plant himself upon the position that God has actually changed his mind, and become pained with regret that he entered upon the work of his superior creation? If, in throwing in these Scripture phrases promiscuously, he had explained his own understanding of the sense in which they should be taken, he would have afforded us a clearer view of his object in adducing them. Yet I do not accuse him of a design to confuse the reader. He could not mean that. What may, in some cases, bear that appearance, is ascribable to an acquired habit of disposing of matters by instalments of verbal quotations, without analysis. In support of an essential point in a grave discussion, to quote, without explanation, a class of passages which, in the judgment of all commentators, need judicious explanation, is not, as my friend will see upon review, the true way of progress.

Prof. H. says, "My friend's appeal to my fraternal affection strikes me as quite in the Universalist vein; but it is not well put. I have never said that 'very good girls will be annihilated.'" I have endeavored to understand my opponent, and to avoid misrepresentation. I have understood and do under-

stand him, to hold that all men since the "fall" (?) are born without an immortal nature, soul, or spirit; and that immortality is a thing to be *acquired*, by faith, or virtue, or both; and of course that there is an exact degree, or line of demarcation, this side, i.e., the natural side, of which, all are wholly mortal and subjects of ultimate annihilation,—and beyond, or on the Christian side of which, all shall inherit the immortal blessing. So critical, so eminent, and so doubtful, does he make this work of achievement, that he represents St. Paul as laboring with great solicitude, that he might *by some means* attain to it. So he applies, erroneously, as I believe,* Phil. iii. 11. Upon this general theory, I cannot understand, nor has he attempted to show, how any who die in childhood can attain to immortal life. Indeed, he even expresses doubt, on his own part, as to this matter.† And I submit to the judgment of the reader, whether the hypothesis I presented of the very good girl's "dying out," is not a fair representation of millions of probable cases, upon that general theory.

As it respects the "Universalist vein," we are proud that our theory of Christian faith does not impose upon us that struggle against our loveliest moral feelings, which, if successful, would reduce us to the grade that St. Paul deprecates, Rom. i. 31:—"Without natural affection." But my friend, in the usual way of the opposition in such cases, diverts our minds, as if to freeze our sympathies, to the supposition of his sister being a Lady Macbeth, or some other vile character. Does he not know that no true parent can ever love a child the less for his making himself miserable by yielding to evil temptations? Does he not know that the love which is peculiarly manifested in the gospel, and inspires the human heart *by* the gospel, is love to sinners? This habit, therefore, of getting up extreme cases of sin to freeze our sympathy into indifference, is a species of warfare against the spirit of the gospel. The breathing of the Holy Spirit into our hearts inspires us to sing:—

"Thus, in the universe of mind,
Is felt the law of love;
The charity both strong and kind,
For all that live and move.

In this fine sympathetic chain
All creatures bear a part;
Their every pleasure, every pain,
Linked to the feeling heart.

* See Adams' and Cobb's Discussion, pp. 326-331.

† See Affirmative, pp. 378-9.

More perfect bond, the Christian plan
 Attaches soul to soul;
 Our neighbor is the suffering man,
 Though at the farthest pole."

11. The reader will please turn back and run his eye over No. 11 of my opponent's Rejoinder, and then yet back to my Negative Argument, pp. 261-2, and read with care. That is all.

12. In respect to the disgusting meanness which I charge my friend's construction of 1 Cor. xv. with virtually imputing to the Corinthian Christians, he here rejoins:—

"I hardly need reply that if I have pictured the Corinthians as caring only for some 'half-dozen' of their friends and not for all God's people, or even as 'loving the brethren' all the world over and not caring for every vicious, scoffing, and persecuting heathen, I plead guilty and ask forgiveness."

With regard to the phrase, "the half-dozen of their friends of the Christian party who had died," every reader understands it to have been used as the figure of *hyperbole*. And I perceive on review that my friend's position justifies it. He was urging, as one of his expedients for making the resurrection of this entire chapter to be "partitive," that "the subjects of discourse were those who had 'fallen asleep in Christ.'" And he adds, "It was doubt respecting *their* destiny that troubled the Corinthian Christians." I am yet unable to understand what my friend could have meant by this language, but that the occasion of this sublime discourse of Paul on the resurrection was the trouble of the Christian Corinthians about the deceased of their friends of the Christian class or party, whose number must then have been small,—and that all this magnificent testimony must be narrowed down, by construction, to an application to this numerically diminutive class. Yet he need not "ask forgiveness;" for he honestly loves his theology; and it was a masterly enterprise to undertake the task of cramping this stupendous apostolic message within the compass of that theology.

Concerning the word "partitive," I am aware that, in grammar, it signifies "distributive." But, applied to God's purpose of grace for mankind, as the opposite of *universal*, it of course refers to what I meant by a party.

With regard to the "truism" which I allege that my friend's construction charges upon Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 18,—if the premise was *the resurrection of the dead* in general, then to remind the doubting Corinthians that their denial of the doctrine involved the falseness of the hope of their brethren who had died in the faith of Christ, was the making of a good syllogism. But

if the doctrine which Paul had preached to that church was that of the resurrection of *some men* only, and those such as had died or should die in the faith of Christ, then of course it was understood that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection was that merely of the resurrection of *some dead persons*; viz., those who died in the faith of Christ. And this would make the argument to read, "If there is no such resurrection as I have preached to you, that is, of those who have fallen asleep in Christ, then they who have fallen asleep in Christ are perished." This appears to me a truism; but my friend thinks otherwise, and doctors have a right to disagree. But our enlightened readers will judge for themselves whether the argument of the apostle involves the resurrection of *Christians* in the doctrine of the resurrection of *Christians*,—or whether it does not, on the contrary, involve the resurrection of *Christians* in the doctrine of the resurrection of the *human race*.

My friend asks, "Has Mr. C. told us how these deceased would have 'perished' in the case supposed?" He seems to have overlooked my paraphrase of the idea in these words, "that is, they were martyrs to a falsehood, and they and their faith are all as nothing." (Negative, pp. 252-3.) The language of the apostle in question involves the idea which I have all along presented as the predominant idea in my mind, that the resurrection is a progressive work. "If the dead *rise* not, then they also which are fallen asleep in Christ *are perished*." This implies the idea that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection involves the existence of an immortal principle or spirit in man, which perishes not with the dissolution of the body, but rises into a higher life, clothed upon with a spiritual body (2 Cor. ~~v. 3~~ 4), and that *this is the resurrection*. So then, if there is no resurrection of the dead, Destructionism is true, and the dead, even those who died in the faith of Christ, *are perished*. Ah, but that *if*—that IF the dead rise not—does not belong to the *Christian theory*. God be praised!

13. In the argument on Matt. x. 28, Mr. H., admitting for argument's sake that it contained no allusion to punishment after death, "challenged the proof that it would not still describe annihilation." This admission was of course the admission, *for argument's sake*, of my interpretation of the passage, as denoting temporal destruction by special judgment,—that is, as the farthest result implied, physical death. In answer to this demand for proof that even upon this admission the destruction is not annihilation, I put in the testimony of the universal resurrection, beyond physical death, of all the posterity of Adam (1 Cor. xv. 22), "the just and unjust." As he has

not shown that those "temporally" * destroyed Jews were not included in the class denominated "the unjust," my answer meets his demand.

The fact was brought into full notice by Mr. H., and duly and respectfully recognized on my part, that several able Universalist theologians have taken the phrase in question to be a hypothetical expression of the idea of annihilation, as being within the power of God to execute, but not in his will, — a manner of expression similar to the saying, "God is able of these stones to raise up children to Abraham." Accordingly, his recalling of that fact in this place gives us no new light on the subject.

For my view of the sense in which men were *not able* to inflict upon the disciples, if they remained true and steadfast, the evils which they should suffer by the judgment of God if they apostatized, I earnestly solicit a careful and discriminating reperusal of my argument, pp. 266–271, and *especially* of the Adams and Cobb Discussion, pp. 174–181.

14. For my friend's collection of the names of several commentators, and reference to others, for and against the metaphorical sense of John v. 28, 29, he has my thanks.

Mr. H., admitting, at least for argument's sake, that John v. 28, 29, and Dan. xii. 2, are parallels, adds, — "but Dan. xii. 2, is referred to the final resurrection, I think by more writers than Job xix. 25, 26, which is one of Mr. Cobb's proofs of man's immortality." I have no doubt of this. But the words of Daniel, assigning the event to the time of which he gives a description, which is copied by Jesus (Matt. xxiv. 21), and assigned to the judgment of that generation, are of more account to me than the necessitated "travail in pain" of a thousand devotees of regal theologies.

To illustrate the difference between a free and scholarly Scripture exegesis and a bounden theological interpretation, I will instance a single fact. At the time when Millerism was raging in this vicinity, which made Dan. xii. a data from which to cipher out much of its reckoning upon the immediate dissolution of the world, Rev. Mr. Colver, a learned Baptist clergyman then officiating in Tremont Temple, delivered and published two sermons on this chapter of Daniel, and gave it precisely the Universalist exposition. I presume that he had never read the Universalist exposition of this chapter; but when his mind was freed from its controlling reverence of the old interpretation by seeing the injurious abuse of it, he could

* See Affirmative, p. 82.

read off its true sense from the prophet's own language, viewed in the light of the Scripture collaterals. And I religiously believe, that every man of fair intellect and respectable education, my esteemed opponent not excepted, if his mind could become divested of all pre-occupancy of creed or predilection, and he would take up all the prominent Scripture passages which are contested in the Universalist controversy, and study them as he does an important passage in any book of literature or science, he would come out, substantially, with the Universalist expositions. Reperuse the Negative, c. 3, § 2, No. 3, and the Adams and Cobb Discussion, pp. 331-347.

15. I appreciate the candor of this paragraph of the Rejoinder. But the *opinions* of Meyer and De Wette, though both were Universalists, do not weigh so much with me as the *argument* on the resurrection which Paul was striving to obtain, presented in the above-cited Discussion, pp. 226-231.

16. I should have been happy to see the *asthma* removed from my friend's exegesis of Heb. vi. 4-6; but it appears to remain. His definitions of the terms *rudiments* and *foundation* are correct, as meaning *first principles* and *fundamentals*. But he is not correct in ignoring the relation of these words, as qualifying forces, to the succeeding context. The apostle does propose to pass on from whatever is meant by these terms, to something more perfect in its adaptation to the work proposed. And as a reason for this he mentions the great difficulty there is in renewing those who had fallen away from the Christian profession, or from the interests of the Christian life, notwithstanding their familiarity with those rudiments.

My friend fails to appreciate the argument from this relation of the text and context. He says, —

“Does Mr. C. mean that when these (the rudiments) are denied, the secondary principles and superstructure, which complete and ‘perfect’ the Christian scheme, may still accomplish the ‘impossible’ or difficult work?”

In answer to this question, I will remark, that every system has its distinguishing fundamentals, the propounding of which is the first business of its teachers, and the leading method of making converts. But, when these first principles have become familiar with the convert, the maintenance of his interest in them, and especially the recovery of a waning interest, requires the development of those principles in their extended bearings, and relations, and productive powers to good. The perpetual reiteration of those same first principles is not sufficient.

But my friend says, —

“Will the strong meat, which only those of full age can digest, renew unto life in the third *aion* those who loathed and rejected pure milk in the second *aion*? My friend certainly does not intend to invert the natural order of building, or to ascribe to the more recondite principles of Christian truth a power which has been exhausted by apostasy from its first and obvious principles.”

“*The natural order of building.*” So my friend conceives it to be the natural order of building, to first put up the ceiling, the papering, the painting, the beautiful and comfortable finish which shall make the structure a desirable and interesting habitation, and then go at work putting up the frame, and, last of all, laying the foundation. If that is really the natural order of building, I confess to having perverted it.

But Prof. H. puts me in the way of correcting such important mistakes. He says my “mistake may be corrected by consulting any good commentary.” Duly appreciating his kindness in prescribing this felicitous rule for gaining knowledge, I have to say that I should as soon think of lighting a taper to enable me to see the light of the midday sun, as going to a commentator to learn the meaning of the simplest sentence of the sacred record. But, though my time is precious, out of mere respect to my friend I take up Clarke, which is lying at my elbow, and from him I read as follows : —

“*Leaving the first principles of the doctrine of Christ.*] Ceasing to continue in the state of *babes* who must be fed with *milk*, with the *lowest* doctrines of the gospel; when ye should be capable of understanding the *highest*.

“*Let us go on to perfection.*] Let us never rest till we are *adult Christians*,” etc.

Then I open, *to the place*, the commentary of Dr. Scott, which readeth thus : —

“The apostle here proposed, to lead the Hebrews into a fuller acquaintance with the deep mysteries of redemption of which he had spoken, and thus to ‘go on unto perfection.’ In order to do this, he would leave ‘the principles,’ the elements, of ‘the doctrine of Christ.’”

So these commentators, as all other “good commentators” must, hold the same “order of building,” into which both building experience and the apostolic instruction have led my mind, beginning at the first principles, and going on to perfection.

And every well qualified Christian teacher finds it so, that, in order to continue and increase the interest and improvements of believers, and *especially* in order to revive the cold and inert, he must go on from the first principles and exemplify the sublime doctrines of the gospel in their ten thousand bearings upon the wants of the soul and the interests of life, and their harmony with all that is beautiful and good in earth and heaven.

True, the Orthodox commentators do not take the responsibility of countenancing me in continuing the relation of the first verse of this chapter, through to the fourth, which expresses the difficulty of renewing again to repentance those who had fallen away from the interests of the *rudiments*. I only speak a faithful truth when I say, that they wanted and needed this latter verse for a theological purpose which required the dis-severing of the connection. But it is sufficient to me that the apostle himself preserves the connection, both by the train of thought, and the use of the conjunction *for*, or *because*.

Mr. H. mistakes me in his presumption that I take the expressions, "leaving the principles," and "going on to perfection," "as referring to the Christian life, and not to the division and discussion of the subject." I have taken the expressions to refer to further elucidations and developments of Christian truth in its extended bearings, and *any* Christian means for the renewal and increase of religious interest and growth. But the apostle had not confidence in the efficiency of *any* gospel instrumentality in human hands for the *general* recovery of the characters described in verse fourth, the work was so extremely difficult. He seems, by the figure which he proceeds to apply, to indicate the probability that a severe judgment would be brought in requisition in their case. To this point he says, —

"For the earth which drinketh in the rain that cometh oft upon it, and bringeth forth herbs meet for them by whom it is dressed, receiveth blessing from God: but that which beareth thorns and briers *is* rejected, and *is* nigh unto cursing; whose end *is* to be burned." Vs. 7, 8.

This figure, describing the judgment to which apostates, unreformed, would be subjected, gives no countenance to either annihilation or endless punishment. The thorny land is not burned to its destruction or final injury. It is burned by the husbandman that the useless and cumbersome thorns and briars may be consumed, and the land be made productive of useful grains and grasses. It is a good representation of God's disciplinary judgments.

17. Prof. H. refers again to Heb. x. 26, 27; and, as I can-

not conceive of him as intending to disconcert the minds of our readers by the flourish of words without definite aim, I must understand him as withdrawing what I had taken him as granting; viz., that this "judgment and fiery indignation" referred to "the destruction of Jerusalem." He now says,—

"Mr. C. thinks that verse twenty-five confirms all that I was 'granting.' Let him compare that verse with all the parallel passages, and ask whether Paul expected a future resurrection as the beginning of an eternal state; and if so, when?"

The reader will see by turning to the passage, that in the verse here referred to, the apostle offers, as the special reason for the watchfulness which he urged, and the social meetings for mutual counsel and exhortation, the fact that *they then saw the day approaching* for the judgment for which they should be prepared. And now my friend asks me to compare this with parallel passages, and consider whether Paul expected a future resurrection as the beginning of an eternal state,—and if so, when? Did he imagine that he could induce me to drop the subject in hand and run away on such an errand as this? The other "book" which that discussion would make would have nothing to do with the point before us. Since Paul spoke of a judgment which was then at hand, and the event often described in the same language did then "shortly come to pass," but such a resurrection as my friend speaks of did *not* then take place, I am surprised that he should, so entirely without cause, impute to St. Paul a meaning which would convict him of ignorance of his subject, and give aid and comfort to the anti-Bible school. I perceive that Orthodox commentators generally take this passage as referring to the destruction of Jerusalem.

On the phrase, "there *remaineth* no more sacrifice for sins," see again my exposition, Negative, c. 5, § 3. On the question, "whether Mr. C.'s exposition saves the apostate," I have only to answer, that, as the passage is shown to mean nothing against his ultimate salvation, this question is irrelevant. Let the question be substituted,—"Has Christ failed?"

18. The "fact" which I referred to as having been brought forward by Mr. H. without dissent, averring it to be the general opinion of commentators that the "sin unto death" is a sin incurring the death penalty, I find on review to be in a quotation made by him from Mr. Balfour, Affirmative, p. 89. I referred to it by memory, and committed a slight mistake. The *general admission* affirmed by Mr. Balfour, as quoted by Mr. Hudson, is "that temporal death was the punishment of crimes under the old dispensation;" and this Mr. Balfour takes to be

"the irremissible penalty in either age." I am happy to correct the mistake. But the matter of my surprise is, that my learned friend should repeatedly adduce a passage as direct proof in this controversy, without attempting a Scriptural reason, in a sense which he knows is inadmissible with the Universalist, and is disputed by eminent Orthodox critics. Dr. Clarke, than whom none is more learned in Talmudic, Rabbinical and theological lore, having canvassed all the commentators on this "sin unto death," sums up all the opinions which he deems worthy of special notice under three classifications, all of which refer it to temporal death in one form or another. And Clarke, in addition to the commentators conceded by Mr. H., favors the opinion that it is the legal penalty of temporal death. But if it is taken to be an incurable disease, the pertinency of my remarks is equally sustained. For the idea is, that, in a public or social prayer, to pray for what is, in the nature of the case, known to be impossible, is an impropriety. When praying, in the family, over a dying person, to ask for his recovery would be shocking to all present.

Mr. H. says, "there is a strong Universalist objection" to our construing this as temporal death. He refers to our general opposition to capital punishment, in accordance with which sentiment he thinks we should pray "for the life of capital offenders." Here, also, he fails to appreciate the argument. If we are opposed to capital punishment, we will pray that the people may change their law. But, under the law as it is, to go upon the gallows with the felon arrayed for execution, and pray God to release him, would be praying for a miraculous interposition, without faith, and, of course, a sin. But who will say that the clergyman may not pray God, and that *in faith* if he have the *Christian* faith, to have mercy on the sinner's soul.

19. The word *aphtharsia* is recalled. Mr. H. says "it never means moral incorruptness, according to Passow, Schleusner, Bretschneider, Wahl, and Robinson." This manner of stating the case is likely to mislead the unlearned. They would understand from it that these lexicographers *reject* the moral use of it. This they could not do. When a lexicographer omits the carrying out of his general definitions into all the particular uses of the word in hand, it does not imply that he ignores them. The literal and general definition of *aphtharsia*, is *incorruption, incorruptibility*. If the lexicon said nothing more, common sense would expect to find the word, in use, applied indifferently to *things* or *principles*, just as the subject might be. And so it is. Parkhurst gives the following as his second

definition:—“*incorruptness in a moral or spiritual sense, freedom from corrupt doctrines or designs.*” Schrevelius defines thus:—“*Aphtharsia*,—*immortalitas, incorruptibilitas.*” The Latin *incorruptibilitas*, signifies, “1, Incorrupt, pure, sincere, entire,” etc. “2, Who will not be bribed, or corrupted.” And Robinson, whom Mr. H. enumerates with those according to whom *aphtharsia* “never means moral incorruptness,” does define it as used, “tropically,” for “incorruptness, sincerity,” and refers to Eph. vi. 24, as an instance of its use in this sense.

My friend says that “‘Glory, honor, and moral purity,’ would be an anti-climax.” So might he reckon “Glory, honor,” an anti-climax, implying that one may have glory before he has honor. But the *moral incorruptness*, as it stands in Paul, makes the true climax. The idea may be expressed in this paraphrase: “They who seek for that *glory and honor* which are concomitants of *incorruptible faith and virtue*, shall have aionion life.” And to the closing question of this No. 19, I will only answer, that there is an infinite difference between making the enjoyment of aionion life to require the possession of the living faith of which it is the concomitant, and making the *immortal existence* depend on our present labor.

I had almost forgotten to say, that I *need not mend my Greek*. The Greek Mss. from which the reading came that I quoted, have the word *aphtharsia*, in Titus ii. 7. But Griesbach has *adiaphtharia*, as Mr. H. informs us. We will not differ from Griesbach. The choice of Ms. for the reading of this word in Titus does not affect the sense of Rom. ii. 7; neither does the want of the latter passage by a thousand Orthodox theologians, for aid of their dogma of infinite rewards and punishments for present doings.

Since writing the above I have discovered that Prof. Hudson himself quoted from the same Greek version with me (of Tit. ii. 7), in his Affirmative Argument, p. 69. But now he prefers Griesbach's version; yet I am not certain that it “mends his Greek.”

My friend has repeatedly admonished me that my definition of *aphtharsia*, in Rom. ii. 7, will lose unto me the testimony of 2 Tim. i. 10, as denoting the revealment of immortal life. Not at all. I am perfectly aware that the Greek word for immortality in the phrase, “brought life and immortality to light through the gospel,” is not *athanatia*, which literally means *immortality*, but *aphtharsia*, the same as in Rom. ii. 7, which means incorruptness, or incorruption. The *life* brought to light through the gospel is obviously the resurrection life, and the apostle's adding the word *incorruption* as descriptive of the

quality of that life leaves no leanness in the subject of Christian hope. (See Adams' and Cobb's Discussion, pp. 143-4.

20. In regard to the *Targums*, I need not repeat what I said in my Negative Argument, pp. 268-9, referring also to the Adams Discussion, pp. 150-1. Mr. H. reiterates his assumption that the Targum of Jonathan Ben Uzziel was written a short time before the birth of Christ. But he gives us no good reason for differing from the learned authorities to which I referred in the passages designated above. He appeals to Gesenius as on his side, but Rev. Dr. Ballou, President of Tufts' College, who is an indefatigable, thorough, and discriminating student of ecclesiastical history, says, "Notwithstanding Gesenius advocates the earlier date of these Targums (Onkelos and Jonathan), I see that other German critics *continue* to assign them to a later." (Uni. Ex. v. 3, p. 433, note.) The reasons offered for the assignment of these Targums to a date so late as the third century have not been overcome. Therefore my friend is yet in labor to conjure the flow of the "wolfish stream" in a backward, up-hill direction, in order to make it modify the language of the Apocalypse. And, as I showed in the argument, if he had found the phraseology which he quotes on the *second death*, in a Jewish commentary of date anterior to that of the Apocalypse, it would avail him nothing, since St. John's visions were generally reproductions of those of the ancient prophets, especially of Ezekiel and Daniel, and *not* copies of the Jewish commentaries or "traditions," which Jesus had condemned as not only unauthorized by the law and the prophets, but as *making them void*. So if Onkelos had been extant (which he was not) in the time of John, with his heathenish perversion of Scripture language and fiendish doctrine of a "second death," John did not adopt him; for, having described a temporal national judgment, he says emphatically, "*this* is the second death." (See Negative Argument, pp. 272-6.)

Prof. H. says—"Mr. C. thinks that Tholuck would be found ignorant of the Universalist exegesis of Matt. xxv." I did not say this. I risked "my reputation for common sense" on the opinion, that "Prof. Tholuck has never investigated the *Scripture teachings* on the subject of judgment and retribution, nor critically studied the subject and bearings throughout of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth chapters of Matthew." I yet stand that risk.

In reply to my friend's remark that he suspects "Prof. Tholuck would ignore the Universalist exegesis of *zoe aionios*," I have to say that I am confident he would not, and does not, in its usual application to the fruit of Christian faith. If we should

find that he does, he would fall, in our estimation, far below the grade we think he occupies as a theologian and biblical critic.

But as it respects the *kolasin aionion* as the antithesis of *zoen aionion*, in Matt. xxv. 46, Prof. Tholuck's exegetical argument for its meaning *endless punishment*, starts upon the back of the assumption that the passage declares the sentence of a *final judgment at the opening of the scenes of eternity*. His exegesis here is precisely the popular Orthodox exegesis, viz.,—that as the *zoen aionion* expresses the final and endless reward of the righteous, the *kolasin aionion*, set over against it, must be taken to describe the final and endless punishment of the wicked.

But this bold leap, with *kolasin aionion*, into the *infinite*, is taken from an utterly false assumption. If my opponent, or any other man, accuses me in his thoughts of temerity in this confident tone of expression, my answer is, that my patience is severely tried with the learned *aionion* play around, and trifling with, this portion of the Master's teachings. My learned friend may count commentators by the hundred who apply it to final human destiny; but when he has adduced the first one, the other ninety-nine add nothing,—for the multiplied Orthodox commentaries are only multiplied reproductions of the same thing. I have never seen the Orthodox clergyman now ministering in East Boston; but I know just as well how he would, not explain, but apply, Matt. xxv. 46, as I should know were I to ask him, and he to answer me. And when I should have got his application, if I should call upon the ten thousand clergymen of the same school in our country, they would all give me the same thing. But nothing would be added to the weight of my neighbor's recitation, by the repetition of it by the other nine thousand nine hundred and ninety-nine.

But Prof. Hudson, in classical education and ecclesiastical historical research, is scarcely behind any of the commentators he quotes. Let him, then, lay aside the commentators a while, and take up the discourse of Christ delivered to his disciples on the Mount of Olives, and recorded in Matt. 24th and 25th, Mark 13th, and Luke 21st; let him compare these three records of the same discourse, and other passages which speak of the coming of the Son of man in his kingdom and glory; and let him follow Prof. Stuart's exegesis of it through the whole of Matt. 24th, and along in chap. 25th down to the last paragraph, applying it, as Jesus himself applied it, to events of that generation;—and then let him (my friend Hudson, I mean) get away with this last paragraph, philologically, hermeneutically

and exegetically, into the resurrection world, and make it describe the condition of our race for eternity,—and show us how he does it;—and we will consecrate our worthy friend to the Headship of a new *aion* in the Christian dispensation. And then, too, when this positive Orthodox desideratum shall be furnished as above, we will confess to a new age of miracles. Till then let us have no more naked assumptions, nor appeals to the assumptions of commentators, on the *kolasin aionion* and *zoe aionion* of Matt. xxv. 46.

Against all these vain assumptions, these reckless leaps into the dark, we modestly and respectfully put the *argument* of the Adams and Cobb Discussion, chap. vi.

21. What is here said of the argument upon the hypothesis of “Radically Bad Men,” I refer to the original arguments, Affirmative, chap. ii.; Negative, chap. vi.

22. *Free Will*. This subject, too, Mr. H. recalls. If I understand him at all, he does not admit that God has a purpose in the creation and government of the moral system, embracing the final destiny of his rational family, the effectuation of which rests upon his efficiency, to be consummated by means in harmony with the laws of the moral kingdom. He thinks I may quote passages of Scripture “by the hundred” which seem to support this view, but he can neutralize them all by “an equal array of passages on the other side, in which God entreats, expostulates,” etc. So he would nullify one and the most sublime portion of Bible doctrine, all which inspires faith in God, by the force of the other portion. This is not my unhappy mission. I “believe God” in the word of his purpose and grace, and I believe in all his entreaties, expostulations, and parental counsels and instructions, proffered to us as moral beings, as means in the prosecution of his work. Dr. Ballou, in his article referred to by Prof. H., has not written a word intended to contradict this view. It cannot be ignored, and faith and hope in God maintained.

Mr. H. thinks I have “mistaken the popular language of the Bible for scientific language.” I am not aware of having committed this mistake. But this I confess, that I have taken the language of the Bible to mean something, and something intelligible and reliable.

I am happy to know that my friend regards my definition of *free agency*, if not obscure, “a truism.” The definition is, that the word *free*, applied to human moral agency, means *voluntary*. To make this a *truism* is to pronounce it “a self-evident and undeniable truth.” And then there is no difficulty in conceiving of the truth and harmony of the two ideas, Divine Sover-

eignty and human Free Agency. For any one, with a rational view of the sovereignty of God, can conceive of His ability, as a moral governor, to win, in due time and suitable manner, the *voluntary* love of his moral creatures.

Of the two ideas, God's sovereignty and man's moral freedom, Mr. H. says, "I think Mr. C. has neither reconciled them, nor saved them both." I return this compliment. Attend with scrutiny.

(1.) If Mr. H. were to say that there is no grand Divine purpose in the moral creation and government, then he were an atheist, ignoring God.

(2.) If he admits that there is a Divine purpose in the moral system, and holds that human free agency will thwart it, he opposes one of these ideas to the other, and *fails* to "save them both."

(3.) If he believes there is a glorious Divine purpose in the moral system, worthy of the infinitely wise and good Author of such a system, and that he will prosecute and consummate this purpose, as the supreme moral Governor may, in a manner consistent with the nature of things in the moral kingdom, so as to win at length the voluntary love of his whole family, then he "*reconciles*" the two fundamental ideas in question, and "*saves them both.*" THIS — WE — DO.

23. In this division of his Rejoinder my friend multiplies words which fail to afford light on the point at issue between us. It relates to *the dying prayer of Jesus*. Were the subjects of it especially the persecuting Jews? Mr. H. thinks the expression, "for they know not what they do," implies that his prayer of forgiveness referred *not* to the Jewish instigators of this persecution, but "to the Romans, who were the *instruments* employed by those who plotted his death." To prove this argument invalid, I showed that all which is implied in the saying, "for they know not what they do," is expressed in several instances with direct reference to the persecuting Jews. (See Negative Argument, pp. 678-681.) Of the words of Paul. 1 Cor. ii. 8, Mr. H. says the reference is to "the princes of this world." True, but the leading responsible agency which Paul ascribes to them as the crucifiers of Jesus, implies a special reference to the Jewish magnates; for any part which other rulers acted in this transaction, was by instigation of the former. Consult in connection with 1 Cor. ii. 8, — Acts iv., particularly vs. 1, 10, 11. And Peter, addressing the Jews alone, said unto them (Acts iii. 14, 15, 17), "But ye denied the Holy One, and the Just; . . . and killed the Prince of life, whom God hath raised from the dead: whereof we are witnesses.

And now, brethren, I wot that through ignorance ye did it, as did also your rulers."

Now all that my friend has said with the view of implicating me as making the crucifixion of Jesus a "sin of ignorance" in the popular acceptance of the phrase, that is, an excusable sin, is uncalled for as it relates to me, and unjust in its implication of the portions of Scripture record which I have adduced. I carefully barred my argument against such a mis-construction in the place above referred to. I quoted these apostolic expressions to show the simple fact denoted by the words connected with the dying prayer of forgiveness, to wit, that in some of the higher points in the case, the murderers of Jesus knew not what they did; and consequently that the words do not turn the intent of the prayer from the prime movers of the crucifixion, to the Gentile military "*instruments*" alone.

But I need not enlarge on this. The point is as plain as it is interesting. View the closing scene of the Master's earthly life, in its historic truth and its spiritual significance. In the background is the world of selfishness and lust, represented in the Jewish hierarchy, who, with their proud and obsequious people, are the responsible party in the eventful tragedy. Conspicuous in the scene is the Son of God, who had taught the doctrine of love even to enemies, love which shall overcome evil with good. Now, in this capital trial, the world is to see whether he will present a living exemplification of his doctrine. Yes, YES! While he sees in the human countenances before him the frowns of hatred and scorn, and all nature seems in consternation, *He* lifts his voice in the majesty of unconquerable love, — "*Father forgive them, for they know not what they do.*" And he bowed his head and died; — for you, for me; — he "*tasted death for every man.*" I would as soon deride the Holy Spirit, as say that the spirit of this prayer did not embrace his enemies.

To my friend's remark that "the prayer on the cross might express a feeling rather than contain a prophecy," I have only to say that I have simply presented it as an exhibition of the spirit of the gospel, which is the spirit of Heaven. But this is *more* than a prophecy. It is a living ASSURANCE.

24. Prof. H. says that in citing the expression that God is the "Father of spirits," he "alluded to the distinction between soul and spirit;" and he leaves all my "remarks suggested thereby," to those *more* familiar with the distinction, and the large history of opinions connected with it, than I appear to be. Inspired by this reference of the matter, I have turned to his work on "The Doctrine of the Future Life," and read what he

says on soul and spirit (chap. vii.), but without getting any light on the reference now in hand. He gives us the different words in the Hebrew and Greek which are rendered soul and spirit; but he uses the latter terms interchangeably when he speaks of the superior nature of man, or of the principle that shall survive the death of the body,—a principle, by the way, which I understand him throughout to regard as in itself mortal.

But we shall be, as those who chase *ignes fatui*, if we run after “the large history of opinions” on “the distinction between soul and spirit,” to gain power to understand our friend’s meaning in the recognition of God as “the Father of spirits.” The occasion on which he introduced it, and the point to which he applied it, must explain his meaning. And for this see his citation (Affirmative, p. 141), and our “remarks suggested thereby.” (Negative, c. 7, §4.)

In connection with this relation of the higher nature or spirit of man to God, in a sense involving the image of his immortality, I will notice a remark of Mr. H. in his advance argument, which I marked, but accidentally passed when reviewing that division of the subject. His remark is this :—“The Universalist will not probably claim that Christ gave immortality to all men; for this would imply that it had been lost.”

My friend probably had in his mind the idea of a gift of immortal life as an afterthought, or an extraneous gift. But even with this view the fact of the gift would not involve the idea that the thing given had been lost. You may give your son a farm; but it would not follow that he had lost it. God “giveth unto all, life and breath, and all things;” but it does not follow that all these things had been lost. In respect, however, to the Father’s gift of immortal life to his children, we do not regard it as an after-thought, and an extraneous bestowment. As I have shown, it was “given us in Christ Jesus before the world begun.” God’s plan was perfect from the beginning. These rational children whom he *made for* immortality, he constituted with natures allied to himself, and which shall be advanced to a more perfect state of being. That advancement which is called the resurrection, will be the consummation of the scheme, the execution of the grant or covenant of the immortal gift; but we have it now in Christ Jesus, and in embryo in our spiritual nature, and have never lost it.

25. Rev. Hosea Ballou, who was a profound theologian and philosopher, always compassed a clear understanding of man as a moral being, when he treated of him as a subject of the Divine administration.

26. I join with my friend in commending to our readers

a reperusal of my argument, pp. 375-6, and 363-4, as to its fairness in representing his theory as requiring man to earn his immortal existence, and making justice to be vengeance. When he opposes Universalism by opposing the corrective character of punishment to justice, we are obliged to attribute to him some appropriate meaning; but we would not misrepresent him.

Mr. Hudson's reference to the doctrine familiar to the Jews, "of temporary and ultimate penalty," casts no shade of obscurity over the theory of punishment and forgiveness which reveres the whole Scripture as true, both that part which asserts the operative judgment of God "rendering unto every man according to his deserts," and that which proclaims the "forgiveness of sins." (See Negative, p. 365.)

27. I renewedly confess that Universalists most gratefully prize their doctrine for its blessed qualities which nourish and refine our richest sympathies and affections, and satisfy our most benevolent and Christlike desires. My friend's return here to his familiar resort, and that of the opposition in general, to calling up evil "spirits from the vasty deep," such as cannibal Fijians, Count Cenci, and Col. Chartres, in order to freeze our love into indifference, will not avail. While we stand in the love of Christ, we shall not be "overcome of evil." In faith we pray, "God be merciful to sinners."

28. My confessed love of happiness, and recognition of the fact that Jesus loves happiness, as denoted in Hebrews xii. 2, has sent off my friend upon another recruit for commentators, a number of whom he finds to render the Greek *anti*, *instead of*, rather than *for*, as in the common version. True, the Greek word is sometimes used for *instead of*, but it is not its common usage, and this translation of it spoils the beauty of the connection in this case. When used for a *motive*, *anti* has always the sense of *because*. In this case Paul makes reference to the race, wherein the motive is *forward*, not left *behind*, and urges Christians in like manner to run the race set before them,—looking unto Jesus as their example, "who, *for the joy* that was set *before him*, endured the cross,—and is set down at the right hand of the throne of God." Thus, again, is the award to which he looked vouchsafed to him, in his glorious and eternal exaltation. And then this joy set before him as a motive, was a motive of the highest excellence, for it was *the good of mankind*. What can be more exalted and glorious as a motive, than that happiness which consists in the good of others. Blessed Jesus! this was his joy. I have no doubt that Jesus loves that joy. But I wonder not that a class of theologians

whose theory required them to be willing to be eternally damned, should labor to criticise this idea out of the text.

The criticism on the Greek *chara*, here rendered joy, is even more unfortunate. My friend quotes Wetstein as saying that "Paul never uses the word *chara* (joy) of heavenly felicity." He uses it for *spiritual* felicity, and this is all the heavenly felicity the Christian knows. It is the word used for joy in Rom. xiv. 17. "The kingdom of God is . . . righteousness, and peace; and *joy* in the Holy Ghost." So also in Acts xiii. 52;—"And the disciples were filled with *joy* (*charas*) and with the Holy Ghost." And this joy is found in heaven: for so says the Son of God himself;—Luke xv. 7; "Joy (*chara*) shall be in heaven over one sinner that repenteth."

But why quarrel with the love of happiness? It is inseparable from conscious being. But I have shown that Universalism stands high above all other systems in respect to the place it assigns to this principle. It does not make happiness to be the chief and extraneous motive, and foreign reward,—but finds it in the love and practice of goodness and truth.

29. In this concluding paragraph, taking the language in the Scriptural sense, I find nothing which I am disposed to controvert. But I will make this addition:—While Prof. H. feels that, if all the manifestations of God's love and grace do not now move him "to holy love and Christian work," he cannot ask to be moved to holy love and adoration by the bursting forth of the light and love of heaven's resurrection morn, I can ask this for him, with all my heart, and that too in faith. Yea, I can offer prayer for all men, without wrath or doubting, (1 Tim. ii. 1–8), knowing that "this is good and acceptable in the sight of God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved (in the dispensation of the fulness of times, if not now) and come unto the knowledge of the truth."

"Were once these maxims fixed, that God's our friend,
Virtue our good, and happiness our end,
How soon would reason o'er the world prevail,
And error, fraud, and superstition fail."

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